Russia: Moments of Dissent after Two Years of War

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LONDON, Feb 26 2024 (IPS) – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine marked its second anniversary on 24 February. And while civil society is offering an immense voluntary effort in Ukraine, in Russia activists have faced intense constraints. The suspicious death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny is part of a great wave of repression. He’s the latest in a long list of people who’ve come to a sudden end after falling out with Vladmir Putin.

Putin is paying a backhanded compliment to the importance of civil society by suppressing it through every possible means. State-directed murder is the most extreme form of repression, but Putin has many more tricks up his sleeve. One is criminalisation of protests, seen when people showed up at improvised vigils to commemorate Navalny, laying flowers at informal memorials, knowing what would happen. Police arrested hundreds and the flowers quickly vanished.

An unrelenting assault

Human rights organisation OVD-Info reports that since the start of the full-scale invasion, the authorities have detained 19,855 people at anti-war protests, brought 894 criminal cases against anti-war activists and introduced 51 new repressive laws.

Among many other Russians jailed for symbolic acts of protest, Crimean artist Bohdan Zizu was handed a 15-year sentence last June for spray-painting a building in the colours of the Ukrainian flag. In November, artist Alexandra Skochilenko was sentenced to seven years for placing information about the war on supermarket price tags. Now people helping Ukrainian refugees living in Russia are being criminalised.

The government is also making it impossible for civil society and independent media organisations to keep working. Last August, the authorities declared independent TV channel Dozhd an ‘undesirable organisation’, in effect banning it from operating in Russia and criminalising anyone who shares its content. In August, courts ordered the closure of the Sakharov Center, a human rights organisation. Through similar means the authorities have forced several other organisations out of existence or into exile.

The state has also designated numerous people and organisations as ‘foreign agents’, a classification intended to stigmatise them as associated with espionage. In November, it added the Moscow Times to the list. The government has also doubled down on its attacks on LGBTQI+ people as part of its strategy to inflame narrow nationalist sentiments. And it keeps passing laws to further tighten civic space. Putin recently approved a law that allows the government to confiscate money and other assets from people who criticise the war.

The state is criminalising journalists as well. In March, it detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich on spying charges, sending a signal that international journalists aren’t safe. The authorities are also holding Russian-US journalist Alsu Kurmasheva of Radio Free Europe, detained while paying a family visit to Russia. Putin is likely planning to use them as leverage for a prisoner swap. State authorities have put other journalists based outside Russia on wanted lists or charged them in absentia.

Meanwhile, Putin has pardoned real criminals for joining the fight. They include one of the people jailed for organising the 2006 assassination of pioneering investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

It’s hard to hope for any let-up in the crackdown, at least as long as the war lasts. A non-competitive election will approve another term for Putin in March. No credible candidates are allowed to oppose him, and recently an anti-war politician who’d unexpectedly emerged to provide a focus for dissent was banned from standing. Last year the government amended laws to further restrict media coverage of the election, making it very hard to report on electoral fraud.

Weak or strong?

For a time last year Putin seemed weakened when his former ally Yevgeny Prigozhin rebelled, marching his Wagner Group mercenaries on Moscow. The two sides agreed a deal to end the dispute, and sure enough, two months later, Prigozhin died in a suspicious plane crash.

Putin has reasserted his authority. He may be gaining the upper hand in the war. Russia has greater firepower and is largely surviving attempts to isolate it financially, with repressive regimes such as China, India and Turkey picking up the slack in demand for its fossil fuels. It’s turned itself into a Soviet-style war economy, with state spending strongly focused on the military effort, although that can’t be long-term sustainable. Some of the world’s most authoritarian governments – Iran and North Korea – are also supplying weapons.

In comparison, Ukrainian forces are running out of ammunition. Support for Ukraine’s effort has come under greater strain due to political shifts in Europe and the breaking of political consensus in the USA, with Trump-affiliated Republicans working to block further military aid.

Putin may be riding high, but such is the level of state control it’s hard to get an accurate picture of how popular he is, and the election will offer no evidence. Given repression, protest levels may not tell the full story either – but some have still broken out, including those in response to Navalny’s death.

A vital current of dissent has formed around unhappiness with war losses. Last September, an independent poll suggested that support for the war was at a record low. Morale among Russian troops is reportedly poor and deserters have called on others to quit. Families of men serving in the military have held protests demanding the fighting ends.

Protesters have offered other recent moments of opposition. In November, people held a demonstration in Siberia against a local initiative to further restrict protests. In January, in Baymak in southern Russia, hundreds protested at the jailing of an activist. There’s also domestic unhappiness at high inflation.

Moments don’t make a movement, but they can offer inspiration that turns into one, and that often happens unexpectedly. Putin’s story is far from over. As with tyrants before, he’ll likely look invincible until just before he falls.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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Pakistan’s Election Outcomes Leave Many Unhappy

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LONDON, Feb 22 2024 (IPS) – Pakistan’s 8 February election has resulted in an uneasy compromise that few wanted or expected. There’s little indication the outcome is going to reverse recent regression in civic freedoms.

Army calls the shots

Around 128 million people can vote in Pakistan, but it’s the army, the sixth-biggest in the world, that’s always had the upper hand. In recent decades, it’s preferred to exert its power by strongly influencing the civilian government rather than outright military rule. Prime ministers have allied with the military to win power and been forced out when disagreements set in. No prime minister has ever served a full term.

In April 2022, Prime Minister Imran Khan was ousted through a parliamentary vote of no-confidence. But it was common knowledge this was the military’s will. Khan, having cosied up to the generals to come to power in 2018, had publicly and vocally fallen out with them over economic and foreign policy. He had to go.

Khan’s fall from grace was swift. He survived an assassination attempt in November 2022. In December 2023, he was barred from running in the election. Just ahead of voting he was found guilty in three separate trials, with the longest sentence being 14 years. Bushara Bibi, Khan’s wife, was jailed too.

The army turned to a former foe, Nawaz Sharif, three times previously prime minister. After he last fell out of favour in 2017, he was forced out and found guilty of corruption. Yet for this election he’d evidently patched things up enough to become the army’s favoured anti-Khan candidate.

A catalogue of restrictions

But voters didn’t go along with the army’s choice. Candidates running as independents but affiliated with Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party won the most seats, albeit short of an outright majority. Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) came second, with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), its partner in the 2022 coalition of convenience that replaced Khan, third.

This was a shock result, given the obstacles placed in the PTI’s way. The government postponed the election from November to February so, it said, it could hold a census. The suspicion was that the move was to allow more time to prosecute Khan and lean on his party’s politicians to swap allegiances.

Sure enough, some PTI representatives were banned from standing and others faced harassment and violence seeking to persuade them to distance themselves from Khan. In the biggest blow, PTI candidates were banned from using Khan’s cricket bat symbol on ballot papers. Symbols are crucial for mobilising party support, since over 40 per cent of people are unable to read. PTI candidates were forced to run as independents.

There was never any prospect of equal space for campaigning. Last year, the media regulator applied a de facto ban on mentioning Khan’s name on TV. In August 2023, it directed TV channels not to give airtime to 11 people, among them Khan and journalists considered sympathetic towards him. As the election neared, the military interfered in the media on a daily basis, telling them which stories to run.

Given these constraints, and the near impossibility of holding physical rallies, PTI used online opportunities. Khan kept up a virtual presence through AI-generated videos. WhatsApp was used to inform PTI supporters which independent candidates to vote for.

But constraints came here too. When the PTI organised an online rally in December, authorities blocked access to major social media platforms and slowed the internet down. On election day, they imposed a full internet and mobile data shutdown for the first time in Pakistan’s electoral history. The authorities claimed they’d done so on security grounds – the Islamic State terrorist group carried out two deadly bombings the day before – but it made independent oversight of voting and counting much harder. Further restrictions on Twitter followed after the results were out.

This pressure on the PTI and its supporters came on top of the ongoing repression of civic freedoms by successive governments. Pakistani authorities have continued to criminalise, threaten and harass human rights activists, restrict online freedoms, intimidate journalists, censor media and violently repress peaceful protests, particularly by women’s rights activists and people from the Baloch and Pashtun ethnic groups.

Uncertainty ahead

Despite the highly unlevel playing field, results show that many took the opportunity the election offered to communicate discontent with military influence, a political establishment dominated by two families and the dire economic conditions. A youthful population has found something appealing in Khan’s fiery populist rhetoric.

But what’s resulted is something few voters likely wanted. The PML-N and PPP quickly announced a resumption of their coalition. The PML-N’s Shehbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s brother, is set to return as prime minister. It would appear to be a coalition united by little more than a determination to keep the PTI out of power, suggesting a weak and fractious government will result.

Strong opposition can be expected. PTI supporters aren’t accepting this quietly. The party claims rigged votes denied it more seats. Thousands have protested and numerous legal cases have been filed. Their claims were given credence when an official in Rawalpindi stepped forward to say he’d been involved in election rigging. One politician from a minor party also announced he was renouncing his seat because the vote had been rigged to exclude the PTI-backed candidate.

Khan is no democratic hero. When he was in power and enjoyed the military’s favour, he used the same tools of repression now being applied to him and his party. Civic space conditions worsened under Khan and there’s been no let-up since.

The bigger problem is a system where the military calls the shots, sets the parameters that elected governments must stay within and actively works to suppress dissent. With many young voters angry and wanting change, problems can only be building up for the future. It’s vital that civic space be opened up so people have peaceful means to express dissent, seek change and hold power to account.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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Myanmar’s Military Catastrophe: Three Years and Counting

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LONDON, Feb 1 2024 (IPS) – The military must have expected an easier ride. Three years ago, it ousted Myanmar’s democratically elected government. But the coup has been met with fierce resistance, unleashing a bloody conflict with no end in sight.

Civil society has scrambled to respond to humanitarian needs, defend human rights and seek a path to peace. Last year, civil society organisations in Myanmar and the region developed and endorsed a five-point agenda that calls for an international response to end military violence, including through sanctions, an arms embargo and a referral of Myanmar to the International Criminal Court – a call the UN Security Council hasn’t so far heeded.

Civil society is also demanding that the key regional body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), takes the conflict more seriously and engages beyond the junta, particularly with democratic forces and civil society.

So far civil society’s calls haven’t been heard. But intensifying violence proves that the approaches tried to far have failed. Staying on the same path is a recipe for further carnage.

Violence and repression

Three years on from the coup, the military doesn’t control significant sections of the ethnically diverse country. People’s defence forces are fighting an armed campaign in support of the ousted National Unity Government, often in alliance with long-established ethnic militia groups.

In October 2023, three armed groups in Myanmar’s north joined the conflict against the junta, forming the Brotherhood Alliance. The resulting offensive in Shan state saw the rebels capture the border town of Laukkai and cut off key trading routes with China. The UN stated that this was the biggest escalation in fighting since the coup. A ceasefire in the region was supposedly agreed in January following China-brokered talks, but fighting resumed.

It seems clear the junta won’t win this conflict any time soon. Morale among armed forces is collapsing and soldiers defecting, deserting or surrendering in growing numbers. Even pro-junta voices on social media have begun to criticise military leaders.

Pushed into a corner, the military is lashing out, committing mass killings, burning villages and unleashing indiscriminate airstrikes to compensate for its struggles on the ground. The deadliest strike so far came in April 2023, when 168 people, including 40 children, were reported killed in the village of Pa Zi Gyi.

This was no one-off. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has reported that the junta continues to bomb hospitals, schools, villages and camps for displaced people. Attacks on civilians include mass killings, torture, sexual violence and forced labour, and the junta also obstructs essential humanitarian aid supplies.

In September 2023, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, condemned this violence as ‘inhumanity in its vilest form’. Research suggests that most of the military’s senior commanders are responsible for war crimes.

The humanitarian impacts are deep. By the end of 2023, over 2.6 million people had been displaced, 628,000 of them since the Brotherhood Alliance launched its campaign. The UN assesses that 18.6 million need humanitarian help and 5.3 million need it urgently. But aid workers are being targeted: at least 142 were arrested or detained last year.

The restriction of humanitarian work is part of wider repression. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a human rights organisation, reports that since the coup 4,468 people have been killed by the junta and pro-military groups. Almost 20,000 people are in detention, among them many activists and protesters charged with offences such as treason and sedition. Torture in prison is widespread, and 34 political prisoners died in detention in 2023.

The junta is doing everything it can to try to control the narrative. It’s believed that 64 journalists are currently detained. Internet shutdowns, website blocking and arrests for social media comments are routine occurrences. Last November, the junta took control of the Broadcasting Council, which oversees TV and radio outlets.

In August 2023, the junta extended the state of emergency, in effect since the coup, for a further six months. The elections that it promised on seizing power are nowhere in sight, and even if they eventually come, they won’t serve any purpose other than trying to legitimise military power.

International action needed

The junta faces strong domestic opposition and has no real international legitimacy but crucially, pressure from the regional body is weak.

ASEAN claims to be following a long-discredited plan, the Five-Point Consensus, which dates back to April 2021. The violence unleashed by the junta against civilians shows it can’t be trusted to act in good faith, but ASEAN still claims to believe it’s possible to involve it in an ‘inclusive dialogue’. At its annual summit in May 2023, ASEAN members reiterated their support for the failed plan, despite civil society’s calls.

ASEAN members are mostly repressive states, and some, including Cambodia and Thailand, have shown signs of seeking to normalise relations with the junta. ASEAN continues to allow junta representatives to attend some of its meetings. This year’s chair, Laos, is an authoritarian state that will have no interest in restoring democracy in Myanmar.

Elsewhere, however, the junta may be running out of friends. China was untroubled by military rule, but it doesn’t want unrest on its border. A potential breakthrough came from the US government in October 2023, when it imposed sanctions on the previously untouchable Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the state-owned corporation that’s the regime’s main source of foreign income. The European Union also stepped up its sanctions in December 2023, including against two companies providing arms and generating income for the junta.

It remains essential to keep the junta diplomatically isolated and to cut economic relations with the many companies it depends on, including MOGE. It’s vital to stop supplying arms to the junta and, above all, to stop selling it the jet fuel it needs to carry out airstrikes.

A UN Human Rights Council resolution adopted in April 2023 condemned the junta’s violence but failed to call for responses such as bans on the sale of weapons or aviation fuel. Events since then have made it sadly clear that decisive action can no longer wait.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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Serbia’s Suspicious Election

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LONDON, Jan 26 2024 (IPS) – Serbia’s December 2023 elections saw the ruling party retain power – but amid a great deal of controversy.

Civil society has cried foul about irregularities in the parliamentary election, but particularly the municipal election in the capital, Belgrade. In recent times Belgrade has been a hotbed of anti-government protests. That’s one of the reasons it’s suspicious that the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) came first in the city election.

Allegations are that the SNS had ruling party supporters from outside Belgrade temporarily register as city residents so they could cast votes. On election day, civil society observers documented large-scale movements of people into Belgrade, from regions where municipal elections weren’t being held and from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Civil society documented irregularities at 14 per cent of Belgrade voting stations. Many in civil society believe this made the crucial difference in stopping the opposition winning.

The main opposition coalition, Serbia Against Violence (SPN), which made gains but finished second, has rejected the results. It’s calling for a rerun, with proper safeguards to prevent any repeat of irregularities.

Thousands have taken to the streets of Belgrade to protest about electoral manipulation, rejecting the violation of the most basic principle of democracy – that the people being governed have the right to elect their representatives.

A history of violations

The SNS has held power since 2012. It blends economic neoliberalism with social conservatism and populism, and has presided over declining respect for civic space and media freedoms. In recent years, Serbian environmental activists have been subjected to physical attacks. President Aleksandar Vučić attempted to ban the 2022 EuroPride LGBTQI+ rights march. Journalists have faced public vilification, intimidation and harassment. Far-right nationalist and anti-rights groups have flourished and also target LGBTQI+ people, civil society and journalists.

The SNS has a history of electoral irregularities. The December 2023 vote was a snap election, called just over a year and a half since the previous vote in April 2022, which re-elected Vučić as president. In 2022, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) pointed to an ‘uneven playing field’, characterised by close ties between major media outlets and the government, misuse of public resources, irregularities in campaign financing and pressure on public sector staff to support the SNS.

These same problems were seen in December 2023. Again, the OSCE concluded there’d been systemic SNS advantages. Civil society observers found evidence of vote buying, political pressure on voters, breaches of voting security and pressure on election observers. During the campaign, civil society groups were vilified, opposition officials were subjected to physical and verbal attacks and opposition rallies were prevented.

But the ruling party has denied everything. It’s slurred civil society for calling out irregularities, accusing activists of trying to destabilise Serbia.

Backdrop of protests

The latest vote was called following months of protests against the government. These were sparked by anger at two mass shootings in May 2023 in which 17 people were killed.

The shootings focused attention on the high number of weapons still in circulation after the wars that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia and the growing normalisation of violence, including by the government and its supporters.

Protesters accused state media of promoting violence and called for leadership changes. They also demanded political resignations, including of education minister Branko Ružić, who disgracefully tried to blame the killings on ‘western values’ before being forced to quit. Prime Minister Ana Brnabić blamed foreign intelligence services for fuelling protests. State media poured abuse on protesters.

These might have seemed odd circumstances for the SNS to call elections. But election campaigns have historically played to Vučić’s strengths as a campaigner and give him some powerful levers, with normal government activities on hold and the machinery of the state and associated media at his disposal.

Only this time it seems the SNS didn’t think all its advantages would be quite enough and, in Belgrade at least, upped its electoral manipulation to the point where it became hard to ignore.

East and west

There’s little pressure from Serbia’s partners to both east and west. Its far-right and socially conservative forces are staunchly pro-Russia, drawing on ideas of a greater Slavic identity. Russian connections run deep. In the last census, 85 per cent of people identified themselves as affiliated with the Serbian Orthodox Church, strongly in the sway of its Russian counterpart, in turn closely integrated with Russia’s repressive machinery.

The Serbian government relies on Russian support to prevent international recognition of Kosovo. Russian officials were only too happy to characterise post-election protests as western attempts at unrest, while Prime Minister Brnabić thanked Russian intelligence services for providing information on planned opposition activities.

But states that sit between the EU and Russia are being lured on both sides. Serbia is an EU membership candidate. The EU wants to keep it onside and stop it drifting closer to Russia, so EU states have offered little criticism.

Serbia keeps performing its balancing act, gravitating towards Russia while doing just enough to keep in with the EU. In the 2022 UN resolution on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it voted to condemn Russia’s aggression and suspend it from the Human Rights Council. But it’s resisted calls to impose sanctions on Russia and in 2022 signed a deal with Russia to consult on foreign policy issues.

The European Parliament is at least prepared to voice concerns. In a recent debate, many of its members pointed to irregularities and its observation mission noted problems including media bias, phantom voters and vilification of election observers.

Other EU institutions should acknowledge what happened in Belgrade. They should raise concerns about electoral manipulation and defend democracy in Serbia. To do so, they need to support and work with civil society. An independent and enabled civil society will bring much-needed scrutiny and accountability. This must be non-negotiable for the EU.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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Guatemala’s Chance for a New Beginning

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MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jan 18 2024 (IPS) – Guatemala’s new president, Bernardo Arévalo, was expected to be sworn in on 14 January at 2pm –the 14th at 14:00, as people repeated in anticipation for months. It was a momentous event – but it wasn’t guaranteed to happen.

One year earlier, Arévalo – co-founder of the progressive Movimiento Semilla (Seed Movement), a political party born out of widespread 2015 anti-corruption protests – was largely unknown, freshly selected as his party’s presidential candidate. He wasn’t on the radar of opinion polls. A long chain of unlikely events later, he’s become the first Guatemalan president in living memory who doesn’t belong to the self-serving elites who Guatemalans call ‘the corrupt pact’, which he has credibly promised to dismantle.

The fear this caused among corrupt elite that has long ruled Guatemala was reflected in a series of attempts to try to stop Arévalo’s inauguration. The huge and sustained citizen mobilisation that came in response can largely be credited with keeping alive the spark of democracy in Guatemala.

Last-minute delays

All the Guatemalan Congress needed to do on the morning of 14 January was certify its newly elected members so the body could swear in the new president. But this routine administrative procedure was dragged on for many hours. The Indigenous movement, at the forefront of the months-long protests that had successfully kept at bay successive attempts to reverse the election results, called on Indigenous communities throughout Guatemala to remain on the alert.

In the late afternoon the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Luis Almagro, surrounded by members of numerous foreign delegations, read a declaration calling on Congress to hand over power, ‘as required by the Constitution’, to the president-elect. This signalled that the world was watching.

As tensions mounted, Semilla reached an agreement for one of its representatives to be elected as president of Congress. This allowed the certification process to resume, and Arévalo was finally sworn in shortly after midnight. Night-long celebrations followed.

A coup attempt in stages

Arévalo’s election was unexpected. He only made it into the 20 August runoff because several other contenders not to the elite’s liking had been disqualified ahead of the first round. His candidacy wasn’t blocked because he scored so poorly in the polls. People’s expectations were extremely low, and first place went to invalid votes.

But once Arévalo entered the runoff, his rise was unstoppable. Death threats soon poured in, and an assassination plot involving state and non-state forces came to light days before the runoff.

As soon as the first-round results were announced, nine parties submitted complaints about supposed ‘irregularities’ that had gone undetected by all international observers. Their supporters converged outside the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) calling for a rerun.

The Constitutional Court instead ordered a recount and instructed the TSE to suspend official certification until complaints were resolved. Following the recount, the TSE eventually endorsed the results two weeks later.

But meanwhile, Attorney General Consuelo Porras Argueta, an official under US sanctions for corruption, launched an investigation into Semilla for alleged irregularities in its registration process and had its offices raided. She also ordered two raids on TSE offices, and when the TSE officially announced Arévalo as one of the runoff contenders, she ordered Semilla’s suspension. The Constitutional Court however blocked this order and the runoff ran its course. Arévalo took 58 per cent of the vote, compared to 37.2 per cent for the pro-establishment candidate.

Efforts to stop Arévalo’s inauguration began immediately, with yet another attempt by the Public Prosecutor to have Semilla suspended. The Constitutional Court continued to receive and reject legal challenges until the day of the inauguration.

For 100 days, two different visions of Guatemala wrestled with each other: people eager for change protested nonstop while corrupt forces linked to organised crime strove to preserve their privileges at any cost.

Democracy on life support

Guatemala has long been classified as a ‘hybrid regime‘ with a mix of democratic and authoritarian traits. Under outgoing president Alejandro Giammattei, civic freedoms steadily deteriorated. State institutions grew even weaker, ransacked by predatory elites and coopted by organised crime.

One of the last acts of Giammattei’s predecessor and ally, Jimmy Morales, was to end the work of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Charged with supporting and strengthening state institutions to investigate and prosecute serious crimes, CICIG helped file over 120 cases in the Guatemalan justice system and its joint investigations with the Attorney General’s Office led to over 400 convictions.

Under Giammattei, the Attorney General’s Office dismantled all anti-corruption efforts and criminalised those in the legal profession who’d worked alongside CICIG. Impunity flourished. Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index found evidence of strong influence by organised crime over politics and politicians, with some crime bosses seeking and securing office.

It’s no wonder that Guatemalans’ trust in state institutions hit rock bottom. According to the latest Latinobarómetro report, in 2021 satisfaction with the performance of democracy stood at a meagre 25 per cent.

Challenges ahead

Arévalo came to the presidency on a credible anti-corruption platform. But dismantling dense webs of complicity, rooting out entrenched corruption and rebuilding state institutions are no easy tasks.

Among the many challenges is a highly fragmented Congress in which 16 parties are represented, with Semilla on only 23 out of 160 seats. A large majority of Congress remains on the payroll of the interests Arévalo has promised to take on, along with most of the justice system. The 14 January events made clear that the ‘corrupt pact’ will do anything it can to stop Arévalo.

Arévalo’s to-do list is long, ranging from reducing political spending and improving social services to reversing laws that criminalise protest and establishing an effective protection mechanism for human rights defenders. At the top is forcing the resignation of Attorney General Consuelo Porras, the highest official presiding over a judicial network set up to ensure the impunity of the ‘corrupt pact’.

Arévalo can’t remove the Attorney General unilaterally, and so will have to negotiate her departure. This will be a key early test of the hope invested in him to keep democracy alive. Many more are sure to come.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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Iran, Back to the Grim Normal

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MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jan 16 2024 (IPS) – Iran’s time of public rebellion has ended. The protesters marching, chanting, and dancing under the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ banner have long stopped. And shifting regional dynamics may play to the regime’s favour.

Protest wave repressed

The wave of protest against the theocratic regime started on 16 September 2022 and lasted far longer than anyone could have predicted. But by the one-year mark it had all but died down, its unprecedented scale and reach superseded by the unparalleled brutality of the crackdown.

The regime murdered hundreds of protesters, injured thousands and arrested tens of thousands. It subjected many to torture, sexual abuse and denial of medical treatment while in detention.

It weaponised the criminal justice system, holding express trials behind closed doors in ‘revolutionary courts’ presided over by clerics, with zero procedural guarantees. It sentenced hundreds – including journalists – to years in jail and handed out several death sentences. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, some of the human rights violations committed by the regime could constitute crimes against humanity.

Shortly after the first anniversary of the protests, on 6 October, it was announced that the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize had been awarded to Narges Mohammadi, an imprisoned Iranian woman activist with 20 years of struggle for democracy, human rights and women’s rights under her belt. Over the years, she’d been arrested 13 times, sentenced to 31 years in prison and 154 lashes, and been in prison three times. She received the news behind bars.

Ahead of the anniversary, afraid of protests returning, the theocratic regime put back on the streets the morality police whose intervention had resulted in Mahsa Amini’s death. Conservatives proposed a new ‘hijab and chastity’ law that would impose a stricter dress code and harsher penalties for violations.

The reinforcement of morality rules soon claimed its next victim. On 1 October, high school student Armita Garawand was left unconscious, reportedly assaulted by a hijab enforcer for not wearing a headscarf. She remained in a coma for several weeks before dying on 28 October. At her funeral mourners were assaulted and dozens were arrested, including well-known human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh.

Succession

Battered but unbeaten, the Iranian regime views upcoming legislative elections as part of its road to recovery. On 1 March, people will be called on to vote for all 290 members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The key battle will be over turnout, which was already down to 42 per cent in 2020 – the lowest since the 1979 revolution. That record could be shattered, as opposition and reformists call for abstention or boycott.

Along with parliamentary elections, in March Iran will hold elections for the Council of Experts, the body of clerics that appoints Iran’s Supreme Leader. The Council has recently faced criticism for its lax oversight of 84-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s performance, and might have to step in relatively soon.

In power since 1989, Khamenei is in a race against the clock. Bent on ensuring that the theocracy he largely built stands strong after he’s gone, he’s preparing his 54-year-old second son to succeed him. But the ongoing economic crisis may conspire against his plans. The cumulative impacts of international sanctions, fluctuating oil prices, mismanagement and rampant corruption have fuelled inflation and unemployment, and discontent runs high.

To prevent accumulated grievances from translating into mass protest, the regime will likely try to tread a fine line between displaying indestructible power and offering minor concessions.

Regional balance shifts

When the protests erupted international support poured in. People around the world showed solidarity with Iranian women and called on their governments to act. Early on, the USA imposed sanctions on the morality police and several senior leaders of the force and other security agencies. New sanctions by the European Union, UK and USA were announced on the eve of the anniversary of the protests.

On International Women’s Day in 2023, a group of Afghan and Iranian women launched the End Gender Apartheid campaign, which seeks recognition and condemnation of the two regimes as based on gender apartheid. They want the 1973 UN Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, which so far applies only to racial hierarchies, extended to gender. The campaign wants this specific and extreme form of exclusion to be codified as a crime under international law so those responsible can be prosecuted and punished.

There was hope that such moves would foster action to hold those responsible to account. Civil society called for the creation of a dedicated accountability mechanism to work alongside the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran.

But on 7 October, as Armita lay in a coma, the paramilitary wings of Hamas launched their attacks into Israeli territory, and global attention shifted to this outrage and Israel’s murderous campaign of revenge. As a key source of support for Hamas, Iran was far from out of the spotlight – but condemnation of theocracy and gender apartheid now took a back seat to geopolitical considerations.

Khamenei publicly stated that Iran wasn’t involved in the 7 October attacks, and although he reiterated Iran’s political and moral support for Hamas, he reportedly told Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh that Iran wouldn’t directly intervene unless it was attacked by Israel or the USA. But Iran’s leadership of the anti-Israeli and anti-western ‘Axis of Resistance’ and the key role it can play in either expanding or limiting the scope of the conflict means it will be included in any attempt to redefine the regional order, and could well emerge stronger.

Amid the chaos and in the search for security, the international community might be increasingly willing to look the other way. Iran’s search for international respectability saw a milestone in November, when it took advantage of other states’ lack of interest to claim the chair of the UN Human Rights Council’s Social Forum. The result was a largely empty room – but it remains the case that Iran succeeded in occupying institutional space to whitewash its blood-soaked image.

This mustn’t be allowed to happen. Iranian women mustn’t be left to their own devices. Iranian pro-democracy and human rights activists, both inside and outside Iran, need the support of the international community if they’re to have any chance.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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