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On 3 August, President Tô Lâm was confirmed as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Vietnam’s top position, following the death of long-serving General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng. Lâm, who has been president since May, is known for leading an aggressive anti-corruption campaign that has seen many officials jailed and others forced to resign. He will continue as president while assuming the duties of general secretary, potentially enabling him to consolidate power ahead of the 2026 party congress, which will choose Vietnam’s top leaders for the next five years. Civil society fears the regime could become even more autocratic and repressive if Lâm retains both positions.

What’s Vietnam’s political system like, and what’s the likely impact of the recent leadership change?

Vietnam is an authoritarian one-party state led by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). There are four key positions of authority: the president, who is the ceremonial head of state, the prime minister, who heads the government, the chair of the National Assembly, the unicameral legislature, and the most powerful, the general secretary of the VCP.

Although the president is elected by the National Assembly, this body is overwhelmingly made up of VCP members, who usually approve all incumbents unopposed. On 3 August, following the death of the last VCP general secretary, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Tô Lâm was confirmed as the new VCP leader.

This appointment is particularly significant because it puts a lot of power in the hands of one person. His dual role gives Tô Lâm considerable influence over the state and party, as well as greater control over the public security apparatus. While he appears set to continue the policies of his predecessor, there are several cracks beneath the surface. His power is likely to be challenged by several VCP members who’ve been forced into retirement by his ‘anticorruption’ campaign, effectively an initiative to eliminate competing factions. We can expect this infighting to continue and intensify.

What does Tô Lâm’s rise mean from a human rights perspective?

Tô Lâm has had a long career, including stints as minister of public security and a member of the politburo. The key role he played in the previous general secretary’s ‘anticorruption’ campaign saw him elected president in May, after his investigations into several high-profile politicians and businesspeople led to the resignation of his predecessor and other top officials.

The accumulation of power in the hands of the architect of a purge is unlikely to lead to improvements in civic space or human rights. Tô Lâm has been closely associated with the worsening human rights situation, as the Formosa and the Trinh Xuan Thanh cases clearly illustrate.

In April 2016, the Formosa company caused an environmental disaster when it discharged heavily polluted waste off Vietnam’s central coast. This caused widespread damage in at least four provinces and sparked protests. Instead of prosecuting Formosa, Tô Lâm, then minister of public security and in charge of the environmental police, suppressed peaceful protests and had 220 people sentenced to a total of 133 years in prison, not including probation after release. He said he was protecting Formosa from what he called ‘hostile forces’ – essentially anyone who criticised the company.

The second case involves Trinh Xuan Thanh, a former vice chair of Hau Giang Province, who fled to Germany in 2016 after being accused of ‘deliberately violating state regulations, causing serious consequences’. He was abducted on German soil by the Vietnamese secret service, which is under the Ministry of Public Security, and returned to Vietnam. Tô Lâm was directly involved in this operation, which Germany condemned as a ‘scandalous violation’ of its sovereignty and a ‘gross breach of international law’.

Given Tô Lâm’s track record, we expect human rights conditions to worsen under his leadership as Vietnam descends into a police state where human rights and the rule of law are ignored. The already limited space for civil society in Vietnam has shrunk under his watch, and we expect this trend to continue.

What are the challenges facing civil society in Vietnam?

Tô Lâm’s rise to power has been marked by his consistent efforts to stifle dissent. Under his leadership, the authorities, particularly the Ministry of Public Security, have increasingly tightened their grip on civil society organisations (CSOs). They have implemented new decrees that overregulate the registration and management of foreign CSOs and applied stricter rules to domestic organisations.

They have also weaponised tax laws and the criminal code to target civil society leaders, charging them with offences such as tax evasion and ‘abuse of democratic freedoms’. This has led to the imprisonment of prominent activists, including environmental and labour rights advocates.

Independent CSOs are subject to strict surveillance, with some being dismantled or forced to reorganise to conform to the authorities. This was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which the authorities used as a pretext to impose further restrictions on civil society under the guise of public health measures.

Despite this repressive environment, some social service CSOs and philanthropic groups continue to operate and strive to make a positive impact. But their independence is severely restricted as they and their activists are constantly targeted.

What international support does Vietnam’s civil society need?

Human rights organisations and international bodies have raised concerns about the shrinking space for civil society in Vietnam. They have called for respect for freedoms of assembly, association and expression and urged the authorities to ease restrictions. While these statements are important, they must be accompanied by trade sanctions and other enforcement mechanisms. Words alone are not enough.

Unfortunately, human rights in Vietnam are also falling victim to geopolitics. As tensions with China escalate, the USA is increasingly seeing Vietnam as a counterweight to China. In this context, human rights and civic space are often sidelined, if not ignored altogether. We believe that a democratic Vietnam would be the best partner and ally in promoting a peaceful, open and stable Indo-Pacific region.

Even if Tô Lâm has a long way to go before he reaches a position comparable to Xi Jinping’s in China, consolidation of power is a general trend we’re seeing among the region’s communist states. Oddly enough, given how these two leaders came to power, it could be a sign that pressure for human rights and civic space, both domestically and internationally, is working. If the authorities feel compelled to respond by consolidating power and positioning figures like Tô Lâm to counter these movements, there is still hope we are on the right track.

Civic space in Vietnam is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Alliance for Vietnam’s Democracy through its webpage or Facebook page.

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