Linking the Malawian Diaspora to the Development of Malawi”
Malawi
Malawi (/məˈlɔːwi,məˈlɑːwi/; Chichewa pronunciation:[maláβi]; Tumbuka: Malaŵi), officially the Republic of Malawi and formerly known as Nyasaland, is a landlocked country in Southeastern Africa. It is bordered by Zambia to the west, Tanzania to the north and northeast, and Mozambique to the east, south and southwest. Malawi spans over 118,484 km2 (45,747 sq mi) and has an estimated population of 19,431,566 (as of January 2021). Malawi’s capital and largest city is Lilongwe. Its second-largest is Blantyre, its third-largest is Mzuzu and its fourth-largest is its former capital, Zomba.
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Moments of leadership transition reveal much about the governance systems and processes in an organisation. The more robust the institutional arrangements are, the more seamless the transition. Since leadership is custodial and not permanent, effective transitions also entail learning from those you are replacing and sharing insights when you are replaced.
Leaving an institution and a place where one has spent several years is always bittersweet. Whatever challenges one faces, one develops the beguiling comforts of familiarity. In my case, as I shared in the previous reflection, I also experienced the complex joys of leadership that left me with a certain wistfulness as I prepared for departure from the United States International University Africa (USIU-Africa) back to the US.
The ambiguous comforts of home
During my vice-chancellorship my wife and I simultaneously felt both at home and away from home, suspended in an ambiguous existential space that was mutually empowering and discordant.
We represented two faces of the African diaspora. As an African American, it was the first time my wife’s Blackness was valorised. As a member of the new diaspora, I relished the inconsequentiality of my Blackness. Both of us felt temporarily liberated from the persistent assaults of racism in the US. But we were always reminded of our foreignness, respectfully for her and grudgingly for me.
One of the things we missed most was the social conviviality with friends and work colleagues that we had previously enjoyed abundantly in all the cities we lived prior to moving to Nairobi.
Of course, in my official capacity as vice-chancellor (VC) I interacted with hundreds of people – state officials, corporate executives, higher education personnel, and ordinary people on campus, at their premises, and other venues. In the first few years, we eagerly hosted social events at our home or at restaurants, as we were used to, but they were rarely reciprocated.
Over the six years there, we never visited the homes of any of our university colleagues. Only one member each of the Board of Trustees and University Council and the chancellor invited us to their homes. Among fellow university leaders, we went for dinner once to the house of another vice-chancellor who was himself a foreigner.
Talking to other African expatriates, we realised this was their experience as well. So, we mostly spent our free time by ourselves. Every opportunity we had we scoured Kenya’s legendary tourist sites from the beautiful resorts in Naivasha and Mombasa to the breathtaking national game parks of Maasai Mara, Tsavo, and Nairobi itself. We savoured going for dinners and weekend brunches at the city’s fine restaurants.
Occasionally, before the pandemic, we would be accompanied by periodic visitors from Southern Africa, North America, Europe, and Asia. A glaring absence was our daughter, Natasha Thandile, who never visited.
The beauty of being in Nairobi is its accessibility as a regional hub. We took full advantage and jetted, whenever an opportunity arose, to Kampala in Uganda, Kigali in Rwanda, and Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and even more frequently to my native homeland, Malawi, as well as Botswana and South Africa, where I also have family and many friends.
We spent the Christmas holidays in the US, except in 2019 when we went to Malawi. It was magical, largely because my son, Mwai, got engaged to a wonderful woman, Sylvia. That was the last time I saw my son.
The Annus Horribilis of 2021
Besides the pressures of managing the pandemic with my colleagues, 2021 was personally a difficult year. In mid-January we lost Mwai to the pandemic. It was one of the most devastating events of my life.
The pain was indescribable, worsened by the fact that due to COVID-19 protocols in Malawi at the time, where he died while on vacation from his job in Mozambique, burial of COVID-19 fatalities had to be conducted within 24 hours and there was no way my wife and I could attend the funeral. We watched it on video, in the cruellest send-off to the unfathomable beyond.
Natasha, isolated in Atlanta, was distraught beyond words at losing her big brother. We tried our best to comfort her, commiserate with her, and be there for her.
We couldn’t wait to re-join and live closer to Natasha and my wife’s family. A decision we had made six years earlier to serve one term suddenly acquired an uncanny prescience. The eager anticipation of reuniting with family and old friends gave us a semblance of solace in the suffocating cloistered life of the pandemic.
After a week’s bereavement leave, my work as vice-chancellor resumed at its unrelenting pace. As management we primarily focused on handling the grim ramifications of the pandemic. As I noted in a previous reflection, except for a few recalcitrants who sought to use the crisis for their own pre-existing sectarian and selfish ends, the university community rallied together – faculty taught, students attended classes, and staff discharged their administrative duties.
The management continued to work well as a team, drawing on the university’s existing business continuity plan and iterative crisis management strategies developed during the pandemic, derived from exhaustive internal analyses and external benchmarking with universities in Kenya, across Africa, in the United States, and elsewhere.
Such are the infinite mysteries of life that even in excruciating times, there are currents of personal and professional uplift. For me, these included the launch of my book, Africa and the Disruptions of the Twenty-First Century, on 25 March 2021, mostly written in 2020 during the pandemic.
Most gratifying was teaching my last class in the 2021 spring semester, which made me appreciate what faculty and students were going through during the pandemic. A particularly joyous occasion was the ceremony marking the donation of my personal library and archives to the university.
In addition, my family planned to set up an endowed scholarship fund in memory of my son. I asked the relevant manager to give me an estimate for 12 scholarships. We intended to fund two students from each of Africa’s five internal regions and the sixth diaspora region. I never got the estimates despite repeated requests.
It was a disappointing reminder of the underdevelopment of fundraising in African higher education that I discussed in an earlier reflection, which I worked hard to change at USIU-Africa.
For more than two years after our director of advancement left, we failed to hire a replacement because of the dearth of university development talent in the local market and lack of resources to recruit internationally. So overwhelming was the success in securing the unprecedentedly large scholarship and e-learning grants from the Mastercard Foundation, which I actively cultivated, that other opportunities were not pursued.
Still, there were more slices of professional joy. One was completing the strategic plan for 2020-25, which was approved, in fall 2021. Another was overseeing the completion of a new building for the School of the Humanities and Social Sciences, the largest construction project in the university’s history. I was also delighted to sign an MOU with a private property developer securing 1200 beds for student accommodation.
Preparing for departure
On my last day before taking my long-delayed leave pending the end of my contract in December 2021, I conducted an interview with the Sunday Standard. The journalist wrote: “When he walks you through the campus, one gets the sense of great achievement from a man proud of what he has done. But still, one gets a sense of a man who still has a lot of ideas for the institution.
Given the chance, would he stay on longer?
‘No. When I took the job my wife and I agreed that I will only do one term as the vice-chancellor, so I would like to keep my word,’ he says.
‘Plus, I think I have done all I could do. I do not want to overstay in this position of authority like so many of our presidents and corporate bosses. Sometimes you have to pass on the baton to the future generations.’”
I concluded that I had a life before I became a VC, and I would have a life afterwards. I didn’t believe in leadership that lasts decades depriving institutions of the oxygen of periodic renewal.
Besides, it’s good to leave when you still have the energy and inclination to do something else, to reinvent yourself. Thus, I looked forward to the next phase of my personal and professional life.
Neither in that interview nor in conversations with university colleagues did I let on that I had already informed the chairs of the board and council and the chancellor of my decision to leave at the end of my contract.
I wrote them on 1 November 2020, 14 months ahead of time. Although the contract did not require such a long advance notice, I thought it essential to give the university enough time to recruit my successor.
In the letter I reassured them that I would dedicate my last year meeting institutional priorities and navigating the ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic.
I would always cherish my experiences at the university, the opportunity to return to Kenya and the continent after spending 25 years in Canada and the UE. I shared with them how I found the energies, vibrancy, demands, and aspirations of the youth, who comprise much of the population across Africa, so uplifting.
I also noted I had come to understand more keenly the continent’s huge educational and developmental challenges, and the need to get our institutions right, our politics right, and our economics right for inclusive, innovative, integrated, and sustainable democratic development.
This invaluable experience had broadened, deepened, and would enrich my future research on higher education, as I now better understood the institutional, intellectual, and ideological contexts and constraints, perils and possibilities of African universities.
Specifically, working at USIU-Africa had been immensely gratifying because I met some wonderful people among students, staff, faculty and colleagues in the various governance bodies.
However, I had also been struck, I said, by a mindset of exceptionalism and entitlement, which could propel us towards excellence and continuous improvement in being the best of ourselves. But it also bred a troubling blindness to the realities around us, opposition to change, risk averseness, a culture of low expectations, of satisfaction with so little.
Overall, I stressed that my experiences as VC had been among the most rewarding of my personal and professional life. I had certainly given the position my all and learned much about the challenges and opportunities of university leadership.
Under my tenure the university had continued to make significant strides in its remarkable journey that began more than 50 years ago as Kenya’s first private, secular, and international university. I concluded that I was committed to working with the board and council for a smooth transition to serve the university’s best interests.
Moments of leadership transition reveal the strengths and weaknesses of governance systems and processes in a country or an organisation. The more mature and robust the institutional organs and arrangements are, the more seamless the transition.
There was no response to my letter, which I had sent before the annual November leadership retreat of the board, council, and management. I expected it would be discussed during the executive session. That didn’t happen.
The matter was also not discussed in the meetings of the council and board in February and March 2021. To no avail, I kept asking the council chair why there was no response to my letter and an announcement made to the university community, or the search process for my successor commenced.
The news of my impending departure came out of the bag, inadvertently, in late March when the vice chair of the council wrote the university secretary and another member of management asking them about university procedures for appointing a new vice-chancellor. That forced me to share the notification with my management colleagues.
I wanted the council to make an announcement and start the search. I was told the inaction was because of sensitivity to my grief. I found it deeply offensive since I had returned to work after the permissible five days bereavement leave, and besides my notice had been sent two and half months before my son passed away.
Several weeks later I broke the news to the university senate to avoid rumours. Only then did the council finally make an announcement to the university community. More than six months had passed since I served notice of my departure. Living in a culture where leaders cling to office past their sell-by date, I wondered if people were shocked that I would leave after one term.
If the council had acted with due diligence, a new VC would have been in place by the time I went on leave, and I would have spent time with him – or her – for a smooth transition.
In my administrative life I have always valued effective transitions, learning from those I’m replacing and sharing my insights with those who are replacing me. Because in the end leadership positions are custodial, they’re not permanent.
A couple of weeks before I left, it was announced that my predecessor, who had previously served for 21 years, would be returning as acting VC for nine months as the search for a new VC proceeded. There was no time for a proper in-person transition, and when I wrote to her immediately after I had resettled in the US, she didn’t respond. I did receive a WhatsApp in which she asked me to stop writing these reflections.
Individuals, organisations, and nations that are not confident enough to engage in vigorous self-critique are doomed to wallow in complacent, unredeemable mediocrity.
Excavating and exposing the complex and contradictory lived realities behind the facade of institutional branding is quite challenging, and even unwelcome to some.
However, critical assessment is essential for continuous growth and improvement.
As an historian, I believe more African leaders, whatever their sector, should write about their experiences as part of the historical record that might be informative and instructive to aspiring and future leaders.
In mid-July 2022, the appointment of my successor, another American, was finally announced. The new VC was scheduled to start on 1 September 2022, almost two years after I had sent my notification letter.
I left Nairobi on a lovely Friday night in late August, on my first flight since the beginning of the pandemic. More than 24 hours later I arrived back in my diaspora home in the US.
I looked forward to living in a new city and state, and what seemed like a new country transformed during the six years I lived abroad on my beloved continent.
I was eager for a fresh phase in my professional life without the all-consuming demands of executive leadership in a remarkable, ascendant, if resource-challenged university, which taught me, and to which I gave, so much.
Paul Tiyambe Zeleza is currently the North Star distinguished professor and associate provost at Case Western Reserve University, a private institution in Cleveland, Ohio, in the United States. This commentary is the ninth of a series of reflections on various aspects of his experiences over six years as the vice-chancellor of the United States International University Africa and reflects his personal opinions. The original article has been edited and shortened.
The disease, now caused by a novel coronavirus called severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2, was first identified in the outbreak of the respiratory disease in Wuhan, China.1 Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) raises ongoing and serious public health concerns around the world. As of 07th February 2022, the ongoing global pandemic outbreak of COVID-19 has spread to at least 225 countries and territories causing 410,837,662 cases and 5,829,542 deaths (case fatality rate (CFR) = 1.42%) globally.2 The United States of America (USA) reported the highest number of cases (79,293,924) (3, 4) and 942,944 deaths3–7 with a CFR of 1.18%, followed by India (42,631,421) cases and 508,665 deaths with a CFR of 1.19%.3,4,7–10 The first case of coronavirus in Africa was reported in Egypt on February 14, 2020.11,12 By the end of October 2021, 47 African countries were affected, with over 150,000 deaths and over 6.07 million confirmed cases.13 Africa is considered one of the most vulnerable continents due to its strong trade relations with China and poor health care system.4,14,15 As of 07th February 2022, the ongoing global pandemic outbreak of COVID-19 has spread to at least 58 African countries,14,16 including South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and, Libya, and resulted in approximately 6,632,037 cases of COVID-19 and 151,537 deaths only on these five Africa countries.2 In South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia and, Libya, COVID-19 infections 3,623,962, 1,147,243, 944,175, 466,539, and 450,118 and deaths reached 95,835, 15,593, 26,679, 7363, and 6067, with case fatality rate (CFR) of nearly 0.15%, 0.042%, 0.22%, 0.006%, and 0.086%, respectively.2 This disease has left a permanently dark mark on the history of the human race.12 The coronavirus disease-19 (COVID-19) pandemic will be infamously recorded in history forever.12
In the case of the Southern African countries, the basic reproduction number (R0) for South Africa was estimated to be 7.02.17 This was followed by Zambia with R0 = 2.59 and Namibia with R0 = 2.37.17 The reproduction number for Malawi was 2.16.17 Among the Central African countries considered, Cameroon had an R0 of 3.74, Chad (2.03),17 Gabon (2.37),17 and the Republic of the Congo (2.54).17 Of these countries, Cameroon was the first to be infected with COVID-19, followed by the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Chad. Among the African island nations,18 Madagascar (4.97) and Mauritius (9.66) showed the highest breeding numbers.17 In North Africa, Morocco (3.92) is estimated to have the highest basic reproduction number, followed by Tunisia (3.87), Algeria (3.31), and Egypt (2.72).13,17 Similar results were obtained in East African countries. Sudan has the lowest reproduction number (1.98), followed by Ethiopia (2.55), Kenya (3.77), and Rwanda (4.04).17 In addition to this, a new type of COVID-19 emerged in the world.19–21 The virus is constantly changing, which can lead to the emergence of new variants or strains of the virus.19,22 Variants usually do not affect the behavior of the virus. But sometimes they make it work differently.23–25 Omicron variants spread more easily than the original virus that causes COVID-19 and delta variants.17,19,20 The Omicron COVID19 variant was first reported in South Africa on November 24, 2021 (26). It is quickly spreading across the world.20,21,26 The severity associated with Omicron is still unknown, but early reports suggest a mild illness, at least in the younger population.19–21 Individuals infected with the Omicron variant may show symptoms similar to those of previous variants. The presence and severity of symptoms can be affected by COVID19 vaccination status, the presence of other conditions, age, and previous history of infection.20,22,27
The biggest burden of COVID19 depends on the medical system and on the prompt and timely response to the pandemic.27–33 But the problem is that almost all African countries respond slightly too slowly, and some of them cannot use their vaccines effectively.34–36 A series of critical factors can lead to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, some of these factors do not seem to be well understood.17,37 Infectious disease modeling is a powerful tool for infectious disease control that helps to accurately predict characteristics and understand infectious disease dynamics.38–40 In infectious disease models, the incidence rate plays a vital role in the transmission of infectious diseases.38–40 From an epidemiological point of view, the number of people infected per unit time is called the incidence.38–40 Here we consider the incidence of non-linearity, as the number of effective contacts between infectious and susceptible individuals can be saturated by the accumulation of high levels of infectious individuals.38–40 This model is also used to calibrate and predict the number of COVID-19 case data in five high-burden African countries, including South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Libya, to estimate the model parameters. We assessed the impact of year structure on the dynamics of COVID-19 cases in all five high-burden African countries. The study performed an intervention analysis to identify the essential intervention that could support policymakers in controlling the COVID-19 outbreak in the five high-burden African countries. The model findings can be also helpful to many other countries which are dealing with the critical outbreak of COVID-19 and predict what will happen in the future. The COVID19 pandemic continues to spread in uncertain ways around the world, despite vaccines being available. Due to the uncertainty of the pandemic, it is necessary to properly understand the development of the disease in the community. More research is needed to adequately understand the transmission dynamics of the virus and its variants in Africa. In this study, researchers used a SIMCR model to estimate the basic reproduction number of COVID-19 among five high-burden African countries based on the number of susceptible, infected, mild severe, and series critical severe. The prediction results and the incidence rate estimation could be used by public health officers to plan, and map out strategies to prevent COVID-19 adequately in Africa.
Methods
Study Setting
The study was conducted among five COVID-19 high burdened African countries. These are South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Libya.
Our study is deterministic modeling where the population is partitioned into five components based on the epidemiological state of the individuals. The model structure that we selected is based on the nature of COVID-19 and general model assumptions to make it simple. In this model, the population is partitioned into five compartments or classes namely: Susceptible S(t), infected I(t), mildly infected population M(t), critical infected population C(t), and recovered R(t) compartments (Figure 1).41 According to this model, a susceptible individual in contact with an infected person is prone to get infected.41–44
Figure 1 Flow chart of the SLMCR mathematical model showing the five states and the transitions in and out of each state.
The flow chart of the SLMCR mathematical model shows the five states and the transitions in and out of each state. S: susceptible population; I: Infected population; M: mildly infected population (moderate symptom); C: critical infected population (critical case); R: recovered population; Λ: recovered rate, λ: infected rate; μ: death rate; β: Recovery rate from M to R; ω: progression rate from latent to a mild compartment; ω2: progression rate from the latent critical compartment; α: the force of saturation infection; γ: recovery rate from mild compartment to recover compartment; β: recovery rate from critical compartment to recovery compartment; ϕ: the rate of progression from mild to critical compartment due to comorbidities with other diseases (Table 1).41
Table 1 The Assumed and Fitted Values of Model Parameters for Five High-Burden African Countries
Ordinary Differential Equations (ODE)
ODEs describe the rate of change in the number of the susceptible, latent, acute, carrier, and recovered compartments at time t.41
These equations are written as follows:
The SICMR model is a compartmental model describing how a COVID-19 disease spreads among the population. The subjects of the SICMR model are susceptible, infected, mild, critical series serious critical, and recovered cases.41
In the model, natural birth rate and natural death rates are considered equal. We use the following symbols to mark the number of individuals in each compartment:41
S(t): susceptible, representing the number of individuals who do not have COVID-19 diseases at time t but are likely to have COVID-19 disease in the future
I(t): infected, representing the number of individuals who get COVID-19 disease at time t
R(t): recovered, representing the cumulative or total number of the recovered groups at time t
C(t): serious critical infected population, representing the cumulative or total number of patient who has critical symptoms at the time of t
M(t): mild severe, representing the cumulative or total number of patient who has mild symptoms at the time of t
Results and Discussion
The output below shows the number of people in each compartment. It was modeled for 30 years. As it is shown, the total populations for every five compartments are estimated for each year (Table 2).
Table 2 The Number of Populations in Each Compartment of the COVID-19 Model Structure Modeled for 30 Years, South Africa, February 2022
This section estimated the model parameters based on the available five African countries’ COVID-19 reported case data from http://worldometers.info.2 The figures (Figures 2–6) present the pattern of infected individuals, susceptible, mild severe, critical mild severe, and recovered individuals for the next 30 years if the number of infected individuals follows this trend in South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Libya.
Figure 2 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 model structure modeled for 30 years, South Africa, February 2022.
Figure 3 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 model structure modeled for 30 years, Morocco, February 2022.
Figure 4 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 model structure modeled for 30 years, Tunisia, February 2022.
Figure 5 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 model structure modeled for 30 years, Ethiopia, February 2022.
Figure 6 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 model structure modeled for 30 years, Libya, February 2022.
To parameterize the model, we obtained some of the parameter values from the literature (Table 2). Others were fitted or estimated from the data. The model was fitted using R version 4.0.5 using starting points from the data (South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and, Libya, COVID-19 infections 3,623,962, 1,146,041, 940,223, 466,455, and 445,876 and deaths reached 95,817, 15,593, 26,679, 7363, and 6067 respectively).2
The prediction results from the model are also shown in the figure below to show direction and to understand the importance of intervention in the evidence-based decision-making process. The predicted result shows that if the number of infected individuals, number of recovered, and critical series severe follow this trend for the next year, there will be around 6,932,672 in South Africa, 1,568,144 in Morocco, 1,770,862 in Tunisia, 929,366 in Ethiopia, and 853,195 in Libya patients infected. In addition to this, if this trend continues in the next 10 years, there will be around 29,221,559 in South Africa, 5,144,339 in Morocco, 5,925,190 in Tunisia, 5,002,988 in Ethiopia, and 3,545,001 in Libya recovered from COVID-19 by April 30th, 2032, as shown in tables and figures below. This is consistent with the report of WHO, which stated that the number of newly confirmed cases was higher among African countries.42 The pattern of increasing cases is driven by South Africa and Ethiopia, which continue to report the highest numbers of new cases.42
If this trend continues for the next 3 decades, the number of susceptible individuals will decrease, but the number of infected, mild severe patients and recovered individuals will increase. The number of susceptible individuals decreased by 50,732,068 in South Africa, 11,782,920 in Morocco, 10,876,563 in Tunisia, 13,482,005 in Ethiopia, and 6,007,478 in Libya in the next 3 decades.
The following are the ggplots of the above table (Table 2). As those graphs clearly show, the number of susceptible individuals decreased among five high-burden African countries. But the number of infected, mild severe, critical severe, and recovered populations will increase at the end of the studying years. The population in the three compartments will increase over the next 30 years. The population in the critical severe compartment will remain almost constant throughout the study period (Figures 2–6).
Intervention Implementation
Providing COVID-19 vaccine to the population of five high-burden African countries is 70–95% effective to prevent COVID-19 transmission from individual to individual.
Now we can think of the COVID-19 vaccine as an intervention to reduce coronavirus transmission from person to person. Currently, the distribution of vaccines is being offered in all African countries. We want to plan the intervention, by assuming that it is possible to offer the COVID-19 vaccine to half of the population in five high-burden African countries. The model formulation considering the intervention is done as follows.
Let the intervention to be offered is labeled as: “CD_ COVID-19”
Coverage of COVID-19 vaccine (C_ CD_ COVID-19) =0.5(50%),
Efficacy of COVID-19 vaccine (E_ CD_ COVID-19) = 0.76(76%)
Lambda intervention for South Africa=lambda*(1- (C_ CD_ COVID-19 * E_ CD_ COVID-19))
The value of the force of infection (lambda) after intervention will be:
Therefore, the intervention will reduce the force of infection by 62%.
The prediction results after intervention are shown in Table 3. If 50% of the population is vaccinated and if the number of infected individuals, recovers, and critical severe follow the same trend for the next 10 years, it is possible to reduce the number of infected individuals in Africa. There will be around 9,847,641 in South Africa, 15,183,777 in Morocco, 3,773,632 in Tunisia, 2,255,118 in Ethiopia, and 1,893,279 in Libya infected. In addition to this, if this trend continues in the next 10 years, there will be around 9,158,288 in South Africa, 14,268,506 in Morocco, 3,525,578 in Tunisia, 2,117,100 in Ethiopia, and 1,399,768 in Libya recovered from COVID-19 by April 30th, 2032 as shown in figures and tables below. A similar study reported that COV2.S given two months after the initial immunization increased vaccine effectiveness in the short term to 100% against severe disease.45 The previous study has also found that vaccination is an important protective factor against COVID-19.46–55
Table 3 The Number of Populations After Intervention in Each Compartment of the COVID-19 Model Structure Modeled for 30 Years, February 2022
If this trend continues for the next 3 decades the number of susceptible individuals will increase but the number of infected, mild severe patients, and recovered individuals will decrease. The number of the susceptible individual increased by 30,711,930 in South Africa, 5,919,837 in Morocco, 3,485,020 in Tunisia, 7,833,642 in Ethiopia, and 2,145,404 in Libya in the next 3 decades with compare to the unvaccinated population and the number of infected individuals decreases by 30,479,271 in South Africa, 19,809,751 in Morocco, 3,456,406 in Tunisia, 7,761,993 in Ethiopia and 2,125,038 in Libya.
The following are the ggplots of the above table result after intervention (Table 3). As those graphs (Figures 7–11) clearly show, the number of susceptible individuals decreased among five high-burden African countries. But compared to the previous result (before intervention) the number of susceptible increased and the intervention reduced the number of infected individuals throughout the study period. From the figure, the number of Infected, Mild severe, critical severe, and recovered populations will increase at the end of the studying years. But compared to the previous results (before intervention) there is a dramatic decrease in the number of infected individuals.
Figure 7 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 modeled for 30 years after the intervention, South Africa, February 2022.
Figure 8 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 modeled for 30 years after the intervention, Morocco, February 2022.
Figure 9 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 modeled for 30 years after the intervention, Tunisia, February 2022.
Figure 10 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 modeled for 30 years after the intervention, Ethiopia, February 2022.
Figure 11 The number of populations in each compartment of the COVID-19 modeled for 30 years after the intervention, Libya, February 2022.
The incidence rates of symptoms and diseases in the general population are important indicators of a population’s health status. The incidence of the COVID-19 pandemic is shown below for the next 30 years among five high-burden African countries. The incidence in the first year will be 55 cases per 1000 in South Africa, 984 cases per 10,000 population in Morocco, 1216 cases per 1000 population, 769 cases per 100,000 population in Ethiopia, and 1097 cases per 10,000 population during one year at risk before intervention. The incidence rate of the COVID-19 pandemic will then decrease till the end of the next 30 years in all countries. But if 50% of the population is vaccinated, the incidence rate in those countries decreases dramatically compared to the unvaccinated population. The Incidence rate after the intervention is 3652 cases per 100,000 in South Africa, 2076 cases per 1,000,000 population in Morocco, 4915 cases per 100,000 population, 3 cases per 1000 population in Ethiopia, and 4385 cases per 100,000 population during one year at risk (Table 4).
Table 4 Incidence Rate per 1000 Population Before Intervention and After the Intervention, February 2022
Conclusion
SIRD and SIRS models are classical and effective stochastic models of infectious diseases. In this research, the SIMCR model is used to describe the transmission of COVID-19 among five high-burden African countries. South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Libya are the top 5 COVID-19 high-burden African countries. Through the analysis of the recent data, the number of infected individuals has increased today. If this trend is continuous for the next 30 years we will have around 86 million infected individuals and millions of deaths only in those five African countries. Also, the incidence rates of those countries are high before intervention compared to after intervention. To reduce those problems, vaccination is the best and most effective mechanism. So, vaccinating half of the population in those countries helps to control and reduce the transmission rate of COVID-19 in Africa for the next 30 years. This will lead to preventing 17,212,405 people from becoming infected and millions of deaths being reduced in those five high-burden African countries for the next 30 years. Finally, we hope that the governments will impose the strictest, most scientifically effective containment measures to quickly conquer COVID-19.
Many research works have been done for short terms forecasting periods like 25, 30, and 60 days. Where in this study, the authors took data for the last year and predicted the scenario for the next 30 years. Moreover, the SIRD model showed excellent accuracy in the prediction force of infection and the best intervention method which previous models could not achieve.
So, this model should be applied for forecasting future analysis and identifying the force of infection for any dataset. The limitation that was observed during prediction was that SIRD models upturn the number of susceptible, infected, recovered, and deaths. But SIRD model is the greatest and most effective model to identify the best intervention method and force of infection. In the future, investigators can explore some predictive models such as the ARIMA model and Bayesian networks in COVID-19. This model is also recommended to be applicable for future pandemics and to identify the most effective intervention method.
Ethics Approval
The study was based on aggregated COVID-19 surveillance data in South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and, Libya taken from the worldometer. No confidential information was included because analyses were performed at the aggregate level. Therefore, no ethical approval is required.
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At its best, flags can be powerful symbols. Flags can represent pride, hope, resilience, history, and the future. At the worst, they are symbols of hate and can incite fear and trigger trauma. Regardless of the use, like language and culture, flags are a vital aspect to any group of people’s identity. Given the history of Black people in United States—ascending from chattel slavery to free American citizens—the journey to establishing an identity for ourselves has been laborious. As the Black identity is constantly changing, the icons that represent us have too.
Here is the growing list of flags that have sewn the Black experience into the fabric of American history:
01
Pan-African flag — 1920
Created by Marcus Garvey in 1920, the Pan-African flag is known to be the first flag for Black Americans. The Jamaican political activist and founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League created the flag to combat racism. It was in response to a hit song called “Every Race Has a Flag but the Coon,” which mocked and stereotyped African Americans. In 1927, Negro World published a 1921 speech from Garvey, stating, “Show me the race or the nation without a flag, and I will show you a race of people without any pride. Aye! In song and mimicry, they have said, ‘Every race has a flag but the coon.’ How true! Aye! But that was said of us four years ago. They can’t say it now.” In 1921, the UNIA published the colors of the flags meaning: Red is the color of the blood which men must shed for their redemption and liberty; black is the color of the noble and distinguished race to which we belong; green is the color of the luxuriant vegetation of our Motherland. The Pan-African flag extends beyond the Black American experience as the colors would appear in newly liberated nations like Saint Kitts and Nevis, Kenya, South Sudan, Libya, Angola, Biafra, and Malawi.
Alex Wong/GETTY
02
Black Panther Party flag — 1966
In 1966, comrades Huey Newton and Bobby Seale founded the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense in Oakland, California. That same year, Newton and Seale met SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael, who championed the call for “Black Power” at a conference. At the time, Carmichael was promoting the armed organizing efforts of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO). The LCFO’s logo was black panther. According to Red Wedge magazine, Lowndes County had extremely conservative right-wing politics fueled by white racists. Due to high illiteracy rates, the white racists of Lowndes were able to go to court to get a symbol of a rooster put on the ballot so illiterate whites would know how to vote for without even being able to read or write. Black people in the town did the same thing; they chose a local varsity mascot of a black panther. Newton and Seale adopted the black panther from Carmichael. However, the panther from Lowndes was too fat for the duo. Newton and Seale asked one of their early recruits, a student-artist, Emory Douglas to redraw the Panther symbol smaller to reflect that the party was about serving the underserved and undernourished.
Brettmann
03
Black American Heritage Flag — 1967
Melvin Charles and Gleason T. Jackson designed the Black American Heritage Flag in Newark, New Jersey. The inspiration was purely birthed out of a lack of representation during parades and not identifying with the American flag. Charles told PBS, that the gold blunted sword invoked pride and the fig wreath symbolized peace, prosperity, and everlasting life. Following the UNIA, the red represents the bloodshed of Black people, and the black represented the pride in black pigmentation.
via @Kewpiiie_speaks Twitter
04
Juneteenth Flag — 1977
With the assistance of illustrator Lisa Jeanna, the Juneteenth flag was created in 1977 by activist Ben Haith, founder of the National Juneteenth Celebration foundation. The red, white, and blue color scheme is a direct homage to both the American flag and the Texas (Lone Star State) flag. Split between a blue and a red stripe, the two colors are meant to replicate a horizon. Blue above and the red is symbolic of the ground soaked with blood; the blood which was shed by the African American slaves for the United States. The white five-pointed star inside of a 12-point star, represents a nova, to symbolize the birth of a new star. The new star symbolizes a new beginning for the newly freed African Americans. The flag was updated in 2007 by Haith to include the date, June 19, 1865, marking the last of the enslaved to be freed.
Boston Globe
05
13 Stripes — 1989
Little can be found about this flag. However, it did appear in Louis Cameron’s “The African American Flag Project.” The 2009 exhibit was a suite of paintings of African American flags with the purpose to explore the dialogue of symbolic representation within the African American community. According to an online archival catalogue, the 13 stripes flag was developed in 1989 in South Central L.A. It is believed to be a private venture. One could argue that the 13 stripes represent either the original colonies of America, or the 13th amendment which abolished slavery. Much of the red, black, and greens colors are universal with the Pan-African ideology. The yellow or gold stripes might represent the richness of Black people, or the gold from African mines.
06
David Hammons’ African-American Flag — 1990
David Hammons African American flag was first created for the art exhibition “Black USA” at an Amsterdam museum in 1990. The flag is exactly what one would think of for the Black version of the American flag. Smithsonian magazine reported Hammons: “Marcus Garvey designed the African American flag, which looked like the Italian flag except that it is red, black, and green. But it is so abstract, so pure, that the masses were frightened by it. I made my flag because I felt that they needed one like the U.S. flag but with black stars instead of white ones.” Hammons seamlessly captures the double consciousness of the Black identity within an American experience. His rendition of the American flag caused great controversy. Just the year prior, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act, authorizing penalties to those that desecrated the flag. But, by 1990, the Supreme Court ruled that the Flag Protection Act was unconstitutional, as it violated free speech rights.
@rocor via Flickr
07
The Harvey African-American Flag — 1991
David and Tonya Harvey created a flag in 1991 to represent the African-American population as a whole, but not connected to any political movement. The idea sparked during a banquet while attendees sang the Negro National Anthem. The couple noticed everyone’s eyes were adverted everywhere because there was a lack of a focal point. They developed the African-American Flag. The red, white, and blue, stripes at the top and bottom border, represents African-American’s contributions to America. While Black people’s history on American soil is traumatic, there is an undeniable connection to this country. There are green, yellow, and black stripes on the side borders, the abundant life in Africa; the riches of Africa; and of course, the regality of African skin. The purple base of the flag represents the regal history of African-Americans. The eight-pointed black star in the center of the flag represents the eight letters in the word Africans—which is an acronym: Aspirations, Family, Righteousness, Individuality, Community, Ability, Nobility, and Scholarship. Outside of the black eight-pointed star, are four yellow diamond shapes, meant to symbolize flashes of light, for perseverance, love, knowledge, and spirituality. Harvey’s widow told Morgan Magazine in 2002, “He wanted the flag to help pull African Americans together…and to remind us that each one of us can succeed and do well.”
screenstill via @AfricanAmericanflags IG
08
NuSouth — 1993
In the same vein of reappropriating negativity to reclaim power, in 1993, a Charleston, South Carolina clothing company, called NuSouth Apparel, remixed the confederate flag. Founders Angel Quintero and Sherman Evans plotted a marketing scheme for a local hip-hop group, DaPhlayva, to push Southern rap identity to the forefront amidst the brewing coastal beef between the East and the West. Much like Hammons’ African-American flag, the NuSouth flag pulled from Garvey’s Pan-African color scheme. The NuSouth presented three different variations of the confederate flag, one with a red background, another in black, and a third with green. Each of which also alternated the colors for the stars and bars. Controversy propelled the brand forward when a teenaged Black girl was suspended for wearing a NuSouth shirt to school. The principal said it was the wrong colors. The flag quickly became a symbol of rebellion in the ’90s—it can be seen in footage from the Million Man March on Washington, D.C. in 1995. The duo even went as far as proposing that the South Carolina State House replace the Confederate flag with the NuSouth flag. The NuSouth brand went under in 2003. However, the two can still be found curate the brand’s history on social media. In 2020, Evans addressed the usage of polarizing imagery stating, “There is a lot of fear in something that is so liberating and free… People say they want freedom but what does that look like?”
courtesy of NuSouth Clothing via Facebook
09
African-American Flag House Flag — 1995
The African American Flag House created their flag between 1993 and 1994 in Charleston, South Carolina. According to the archived website, the Foundation hoped that the flag would become “a positive and unifying symbol that would represents the enormous historical investment of African Americans.” The First Star announces that all humankind was born out of the womb of Africa. The Second Star informs with pride that the African gave rise to the first civilizations and kingdoms of the world. The Third Star depicts the cruel abduction of Africans from their original roots. The Fourth Star vows that African Americans will never forget the holocaust of the Middle passage and the millions of Africans who suffered and died during the terrible crossing.
The Fifth Star recalls the unholy bondage of African Americans prior to the abolishment of slavery in America. The Sixth Star praises all those African Americans who defied and rebelled against injustice and genocide in America. The Seventh Star is a memorial to African Americans who have silently or aggressively defended and preserved the Constitution of the United States of America. The Eighth Star recognizes the strength of the African American family and its inner spiritual belief in universal brotherhood. The Ninth Star is a testament to the strength and tenacity of African Americans to emerge victorious despite any adversity or challenge. The Tenth Star honors African Americans for their accomplishments in making the American dream a reality. The Eleventh Star calls for African Americans to probe their history and to celebrate their culture and heritage. The Twelfth Star signifies the achievements of African Americans through hard work, scholarship, and determination. The Thirteenth Star is the symbol of Pan African unity. The Fourteenth Star leads African Americans into the future with honor, truth, and the dream of a greater tomorrow. The Green Stripes remind us of our living earth and the roots of all humanity buried deep in African soil. The Yellow Stripes symbolize the moral excellence and spiritual wealth of African Americans as they interact with all diverse cultures of America. The Black Stripes underscore African American families and their significant economic, spiritual, social, and political contributions to America. The White Stripes warn African Americans to be constantly vigilant of forces that call for death of freedom and the surrender of rights guaranteed to all by the Constitution of the United States of America. The Blue Stripes illustrate lofty skies that will always extend a bridge between African Americans and Africa. The Red Stripes tell of the passionate and soulful fire within the hearts of African Americans and that their blood shed in defense of freedom shall not be in vain.
screen still of Louis Cameron’s “American Flag Project”
10
African-American Flag of Inclusion — 1999
In 1999, the “African American Flag of Inclusion” was designed by Cecil W. Lee, a New York-based painter, photographer, and digital artist. He presented it at a one-man art show at Gallery X in Harlem. Lee’s rendition of the flag is a fusion of the American flag and Garvey’s Pan-African flag. By replacing the top seven stripes of the United States national flag with the Black Liberation flag pattern, Lee intended to represent “all African Americans regardless of their individual beliefs or political affiliations.” Per Lee’s website, he suggests, the elements of the African American Flag of Inclusion stand for: red is for life/blood, family, vitality & oneness, black is for the people, strength, depth, and influence. Green, represents earth, evolution, growth, and progress, while the stars and stripes represent equality and unification.
courtesy of Cecil W. Lee
11
Black American Flag — 2003
This flag dates to as early as 2003. Proposed as the flag for African Americans or Black Americans population. The base of the flag is Black, meant to symbolize two aspects of the Black identity: the backbone of the history in America, rooted in slavery and unity toward social change. The lone white star in the top left corner is the North Star. While the North Star navigated our enslaved ancestors out of slavery, it can also guide Black Americans toward a better future.
Black American Flag Facebook
12
Foundational Black Flag — 2020
Popularized online by controversial media personality, Tariq Nasheed, Foundational Black Americans are descendants of Black slaves who built the United States from the bottom. The movement is considered divisive for it’s anti-Pan-African sentiments. According to the website, FBAs believe that the origins and history of Black people in America did not begin at the start the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in the early 1600s. Instead, they propose that FBAs settled in North America in 1526, when they were allegedly brought over from the Caribbean by a “colonizer” named Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón. FBAs have two flags. The first of which is a maroon flag with a gold emblem of two axes and a torch underneath five gold stars. The maroon color is a nod to the Maroon Africans, or Africans in American who formed settlements away from slavery—they are often mixed with Indigenous people. The torch and axes represent the weapons used to fight for freedom. The five stars represent the states where many maroon societies were established: Virginia, North/South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana.
courtesy of @chillin662 via Twitter
13
Foundational Black American flag — 2020
The second flag, possess the American color scheme, a nod to Grace Wisher, the free African American woman, who was indentured as a child to the famous Star-Spangled Banner flag seamstress, Mary Pickersgill. The three white stars represent the three ethnic groups that make up Foundational Black Americans: Black aboriginal people of North America, Black explorers and traders who explored the Americas before Columbus, and the captives brought to the Western Hemisphere from Africa. The center is the Black power fist from the 1960s. The red and blue olive branches represent the unity amongst Black aboriginals and Black enslaved people. The nine red pillars symbolize the significant slave rebellions, one of which is commonly hidden, hence why one of the red bars is behind the fist.
The past one decade has been a mixed grill for lovers of literature and the arts on the African continent.
It has been a period that has witnessed a flowering of new talents, but also tragically a decade that has seen the passing on of giants of our culture and literature, icons that have made Africa proud .
Each of the departed literary greats in the last one decade has enriched through their writings our literary heritage, and contributed in their own way towards building African literary culture as we know it today.
Their passing though painful, but we are consoled by the fact that they have entered the pantheon of immortality.
And as Famished Road writer, Ben Okri writes: “The real literature of a people begins with the passing of writers into the realm of ancestors. Literature begins with the dead.”
Biyi Bandele Thomas belongs in the generation of writers following Ben Okri’s, the emergent writers of the 90’s who began to bloom and flowered enriching our literary repertoire.
Bandele cut his novelistic and dramatic teeth at the then University of Ife, where he had the privilege of being coached by avant-garde such as Biodun Jeyifo and others, and in 1989 he won the prestigious BBC writing competition.
He had forged an affinity and lifelong attraction to the theatre working with the Royal Court Theatre, the Royal Shakespeare Company, in addition to writing radio drama and screenplays for television. Among his rich repertoire are: Rain; Marching for Fausa (1993); Resurrections in the Season of the Longest Drought (1994); Two Horsemen (1994), which had the honour of a selection as Best New Play at the 1994 London New Plays Festival; Death Catches the Hunter and Me and the Boys (published in one volume, 1995); and Oroonoko, an adaptation of Aphra Behn’s 17th-century novel of the same name.
In 1997, Bandele undertook an an ambitious project which turned out a success, the highly acclaimed dramatization of Chinua Achebe’s classic, Things Fall Apart. Brixton Stories, Bandele’s stage adaptation of his own novel The Street (1999), premiered in 2001 and was published in one volume with his play Happy Birthday Mister Deka, which premiered in 1999. He also adapted Lorca’s Yerma in 2001.
He was a writer-in-residence with Talawa Theatre Company from 1994 to 1995, resident dramatist with the Royal National Theatre Studio (1996), the Judith E. Wilson Fellow at Churchill College, University of Cambridge, in 2000–01.
He also acted as Royal Literary Fund Resident Playwright at the Bush Theatre from 2002 to 2003.
Talking about influences in one of his interviews, he mentioned the impact of John Osborne’s Look Back in Anger on him.
Among his prose endeavors are: The Man Who Came in from the Back of Beyond (1991) and The Street (1999), which have been described as “rewarding reading, capable of wild surrealism and wit as well as political engagement.”.His 2007 novel, Burma Boy, reviewed in The Independent by Tony Gould, was called “a fine achievement” and lauded for providing a voice for previously unheard Africans.
His directorial debut film, Half of a Yellow Sun – based on the 2006 novel of the same name by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie – was screened in the Special Presentation section at the 2013 Toronto International Film Festival, and received a “rapturous reception”. His passing is yet another sad blow to African writing. But then, in the last one decade, the continent has tragically travelled the tortuous road of loss and despair.
Ferdinand Oyono started the round of losses in 2010 when he died . The popular author of House Boy was one of Cameroon’s greatest diplomats. He once served as the country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Culture. His first novel, Une vie de boy was published in 1956 and translated as Houseboy by John Reed for the Heinemann African Writers Series in 1966. 2010.
Lewis Nkosi was a great South African author whose works were under censor and total ban under South Africa’s Suppression of Communism Act. He was the first black South African to receive Harvard’s Nieman Fellowship and spent 30 years in exile abroad. His novel Mating Birds (1983), which examines an interracial affair, is perhaps his most notable work. His Home and Exile is an influential work.His most popular play The Rythm of Violence is a powerful indictment of the evil of apartheid. He died in 2010.
In 2011, the African writing lost Kenyan writer,Margaret Ogola, whose first novel, The River and the Source, won The Commonwealth Writers’ Prize for Best First Book, Africa region, in 1995. Get this: she was also a pediatrician and the medical director of a hospice for HIV and AIDS orphans! Google honored her with a Google Doodle on her 60th birthday.
Does Chinua Achebe really need an introduction? No! The doyen of African literature departed this planet earth in 2013 to commune with the ancestors. He will be remembered for a number of earth-shaking works like Things Fall Apart, Arrows of God and others. Arguably the most famous African author.
In 2014 we lost Kofi Awoonor to the madness of terror when he was tragically killed in the Westgate shopping mall attack in Kenya.
He was a Ghanian poet, novelist, and scholar whose works include translations of Ewe dirge singers. He was imprisoned in 1975 on the suspicion of being involved in a coup, but released in 1976. He served as Ghana’s ambassador to Brazil and Cuba. He was one of Africa’s greatest poets and dramatists.
Mbulelo Mzamane was a South African author, poet, and academic who, like many anti-apartheid activists, spent a fair amount of time in exile. Among his awards are the African Literature Association’s Lifetime Award and the Mofolo-Plomer Prize for Literature. Nelson Mandela called him a “visionary leader and one of South Africa’s greatest intellectuals.” He died in 2014.
Nadine Gordimer was a white South African writer who won Nobel Literature Prize. Like most writers critical of apartheid, her works were also once banned by the South African government. In interviews, she admitted that she never intended to be a writer whose works are considered political, but she came to realize that South African society didn’t allow for apolitical writing.
Chris van Wyk , a South African novelist, poet, and children’s books author died in 2014. He’s most widely known for his poem “In Detention,” a poem which satirizes the bizarre reasons provided by the apartheid government for the deaths of political prisoners. His poetry collection It’s Time to Go Home (1979) won the Olive Schreiner Prize.
In 2015, André Brink, the South African author also died .He began writing in Afrikaans but turned to English when his works became censored by the South African government. He was part of Die Sestigers (“the Sixtyers”), a literary group that aimed to revolutionize Afrikaans literature. His novel A Dry White Season (1979) was adapted into a film starring Marlon Brando.
Also died in 2015 was Grace Ogot , a Kenyan author who was a nurse by profession and who later became a member of Kenya’s National Assembly. She was the first woman whose fiction was published by the East African Publishing House and her numerous short stories offer insight into traditional Luo life and its conflict with colonialism and modernity.
Chenjerai Hove was a Zimbabwean novelist, poet, and essayist whose works shone light on the lives of his fellow citizens under colonialism and Robert Mugabe’s rule. Surveilled and harassed under Mugabe’s rule, Hove left Zimbabwe for exile in Norway in 2001, where he remained until his death in 2015.
Elechi Amadi was a Nigerian playwright and novelist renowned for his historical trilogy about traditional life in the villages: The Concubine (1966), The Great Ponds (1969), and The Slave (1978). His only nonfiction work, Sunset in Biafra (1973), recounts his experiences as a soldier and civilian during the Biafran War.He joined his ancestors in 2016.
Isidore Okpewho was a Nigerian author and critic whose works won him the 1976 African Arts Prize for Literature and the 1993 Commonwealth Writers’ Prize for Best Book (Africa Region). His scholarly work on African oral literature garnered him, among others, a Guggenheim Fellowship. Tragically we lost him in 2016.
Peter Abrahams was a South African journalist and author whose writings addressed the intricacies of racial politics and the injustices of apartheid. In the introduction to his memoir, The Black Experience in the 20th Century: An Autobiography and Meditation (2001), Nadine Gordimer declared him “a writer of the world, who opened up in his natal country, South Africa, a path of exploration for us, the writers who have followed the trail he bravely blazed.” This pioneering writer who authored the famous Mine Boy died in 2017.
Buchi Emecheta really needs no introduction. She is one of Africa’s most popular female writers. She wrote The Slave Girl and the Joy of Motherhood among others. She died in 2019.
Miriam Tlali was the first black South African woman to publish a novel in English in South Africa itself in 1975. Originally titled Muriel at Metropolitan and reissued in 2004 under the title Between Two Worlds, the novel depicts daily life under apartheid, particularly how it hinders black women’s employment opportunities. For her writing, Tlali was persecuted by the apartheid government and brutally beaten at her home in Soweto several times, but she bravely refused exile. Her death was a big loss to African writing.
Abiola Irele was a Nigerian scholar perhaps best known for his work on the concept of Négritude. His books include The African Experience in Literature and Ideology (1990) and The African Imagination: Literature in Africa and the Black Diaspora (2011). Upon his death, Wole Soyinka wrote a poem titled “Olohun-Iyo” as a tribute to him. He was widely considered the doyen of African literary criticism, and his influence on African writing is often compared to that of Northrop Frye in European literature. Tragically we lost him in 2017.
Between 2010 and Bandele’s death in 2022, there are other eminent writers that left us for the great beyond.
Keorapetse Kgositsile was a South African poet and essayist whose writing explored the idea of Pan-African liberation. His verse distinctively combines South African and Black American structural and rhetorical traditions. He was named South Africa’s poet laureate in 2006. 2018.
Ahmed Khaled Tawfik was one of the few Egyptian authors to publish extensively in science fiction, fantasy, and horror. A doctor by profession, Tawfik once said that “[his] English was not good enough to read horror literature, so [he] started writing it [himself].” He has published over 100 books. He died in 2018.
David Rubadiri who died in 2018 was a widely-anthologized poet and diplomat who served as Malawi’s first ambassador to the US and the UN. He left government service in 1965 following disagreements with then-president Hastings Banda and subsequently taught at Makerere University, the University of Nairobi, and the University of Ibadan.
Seydou Badian Kouyaté was a Malian politician and writer who composed the lyrics for Mali’s national anthem. He won the 1965 Grand prix littéraire d’Afrique noire for his book, Les dirigeants africains face à leur peuple. He was exiled to Senegal following the 1968 coup. He left the world in 2018.
Charles Mungoshi was a Zimbabwean author who wrote novels and short stories about colonial and post-colonial struggles in both Shona and English. His works have won him the Noma Award, the Commonwealth Writers’ Prize, and International PEN Awards. He also left in 2019.
Pius Adesanmi was a Nigerian scholar and columnist whose satirical writings for Premium Times and Sahara Reporters took for their target various aspects of Nigerian society and politics. His works include a poetry collection and several essay collections. He was, unfortunately, a victim of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crash.
Bernard Dadié was an Ivorian poet, dramatist, and novelist whose works explored African oral traditions. He was the founder of the National Drama Studio in Côte d’Ivoire and served as the country’s Minister of Culture between 1977 to 1986. In case you didn’t notice from the dates above, he lived till the grand old age of 103! In 2019.
Gabriel Okara who died in 2017 was a Nigerian poet and novelist often dubbed the “first Modernist poet of Anglophone Africa.” He is perhaps best known for his novel The Voice (1964), which distinctively imposes Ijo syntax onto English. He was also the director of Rivers State Publishing House in Port Harcourt from 1972 to 1980.
Binyavanga Wainaina was Zimbabwean Caine Prize winner. A TIME 100 Most Influential Person and founding editor of Kwani?. He was the author of “How To Write About Africa.” He was an avid champion of gay rights. He left us in 2019.
Molara Ogundipe who died in 2019 was a Nigerian poet, critic, and editor perhaps best known for the concept “Stiwanism” (Social Transformation in Africa Including Women) which refers to, among other ideas, a resistance of Western feminism and the foregrounding of an indigenous feminism that has always already existed in Africa.
Tejumola Olaniyan was a Nigerian academic who held the position of Louise Durham Mead Professor of English and Wole Soyinka Professor of the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His books includeTaking African Cartoons Seriously: Politics, Satire, and Culture (2018) and Arrest the Music!: Fela and His Rebel Art and Politics (2004). He left us in 2019.
Harry Garuba who breathed his last in 2020 was a Nigerian poet and professor who served as the Director of African Studies, among other positions, at the University of Cape Town. His books include the poetry collections Shadow and Dream & Other Poems (1982) and Animist Chants and Memorials (2017) and the academic monograph Mask and Meaning in Black Drama: Africa and the Diaspora (1988).
Elsa Joubert was a South African author who was also a member of “Die Sestigers” and was known for her anti-apartheid novels. Her novel, The Long Journey of Poppie Nongena (1978) was adapted into a film in 2019. She passed away from Covid-19-related complications.
John Pepper Clark-Bekederemo, more popularly known as J.P. Clark, was a renowned poet, playwright, and professor. His work focused on themes such as insitutional corruption, violence, and colonialism, and he was also an outspoken activist for the rights of the Ijaw ethnic group. He received the Nigerian National Order of Merit Award for literary excellence in 1991. He was the third leg of the quartet of Wole Soyinka and Chinua Achebe, all archetypal figures in African writing.
Researchers have discovered that a widely used blood test to detect kidney function is off the mark among African populations.
The serum creatinine test measures the amount of creatinine in your blood. According to the National Kidney Foundation, creatinine is: “A waste product that comes from the normal wear and tear on muscles of the body. Creatinine levels in the blood can vary depending on age and body size. A creatinine level greater than 1.2 for women and greater than 1.4 for men may indicate that the kidneys are not working properly. As kidney disease progresses, the level of creatinine in the blood rises.”
But a study by the African Research on Kidney (ARK) Disease Consortium, which sought to find the most accurate way to measure kidney function in African populations, compared the creatinine option with another benchmark test called the measured glomerular filtration rate (mGFR).
Not fit for Africans
ARK researchers found that creatinine-based tests were inaccurate for predicting kidney disease in African populations. They refer to the test’s inability to account for the unique biological characteristics of African populations. The creatinine-based test was shown to be inaccurate for diagnosing kidney disease, and this may be because it does not account for “unique biological characteristics in African populations.”
The ARK Consortium comprises researchers from the:
University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in South Africa
The Medical Research Council/Wits-Agincourt Rural Public Health and Health Transitions Research Unit (Agincourt) in SA’s Mpumalanga province;
The Malawi Epidemiology and Intervention Research Unit (MEIRU)
The Medical Research Council/Uganda Virus Research Institute and London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Uganda Research Unit
The London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), UK
The scale of the problem in Africa
Kidney disease is silent in the early stages because many people only develop symptoms when their GFR drops below 30 to 45 millilitres (ml). This means that most people won’t know their GFR is lower than usual. This is why screening people with risk factors for kidney disease remains essential.
The study used population data from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa and Uganda to estimate overall levels of kidney disease. The results suggest that kidney disease prevalence may be substantially higher in Africa than previously thought, increasing from 1 in 30 people to about 1 in 8 people.
Diversity of populations makes it difficult.
Dr June Fabian from Wits noted that the scale of kidney disease in Africa has been challenging to determine.
“The biodiversity of African populations means that what we find that applies in Southern Africa might not apply in West Africa. So, there aren’t a lot of studies that have looked at kidney disease in many African populations. We don’t have a lot of funding to do these studies, so a lot of the studies are often situated in a hospital with many HIV patients. So, they’ll report a high prevalence of chronic kidney disease, but it does not necessarily reflect what’s going on at the community level or in the general population.”
Fabian said population-based studies are required. But these are expensive and need a larger sample group. This is why there isn’t a lot of data from Africa. In addition, different criteria are used to determine the prevalence of kidney disease in other studies, making available data challenging to interpret.
“The point of our study was to try and standardise all of that. Because we did that, I think we can quite reliably say that the prevalence is between six and 12% depending on the country because people have different risk factors in different countries,” she explained.
Kidney function test flaws
Fabian explained how kidney function tests work to diagnose disease.
“If you’ve got diabetes, and you go and see a primary health care nurse to test your kidneys, she’ll pull a tube of blood, send it to the lab, and the lab will measure the creatinine. And based on that, she’ll work out what we think the kidney function is.”
This is done by estimating the glomerular filtration rate (GFR). The GFR is how much blood your kidneys are filtering through per minute. A high GFR means that the kidneys are working very well.
“What we realised when we did this study is that kidney function in African populations is overestimated by using the creatinine test. We are reporting GFRs that are too high because these estimation calculations are based on studies done in high-income settings.”
Before the ARK study, Fabian said the studies were done in countries like the US, Sweden, and Belgium. Very few studies have covered the African population looking critically at how kidney disease affects people.
“That is what we wanted to check in this study because a handful of really small studies showed that maybe the way it’s done in Europe doesn’t apply in Africa. This is because we are reading the kidney function as too high. If your GFR is less than 60, your kidneys filter less than 60 ml per minute. If the test pushes everyone up, we are not picking up people with those lower GFRs, which means we’re missing kidney disease.
The “gold standard” refers to the method to measure kidney function that is currently working to diagnose kidney disease in Africa. Fabian said the problem is that it is expensive and impractical because a person must be there for six hours.
“Because African Americans are big and have a lot of muscle, everyone assumes that everyone else in Africa is the same. Everyone thought that African populations have lots of muscle, and the creatinine would be high as they see it in African Americans. We found that people are quite small.”
Fabian explained that another dependent factor is how much meat a person eats.
“If meat is regularly in your everyday diet, your creatinine will increase. In poorer communities, people often don’t have a lot of money and don’t eat much meat. Even in Bushbuck Ridge, women have very low creatinine, and we’re not sure exactly why. But in Malawi, people might eat meat once every two weeks or once a month. That is not the same as high-income settings where people eat meat almost daily.”
These kinds of factors are not considered during studies in high-income settings. Fabian emphasised the importance of doing this work in African populations.
Risk factors of kidney disease
“Your kidney function starts with your mom’s health. For example, if you’ve got a young mum with a pregnancy, who doesn’t get into antenatal care, delivers prematurely and might have diabetes or hypertension herself. All those factors impact your kidneys when you’re in the womb and are developing all the time, up to 36 weeks.”
This means that if you’re born prematurely, at 33 weeks or so, and your mom never got antenatal care or was malnourished during the pregnancy, your kidney function will be impacted from the day you are born.
“If you are stunted, your muscles don’t grow well, and you are malnourished. This carries over and impacts your kidney function later on in life. These are the kinds of things that don’t apply in high-income settings. We also see in poor communities that in adolescence, people go from being underweight, especially girls, to being quite overweight. And if that happens, that also puts you at risk of kidney disease because you’re at risk of becoming diabetic or developing high blood pressure later on in life.”
Too expensive
Tests based on cystatin C worked better than creatinine to indicate poor kidney function. But it is not widely available in Africa.
The cystatin C test, which would be more suitable in Africa, costs around R320. This is three times more expensive than the widely-used but less accurate creatinine, at just R67.
“We know cystatin C is better in Africa, but relatively speaking, it’s a no-go in resource-poor settings,” says Fabian.
The study’s findings suggest that moving from the creatinine test of kidney function to using cystatin C would be preferable. In addition, researchers said that it would also assist in ensuring accessibility and enabling doctors to use them should be a priority for Africa. – Health-e News