Civil Society, Climate Action, Climate Change, Environment, Featured, Global, Headlines, Human Rights, Humanitarian Emergencies, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Online transactions and E-commerce have become a key part of people’s life in Asia and the Pacific. Credit: Unsplash/Rupixen

BANGKOK, Thailand, Aug 12 2024 (IPS) – The rapid growth of digitalization has fundamentally altered commerce, impacting production and facilitating the movement of goods. The 2023 Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report (APTIR), has pointed out that although digital trade revenues of Asia and the Pacific account for a significant share of global trade, this growth is uneven, with trade concentrated in a few areas, leading to disparities across the region.

Studies show a positive relationship between digital trade and progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These linkages among digital trade policy and the social and economic pillars of the SDGs may appear more indirect, but they do manifest through economic channels.

Various facets of the relationship between sustainable development and digital trade are evident, such as the impact of digital trade on wealth inequality in the region, the role of the Internet in export expansion, how e-commerce facilitates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and how digital trade can help achieve the ambitious agenda behind the SDGs.

However, better digital infrastructure does not necessarily engender competition and instead requires active measures from the government to promote linkages between export superstars and domestic suppliers.

Additionally, robust regulatory frameworks on digital trade can help eliminate “monopolistic and restrictive” trade policies, contributing significantly to a more equitable distribution of wealth.

Examples of good practices

Different policy measures to establish an inclusive digital trade and e-commerce landscape have been used across the region. For example, research on internet courts in China showed how such public and digitized judicial systems benefit smaller and medium-sized firms compared to private dispute resolution mechanisms, which are highly costly.

Similarly, research on the Pacific Alliance’s trade policies, particularly its binding agreements and work instruments, provided a framework to incorporate net neutrality in the promotion of equitable digital development.

Indonesia’s introduction of single submission for freight transport applications and its impact on sustainability in supply chains was another case study. This policy instrument has had significant impacts across multiple domains, such as increasing time effectiveness, reducing costs, and increasing transparency in shipping and port clearances.

Lessons learned and the way forward

There is a need to understand the specific digital trade policy instruments that promote sustainable development. It is critical to acknowledge key differences and similarities between trade and digital trade policy to strategically leverage their interlinkage to achieve the SDGs. Social development works in tandem with economic progress.

A key concern is the lack of data on cross-border e-commerce in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America regions, which hinders the implementation and evaluation of programs designed to promote the participation and productivity of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

More concerted efforts to improve data measurement through private-public partnerships could be a possible policy intervention to address this issue. States should establish effective monitoring systems by improving the availability of economic statistics and third-party evaluations for measuring the progress and impact of SME support programs.

However, given the diversity in operations of SMEs across sectors, it is essential to devise and tailor policies that cater to their specific needs and realities.

There is also a need for sharing real-world examples of successful government initiatives and SME support programs so neighboring countries can draw lessons from them. There are doubts about the long-term usefulness of stand-alone Digital Economy Agreements (DEAs) due to the lack of stringent legal provisions for possible breaches, unlike market-access free trade agreements (FTAs).

Lastly, the United States, which has played a pivotal role in advocating for an open global trade environment, gradually step back from its position, it is time to rethink the leadership that would guide the establishment of digital trade provisions in the future.

This involves showcasing how digital trade rules will be established and enforced moving forward. Who will provide such public goods for digital trade is a major question facing the global economy.

Given its rapid digital-economy growth, significant market size, and increasing influence in global digital trade, should that leadership come from the Asia-Pacific region?

Witada Anukoonwattaka is Economic Affairs Officer, Trade Investment and Innovation Division, ESCAP; Preety Bhogal is Consultant, Trade Investment and Innovation Division, ESCAP.

IPS UN Bureau

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Civil Society, Climate Action, Climate Change, Environment, Featured, Global, Headlines, Human Rights, Humanitarian Emergencies, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

The 60th session of the Subsidiary Bodies of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (SB 60, UNFCCC), took place in Bonn June 3-13, with the issue of climate finance high on the agenda. Credit: UN Climate Change Lucia Vasquez Tumi

BONN, Germany, Jun 28 2024 (IPS) – Despite the evident and increasing urgency of the climate crisis, the June intersessional meeting of the UNFCCC closed with little to show for two full weeks of negotiation.

With COP29 being cited as ‘the Finance COP’, much of the focus across various agenda items was on ever contested questions of who owes what to whom. Crucially, the meeting was supposed to advance negotiations on a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance for the post 2025 period, due to be agreed in Baku.

However, despite ‘quantified’ being in the very name of the goal, developed countries refused to be drawn on the critical matter of how much is owed and needed.

The 2020 goal of $100bn per year (stretched to 2025) remains unfilled, with the vast majority of what the Global North claims to have contributed in the form of loans, or money redirected from other overseas budgets.

Likewise, despite the long fought battle which secured a new loss and damage finance mechanism at COP27, that pot too remains as good as empty, with current pledges equating to less than 0.2% of the climate change related losses faced by Global South countries each year.

Climate finance is key. Intimately related to the core UNFCCC principles of equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR), it is central to unlocking the stalemate that has plagued negotiations since they began.

But instead of concrete finance commitments and delivery, carbon markets are increasingly being spun as climate finance, with some increasingly desperate nations on the frontlines of the climate crisis grasping wishfully at the idea that a 5% share of proceeds from markets under the Paris Agreement will plug the longstanding gap on adaptation funding, and others preparing to sell off their rich ecosystems as some form or other of carbon credits.

As the practical limitations, to say nothing of the social and environmental harms, of novel land based Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) schemes are increasingly exposed at a scale to impact the climate, Bioenergy Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), one of the most widely touted CDR technologies, would require twice the entire global land area currently under cultivation, oceans are being sized up as the next frontier for such exploitation.

Oceans cover over 70% of the Earth’s surface, and are already our greatest ally in the fight against climate change. Alarmingly, however, highly speculative and risky theories about engineering them at will to sequester and store ever more carbon are increasingly being incorporated into the climate policy landscape.

We see this in the opaque language that invites parties to scale up ‘ocean-based mitigation action’ that found its way into the Global Stocktake decision text last year in Dubai, and more clearly in the explicit inclusion of dangerous ocean CDR methods in the ongoing wrangling over Article 6 guidelines, which in various iterations identify ocean fertilisation, ocean alkalinity enhancement and algae cultivation / biomass sinking for potential inclusion.

And concerningly, we also saw it in this year’s Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue held in Bonn. Pitched as a “[recognition of] the need to strengthen the understanding of, and action on, ocean and climate change”, the Dialogue, now in its 4th year, saw a push for research and development of marine CDR under its theme on ‘Technology Needs for Ocean Climate Action, including Finance Links’.

The problem for those who would financialise and plunder the oceans under the guise of climate mitigation is that there are of course other UN Conventions of equal importance to the UNFCCC that have for good reason imposed restrictive regulations on these activities.

The Convention on Biological Diversity has had a de facto moratorium in place on all geoengineering since 2010, while the London Convention / London Protocol, which regulates pollution at sea, has made clear its intention to add potentially a further four categories of marine geoengineering to its 2008 prohibition on ocean fertilisation.

Crucially, a commercial factor is a key element under both regimes in restricting outdoor experiments – which of course is inherent in any ocean-based CDR envisaged under carbon markets, voluntary or otherwise.

The fact is, however, that none of the marine geoengineering approaches increasingly referred to as CDR do anything to tackle the root causes of climate change, and none have been able to demonstrate that they can effectively capture or store carbon with any permanence.

They are an extremely dangerous distraction from the real action we know is needed to rapidly bring down greenhouse gasses, starting with an urgent and just phase out of fossil fuels. Furthermore they are likely to cause great harm to the delicate equilibrium of the oceans – already severely stressed by over-exploitation, pollution and global heating – with potentially grave consequences for ocean biodiversity, food chains, fisheries, and even the oceans’ natural capacity to sequester carbon.

At least 40 open-water marine geoengineering experiments are currently underway or in planning, across a variety of theories and technologies, many of which have a clear commercial element and are likely in violation of international agreements. Some of these are already running into very practical challenges, such as the postponement of Planetary Technologies’ planned ocean alkalinity enhancement trial in Cornwall, where community resistance led to an independent assessment which exposed serious flaws in the plan, while biomass cultivation and sinking start-up Running Tide announced the closure of its fairly advanced operations only this last week, citing lack of demand for carbon credits from the voluntary market.

Ultimately however, as a broad spectrum of civil society organisations made clear in several interventions at the Ocean and Climate Dialogue, and in a statement endorsed by over 100 organisations as of last month, Paris Agreement carbon markets, which are so very clearly legitimising these highly speculative and risky approaches, cannot ignore international agreements restricting them and must uphold the precautionary principle.

As we head to COP29 in Baku and as IPCC kicks off its work on the 7th Assessment Cycle later this year, the voices of civil society across the globe, Indigenous Peoples, coastal communities and fisherfolk must be heard as they reiterate the risk of undermining the vital role oceans play in sustaining life on earth. It is unquestionably clear that our oceans cannot be for sale.

Mary Church is Geoengineering Campaign Manager, Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) and member of Hands-Off Mother Earth! (HOME) Alliance.

IPS UN Bureau

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