Introduction

The region known as the Great Lakes of Africa is endowed with enormous natural and human resources with opportunities for socio-economic transformation, but the region has been plagued by conflicts, insecurity, and unimaginable human suffering for decades. The conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between the Congolese security forces and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group, and the US-led efforts which resulted in the peace agreement signed on June 27, 2025, is the focus of this paper.

While the conflict is not a new phenomenon, the recent military gains of M23 have raised concerns on the regional security implications of the escalating conflict. In January 2025, for example, the M23 group captured Goma, the largest city in North Kivu and the strategic mining hub of Walikale. The capture of the cities in both North and South Kiva provinces escalated the conflict with high fatalities and displacement. While applauding the peace agreement that was brokered by the United States (U.S.) and Qatar, one wonders why the African-led (African Union-AU) peace negotiations were not successful. The AU-backed peace process, which was launched in 2022, is a case in point.

The key question of interest is: What explains the renewed interest of the U.S. in the Great Lakes region? I address this question from two standpoints. First, I provide a brief background of the region with a focus on the root causes of the conflict. Second, I discuss the dynamics of the US-led peace efforts between DRC and Rwanda. I conclude by providing some recommendations on how Africa can develop a robust African-centered framework in taking the lead to resolve or find African-centered solutions to Africa’s problems.

The Great Lakes Region

The African Great Lakes consist of seven lakes covering different countries in Central, East, and Southern Africa. In order of their size from the largest to the smallest, the lakes include, Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Malawi, Lake Turkana, Lake Albert, Lake Kivu, Lake Edward. The region can be narrowly or broadly defined, but for lucidity purposes, this paper focuses on the narrow definition which includes four countries (i.e., DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda). According to the African Centre for the Constructive Resolutions of Disputes (ACCORD), conflicts in the Great Lakes region are not only interconnected, but they are also complex, often involving state and non-state actors with regional and global networks.

While some conflicts start within countries, they in most cases, spill over to other countries in the region due to cross-border or transnational ethnic identities and other interconnections. The root causes of conflicts in the region are clearly documented in the literature. Factors such as unequal access to resources, politics of exclusion, proliferation of small arms, and historical grievances between ethnic groups. Others include fragile states with weak political and governance systems, economic mismanagement, and the collapse of social services.

The conflict in the eastern Congo started in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide where ethnic Hutu extremists killed an estimated one million minority ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus. About two million Hutu refugees crossed into eastern Congo where most of them settled in refugee camps in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, including Hutu extremists who started organizing themselves in eastern Congo. After the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which ended the genocide in 1994, the RPF shifted its attention to eastern Congo in its efforts to deal with what it describes as the security threats from the Hutu extremist group. This led to the start of Rwanda’s involvement in eastern DRC under the Tutsi-led government of President Paul Kagame and the subsequent wars between the two countries. The First Congo War (1996-1997) and Second Congo War (1998-2002) are cases in point.

Rwanda, Uganda, and DRC signed peace agreements between 2002 and 2003. The peace agreements led to the formation of a transitional government in Kinshasa led by Joseph Kabila. Despite the efforts to achieve lasting peace in the region, clashes have continued to persist in the eastern DRC. The rise of M23 rebel group in the early 2000s in eastern DRC further complicated the conflict situation. Mostly made of ethnic Tutsis, M23 emerged as a formidable rebel group to the surprise of many observers. DRC has accused Rwanda of backing M23, but Rwanda has long denied the accusation. Instead, Rwanda claims its forces are acting in self-defense against DRC’s army and the remnants of ethnic Hutu militiamen that have been connected to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Paul-Simon Handy of the Institute of Security Studies captures it well when he noted that the mutual accusations between Rwanda and DRC never cease to end as Kigali continues to blame Kinshasa of supporting DRC-based Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an argument, Rwanda often uses to justify its military incursions in eastern Congo. While Rwanda’s claim about the security concerns from the Hutu militia group linked to the 1994 genocide in eastern Congo has some merit, the question on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the DRC cannot be ignored.

Previous Peace Efforts

Like other regions, security and peace are needed for the democratic progress and development in the Great Lakes region. Political leaders with support from the AU and external partners have been engaged in finding a lasting solution to the conflict, but they have been largely unsuccessful. The escalation of the crisis at the beginning of 2025 coupled with the military gains of M23 further reveals the failure of previous attempts to construct durable security architecture in the region. The 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework or the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement which was expected to be implemented with support from the UN, African Union, SADC, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) as guarantors could not be sustained given the re-emergence of M23.

As some experts have suggested, the implementation of the 2013 peace agreement by the ICGLR was problematic due to problems such as inadequate funding, decision making challenges, and lack of cooperation from the warring factions. After months of negotiations, the Luanda peace process was revived through the mediation of the Angolan President Joao Lourenço with support from the AU to help defuse the tension between Rwanda and DRC. Unfortunately, the escalation in fighting between the warring factions in 2023 led to another stalemate. This brings me to the US-led brokered peace deal with diplomatic support from Qatar, which was signed on June 27, 2025, in Washington DC.

The US-Brokered Peace Deal

There is no question that the US brokered peace with diplomatic support from Qatar, which was signed by the foreign ministers of Rwanda and DRC on June 27, 2025, marked a significant milestone towards peace in eastern Congo. The peace agreement, which was signed in the presence of U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, at the State Department overlooking the portrait of Colin Powell, the first African American U.S. Secretary of State, was a well-crafted symbolism with a strong African-centered imagery. The Trump administration’s sudden interest in the Great Lakes region and efforts to end the conflict came as a surprise to experts given the “prediction” that President Trump is not likely to engage actively with Africa in his second term.

It could be argued that Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy with trade-inspired deal making provides a persuasive explanation for his renewed interest to resolve the conflict for access to critical mineral deposits in the region. Richard Moncrieff, an expert on the Great Lakes region, also noted that Trump’s senior officials realized that the resolution of the conflict will be a win for Trump as he continues to portray himself as a global peacemaker through his so-called foreign policy of peace through strength. It is clear that the U.S. has been involved in the region, like other regions in Africa through counterterrorism initiatives, but there is no question that the mineral reserves of DRC provided further incentives for the renewed interest from the U.S. in resolving the conflict. It was therefore not surprising that the June 27th agreement includes U.S. access to critical mineral reserves of DRC such as cobalt, copper, and lithium, which will benefit U.S. tech and electric vehicle companies.

Qatar’s role in the peace process deserves to be underscored as well. As generally known, Qatar is not new to high level diplomacy through conflict mediations, but its interest to help achieve peace in eastern Congo is worth discussing. To some experts, Qatar’s involvement could be driven by its precedent in mediating African conflicts such as the mediated conflict between rebels in Chad and the traditional government. Qatar is also strengthening its economic ties with countries in the region. For example, Qatar Airways has invested in RwandAir and has about 60% stake in the construction of the Bugesera International Airport in Rwanda. Similarly, the economic ties between Qatar and DRC have been strengthened since 2024 when Qatar Airways expanded its operations to Congo’s capital, Kinshasa.

The peace deal needs to be celebrated, but reactions to the deal are reported to be mixed in both countries, especially in DRC, as some have expressed concern about the access to the country’s vast mineral deposits as part of the peace agreement. For others, until a presidential handshake takes place between President Felix Tshisekedi of the DRC and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda to cement the peace agreement, problems are likely to arise. Let’s hope the proposed meeting between the two leaders will occur sooner than later. The inability of the AU and other regional leaders to take the lead in brokering the peace agreement is another source of concern for experts given the history of Africa’s marginalization on African-centered issues by global powers. The history of broken peace agreements between the two countries is another source for concern.  

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Great Lakes region deserves peace, security, and democratic progress which has eluded the area for decades. As the region and the rest of Africa celebrate the new peace agreement, lasting peace, as Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, has noted, “requires more than a signature.” Not only do I share Mvemba’s more than a signature point of view, but I also support his critical suggestion that the implementation of the peace agreement and its likely future success depend on addressing the root causes of the conflict.

In addition to incorporating factors such as inclusive national dialogues, improved oversights, and economic diversification in the implementation of the peace agreement, I also recommend the creation of cross-national trust networks at the governmental and local levels and the strengthening of good governance practices in the region. The AU’s Peace/Security Architecture also needs to be supported to help Africa lead with African-centered solutions.

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