Inside Africa’s Big Bet on Youth to Feed the Continent and Who’s Actually Getting Funded

Africa, Conferences, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Editors’ Choice, Environment, Featured, Food and Agriculture, Food Systems, Gender, Headlines, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations, Trade & Investment, Women & Economy

Food Systems

Winnie Wambui, co-founder of Harcourt Agri-Eco Farm in Kenya, speaks to IPS outside the Dealroom at the Africa Food Systems Forum 2025, held at the Centre International de Conférences Abdou Diouf (CICAD) in Dakar, Senegal, September 4, 2025. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

Winnie Wambui, co-founder of Harcourt Agri-Eco Farm in Kenya, speaks to IPS outside the Dealroom at the Africa Food Systems Forum 2025, held at the Centre International de Conférences Abdou Diouf (CICAD) in Dakar, Senegal, September 4, 2025. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS

DAKAR, Sep 15 2025 (IPS) – Winnie Wambui leans forward on the panel stage, microphone in hand, scanning the room until she spots a raised hand.


Everyone in the room wears headphones, each voice isolated so that discussions don’t clash with sessions in adjacent halls. A question cuts through: how did a student science project become a commercial business?

At 24, Wambui, a Kenyan agripreneur, runs Harcourt Agri-Eco Farm, which recycles organic waste into animal feed using black soldier flies.

“Back then, I didn’t know it would become a farm or a business,” she said to a room of agripreneurs, researchers, and investors, describing her first experiments in 2022 as an energy engineering student at Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT).

Today, her eight-person team processes around 30 tonnes of waste each month and monitors the carbon emissions avoided.

The enterprise now generates at least USD 1,000 in monthly revenue, a modest but steady profit by Kenyan standards.

Inside the calm Knowledge Hub, on a panel organized by the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (icipe), Wambui tells her story to a dozen listeners in an intimate, almost subdued setting. But just outside, at the leafy Centre International de Conference’s Abdou Diouf (CICAD) in Dakar, Senegal, the atmosphere is charged.

Presidents, cabinet ministers, development banks, and agribusiness executives pace the halls at the annual Africa Food Systems Forum (AFSF) 2025, the continent’s flagship platform for agricultural policy and investment.

This year, the forum positioned youth at the center of Africa’s food security agenda.

Wambui is part of a new generation of innovative agripreneurs that governments and financiers promise to support.

For the first time, youth agripreneurs joined heads of state on the Forum’s opening stage, a symbolic gesture of recognition in a region where nearly 400 million people are under 35.

“Our median age is just 19. And by 2050, one in three young people in the world will be African,” said Claver Gatete, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).

He said that if given land, finance, technology and markets, the youths can feed not only Africa but also the world.

However, turning such vision into reality is where the continent struggles.

The African Development Bank (AfDB) often says that Africa holds roughly 60 percent of the world’s uncultivated arable land, yet poor infrastructure, limited financing, and climate shocks keep much of it idle.

With the continent collectively importing approximately USD50 billion worth of food annually, according to the African Export–Import Bank (Afreximbank), the stakes are high.

At the national level, countries like Kenya continue to face hunger crises at emergency levels.

At the start of the year, the World Food Programme estimated that around two million people were experiencing acute hunger—a recurring crisis in a country with relatively better infrastructure and higher investment flows than many of its East African neighbors.

Experts say that despite localized crises, structural issues in African agriculture worsen food insecurity across the continent.

“We have relied on grants and aid to keep agriculture afloat, and this has made the agriculture sector stuck in a risk perception trap,” said Adesuwa Ifedi, Vice President of Africa Programs at Heifer International.

Ifedi said that commercial banks and investors avoid the sector, leaving grants to fill the gap. But grant dependence can undermine ventures in the eyes of private financiers.

“Grants should leverage commercial capital so the ecosystem can thrive,” Ifedi said.

This year’s Forum coincided with the recent African Union’s rollout of its Kampala Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Strategy & Action Plan (2026–2035), or CAADP 3.0.

The new 10-year plan aims to mobilize USD 100 billion in investment, raise farm output by 45 percent, cut post-harvest losses in half, triple intra-African agrifood trade by 2035, and place youth inclusion at the core of Africa’s food future under the AU’s Agenda 2063.

In Dakar, over 30 agriculture ministers gathered under the chairmanship of former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn Boshem, pledging to move beyond policy drafting toward delivering tangible results for agribusiness investment.

Their top priority, they said, was to shrink Africa’s food import bill by strengthening regional value chains.

Dr. Janet Edeme, head of the Rural Economy Division at the African Union Commission, told IPS that the Forum provides mechanisms to operationalize CAADP 3.0, aiming to empower at least 30 percent of youth in the agri-food sector while closing a USD 65–70 billion annual financing gap for agricultural small and medium-sized enterprises (agri-SMEs).

She said AFSF offers a rare opportunity for youthful agripreneurs to showcase bankable projects, access mentorship, and meet investors who would otherwise be out of reach.

“There are dedicated spaces—deal rooms, youth innovation competitions, investment roundtables—where these innovators can connect with governments, development finance institutions, and private investors,” said Edeme.

Organizers pointed to new spaces for youth to meet investors, but agripreneurs like Wambui said those opportunities felt distant.

She had never heard of the AU’s new flagship plan.

“I’m only hearing about that from you. If it’s meant to guide Africa’s food future, why aren’t there clear materials or programs I can see and use?” Wambui said. “Otherwise, we leave without knowing what strategies exist to support our work.”

By day two of the six-day forum, she had found her way into the deal room, the flagship space to connect entrepreneurs with investors, but instead of streamlined matchmaking, she found confusion.

“We are looking for the investors, and they’re looking for us—yet we don’t meet. Deals still depend on connections. That’s why I came to Dakar.”

Wambui, who co-founded Harcourt Agri-Eco Farm with two other partners, said the business has grown enough to cover wages, taxes, and debt repayments. Banks now extend her loans.

But that access to financing remains an exception in a system stacked against most, said Dr. Eklou Attiogbevi-Somado, the African Development Bank’s Regional Manager for Agriculture and Agro-Industry in West Africa.

He said that AfDB data shows commercial banks in Africa channel just 3–4 percent of their lending into agriculture.

Dr. David Amudavi, CEO of Biovision Africa Trust, said this capital drought is a huge concern in a sector that drives most livelihoods on the continent.

Amudavi, whose non-profit organization promotes ecological agriculture, said that the squeeze leaves farmers, and especially young agripreneurs, struggling to access credit for starting or scaling their agribusinesses, even though nearly 60 percent of Africa’s unemployed are under 25.

“Without finance, many youth-led ventures stay stuck at micro-scale or collapse,” Amudavi said.

Not far from the Youth Dome, at the deal room, Tanzanian agripreneur Nelson Joseph Kisanga, the co-founder of Get Aroma Spices, is also navigating the same maze.

Seven years ago, he left a banking career to try poultry farming, losing almost everything in his first three years.

Kisanga regrouped, merged his venture with that of his wife, Deborah, also a young agripreneur, and built Get Aroma Spices, now working with more than 50,000 farmers across southern Tanzania.

“Agriculture back home is seen as not for young people,” he said. “Even now, scaling means loans at high interest rates. There’s no other way.”

The family-run company exports turmeric, ginger, cardamom, and avocado oil while operating a youth- and women-led agro-processing hub through a public-private partnership.

His presence at the AFSF forum has already borne fruit.

“My intention coming here was to break into the West African market, and I’m happy to say I have clinched a supply deal in Ghana. All that’s left is for the lawyers to finalize the contract.” Kisanga said, before moving to the Youth Dome, a separate pavilion for young participants.

Inside, some groups chatted, others played basketball and table tennis, while others listened as young agri-food innovators pitched their ideas to a panel of investors.

Despite the fanfare, the forum ended without revealing how much capital reached youth-led ventures.

The most visible funding for youth at the summit came via the GoGettaz Agripreneur Prize, a pan-African initiative under the Generation Africa movement. The prize awarded USD 50,000 each to Egypt’s Naglaa Mohammad, who turns agricultural waste into natural products, and Uganda’s Samuel Muyita, who uses nanotechnology to reduce post-harvest fruit and vegetable losses.

An additional USD 60,000 impact award brought total prizes to roughly USD 160,000.

Other announcements included a USD 6.7 million trade programme from the United Kingdom (UK), the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and the African Union (AU).

Senegal also launched a USD 22.5 million pilot for Community Agricultural Cooperatives, with financing linked to the African Food Systems Resilience Fund.

Yet there was no breakdown showing how much, if any, flowed to youth-led ventures.

The opacity mirrors past patterns.

Public summaries from the 2023 deal room reported only USD 3.5 million in closed investments, with no traceable flows to youth-led enterprises.

With AFSF positioned as Africa’s premier delivery platform, observers measured the announcements against CAADP 3.0’s USD 100 billion mobilization target, saying the gap is stark.

“We have seen this pattern before: big pledges at the summit, but little clarity or follow-up on how much actually reaches youth and smallholder farmers—the backbone of African food production,” said Famara Diédhiou, a Senegal-based food systems program manager with a regional civil society network.

“Without such accountability and inclusion of all stakeholders, these forums risk becoming mere showcases rather than platforms that deliver,” he said.

For now, even with the youth-first theme, AFSF still leaves young founders stuck in the same cycle of chasing visibility, hustling for contacts, and stitching together their own contracts.

As Wambui found, Kisanga, who has attended three previous Forums, said that in AFSF access is everything: you need to know in advance who to meet and be in the right room at the right moment.

“All visibility is currency,” said Kisanga. “That’s how you survive.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

IPS UN Bureau, IPS UN Bureau Report, Senegal,

 

‘Angola produces large quantities of oil and diamonds, yet most people don’t see the benefits’

Active Citizens, Africa, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Energy, Featured, Headlines, Human Rights, Labour, Natural Resources, TerraViva United Nations

Sep 5 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses recent protests in Angola with Florindo Chivucute, founder and executive director of Friends of Angola, a US-based civil society organisation established in 2014 that works to promote democracy, human rights and good governance in Angola.


The Angolan government’s 1 July decision to remove diesel subsidies, sharply pushing up public transport costs, triggered a series of protests. Angola is one of Africa’s biggest oil producers, but many have seen little benefit from its oil wealth and continue to live in poverty. People have taken to the streets in unprecedented numbers to demand an end to corruption and mismanagement, presenting the ruling party, in power for 50 years, with its biggest test. Security forces have responded to incidences of looting and vandalism with lethal violence. At least 30 people have been killed, 277 injured and over 1,500 arrested.

What triggered the protests?

Fuel subsidy cuts sparked the crisis. The protests began on 28 July, after the government’s decision to remove diesel subsidies immediately pushed up fuel prices. What started as a drivers’ strike in Luanda, the capital, quickly spread to other provinces and escalated into bigger protests.

The impact was devastating. For many families, even a small rise in fuel costs is crushing, because wages have been eroded by years of recession and currency devaluation. When transport costs rise, food prices and school fees rise too, leaving those already struggling unable to make ends meet.

But fuel was just the trigger. The unrest reflected much deeper frustrations, including high unemployment, particularly among young people, growing poverty and anger at corruption and mismanagement. People see public resources channelled into luxury spending and infrastructure deals benefiting a few powerful figures connected to the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), while basic services and jobs are neglected. Combined with the immediate shock of higher fuel prices, these grievances fuelled widespread anger.

Why are people struggling in such a resource-rich country?

This is the irony at the heart of the crisis. Angola produces large quantities of oil, along with diamonds, yet most people don’t see the benefits. Mismanagement and entrenched corruption are central to the problem. Revenues from natural resources have too often been captured by networks close to political power and channelled abroad or invested in ways that don’t create jobs.

Angola’s dependence on fuel imports makes the situation worse. We don’t have sufficient domestic refining capacity. Instead of using oil revenues to build refineries and strengthen local industry, a system emerged in which those with political connections profited from importing refined products back into the country. This removed incentives to invest in local processing or agriculture. The result is a tiny wealthy elite and a large majority with very low wages and limited access to services.

What do these protests reveal about the government’s grip on power?

The protests have marked a turning point. The MPLA has dominated politics since independence in 1975, and large-scale protests are not common. The fact that so many people were willing to take to the streets, particularly in and around the capital, shows growing discontent with the government and ruling party.

The authorities’ reaction has been heavy-handed. Security forces have used teargas and live ammunition in some cases, and carried out numerous arrests, including of union leaders and journalists. In some areas protests were accompanied by looting and, tragically, by deadly clashes with security forces. Civil society has since called for investigations into the killings and for accountability for those responsible.

The government’s strategy risks backfiring. By responding with force and detentions, it risks creating a greater sense of mistrust and frustration, which could influence how people engage with political processes as we approach the 2027 election.

How is civil society organising and what challenges does it face?

Civil society – including church groups, trade unions and local associations — has mobilised quickly to call for accountability and transparency. New coalitions are forming; for example, groups such as the Bishops’ Conference of Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe’s Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace, Friends of Angola, the Justice, Peace and Democracy Association and Pro Bono Angola are working with religious organisations to push for investigations into the killings and provide humanitarian support to families affected by the unrest.

But the environment is hostile. Funding for democracy and human rights work is scarce, so organisations struggle to pay staff or sustain programmes.

State surveillance creates another barrier. The state has invested heavily in surveillance infrastructure, and civil society organisations are often targeted by cyber intrusions and closely monitored. The legacy of communist authoritarian rule creates deep mistrust, which makes organising more difficult.

Language barriers limit international support. Much of the work happens in Portuguese, which limits reach to the wider international audience that often communicates in English, French or Spanish.

Additional restrictions threaten to further tighten civic space. Recent draconian measures include the 2024 National Security Bill and the Bill on the Crime of Vandalism of Public Goods and Services. In addition, the 2023 draft law on Non-Governmental Organizations, approved by presidential decree, imposed harsh regulations. These restrictive laws and policies undermine fundamental freedoms and, if fully implemented, risk worsening the already limited environment for civil society in Angola.

What would it take to address the underlying problems?

Strong political will is needed to tackle corruption and manage public finances transparently. This means opening up procurement and fiscal data, pursuing accountability for past abuses, and ensuring resource revenues are channelled into public priorities such as hospitals, local industry and schools. Investment in education, healthcare and small-scale agriculture would create jobs, strengthen livelihoods and reduce dependence on imports.

Institutional reform is equally vital. This means protecting property rights, improving the business environment so investment generates employment and strengthening an independent judiciary and electoral processes so people can seek change through democratic channels.

International partners have a role to play by supporting electoral transparency and demanding accountability from companies and governments that operate in Angola.

The 2027 election will offer a crucial test. The international community should pay close attention and support reforms that increase transparency and electoral integrity. Electoral reforms and the clear, public release of results at the local level would go a long way towards restoring confidence in democratic processes.

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SEE ALSO
Angola: ‘Criticising the government means risking arbitrary detention, intimidation and physical assault’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Pedro Paka 30.Jul.2025
Angola: Repressive new laws threaten civic space CIVICUS Monitor 15.Sep.2024
Angola: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Emilio José Manuel 01.Jan.2025

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Togo’s Young Generation Challenges Six Decades of Dynastic Rule

Active Citizens, Africa, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Energy, Featured, Headlines, Human Rights, Labour, Press Freedom, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Credit: Pascal.Van, licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Sep 2 2025 (IPS) – In late June, thousands flooded the streets of Lomé, Togo’s capital, presenting the ruling dynasty with its biggest challenge in decades.

The catalyst was constitutional manoeuvring by President Faure Gnassingbé to maintain his grip on power. In March 2024, his government pushed through constitutional amendments that transformed Togo from a presidential to a parliamentary system. This created a new position, the President of the Council of Ministers – effectively Togo’s chief executive – elected by parliament rather than by popular vote, and with no term limits. Gnassingbé assumed this new role in May, making it abundantly clear the changes were only about keeping him in power indefinitely.


This constitutional manoeuvre was the latest episode in a 58-year family saga that began when Faure’s father, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, seized power in a 1967 coup. For 25 years, the elder Gnassingbé ruled over a one-party state, staging ritual elections that reached absurd heights in 1986 when he claimed re-election with close to 100 per cent of votes on an implausible 99 per cent turnout. Even after nominal multiparty democracy arrived in 1992, elections remained charades with predetermined outcomes, as opposition parties faced systematic obstacles that made fair competition impossible.

When Eyadéma died in 2005, the military simply appointed his son Faure as successor, despite the constitution mandating immediate elections. International pressure forced a hastily organised vote, but this followed the familiar script of violence, fraud and repression. The pattern repeated in 2010, 2015 and 2020, with each election offering a veneer of legitimacy for continued authoritarian rule – and eliciting successive waves of protest that were either violently repressed or pre-emptively suppressed.

Now, two decades after Faure took power, this latest constitutional gambit has triggered the most significant challenge to his rule. The constitutional changes designed to keep him in power have instead galvanised opposition, creating a focal point for decades of accumulated grievances.

The current protests differ from their predecessors by being overwhelmingly led by young people who’ve never known any other leaders than the Gnassingbés. Raised on promises of multiparty democracy, they’ve witnessed systematic electoral fraud to perpetuate a government wholly unresponsive to their needs. They connect their daily struggles with unemployment, power outages and crumbling infrastructure with the long-term denial of their democratic freedoms.

The arrest in May of a popular rapper and TikToker, Aamron – for posting a video calling for street protests to coincide with Gnassingbé’s birthday on 6 June – galvanised discontent, turning simmering frustration into organised resistance. Aamron’s detention sparked the formation of the 6 June Movement (M66), led by young artists, bloggers, diaspora-based activists and civil society figures who rely heavily on social media to coordinate protests, bypassing state-controlled channels.

The government’s response, however, has followed a familiar path of authoritarian crackdown. In late June, security forces killed at least seven people, including 15-year-old Jacques Koami Koutoglo, and they’ve also used teargas, beatings and mass arrests against protesters. The regime has detained journalists, forced deletion of protest footage and imposed internet shutdowns during protests. It has suspended international media outlets including France 24 and RFI for their protest coverage. it has even issued international arrest warrants for M66 leaders based abroad, accusing them of terrorism and subversion.

Protests have continued despite repression. The leadership of young people, less intimidated by the security apparatus and better connected through social media, has allowed for the diversification of opposition tactics, with activists shifting between street protests, legal challenges and international advocacy as circumstances dictate. The diaspora is also playing a role, with Togolese communities abroad organising solidarity protests and advocating with international organisations for sanctions against the Gnassingbé regime.

Significant obstacles however remain. Gnassingbé controls all levers of power, including security forces, the electoral commission and the Constitutional Court. For a democratic transition to result, international pressure would need to intensify, including the imposition of targeted sanctions on regime officials and their economic interests. Regional bodies, particularly the Economic Community of West African States, would need to act, including by threatening to suspend Togo until democratic reforms are implemented.

Whether these protests trigger democratic change or become yet another chapter in the history of repressed dissent will ultimately depend on the ability of pro-democracy forces to sustain pressure and whether the international community finally decides to act. Gnassingbé’s constitutional manoeuvre may prove to be his final act, not because it succeeded in keeping him in power, but because it awakened a new generation. Togo’s young people have discovered the power of collective action—and that could prove decisive.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Aid Funding Crisis Means Parliamentarians’ Visionary Leadership Even More Crucial

Africa, Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Climate Change, Conferences, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Editors’ Choice, Featured, Gender, Headlines, Health, Humanitarian Emergencies, Middle East & North Africa, Population, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations, Women’s Health, Youth

Population

Dr. Alvaro Bermejo, Director General of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) addresses the Let's Discuss the Future of Africa Together seminar that took place last week (August 21) on the sidelines of TICAD9 in Yokohama City, Japan. Credit: APDA

Dr. Alvaro Bermejo, Director General of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) addresses the Let’s Discuss the Future of Africa Together seminar that took place last week (August 21) on the sidelines of TICAD9 in Yokohama City, Japan. Credit: APDA

YOKOHAMA CITY, Japan & JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, Aug 25 2025 (IPS) – As funding for sexual and reproductive health rights was on a “cliff edge,” parliamentarians now needed to play a “visionary” leadership role because “financing strong, resilient health systems for all their people rests with governments,” said Dr. Alvaro Bermejo, Director General of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF).


He was speaking at the Let’s Discuss the Future of Africa Together seminar that took place last week (August 21) on the sidelines of TICAD9 in Yokohama City, Japan.

The session was organized by the Asian Population and Development Association (APDA), in collaboration with the Forum of Arab Parliamentarians for Population and Development (FAPPD) and the African Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development (FPA).

He told parliamentarians that their role is most critical.

“Africa’s health faces a serious challenge: According to WHO’s latest analysis, health aid is projected to decline by up to 40% this year compared to just two years ago. This is not a gradual shift—it is a cliff edge,” Bermejo said. “You know as well as I do that lifesaving medicines are sitting in warehouses, health workers are losing jobs, clinics are closing, and millions are missing care.”

While this reality was outrageous, it needed to be adapted to.

“And in this crisis lies an opportunity—an opportunity to shake off the yoke of aid dependency and embrace a new era of sovereignty, self-reliance, and solidarity,” with a clear mission to protect the health and lives of women and vulnerable populations through delivering high-quality sexual and reproductive health services.

Parliamentarians engaged in debates during a policy dialogue seminar organised by the Asian Population and Development Association (APDA), in collaboration with the Forum of Arab Parliamentarians for Population and Development (FAPPD) and the African Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development (FPA). Credit: APDA

Parliamentarians engaged in debates during a policy dialogue seminar organized by the Asian Population and Development Association (APDA), in collaboration with the Forum of Arab Parliamentarians for Population and Development (FAPPD) and the African Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development (FPA). Credit: APDA

This seminar and another in the series, Policy Dialogue on the Africa-Japan Partnership for Population and Development, were both supported by the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) Arab States Regional Office (ASRO), the Japan Trust Fund (JTF) and IPPF.

During the discussions, a wide range of topics about population dynamics in Africa and Africa-Japan cooperation were discussed.

In his opening remarks, Ichiro Aisawa, a member of the House of Representatives of Japan, told the seminar it was necessary to take joint action across borders and generations.

“Youth holds the key to unlocking Africa’s future. By 2050, it is predicted that approximately 70 percent of Africa’s population will be under the age of 30. As African countries enter a demographic dividend period, the role played by parliamentarians in each country will be extremely important.

Aisawa said it was necessary to listen to the voices of the community in addressing issues related to youth empowerment, gender equality, and sexual and reproductive health (SRH).

Parliamentarians should take “concrete action through legislation and policies; it is essential to harnessing the potential of young people, directly linking them to social and economic growth, and creating a society in which no one is left behind.”

Yoko Kamikawa, Chairperson of Japan Parliamentarians for Population (JPFP), addresses a seminar for African and Asian parliamentarians on the sidelines of the TICAD9 in Yokohama City, Japan. Credit: APDA

Yoko Kamikawa, Chairperson of Japan Parliamentarians for Population (JPFP), addresses a seminar for African and Asian parliamentarians on the sidelines of the TICAD9 in Yokohama City, Japan. Credit: APDA

During the discussions, representatives from Africa gave examples of how Japan had supported their health initiatives, especially important in a climate of decreasing aid.

Maneno Zumura, an MP from Uganda, said what compounded the issues in her country and in Africa was “the changes in climate. The unpredicted climate has affected agricultural activities by 40 percent, especially in drought-prone areas of the country.” This had resulted in nearly a quarter (24 percent) of children experiencing malnutrition.

However, she noted that Japan had made considerable contributions to education and health.

“As we assess Uganda’s development and Japan’s impact, it’s clear that sustainable progress thrives on global solidarity and local governance. Key achievements include a 62 percent rise in women’s incomes through cooperatives, a 50 percent drop in maternal mortality in refugee settlements, and supporting the road infrastructure and education, illustrating how policy-driven interventions can break cycles of poverty and inequality.”

There were several specific projects she alluded to, including education experts from Japan who contributed to an improvement of the quality of primary education in districts of Wakiso, Mbale, and Arua through the Quality Improvement in Primary Education Project (2021-2023). They also trained 1,500 teachers in participatory teaching methods.

“The Government of Japan supported the vulnerable communities like refugees and host communities by strengthening the social services like health in refugee camps like Rhino Camp,” Zumura continued, including construction of a health center with antenatal facilities serving over 300,000 people in camps of Bidibidi and Rhino Camp. They also trained 200 health workers in the management of childhood illnesses and maternal health care.

Mwene Luhamba, MP, Zambia, said his country was looking forward to partnering with Japan in expanding One-Stop Reproductive Health Services, enhancing parliamentary engagement, and investing in youth programs.

Bermejo said part of the solution to the development issues is to confront constraints.

“Some countries in Africa do need global solidarity, but what Africa needs from the world, more than anything else, is fair terms. We must also confront the structural constraints. Debt service burdens are crowding out social investments. Let us seize this moment, not just to repair but to transform,” he said. “Sexual and reproductive health services save lives. They empower individuals, promote dignity, and drive national development.”

In her closing remarks, Yoko Kamikawa, Chairperson of Japan Parliamentarians for Population (JPFP), said that it was through dialogue across borders and sectors that “we build consensus, strengthen legal frameworks, and ensure that national strategies reflect the voices of all people and empower them—especially women and youth.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

Women in Sudan are Starving Faster than Men; Female-Headed Households Suffer

Active Citizens, Africa, Armed Conflicts, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Food and Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition, Gender, Headlines, Health, Human Rights, Humanitarian Emergencies, Migration & Refugees, TerraViva United Nations

In Sudan, women-led households are three times more likely to deal with serious food insecurity compared to male-led households. Credit: UN Women Sudan

UNITED NATIONS, Aug 12 2025 (IPS) – The food crisis in Sudan is starving more day by day, yet it is affecting women and girls at double the rate compared to men in the same areas. New findings from UN-Women reveal that female-headed households (FHHs) are three times more likely to be food insecure than ones led by men.


Women and girls make up half of the starving in Sudan, at 15.3 million of the 30.4 million people currently in need. In the midst of the current humanitarian crisis brought on by the Sudanese civil war, women are increasingly seen to be leading households in the absence of men due to death, disappearances or displacement amidst the civil war, making simply living in a FHH a statistical predictor of hunger.

“With conditions now at near famine thresholds in several regions in the country, it is not just a food crisis, but a gender emergency caused by a failure of gender-responsive action,” said Salvator Nkuruniza, the UN-Women representative for Sudan.

Famine Risks for Sudan’s Women

This famine has left only 1.9 percent of FFHs food secure, compared to 5.9 percent of male-headed households (MHHs) reporting food security. 45 percent of the FHHs reported poor food consumption which was nearly double the rate as compared to MHHs at 25.7 percent. Considering this, only one third of FHHs have an acceptable diet in comparison to half of MHHs. In these worsening conditions 73.7 percent of women nationally are not meeting the minimum dietary diversity, which is limiting nutrient intake and thus endangering maternal and child health.

Rates of poor food consumption have doubled in one year across FHHs, meaning a longer drawn conflict will see even worse numbers leading to the ultimate starvation of many. Nearly 15 percent of FHHs are living in conditions that meet or are near famine thresholds compared to only 7 percent of MHHs meeting the same threshold.

With all available funding, the World Food Programme (WFP) has scaled assistance to support nearly 4 million people per month, leaving an additional 26 million people still in need of support. As one representative from the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) told IPS, under these circumstances WFP has had to make tough calls, either shrinking assistance packages or reducing the amount of people who receive assistance. There have been cases where they have been forced to cut off all assistance in general.

Within Sudan’s civil society, women-led organizations (WLO) are playing a central role in delivering vital meals to affected groups across Sudan. Nkurunziza told IPS that “WLOS are the backbone of response in many areas,” who can access areas which the international system cannot reach. WLOs in West Kordofan are solarizing clinics, running nutrition outreach, managing mobile maternal health care, and operating informal shelters. In North Kordofan, WLOs. are running protection hotlines, distributing food, and helping displaced families find safety. Many times they are providing these services without institutional funding.

UN Women has been supporting 45 WLOs with institutional support, funding and technical assistance, which has allowed these organizations to operate across sixteen states. However, underfunding still remains a critical issue for WLOs. Nkurunziza explained how due to funding deficits, one WLO that operates across eight states was forced to shut down thirty-five of its sixty food kitchens. WLOs must also deal with serious logistical and digital constrains, making it nearly impossible to have any form of coordination meetings. Sudan is also facing the world’s largest displacement crisis, making a shrinking of operations among deteriorating consumption rates detrimental to attempts to elevate food security.

Aid Delivery Challenges

Amidst funding shortfalls, supply chains have struggled reaching critical locations due to Sudan’s size, lack of infrastructure, and weather difficulties. WFP shared that Sudan is “roughly the size of western Europe”, and as such they and other humanitarian actors are having to transport humanitarian items over 2500 kilometers across deserts and challenging terrain. They added that road infrastructure in remote areas such as Darfur and Kordofan has further increased the difficulty. The rainy season between April and October has also added further complications, which has made many roads completely flooded or impassable.

WFP said that the conflict has not only affected supply chains, but trade routes themselves. Among the besieged cities of El Fasher and Kadulgi, supplies remain limited and far and few. WFP is “extremely concerned about the catastrophic situation, especially in El Fasher and Kadulgi and urgently [needed] guarantees of safe passage to get supplies in – while we continue supporting with digital cash transfer”. This comes amidst not being able to deliver food and aid supplies by road.

Gender Disparities and Solutions

Nkurunziza told IPS that even before the conflict, women and girls “faced challenges in accessing their rights due to cultural norms and traditional practices”, adding that this conflict has only widened these gaps.

Food access is only one example of how gender inequality manifests during this crisis. Nkurunziza noted that food queues are often dominated by men compared to women from FHHs. He added that women have been “largely left out” of decision-making spaces, therefore their specific needs are “frequently overlooked”.

The search for food has caused an increase in harmful coping mechanisms like child marriage, sexual exploitation, female genital mutilation, and child labor. The nature of these harmful instances come from unchecked sexual exploitation and abuse due to the lack of law enforcement and government in many areas. Since April 2023, 1,138 cases of rape have been recorded, including 193 children. This number is expected to be even higher, as social and security fears may be preventing accurate reporting of gender-based violence crimes.

“The conflict has magnified every existing inequality,” Nkurunziza said, adding that this created the need for responsive action, moving beyond simple rhetoric.

In their report, UN Women outlined several measures that needed to be adopted in order to diminish famine conditions among women, including prioritizing food distribution and assistance planning to FHHs and establishing localized distribution sites, thus reducing movement-related risks for women. They also recommended increased representation in local aid committees and decision-making spaces by at least 40 percent. They called for increasing investment and funding to WLO’s, which are currently receiving less than 2 percent of humanitarian aid funds.

Despite these challenges, Nkurunziza said that WLOs are still working to feed families. “They are not waiting for permission — they are responding. The question is whether the system will finally recognize them as equal partners or continue to leave them behind.”

IPS UN Bureau Report



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Spotlight on Landlocked Developing Countries Ahead of Third UN Conference

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Uganda's Malaba town borders Kenya to the east and is a major entry point for goods destined for landlocked Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan from Kenya's Mombasa Port. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS

Uganda’s Malaba town borders Kenya to the east and is a major entry point for goods destined for landlocked Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan from Kenya’s Mombasa Port. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS

NAIROBI, Aug 1 2025 (IPS) – Landlocked developing countries face a unique set of challenges. Without coastal ports, they rely on transit nations, causing higher trade costs and delays.


To explore solutions to these complex hurdles, the Third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) or LLDC3, will take place in Awaza, Turkmenistan, 5–8 August 2025.

May Yaacoub, LLDC3 spokesperson and head of Advocacy and Outreach at the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UNOHRLLS), told IPS that the conference is “an opportunity to unlock the full potential of landlocked countries and address the challenges faced by some of the world’s most marginalized countries.”

“In every LLDC the map itself shapes the economy. Without a coastline, even the simplest export, whether cotton lint, copper cathode or cloud‑based software, must first cross at least one foreign border and frequently an entire transit corridor before it reaches a port,” Tomás Manuel González Álvarez, Senior Programme Management Officer and LLDC Team Lead at UNOHRLLS told IPS.

“The UN estimates that this physical detour means average transport costs in LLDCs are about 1.4 times higher than in comparable coastal economies. Those added costs depress profit margins, narrow the range of viable products and deter investors who value just‑in‑time delivery.”

Against this backdrop and while lacking direct sea access causes and exacerbates hurdles in trade, connectivity, and development, Yaacoub says LLDCs host vibrant communities with untapped potential and that these countries “have the ideas and know what they need to prosper. By supporting them at LLDC3 with partnerships, innovations and cooperation, we can help to build a more equitable and prosperous future for all.”

“This conference comes at the heels of the expiration of the Vienna Programme of Actions, which was adopted in Vienna, Austria, in November 2014, during LLDC2. LLDC3 will continue the work of LLDC2 and serve as a platform to explore innovative solutions, build meaningful and strategic partnerships, and increase the investment in LLDCs,” she observed.

The theme of the conference is ‘Driving Progress through Partnerships’, which she says underscores a shift from donor-recipient dynamics to mutual accountability and co-investment. And, that this includes a stronger role for transit countries, enhanced multilateral cooperation, and alignment with the SDGs, Paris Agreement and the Pact of the Future.

Álvarez emphasizes that this key, landlockedness, is experienced very differently and that the conference agenda reflects an understanding of these complexities. In Africa, “for countries such as Niger or Zambia, the critical pain point is the sheer length and fragility of overland routes—1,800 km from Niamey to Cotonou; 1,900 km from Lusaka to Durban.”

“Road and rail bottlenecks meet frequent customs stops and, in parts of the Sahel, insecurity. The result is chronic delays and freight rates that can exceed the f.o.b. (a term that defines who pays for the transportation costs) value of low‑margin agricultural commodities.”

He says in Asia, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan possess better road and rail grids yet face. At the same time, these economies are accelerating an energy transition, moving from hydrocarbons to renewables and green hydrogen so they now need corridors that can carry high‑voltage electricity and fiber as well as bulk ore.

“Bolivia and Paraguay rely on the 3,300‑km Paraguay–Paraná waterway for almost four‑fifths of their trade. Low river levels during recent droughts have stranded barges and cost Paraguay an estimated USD 300 million in 2024 alone. Moreover, new tolls levied by Argentina highlight the vulnerability that comes with dependence on a single transit state,” he says.

Within this context, Yaacoub says LLDC3 represents a major change in both scope and ambition compared to its predecessors—LLDC1 held in Almaty in 2003, which was a ministerial meeting, and LLDC2 in Vienna in 2014. The first conference of this nature, or LLDC1 focused primarily on transit policy, infrastructure development, international trade, and technical and financial assistance.

LLDC2 expanded to include structural economic transformation, regional integration, and means of implementation. Notably, she says, LLDC3 “introduces a more holistic and forward-looking agenda, emphasizing climate resilience and adaptation, digital transformation and technology access, sustainable industrialization, reforming the global financial architecture, shock-resilience and disaster risk reduction.”

Yaacoub says the LLDC3 agenda reflects the unprecedented global complexities of the current era—climate change, pandemics, geopolitical tensions, and economic shocks. Key thematic areas include climate vulnerability and financing, with an emphasis on operationalizing the Loss and Damage Fund, doubling adaptation finance, and ensuring access to concessional resources.

Álvarez says the conference is particularly focused on converting the narrative from landlocked to land‑linked and that unlocking these countries potential relies on a strategy built on mutually reinforcing pillars that include “how Multibillion‑dollar investments in regional corridors, the Central and Northern Corridors in East Africa, the Trans‑Caspian route into Europe, and new dry‑ports on the Paraguay‑Paraná system can cut door‑to‑port time by 30 percent within the decade.”

He says building climate resilience is critical due to a “heavy reliance of LLDCs on agriculture, especially rain-fed agriculture, as a primary source of income, employment, and sustenance. Climate variability has already begun to disrupt agricultural cycles, reduce crop yields, and threaten food security. These effects ripple across rural economies, deepening poverty and forcing difficult choices for households.”

Álvarez says these issues are critical, as the same remoteness that inflates freight costs also hampers relief when drought, flood or storm strikes. Many LLDCs suffer disproportionately from climate‑related disasters because they lack redundant road and telecom links, and that “as extreme weather intensifies, production shocks travel quickly through thinly diversified economies and can wipe out years of growth.”

Overall, he says, “collectively these headwinds jeopardize progress on at least six Sustainable Development Goals—most visibly Goals 1 (No Poverty), 9 (Industry and Infrastructure) and 13 (Climate Action). Unless structural constraints are eased, many LLDCs risk missing the 2030 milestones by a full generation.”

Álvarez says the “developmental drag created by geography is not merely inconvenient; it is systemic.”

Stressing that high logistics costs shrink the set of competitive exports and that “many LLDCs remain reliant on two or three unprocessed commodities, leaving them vulnerable to price swings and limiting the spill‑overs that normally accompany industrial clustering.”

He says limited fiscal space means that governments struggle to finance education, health and social protection at scale. LLDCs as a group record poverty rates 50–60 percent higher than the global developing‑country average and score lower on the World Bank’s human‑capital index, 0.36 versus 0.48 in 2024.

Yaacoub confirms that all these issues will be explored in depth across key thematic areas that also include the private sector, civil society and youth engagement to foster inclusive partnerships and South-South and Triangular Cooperation with an emphasis on regional and interregional collaboration.

“This inclusive process ensures that the new Awaza Programme of Action is grounded in the lived realities of LLDCs and their partners,” she observes.

After all is said and done, Yaacoub says the most desirable outcome from the Third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries would be the global endorsement and operationalization of the Awaza Programme of Action, which is a transformative and actionable framework that empowers LLDCs to overcome their structural challenges and thrive in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

Stressing that LLDC3 will serve as “a high-level platform to present, promote, and mobilize support for the implementation of the Awaza PoA that was adopted in December 2024. The second outcome would be the mobilization of resources and investment commitments from development partners to support infrastructure, climate resilience, and digital transformation.”

Ultimately, she is optimistic that the conference will lead to strengthened partnerships and regional cooperation to renew and expand transit agreements and regional integration initiatives, including enhanced South-South and Triangular Cooperation frameworks and commitments to multilateral collaboration aligned with the SDGs, the Paris Agreement and the pact of the Future.

IPS UN Bureau Report