
In a November 2024 Pan-African Parliament meeting in Midrand, a guest from the Afro-Caribbean diaspora asked a simple but profound question to the continental MPs: “Why is Pan-Africanism declining?”
The question should have elicited vigorous debate but, like so many vital critical issues, it barely got any attention from the delegates.
Pan-Africanism has a long history. The yearning for freedom and human dignity inspired abolitionism, nationalism and the creation of nation states. But postcolonial African states have not, by and large, succeeded in nurturing accountable and effective institutions as well as vibrant civic life in each territory, and among countries, to give substance to the spirit of Pan-Africanism.
Pan-Africanism is in decline as that delegate noted, but the question is: Why? Before offering an analysis of how it came to this state, it is useful to provide its brief history.
The first rumblings of Pan-Africanism emerged in the Americas during the era of slavery when Africans from many regions on the continent were forcibly cast together under the most inhuman system of oppression the world has ever known. Whether they were from west, central, south, north or east Africa, their common subjugation created a new identity which gradually evolved to African-American or Afro-Caribbean.
Struggling against slavery and its dehumanisation became the soul of the Black Abolitionist’s movement and their white allies. This collective identity formation has endured and inspired many other subjugated peoples in the Americas, such as the women’s movement.
Further, after the abolition of slavery, religious elements of the African American population saw colonialism as the continuation of slavery in another guise. Some came to preach in Africa as they thought the church could be a force for liberation.
The second iteration of Pan-Africanism evolved with the struggle for liberation in Africa and the Caribbean. This involved mutual support among the liberation movements in various colonies and regions with the primary goal of gaining political independence. Nkrumah’s (Ghana) and Nasir’s (Egypt) advocacy for African liberation and unity were exemplar cases.
Third, once the majority of countries in the continent became independent, the stage was set for the formalisation of Pan-Africanism. This led to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. The OAU was most successful in supporting the liberation movements in southern Africa. Nevertheless, internal division between post-colonial blocks in the OAU, such as Francophone and Anglophone, remained.
Fourth, the demise of apartheid South Africa in 1994 closed the curtain on the liberation agenda. The ambitious new Republic of South Africa, under the leadership of President Nelson Mandela and his deputy, Thabo Mbeki, tried to energise the OAU.
Mandela and Mbeki genuinely spoke for Africa and made attempts to rejuvenate the continental organisation with the support of others. Consequently, the OAU was renamed the African Union (AU) in a continental meeting in Durban, South Africa, in 2002. The aim was to advance African integration as well as give the continent a greater muscle in international affairs.
Over time, a number of AU institutions were established, such as the African Court of Human and People’s Rights (1998); the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2001); the AU Commission (2002); the African Peace and Security Council (2002); and the Pan-African Parliament (2004).
A mismatch between the rhetoric and reality of the AU
The formal institutional structure of the OAU/AU has been in place for over 60 years. Despite such longevity, Pan-Africanism has not evolved significantly beyond formalities.
For Pan-Africanism to flourish, three things must be in place: 1) Common institutions that methodically and steadily gain legitimacy by effectively solving some of the strategic regional and continental problems; 2) A growing progressive and cohesive civic identity within each nation state; and 3) A rising continental civic identity anchored on the successful operations of the AU institutions.
But significant advances have not been made in these vital areas. Among the major problems on the continent has been the prevalence of unaccountable and corrupt regimes in most parts of the continent for decades. Such regimes fuel communal strife which undermines trust among populations and between them and states.
Moreover, corrupt practices in the public and private sectors in many countries have been so normalised such that ordinary people are relegated as subjects rather than citizens.
These national political cultures impede the transformation of the spirit of liberation into civic bonds in each country. Examples of countries suffering from such maladies include Nigeria, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Kenya, DRC, Malawi, Congo, Angola, Ethiopia. Eritrea, Chad, Sudan, Gabon, South Sudan, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, etc.
Without vibrant civic culture in most countries, it is inconceivable to develop substantive civic ties across national borders. The sentiments of the liberation days are still alive in many parts of the continent, although waning, but few shared political bonds have been created and nurtured across borders to facilitate shared regional or continental civic agendas.
Because of the dearth of substantive civic bonds across national boundaries, two factors have hobbled the AU’s capacity to give real substance to Pan-Africanism.
First, the AU has become the annual club of mostly unaccountable leaders where deliberations rarely ever positively advance the freedoms of ordinary people or their material wellbeing.
Second, the unfocused and unrealistically expansive bureaucratic agenda of the AU makes it dependent on the financial generosity of non-Africans. For instance, continentally generated resources cover only 32% of the AU budget while 65% originates from outside.
The AU’s need for substantial budgetary support from outside to finance its agenda means that it does not have financial autonomy to chart an Afrocentric developmental agenda. A clear example of this weakness is the AU’s inability to silence the guns in countries such as Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, DRC, etc, and prevent the ill effects of foreign agendas as was the case in Libya, where Nato ignored the AU plea, deposed Gaddafi, and instigated a civil war.
The Pan-African spirit lives on, but…
A Somali proverb best captures the Pan-African conundrum: “Hal xaaraani nirig xalaala ma dhasho.” This literally means that an illegitimate she-camel cannot give birth to a legitimate offspring.
The implication of the proverb is that corrupt, authoritarian, incompetent and sectarian leaders cannot inspire the progressive revolution which Pan-Africanism requires. Political and economic mismanagement in the nation states, with a few exceptions, is not a good recipe for continental advancement.
Thus, the dearth of rich and vibrant civic political culture in most African countries, and national political leaders bereft of trust, cannot inspire and build continental institutions that can rejuvenate substantive Pan-Africanism.
There is little doubt that the spirit of Pan-Africanism lives among our people, but it will require a new cohort of leaders as well as purposely organised civic movements to alter our Pan-Africanist fortunes. DM