PARIS, Feb 17 2025 (IPS) – The world is witnessing a dangerous retreat from international solidarity by Global Minority countries. From Washington to Brussels, governments are slashing funds that sustain human rights, democracy, and humanitarian initiatives.
The U.S. foreign aid freeze, the European Union’s cut in development spending, and Belgium’s reduction in foreign aid all reflect a broader trend in countries with far-right elected governments of prioritizing domestic politics over global responsibility and solidarity.
Some may argue this is simply an abstract budgetary issue. But these funding cuts translate into real-life lost jobs, shuttered programs, and the most marginalized communities being left without vital support.
They send a clear signal: governments, even those once seen as champions of human rights, are redefining their external priorities and turning inward. The consequences will be devastating, particularly for Global Majority countries, where local organizations are already struggling to survive.
But this crisis is not inevitable. Philanthropy, civil society, and remaining international allies must step up not just to fill financial gaps but to rethink global solidarity and how civil society is funded, protected, and sustained in the long term.
The dangerous trend around funding cuts
Far-right governments and their growing global influence are driving these decisions. The U.S. foreign aid suspension is part of a broader pattern of governments scaling back support for civil society and humanitarian initiatives.
Similarly, the European Union’s decision to cut its development spending by 2 billion euros over the next three years will reduce aid to the world’s lowest-income countries by 35%, exacerbating existing inequalities.
Belgium’s 25% cut in foreign aid mirrors this shift, as does the Netherlands’ move to reduce funding for NGOs, prioritizing themes that serve its national interests over global needs. These disruptions weaken trust in international partnerships and force organizations further into survival mode rather than allowing for long-term strategic action.
The withdrawal of funding not only to civil society and humanitarian organizations, but also to multilateral institutions will further hinder efforts to address economic inequality and climate change for all.
Although it will take time to fully assess the impact of these recent decisions, we can already foresee their magnitude in terms of humanitarian assistance, but also in terms of human rights, democracy and global governance.
The U.S. 90-day foreign aid freeze alone has halted critical funding for international development organizations and federal contractors delivering humanitarian assistance worldwide. Thousands of jobs will be lost, and many organizations may not survive the freeze due to a lack of reserve funds.
Beyond economic devastation, the crisis is deeply human. Hospitals that once provided essential care are shutting down, perishable food supplies are going to waste, and communities are left without lifesaving support.
The full impact on human rights and democracy may take longer to materialize, but we already see the warning signs: fewer resources for independent media, greater exposure for vulnerable activists, and increasing shrinking spaces for civil society.
This funding retreat is particularly dangerous for civil society organizations operating in repressive environments. Countries where civic space is already under immense pressure will become even more vulnerable, putting human rights defenders and activists at higher risk.
According to the CIVICUS Monitor, 72.4% of the world’s population lives in countries where civic space is repressed or closed. The message these funding cuts send to authoritarian and repressive states is clear: civil society is no longer a priority for Western democracies that once invested in the protection and promotion of civic space.
The role of philanthropy
Private foundations and philanthropic institutions must fill the gaps left by bilateral funders, providing flexible and rapid funding to sustain critical work. While the shortfall is vast, philanthropy must rise to the occasion to prevent the collapse of vital organizations and initiatives.
Emergency grants are needed to sustain operations, protect staff, and support security-related expenses such as safe houses, legal aid and physical and digital protection. Without this intervention, our ability to advocate for democracy, justice, and human rights for all will be severely diminished. Investments must prioritize local actors, ensuring they have the resources to lead, innovate, and sustain their work beyond donor-driven priorities.
Rethinking global solidarity
This moment calls for a fundamental rethinking of global solidarity. The traditional donor-recipient model is currently showing its limits. In this time of crisis, we must recognize that the challenges faced by civil society globally are shared, and the responsibility to support those in need should be mutually distributed rather than concentrated in a few high-income countries.
We should foster collaborative, co-designed solutions where all partners, North and South, large and small, share the risks and rewards of international development efforts.
This is where the power of coalitions and alliances like CIVICUS comes in. In the face of growing fear and retribution, many individuals and organizations, both in the U.S. and abroad, are afraid to speak out. CIVICUS and other global alliances and coalitions must step in to amplify the voices of those who fear retaliation and support those on the ground fighting for justice.
This moment demands not just financial resources but a renewed commitment to our shared values. This crisis might be ripping the guts out of the international aid system, but it cannot take the heart out of solidarity.
Conclusion
This moment is a stress test for global civil society. If donor-driven priorities continue to dictate the fate of grassroots organizations, social and activist movements, and civil society organizations, we will see the erosion of human rights, justice, and democracy worldwide.
The question is not just how to survive these cuts, but how to build a model of solidarity that is independent of political whims.
At the same time, this is a moment for introspection and transformation within civil society itself. Circumstances demand that we explore alternative means of resource mobilization, adapt to new challenges, and build resilience that is not solely dependent on traditional funding structures.
Now more than ever, we must reaffirm our commitment to global solidarity not as a charitable act, but as an existential necessity for a just and sustainable future.
Jessica Corredor Villamil is Chief Officer, Advocacy and Solidarity Action at CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance. She is based in Paris.
GEBZE, Turkiye, Feb 17 2025 (IPS) – The 4th International Conference on Financing for Development could catalyse coordinated action to close the financing gap and set the stage for a STI-driven transformation in the world’s poorest countries.
The stark reality is that just over 250 weeks remain to go before the end of the decade, marking the endgame for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). With less than a fifth of the Goals on track, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) or the world’s poorest countries urgently need bold, innovative financing for science, technology and innovation (STI) to re-set their development trajectories and salvage the 2030 Agenda.
In June/July this year, the Spanish city of Seville will host the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development, or FfD4. The last such summit was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2015, the same year the SDGs were agreed.
Since then, the development financing gap has widened as has the divide between the richest and poorest countries across the globe. The financing gap – the amount of money required to achieve the SDGs and the resources that have been committed – is now estimated at $4.2 trillion annually.
The silver lining could be golden for the world’s most vulnerable
Notably, this past decade has seen astonishingly rapid developments in STI, spanning areas such as biotech, artificial intelligence, machine learning, green technologies and satellite connectivity. These breakthroughs, largely driven by digital technologies, have created immense wealth for a few.
According to Oxfam, five individuals will reach trillionaire status before the close of 2029, while the number of people living in poverty has remained stubbornly high since 1990. Yet for the 700 million people in the margins, this progress has not translated into better opportunities.
For them, these developments in STI could be truly transformational. There’s no better time than now to close the inequality gap and harness these assets for the benefit of all.
“There is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come”- Victor Hugo
The concept of a dedicated global fund for STI has never been fully operationalized at scale, but the idea is not new. The United Nations, UNESCO, the World Bank, the African Union, the G77 and China have all proposed the idea of an STI funding pool, suggesting growing momentum and backing for such a mechanism.
However, it is important to push the envelope and make the case for such a fund exclusively for the LDCs. June/July’s high-level summit on financing for development could provide the coordination and impetus it needs to get started. With the key global players in attendance, this summit could be a pivotal moment to bring the idea of a STI fund to life.
What the world’s 44 least developed countries (LDCs) need.
A global fund for STI should focus on financing three priorities: Boosting the capacity of institutions in LDCs; closing the skills gap; and creating an enabling environment for STI to flourish.
Economic resilience and structural change depend upon strong productive capacity which is driven by equally strong national institutions that can effectively implement pro-growth strategies and technology. Tech transfer and skills building will only support development if a country’s institutions can take advantage of the technologies they need. This aligns with the imperative to upskill and reskill workers in LDCs.
With just under half of their citizens having no access to electricity and only a third able to access the internet, it is imperative that countries are supported with vital, enabling development infrastructure. Additionally, a grant financing facility to bolster centres of excellence in the Global South would enable countries to effect game-changing outcomes in critical areas such as climate change, agriculture, and business development.
Why a global STI fund is a smart investment
Investing in the tech capacities of LDCs is not only a moral obligation but makes good business sense. High levels of inequality limit access to education and skills, undermining social mobility and economic growth in the world’s 44 LDCs. Rapid economic growth and development in these countries – with their massive market of over one billion people – represents an equally massive opportunity for countries in the global South and also for developed countries.
Investing in a dedicated STI fund would pave the way for long-term sustainable development in LDCs, providing opportunities for collaboration, harnessing the talent of their youthful populations and opening up new markets.
The Financing for Development summit as a catalyst for coordinated action
This decade began with a global pandemic that wrought havoc on economies worldwide, particularly the most vulnerable. Those who didn’t have the buffers to bounce back continue to struggle to meet basic development objectives and as a result, the SDG promises of 2015 remain elusive.
The 4th International Conference on Financing for Development presents a unique opportunity to focus on STI as an essential driver for development. The summit could catalyse coordinated action to close the financing gap and set the stage for a STI-driven transformation in the world’s poorest countries.
As we approach the final stretch of the 2030 Agenda, the need for solutions has never been more obvious. Investing in a global STI fund for LDCs is not just about making a big difference for the people in the poorest and most vulnerable countries, it also makes good business sense.
Deodat Maharaj is the Managing Direct0r of the United Nations Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries and can be reached at: deodat.maharaj@un.org
Residents walk next to a vehicle with M23 fighters in Bukavu on February 16, 2025. M23 fighters entered the DR Congo provincial capital of Bukavu on February 14, 2025. [AFP]
For decades, Congo’s eastern regions of North and South Kivu have been a tinderbox waiting to catch fire — and those willing to light a match were many and varied.
History has been rhyming in that vast country, where the more things seem to change, the more they stay the same.
The players of the ongoing war that started in earnest last month — Tutsis and Hutus and their allies, including Rwandan and Congolese governments, as well as mercenaries — are more or less the same.
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The setting is the same as it was in the 1990s. Yesterday’s accusations, counter-accusations, grievances and modi operandi are the same as today.
As ever, Congolese civilians are being killed in their thousands and displaced in their hundreds of thousands.
And the international community is as confused and complicit as before.
If in the 1996 war, forces from Uganda, Angola, Burundi and African American mercenaries fought alongside Rwanda. Today, Burundi, South Africa and European mercenaries are fighting for Congo.
Unlike the past, though, Rwanda and its Tutsi proxies, who’re tacitly supported by Uganda, are fighting alone this time around.
The ongoing war in eastern Congo has many similarities to the 1996 Rwanda-led offensive that eventually toppled Mobutu Sese Seko a year later.
At the time, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame argued that Hutu militiamen, many of whom were perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in his country, were using refugee camps in Eastern Congo as bases to try to retake power from his Tutsi-led government.
To avert such a possibility, Rwanda trained and armed Congolese Tutsis, who were victims of Congolese Hutus and their government, and finally sent its troops across the border to finish the job.
Whether Kagame harbours similar intentions now is far from clear. Nor is it clear whether the current war would spark a regional war, as it did in 1998.
But, ominous signs are everywhere: Rwanda and Congo are trading accusations.
The world’s big powers are distracted by wars in Europe, the Middle East and Sudan. The US that once acted as the world’s police is more concerned about its own internal affairs, as President Donald Trump is busy remaking his country.
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On Feburary 7, 2025, almost two weeks after Rwandan-backed rebel group, M23, seized the major city of Goma, James Ngango, Rwanda’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva, said that an “imminent” large-scale attack against Rwanda was being hatched in Congo before the rebels captured Goma, a city of two million people.
Ngango accused a Kinshasa-backed coalition of stockpiling a large number of weapons and military equipment near Rwanda’s border, especially around Goma’s airport.
Ngango’s claim was akin to Kagame’s 1996’s raison d’être that Hutus were trying to invade Rwanda.
Prior to the 1996 invasion of Congo, Rwanda had two main concerns: refugee camps in eastern Congo that were housing Hutu extremists and laxity by the UN.
“It is my strong belief that the United Nations people are trying to deflect the blame for failures of their own making onto us,” Kagame, who was then vice president and defence minister, told a Washington Post reporter in 1997.
“Their failure to act in eastern Zaire (now Congo) directly caused these problems, and when things blew up in their faces they blamed us. These are people who want to be judges and nobody can judge them.”
Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Corporation said the war “was triggered by constant violations of ceasefire by the Congolese Armed Forces in coalition with UN sanctioned militia FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), European mercenaries, ethnic militias (Wazalendo), Burundian armed forces, SMIDRC (the Southern African Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) forces, as well as Monusco (the French meaning of United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).”
To Rwanda, the war in eastern Congo was inevitable.
“Is there anybody among us who did not see this coming,” Kagame told his East African counterparts during a virtual meeting on January 29, 2025, that Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi skipped. “I, for one, saw it coming to be where we’re now. I saw it coming because I didn’t see who was taking charge of the process, who was listening, who was trying to provide any guide as to what we should be doing from one thing, from one day to another.”
For years, Kigali has voiced its displeasure with Kinshasa’s approach toward the M23 movement, a Tutsi ethnic group whose presence in eastern Congo served its interest.
Last month, Kagame accused East African leaders of not matching their words with action.
“We’re on one hand assuming or pretending we’re coming together over an issue and trying to find a solution, while at the same time each country is pulling in its own direction, different from others,” he said. “This is the fact of the matter.”
Our people
He accused Tshisekedi of bringing Burundi and Southern African Development Community (SADC) forces to Congo to fight his war.
“SADC was, without any doubt, coming to assist Tshisekedi to fight alongside FDLR, these murderers of our people in this country, to fight against mercenaries and to have Burundi on ethnic political basis,’’ Kagame said
‘‘They have displaced people, they have murdered people, they have persecuted on a daily basis for who they’re.”
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) lack of consistency — at one time accepting M23 as a local rebel group and another time characterising it as a foreign terrorist organisation — is the core difference between Kinshasa and Kigali, which ethnic Tutsis in East Africa look up to as their protector.
M23’s name was inspired by the unfulfilled peace treaty between the Tutsi rebel group, National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), and the Congolese government on March 23, 2009.
That deal called for, among other things, the transformation of the group into a political party and integration of its fighters into the Congolese army.
The deal fell apart after Kinshasa failed to honour it, touching off a new rebellion by a Tutsi group, now rebranded as M23.
In 2023, the M23 agreed to withdraw its fighters from North Kivu and to sue for peace during talks with Kenya’s former President Uhuru Kenyatta, who led an East African Community’s process aimed at ending the conflict in eastern Congo.
But, Kinshasa, dissatisfied with the force’s lack of military action against M23, expelled it and replaced it with another force from SADC that, according to Rwanda, worked with European mercenaries and FDLR, a group made up of the remnants of the militia that sought refugee in eastern region after carrying out the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
“There was never any discussion with East African Community about this,” a Rwandan government’s spokesperson wrote in an email to The Standard.
On December 15, 2024, weeks before the eruption of the war, Kagame skipped a scheduled meeting with Tshisekedi in Angola’s capital, Luanda, after Kinshasa rejected his request that it hold direct talks with M23.
The two leaders were expected to sign an agreement calling for the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from eastern Congo and neutralisation of FDLR.
“That summit couldn’t take place because the only item on the agenda (that was important to Rwanda) was no more,” Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe told Al Jazeera in a recent interview.
The cancellation of that meeting deepened the diplomatic row between the two neighbours and may have, retrospectively, turbocharged M23’s offensive that led to the capture of Goma, the largest city in eastern Congo, on January 26.
Since then, the group has been scything through villages and towns in eastern Congo.
The group, which now calls itself the Congo River Alliance (or its French acronym, AFC), has recently taken control of Bukavu, which points to the likely hood of the group pushing to other towns of South East DRC. It had already driven DRC forces and their allies from most of North Kivu.
Its leader, Corneille Nangaa, said his aim was to “liberate” the country from its current leaders and “give a good life” to Congolese people with “no exclusion, no discrimination.”
“Our struggle has an objective: Our objective is to go to Kinshasa because we have a vision for the people of DRC,” Nangaa told Rwanda’s New Times newspaper in an interview. He said his group’s vision was “to make Congo a business land.”
Both the UN and DRC have accused Rwandan forces of playing a role in the Goma takeover, something Rwanda didn’t explicitly address. Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye has also accused Rwanda of expansionism and of training Burundian Tutsi fighters to destabilise his country.
“People get lost in the blame game — this and that — and forget to address the root causes of the problems we have and find a solution,” Kagame said in a press conference on January 3. “And then you have geopolitics being played into all this.”
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk said nearly 3,000 people have been killed and 2,880 injured in attacks by the M23 and their allies since January 26, 2025, “with heavy weapons used in populated areas, and intense fighting against the armed forces of the DRC and their allies.”
On February 7, 2025, the World Health Organisation (WHO)said more than 70 (or six per cent) of the health facilities in North Kivu have been affected, with some completely destroyed and others struggling to restart operations.”
The rapid collapse of DRC forces is likely to weaken its bargaining power in any future negotiations with M23, a group it has been trying to eradicate since its emergence in 2012.
“Right from the start, it was evident that we’re not looking at a repeat of 2012 in terms of the type of the warfare, in terms of the brutality of the warfare, in terms of the sophistication of the weaponry that was used,” said Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, DRC’s Foreign Affairs minister, in an interview with Sans Frontieres Associates on February 10.
Kayikwamba said “this is not reminiscent of 2012 (when M23 captured Goma), but this is reminiscent of Rwanda and its tactics in eastern DRC in the late ‘90s.”
“We are looking at IDP camps being forcefully disbanded, we’re looking at people being disappeared. We’re looking at thousands of people being killed in a span of a few days,” she said, claiming that Kagame was being “emboldened by impunity” of ruling Rwanda for more than 30 years.
Rwanda’s alleged involvement in DRC echoes the 1997 invasion to overthrow Mobutu and installation of Laurent Kabila as his replacement.
That war started from eastern Congo. Then, as now, Rwandan forces and their allies swept through large swathes of the vast country without much resistance.
For its part, Rwanda has accused Kinshasa of collaborating with FDLR and of persecuting ethnic Tutsis, using regional armies and mercenaries.
“Three fundamental issues must be addressed: First, the FDLR must be neutralised as a threat. Second, Congolese Tutsi communities must be protected from persecution. Third, refugees must be able to return home safely,” said Rwanda’s government in a statement to The Standard.
The DRC has since the mid 1900s been a geopolitical plaything for foreign countries, with some as far as Eritrea and South Africa at one time meddling in its affairs.
An estimated 5.4 million people died in DRC as a result of what is called the African World War between 1998-2003 in which nine African countries took part.
The International Rescue Committee said “in terms of fatalities” the DRC war and its aftermath surpassed any other since World War II.
The mineral-rich eastern Congo, as most of DRC’s regions, has been a scene of suffering for its inhabitants and a sphere of influence for international companies and nations trying to loot its resources.
More than a dozen countries, including Burundi, Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, as well as European mercenaries, operate in eastern Congo.
As of October 2024, the UN had 10,183 soldiers and 1,324 police forces. That force was as powerless and inept as it was in 2012 when the M23 first captured Goma.
More than 100 armed groups operate in the country due to its lawlessness and the almost nonexistent infrastructure.
Rwanda’s government told The Standard that it’s ready to “work with all parties who are committed to finding a lasting solution to the instability in the region.”
It also welcomed the recent joint communiqué by leaders of East African Community and SADC that called for the “cessation of hostilities and an immediate ceasefire” and peaceful resolution of the conflict through the Luanda/Nairobi process.”
The leaders of the two blocs “emphasised that political and diplomatic engagement is the most sustainable solution to the conflict in eastern DRC” and directed their chiefs of defence forces to meet within five days and provide a technical direction on how, among other issues, hostilities could be ended and immediate ceasefire could be realised.
They also called for the “neutralization of FDLR,” a long-held demand of Rwanda, which was asked to disengage its forces from Congo as agreed in the Luanda process.
Hubert Kabasu Babu, a Congolese writer and analyst of African politics, said Tshisekedi’s refusal to talk to M23 to address its grievances and to deal with the issue of FDRL that threatens Rwanda was “incomprehensible” that only exacerbated the crisis.
He said DRC is suffering from “state degradation” that was worsened by Tshisekedi’s “predatory and oppressive authoritarian drift.”
The International Crisis Group urged European Union and its member states to press Rwanda “to accept a deal to withdraw the M23 from Goma, with its troops and proxies desisting from further advances.”
If Rwanda maintains its aggressive military posture, the group said, “Brussels should withdraw its support for the Rwandan army mission (in Mozambique) to signal its growing concern about the escalating conflict in North Kivu.”
It said two issues are vitally important for relations between Kinshasa and Brussels.
“First, tensions are mounting between Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and the opposition over his plans to change the constitution and potentially remove the current two-term limit so as to extend his stay in office,” said the group. “Secondly, while Europe is interested in enhancing its access to the DRC’s minerals, these remain a source of corruption and illicit financial flows that are hurting the country’s development.”
President Tshisekedi has repeatedly threatened to attack Rwanda and has even entertained ousting the regime there, which, in essence, could mean a new genocide in Rwanda as any potential seizure of Rwanda by Hutus is likely to trigger another bloodbath.
PESHAWAR, Pakistan, Feb 16 2025 (IPS) – “I was shocked when told by a security guard that the clinic has been closed down. I, along with my relatives, used to visit the clinic for free checkups,” Jamila Begum, 22, an Afghan woman, told IPS.
The clinic has been established by an NGO with the financial assistance of the USAID to reduce maternal complications on the outskirts of Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, one of Pakistan’s four provinces. Begum, who is near to delivering a baby, says she couldn’t afford the high fee of blood tests and ultrasound examinations in private hospitals and is concerned about her delivery. Fareeda Bibi, an Afghan refugee, is concerned too.
“We have been receiving more than a dozen Afghan women for pre- and post-natal checkups through a clinic funded by the U.S., which has now been shut down,” Bibi, a female health worker, said at a clinic on the outskirts of Peshawar.
Pakistan is home to 1.9 million Afghan refugees and most of the women seek health services in NGO-run health facilities funded by the United States.
“The Afghan women cannot visit remote hospitals and came here conveniently because we have all female staff but all of a sudden, the small clinics have been closed, leaving the population high and dry,” Bibi says. “In the past year, we have received 700 women for free check-ups and medicines, due to which they were able to stay safe from delivery-related complications.”
Jamila Khan, who runs an NGO helping women in rural settings of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, one of Pakistan’s four provinces, is also upset by the funding freeze.
“Most of the USAID’s funds were used by NGOs, who will now either be completely closed down or will look for new sources of funds. For the time being, they are struggling to continue operations after the withdrawal of promised funds,” she says.
The suspension of funds by the USAID has hit all sectors in Pakistan, a former employee of USAID, Akram Shah, told IPS.
“The 39 projects funded by the United States included energy, economic development, agriculture, democracy, human rights and governance, education, health, and humanitarian assistance. The suspension order has impacted all,” he says.
President Donald Trump’s directives of suspending USAID funding worldwide after assuming his office also brought to a standstill several projects worth over USD 845 million in Pakistan.
Shah says the abrupt funding cut will badly harm the small landowners who looked towards the USAID but now we are immensely concerned about how to go ahead with our annual plan of going crops without financial assistance.
Our farming has been worst hit as farmers banked on the financial and technical assistance provided by the U.S. to enhance agricultural productivity.
“Most farmers in rural areas have been benefitting from the USAID for a long time, as we got high-quality seeds, tools, fertilizers, etc., which helped us to grow more crops and earn for our sustenance,” Muhammad Shah, a farmer, says.
The health sector is also badly hit, as USAID’s money kept running the Integrated Health Systems Strengthening and Service Delivery Integrated Health System Program, says Dr. Raees Ahmed at the Ministry of National Health Services Regulations and Coordination.
The promised funds of USD 86 million aimed at strengthening Pakistan’s healthcare infrastructure would leave the program half finished, he says. Additionally, Pakistan was supposed to receive USD 52 million under the Global Health Supply Chain Program to ensure the availability of essential medical supplies, but it will be closed down for want of funds.
Education officer Akbar Ali says they had pinned hopes on USAID’s assistance of USD 30.7 million for the Merit and Needs-Based Scholarship Program for the poor students to continue their studies but it has become a dream now.
Ali says the inclusive democratic processes and governance projects, of which USD 15 million was promised, have been halted. The program, in which teachers were also included, was intended to enhance democratic governance and transparency.
Funds for improving governance and the administrative system in the violence-stricken tribal areas along Afghanistan’s border will also stop. The USAID had pledged USD 40.7 million.
Muhammad Wakil, a social activist, says his organization, which is working for a U.S.-funded Building Peace in Pakistan, is also suffering. The program, worth USD 9 million, aimed at fostering religious, ethnic, and political harmony, has had to close.
“We have asked our workers to stay home and have suspended at least 20 workshops scheduled this year,” Wakil says.
He wondered why the United States, a staunch supporter of peace and religious harmony, has stopped funds.
The Mangla Dam Rehabilitation Project, a USD 150 million initiative essential for Pakistan’s energy and water security, has also suffered.
The decision to suspend these aid programs comes as part of a broader restructuring of US foreign assistance under Trump’s “America First” policy.
USAID, established in 1961 under President John F. Kennedy, has long been a cornerstone of US foreign policy, administering approximately 60 percent of the country’s aid budget. In the 2023 fiscal year alone, USAID disbursed USD 43.79 billion in global assistance, supporting development efforts in over 130 countries, media reported.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are off track. Decades of progress on poverty and hunger have stalled, and in some cases, been thrown into reverse. Many developing economies are mired in debt, with financing challenges preventing the urgently needed investment push in the SDGs, according to the United Nations. But amid these challenges there lies opportunity. The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) – 30 June to 3 July 2025–provides a unique opportunity to reform financing at all levels, including to support reform of the international financial architecture. Credit: United Nations
STOCKHOLM Sweden / MILAN, Italy, Feb 14 2025 (IPS) – When world leaders gather in Seville for the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) in June, they will be meeting at a pivotal moment: one defined by mounting systemic risks, a multiplication of crises, and proliferation and fragmentation of development co-operation actors and funds.
International development co-operation is also threatened by the ongoing erosion of funding, including through unilateral decisions of unparalleled magnitude. While momentum for reform and transformative change to the financial and development architecture is growing, it is crucial not to lose sight of the fundamentals.
To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), increases in the quantity of development financing, be it official development assistance (ODA), private finance, or South-South co-operation, must be complemented with boosting the quality of all types of financing so that they are delivered and used in the most effective way.
Efforts to increase the quality of financing are embodied by the development effectiveness agenda and its internationally agreed principles: country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and mutual accountability. The principles are tried and tested, and more relevant than ever.
They build on and reflect decades of global experience and are increasingly crucial for addressing the challenges that characterize today’s development co-operation landscape, such as fragmentation and misalignment with country priorities. They are also key for mobilising different types of finance from a growing array of development partners and partnerships.
Yet, as the development landscape has increased in complexity in the years after the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the systematic focus on development effectiveness at country level has not been adequately integrated into country ecosystems and ambitions. For instance, Integrated National Finance Framework (INFF) processes could be better utilized as opportunities to talk about development effectiveness.
As Co-Chairs of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, we believe that development effectiveness is essential to mobilising financing for sustainable development, across all types of international co-operation for development. The FfD4 Outcome Document must clearly stress this point.
A stronger, more systematic focus on the benefits of development effectiveness – and on addressing the bottlenecks and trade-offs that hinder progress on the 2030 Agenda and SDGs – is essential to reinstate trust, increase financing for development, and achieve long-term positive impacts.
The four principles of effective development co-operation remain the core enablers of development effectiveness. We welcome the focus of the recently released FfD4 Zero Draft Outcome Document on country leadership, coherence, and mutual accountability, but reiterate the need to uphold past commitments originating from the long-lasting aid effectiveness and development effectiveness processes.
It is important for the Outcome Document to stress the continued validity and intertwined nature of the four effectiveness principles, including the role of inclusive partnerships and of civil society organizations in particular.
The involvement of all stakeholders – partner countries, development partners, the private sector, civil society, parliamentarians, philanthropies, and trade unions – remains central to the effectiveness agenda. It is also important to focus on the effectiveness of partnerships with the private sector, in particular by creating enabling environments for a local private sector to thrive, an area monitored by the Global Partnership through the Kampala Principles Assessment.
Effective private sector partnerships are key for ensuring transparency and accountability and for combatting corruption. A whole-of-society approach is key to achieving true country ownership, which has emerged as a central theme in the FfD4 negotiations.
How can the Global Partnership and development effectiveness contribute to FfD4 and its follow-up?
First, the Global Partnership Monitoring Exercise provides evidence to inform how development actors can improve their policies, practices and partnerships, insights into progress in implementing the agreed effectiveness commitments, as well as opportunities for learning, dialogue and sharing of experiences on emerging effectiveness challenges.
The monitoring is a partner-country led tool holding development stakeholders to account for their implementation of the commitments, and a starting point for concrete action and behaviour change. Since 2011, 103 partner countries have led the monitoring exercise one or more times in collaboration with over 100 development partners and other actors. The ongoing global monitoring round will bring new evidence into the discussions on effectiveness, including in the lead-up and follow-up to FfD4.
The fresh insights from the monitoring round are one important source of evidence which will feed into country-led multi-stakeholder action for how to enhance effectiveness.
Second, the Global Partnership’s 4th High-Level Meeting (HLM4) in 2026, where the monitoring results will be presented, is the next crucial moment after FfD4 to take stock of development effectiveness, accelerate progress, drive accountability, and inform policy dialogue on international development co-operation trends.
We invite all development stakeholders to contribute to HLM4, and to act on the dilemmas, tensions and trade-offs we are all facing to expedite delivery of the 2030 Agenda. Strengthening and streamlining the development co-operation architecture must be a collaborative, inclusive process.
The Global Partnership offers a proven, multi-stakeholder platform to ensure that all voices are heard in shaping the future of development co-operation.
We invite you to join forces with us: raise the profile of development effectiveness in the lead-up and follow-up to FfD4, and use the monitoring findings for learning, dialogue and action at country level.
Recognizing that development effectiveness is a key enabler for sustainable development by 2030 (and beyond) and fully embracing and recognizing the effectiveness principles in their integrity, is a prerequisite for an impactful and action-oriented outcome at FfD4. Annika Otterstedt is Assistant Director General, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and Luca De Fraia is Co-Chair, CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness.
Annika Otterstedt and Luca De Fraia are also Co-Chairs of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.
The UN General Assembly votes to suspend the rights of the membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council during an Emergency Special Session on Ukraine. April 2022. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 14 2025 (IPS) – When some of the world’s “authoritarian and repressive regimes” were elected as members of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) –including Cuba, China, Russia, Kazakhstan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) — a US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher infamously remarked: “The inmates have taken over the asylum, I don’t plan to give the lunatics any more American tax dollars to play with.”
That remark brought back memories of a 1975 award-winning Hollywood classic “One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest”, with Jack Nicholson as a rebellious patient causing havoc at a US mental institution while leading a group of protesting inmates.
And last week, the US decided, metaphorically speaking, to fly over the cuckoo’s nest—and withdraw from the Geneva-based 47-member Human Rights Council.
Dr. Simon Adams, President and CEO of the Center for Victims of Torture, told IPS the Human Rights Council and all United Nations bodies are better and stronger with the United States being actively engaged.
“Any state withdrawing from the HRC only encourages the dictators, torturers, and human rights abusers of the world. At this moment in history, with creeping authoritarianism and human rights under attack in so many parts of the world, the Human Rights Council remains indispensable,” he added.
UN Human Rights Council in session in Geneva. Credit: UN Photo/Elma Okic
Ambassador A.L.A. Azeez, a foreign policy commentator, who previously served as Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, told IPS the United States’ withdrawal from the UNHRC is a counterproductive move that harms both US interests and the global cause of human rights.
This departure from a critical multilateral institution is unlikely to achieve transformative change within the council. It never happened with its previous withdrawals, nor may it happen now, with the current one, he pointed out.
What does it achieve then?
“It removes the US’s opportunity to engage constructively with members and stakeholders, contributing to the strengthening of human rights multilateralism. By exiting, the US forfeits its ability to shape the narrative, push for necessary reforms, and advocate for its values”.
Human rights multilateralism, he argued, depends on the engagement and collaboration of diverse nations. Not one state or a small group of states alone however influential they are!”
This withdrawal amounts to an abdication of shared responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights. It risks signaling a diminished US commitment to human rights, potentially eroding the international human rights system and damaging whatever credibility and moral authority the US has on the world stage, said Ambassador Azeez.
Periodic withdrawals from international bodies like the UNHRC severely damage the US’s image as a steadfast defender of human rights and multilateralism. The US cannot afford to project an image of selective engagement, perceived as contingent on the council’s alignment with US views.
This erosion of credibility hinders the US’s ability to lead by example and effectively champion human rights.
The primary motivation for the withdrawal seems to be concerns about bias against a close US ally in the Middle East. While such concerns are often expressed, is exiting the council the best solution? A more constructive approach would be to remain engaged and work to address perceived concerns from within.
While strategic calculations may drive the idea of disengagement from multilateral bodies, the era of unipolarity is over. Multilateralism must reassert itself, acting as a mediating force among competing geopolitical interests. The importance of remaining engaged in multilateral human rights efforts and driving meaningful change from within cannot be overstated, declared Ambassador Azeez.
Responding to a question at the UN press briefing February 4, UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said: “It doesn’t alter our position on the importance of the Human Rights Council as part of the overall human rights architecture within the United Nations,” he said.
“And on UNRWA, I’m not sure that’s something that’s very new. I mean, and again, it doesn’t alter our commitment to supporting UNRWA in its work, and in its work of delivering critical services to Palestinians under its mandate,” said Dujarric.
Amanda Klasing, National Director, Government Relations & Advocacy with Amnesty International USA, said announcing that the United States is withdrawing from the Human Rights Council when it is not even a sitting member, is just the latest move by President Trump to demonstrate to the world his complete and blatant disregard for human rights and international cooperation — even if it weakens U.S. interests.
“Our world needs multilateral cooperation around shared interests, especially the protection of human rights. International institutions will continue to function, either with the U.S. or without it, but it seems that President Trump is uninterested in having a seat at that table to shape the norms and policies of the future, or even to protect the human rights of people in the United States”.
The HRC provides a global forum for governments to discuss human rights concerns, can authorize investigations that bring to light human rights violations, and, while not perfect, is a tool to hold governments accountable in fulfilling their human rights obligations, including to their own population.
President Trump’s performative decision to pull the U.S. out of the HRC, Klasing pointed out, signals to the rest of the world that the U.S. is happy to completely cede important decisions about human rights violations happening across the globe to other countries.
“This isn’t about President Trump thumbing his nose at the institution, instead he’s just demonstrating he’d rather make a callous show of rejecting human rights than do the work needed to protect and promote human rights for people everywhere, including in the U.S.”
