Over 25,500 Palestinians Killed: Absence of Accountability is Nothing Short of Shameful

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Over 25,500 Palestinians Killed: Absence of Accountability is Nothing Short of Shameful

A boy walks through a destroyed neighbourhood in Gaza City. Credit: UNICEF/Omar Al-Qattaa

 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk’s remarks to the Interactive Dialogue on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, at the 61st session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on February 26 2026.

GENEVA, Feb 27 2026 (IPS) – The situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is a human-made disaster.

The report before you sets out events between 1 November 2024 and 31 October 2025 that show Israel’s utter disregard for human rights in Gaza and the West Bank, and the serious violations also committed by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups.


The evidence gathered by my Office reveals a consistent pattern of gross violations and abuses of human rights, serious violations of international humanitarian law and atrocity crimes – that remain unpunished.

Israel’s continued attacks on residential buildings and makeshift tents, destroying entire neighbourhoods, caused mass civilian deaths. More than 25,500 Palestinians were killed, including entire families, and more than 68,800 were injured during the reporting period.

Among those killed were many Palestinian journalists. My Office has verified that 292 were killed in Israeli operations since 7 October 2023.

Israel’s militarization of humanitarian aid, through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, also led to large-scale killings. Between late May and 8 October 2025, my Office recorded 2,435 Palestinians killed by the Israeli military near food collection points — mostly young men and boys.

In August 2025, famine was declared in Gaza, affecting more than half a million people. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, at least 463 Palestinians, including 157 children, died from starvation. This was the direct result of Israel’s blocking of humanitarian aid and other deliberate actions.

A woman holds a child as a storm approaches Khan Younis in Gaza. Credit: WFP/Maxime Le Lijour

Israeli forces continued to kill humanitarian and medical personnel during this period, and to make mass arrests of Palestinians across Gaza and the West Bank. These arrests often amounted to arbitrary detention, and included enforced disappearances.

Since 7 October 2023, my Office has verified that at least 89 Palestinians have died in Israeli custody. Torture and other ill-treatment of Palestinians in Israeli detention remain widespread.

Israeli operations destroyed some 80 percent of civilian infrastructure in Gaza – including homes, schools, hospitals, cultural sites, and water treatment plants.

During the reporting period, Israel continued to forcibly displace Palestinians, into ever-shrinking areas of the Gaza strip. Over the course of 2025, Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups continued to hold hostages in blatant violation of international law.

Fifty-one hostages who were seized on 7 October 2023 were returned to their loved ones. On their release, the hostages recounted their traumatic ordeals, including sexual and gender-based violence, torture, beating, and prolonged confinement underground.

In June, there were reports that armed men, allegedly affiliated with Hamas, summarily executed 12 Palestinians associated with the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, Israeli security forces continued to launch airstrikes and use unlawful force, killing hundreds of Palestinians.

In January 2025, Israeli forces launched Operation Iron Wall in the northern West Bank, which is still ongoing. So far, they have forced 32,000 Palestinians from their homes.

Meanwhile, Palestinian security forces increased the use of unnecessary or disproportionate force, resulting in the unlawful killing of at least 8 Palestinians. They also arbitrarily detained and ill-treated more than 300 Palestinians.

The ceasefire of 11 October 2025 brought some measure of relief. But we must not mistake this for peace or safety. People are still dying in Gaza from Israeli fire, cold, hunger, and treatable diseases and injuries.

Since the ceasefire, Israeli attacks in Gaza have killed more than 600 Palestinians and injured more than 1,600, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health. Anywhere else, this would be considered a major crisis.

My Office has also recorded at least 80 reported killings of Palestinians by Hamas since the ceasefire, mostly by summary executions and in clashes with rival factions. Gaza now has the highest number of amputee children per capita in the world.

Israel continues to destroy civilian infrastructure and forcibly transfer Palestinians within the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The humanitarian situation is still extremely precarious, as Israel continues to impede the humanitarian community’s ability to bring in food, shelter, fuel, medical supplies, and other essential items.

Since the ceasefire, at least 11 children have died from hypothermia. I deplore Israel’s decision at the end of last year to suspend some 37 aid groups from Gaza. I also deplore the ban on UNRWA operations and the demolition of its premises in East Jerusalem in blatant violation of international law.

Today, the situation in the West Bank is particularly disturbing. Recent Israeli measures expanding land expropriation consolidate the annexation of Palestinian territory. This is in flagrant breach of the Palestinian right to self-determination.

Israeli security forces continue to use unnecessary and disproportionate force, and have killed 1,020 Palestinians since 7 October 2023, according to figures verified by my Office.

Taken together, Israel’s actions appear aimed at making a permanent demographic change in Gaza and the West Bank, raising concerns about ethnic cleansing.

The absence of accountability for the egregious violations committed is nothing short of shameful. Instead, there are efforts to obstruct accountability. The unilateral sanctions imposed on 11 judges and prosecutors of the International Criminal Court are completely unacceptable.

As are those imposed on the Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, appointed by this Council. Time and again, I stand before this Council and brief on the litany of violations. I make recommendations, plead for accountability, and for respect for international law.

I do so again today, because it is crucial. The ongoing violations of international law in Gaza must stop. I need to issue a stark warning about the rapidly deteriorating situation in the West Bank. Israel must end its unlawful occupation, in line with the conclusion of the International Court of Justice. And Israel must lift undue restrictions on the flow of humanitarian aid.

We have thought a lot about the contribution my Office can make to shift the trajectory of this awful situation. It may seem incongruous or inappropriate to talk about reconstruction as the suffering continues unabated.

But we have a responsibility to think about what is needed to break this senseless cycle. To talk about lasting peace. Human rights have been crushed in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Any realistic effort to rebuild and move toward lasting stability will have to be anchored in human rights. And this is urgent. The reconstruction of Gaza is not a logistics exercise.

Rebuilding Gaza and restoring human rights throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory requires focusing on what people have lived through over many generations and cutting through the contested narratives.

I see five elements that can help us get there.

First, there need to be meaningful steps towards accountability for all human rights violations and abuses. My Office’s reports form part of this record. Continued monitoring and reporting of the human rights situation is critical.

Second, there must be the long-overdue realization of Palestinians’ right to self-determination, including full responsibility for their own governance and control over their land and resources. Palestinians must be able to shape their own futures and lead reconstruction efforts in Gaza.

Third, security is more than weapons and walls. Unequal treatment is feeding grievances. People can only feel safe when they have faith in equal justice and the rule of law. All segregationist laws and policies that resemble the kind of apartheid system we have seen before must be dismantled.

Fourth, Palestinian and Israeli civil society organizations and human rights defenders that are trusted by their communities need to be central partners in safeguarding human rights going forward. They need the support and protection of the international community.

And finally, we need understanding and healing among Palestinian communities, and between Palestinians and Israelis. This means working to undo the dehumanization which has fuelled this decades-long conflict.

The voices of peace movements – Palestinian, Israeli, and those that bring together Palestinians and Israelis – must be heard and heeded. This can strengthen the constituency for dialogue and increase the space for shared narratives.

The international community needs to step into the moral vacuum and seize the moment – not to return to the pre-October 2023 status quo, but to finally address the underlying causes of this conflict.

Member States need to pursue a path to sustainable peace — one in which Palestine and Israel live side by side in equal dignity and rights, in line with UN resolutions and international law.

IPS UN Bureau

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After a Brutal Winter, Millions of Ukrainians Face Deepening Displacement and Uncertainty

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Opinion

Result of the General Assembly vote on the draft resolution “Support for lasting peace in Ukraine” adopted during the emergency special session. 24 February 2026
Four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UN is marked the day with high-level debate and renewed calls to end the war – including in the General Assembly which passed a resolution reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

GENEVA, Feb 25 2026 (IPS) – After surviving the harshest winter in a decade, millions of displaced Ukrainians are confronting a growing crisis marked by hardship and ongoing attacks as peace prospects remain distant.


Inside Ukraine, repeated attacks on housing, energy systems and essential services throughout the winter left millions without heating or electricity for prolonged periods. While temperatures are slowly rising, the damage remains. An estimated 10.8 million people inside the country need humanitarian assistance in 2026, and 3.7 million are internally displaced.

At the same time, 5.9 million Ukrainians remain refugees abroad. Across Europe, host countries have provided protection and opportunities at an unprecedented scale, giving refugees access to education, healthcare and employment. This has helped millions regain stability and contribute to host communities.

As the war continues, however, more is needed to support refugees from a displacement crisis with no clear end. Alongside Temporary Protection, States should explore options for alternative arrangements for longer stay. These can bring stability for the most vulnerable in particular, for whom return may not be immediately possible even after the war.

Evidence shows that meaningful inclusion delivers results and refugees significantly boost host country economies. In Poland, analysis by UNHCR and Deloitte showed that Ukrainian refugees’ net impact amounted to 2.7 per cent of the Polish GDP, in 2024. With increased language training and wider recognition of credentials, access to decent work and self-reliance can improve for refugees across the region.

Inside Ukraine, communities continue to repair homes, restore services and rebuild livelihoods, with the support of UNHCR and NGO partners. But after four years of war, resilience has limits. Sustained humanitarian assistance remains essential, alongside scaled-up recovery and reconstruction support to prevent further displacement and enable safe conditions for return.

When conditions allow, gradual and voluntary returns will be critical for Ukraine’s recovery. UNHCR is working with the Government and partners to restore people’s documents, support rehabilitation of social infrastructure and repair war-damaged homes. UNHCR also works with partners to analyse refugees’ intentions, forecast return movements and support Ukraine’s recovery planning.

Since the start of the full-scale war, UNHCR and partners have supported 10 million people with emergency aid, protection services and psychosocial support. In 2026, UNHCR plans to assist a further 2 million people inside the country, subject to sufficient funding. Across the region, UNHCR and partners are supporting 1.7 million refugees and the States hosting them, with a focus on inclusion and self-reliance.

As winter fades, the humanitarian crisis does not. We must support the people of Ukraine with humanitarian relief and recovery inside the country, and with safety and self-reliance abroad.

Philippe Leclerc is UNHCR’s Regional Director for Europe and Regional Refugee Coordinator for the Ukraine Situation

IPS UN Bureau

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Iran: A Regime with Nothing Left but Force

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Opinion

Iran: A Regime with Nothing Left but Force

Credit: Georgios Kostomitsopoulos/NurPhoto via Getty Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 24 2026 (IPS) – The Islamic Republic of Iran has put down another uprising, with a ferocity that makes previous crackdowns seem restrained. The theocratic regime has survived, but it has done so by substituting violence for the economic security it cannot provide and the political legitimacy it no longer has. Its show of force is also an admission of weakness.


The protests that began on 28 December were triggered by a specific event — the collapse of the rial to a record low — but rooted in years of accumulated grievances. The second half of 2025 alone saw at least 471 labour protests across 69 Iranian cities. Inflation stood at 49.4 per cent. The 12-day war with Israel in June sent the Tehran Stock Exchange down around 40 per cent and cost many people their jobs. The United Nations Security Council reimposed sanctions in September. The government cut fuel subsidies in November and slashed exchange-rate subsidies in December. Over 40 per cent of Iranian households now live below the poverty line and around half the population consume fewer than the recommended 2,100 calories per day.

It was this collapse that brought typically conservative bazaar merchants onto the streets. Within two weeks, the protests had spread to all of Iran’s 31 provinces, drawing in the urban middle class, working-class communities and people from rural provinces who had historically been among the regime’s most reliable supporters. What began as an economic stoppage rapidly became political defiance. For the millions who joined the striking merchants, the plummeting currency and rising cost of food were not market failures; they were proof of the regime’s corruption and ineptitude. Generation Z played a central role, demanding not reform but profound change. Lethal repression provided further confirmation the system was beyond reform.

The state’s response evolved. Initially it offered token economic concessions alongside its usual crowd control violence such as batons and teargas. When it became clear that a widespread movement with political demands had taken hold, it shifted to total attrition. On 8 January, authorities imposed a near-total internet shutdown and authorised security forces to use military-grade weapons against crowds. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a parallel military structure, major political force and economic empire with a direct stake in the regime’s survival – spearheaded the crackdown, with its affiliated Basij paramilitary networks playing a central role in street-level violence.

The casualty figures were deliberately obscured by the internet blackout, but all evidence points in the same direction. Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights reported that at least 3,000 civilians — including 44 children — were killed in the first 17 days. Iran Human Rights, citing Ministry of Health sources, documented a minimum of 3,379 deaths across 15 provinces. The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency reported around 7,000 verified fatalities by mid-February, with 12,000 further cases under review. Time magazine cited hospital records suggesting the toll may have reached 30,000. Even the lowest of these figures vastly eclipses the 537 deaths recorded during the 2022-2023 Woman, Life, Freedom protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s concession that ‘several thousand’ had been killed confirmed the order of magnitude.

By 16 January the streets had been cleared, but a quieter repressive campaign continued, with nighttime raids, enforced disappearances and mass detentions in unofficial holding sites outside the legal system, targeting not only protesters but also doctors who treated the wounded, lawyers who provided legal assistance, bystanders who helped and people who posted supportive statements online. Authorities have detained over 50,000 people. Revolutionary Courts have fast-tracked mass indictments through summary trials, often conducted online and lasting mere minutes, with defendants denied independent legal counsel and confessions extracted under torture. Eighteen-year-old Saleh Mohammadi, whose retracted confession was obtained after interrogators broke bones in his hand, has been sentenced to be publicly hanged at the site of his alleged crime. Dozens more face imminent execution.

The regime has, for now, held: its security forces have not fractured, there have been no significant elite defections, and the IRGC has maintained its capacity for suppression. But it rules over a country with a wrecked economy, a battered nuclear programme, weakened regional proxies and a population that has run out of reasons to comply. Each protest cycle has required a higher threshold of state violence to suppress, a sign the regime has no other tool left.

What prevents weakness from becoming collapse is the absence of any alternative. The international response briefly suggested external pressure might tell – but did not. Donald Trump told Iranian protesters that ‘help is on its way’. The European Union listed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. The UK imposed fresh sanctions. The Iranian diaspora held at least 168 protests across 30 countries. But the international noise simply enabled the regime to spread the narrative that the uprising was foreign-directed.

The exiled opposition is fragmented along ethnic, ideological and generational lines, seemingly more consumed by internal rivalries than the task of converting widespread discontent into sustained political pressure. Inside Iran, the most credible opposition voices — Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi, reformist politician Mostafa Tajzadeh and veteran leader Mir Hossein Mousavi — are imprisoned or cut off from public life.

A weakened regime facing a leaderless opposition can endure, but what it cannot do is reverse its decay. Violence may clear the streets, but it cannot rebuild the economy, restore trust or give Iran’s young people a reason to stay. The regime has bought time, at an ever-rising price, but the crisis it’s suppressed isn’t going away.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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‘Worrying’ War on Drugs Rhetoric Comes with Human, Financial Costs

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Crime & Justice

Policing exhibit at the Museum of Weed. An IDPC report paints a picture of an increasingly punitive approach to drugs in some countries, but also highlights reforms. Credit: Bret Kavanaugh/Unsplash

Policing exhibit at the Museum of Weed. An IDPC report paints a picture of an increasingly punitive approach to drugs in some countries, but also highlights reforms. Credit: Bret Kavanaugh/Unsplash

BRATISLAVA, Feb 19 2026 (IPS) – Drug reform campaigners have called for an overhaul of global drug controls amid an increasingly complex and deadly drug situation in the world and as hardline anti-drug approaches are increasingly being used as cover for repression of civil society and human rights defenders.


A report released earlier this month by the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) assessed progress made since the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs, widely viewed as a potential turning point in global drug policy.

It found that the promise of UNGASS remains largely unfulfilled – despite notable progress in some areas – and that punitive and prohibitionist approaches continue to dominate global drug control, despite their enormous human and financial cost.

“Punitive approaches [to drugs] are costing lives, undermining human rights and wasting public resources, while silencing the very communities that hold the solutions. This report shows why governments must move beyond rhetoric and commit to real structural reform,” Ann Fordham, IDPC Executive Director, said.

Advocates of drug policy reform have for decades pointed to evidence showing how hardline drug policies have completely failed.

The IDPC report documents how current prohibitive policies have, far from curbing drug markets, contributed to their massive expansion and diversification, while at the same time the number of people who use drugs continues to rise and is now estimated at 316 million worldwide – a 28 percent increase since 2016.

The group says repressive policies are also driving devastating and preventable harms. These include:  2.6 million drug use-related deaths between 2016 and 2021, with projections indicating further sharp increases since; mass incarceration – one in five people globally incarcerated are for drug offences – disproportionately affecting marginalised communities; over 150 countries report inadequate access to opioid pain relief due to overly restrictive controls on essential medicines;  expanding use of the death penalty for drug offences; and the displacement of illegal drug activities into remote and environmentally fragile regions, including Central America and the Amazon basin, as a result of interdiction and eradication efforts.

Despite this evidence, many countries continue to pursue hardline drug policies.

Fordham said this was because of “the vast vested interests in the status quo”.

“The prison industrial complex is a prime example of this. Our report documents that one in five people in prison are incarcerated for drugs globally, while evidence shows that this strategy has done nothing to reduce the scale of the illegal drug markets,” she told IPS.

The group has also highlighted a worrying return to prominence of ‘war on drugs’ rhetoric – popular in the 1970s and 1980s – which it says is increasingly being used to justify militarisation, repression and violations of international law, including the Trump Administration’s weaponising of ‘narco-terrorism’ narratives to legitimise extraterritorial force and roll back rights, health and development commitments enshrined in the UNGASS Outcome Document.

“Punitive and hard-on-drugs narratives serve other interests for populist leaders, with drug policies being used to scapegoat people who use drugs and other people involved in the illegal drug market for broader societal issues, including homelessness and increases in levels of violence.

“Drug control is also increasingly used to restrict civil society space by threatening or attacking civil society and community organisations promoting much-needed reforms and condemning their governments for egregious human rights violations,” said Fordham.

Other drug policy reform advocates and experts have said this trend has become increasingly evident in the last year.

“Over the last year, we can definitely see the emergence of some new [drug policy] trends. First of all, there has been a radical change of rhetoric and narratives under US President Donald Trump’s administration,” Anton Basenko, Executive Director of the International Network of People Who Use Drugs (INPUD), told IPS.

He also highlighted how governments are using drug policy as a cover for breaches of international law to further other political aims, citing the claim by the US administration that the recent abduction of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro by US forces was connected to stopping illegal drugs from coming into America.

“Over the last year, there have been completely different narratives from leading countries [on drug policy], like the U.S. And of course, some countries politically are always looking to the U.S. and listening to what they are saying and they might try to replicate something similar politically, using America’s action as an example,” he said.

Other experts fear there is a real risk this could lead to a worsening of wider human rights problems in other countries.

“The shamelessness with which the US is now trampling on international law, using the war on drugs as cover for some of its most egregious violations, is deeply troubling. There is certainly a risk that it licenses other actors to be even more brazen in their abuses of international human rights law regarding drugs and more generally,” Steve Rolles, Senior Policy Analyst at the UK-based Transform Drug Policy Foundation, told IPS.

The IDPC report draws a set of conclusions emphasising the need for reform and modernisation of current UN drug control treaties as well as, among others, a reconfiguration of the global drug control system so that it is orientated on rights, health and development.

The group says this is especially important now as the United Nations prepares to implement system-wide reforms and an independent expert panel begins reviewing the international drug control regime, providing a rare opportunity to “correct course”.

But that call also comes at a time when, as the IDPC points out, the work of organisations which have been successful in driving drug policy reform, as well as the implementation of life-saving harm-reduction programmes, community advocacy and civil society are battling funding crises.

Cuts to foreign aid funding by major donor states, especially the US, over the last year have been devastating for civil society, including groups working  to combat HIV and help vulnerable communities, including drug users, around the world. Funding for harm reduction, which has historically been low, is now in crisis, campaigners say.

“In 2022, available harm reduction funding amounted to just 6% of the USD 2.7 billion needed annually. The Trump administration’s decision to halt funding for HIV and harm reduction in 2025 has turned the harm reduction funding crisis into a catastrophe,” said Fordham.

“State-funded and third-sector voluntary services are all feeling the pinch, and even services funded by philanthropy are seeing priorities shift towards emerging crises. Many services will struggle on as best they can, but inevitably there is a terrible cost when services proven to save lives are starved of funds or closed down,” added Rolles.

However, it is precisely because of these funding constraints that it is vital, IDPC argues, that its recommendations are taken on board by global policymakers.

“The funding constraints and current challenges faced by the UN and multilateralism more broadly make our recommendations all the more important. The current system is clearly outdated and harmful, only serving to undermine health, human rights, development, human security, and environment protection – all the key objectives that the UN was created to uphold in the first place,” said Fordham.

But while the IDPC report paints a picture of an increasingly punitive and prohibitive approach to drugs in some countries, it also highlights significant progress in the introduction of more progressive policies in a number of countries.

These include important policy shifts in many jurisdictions towards decriminalisation and the legal regulation of cannabis, both for medical and recreational purposes.

Hundreds of millions of people now live in jurisdictions where recreational cannabis is legal, with markets having been created in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. The IDPC report also suggests a renewed interest in psychedelics may soon drive a new wave of regulatory innovation.

“Just over 10 years ago, nowhere in the world had legally regulated adult-use cannabis. Today more than 500 million people live in over 40 jurisdictions with some form of legally regulated adult access… for me, this demonstrates how reforms that seemed impossible just a few years ago are now being realised on every continent,” said Rolles.

He added that there had been “notable progress [on drug policy reform] across the last decade, including the continuing wave of cannabis reforms across the Americas, the EU and much of the world; the spread of innovative harm reduction in response to the opioid epidemic; progress on decriminalisation in other jurisdictions; and an increasingly sophisticated reform narrative gaining traction in high-level forums – including endorsements for reform, including regulation of all drugs”.

“An increase in jurisdictions legalising and regulating cannabis feels inevitable. There are strong movements and political support for change in a number of Latin American and European countries,” Rolles said.

These reforms were driven in large part by non-state and civil society organisations – those same organisations which are seeing their funding and the freedom to press their case increasingly shrinking in many states.

But drug policy reform advocates are not expecting progress to stop despite the challenges such groups face.

“Almost all of the [cannabis legal regulation] reform has been driven by civil society advocacy, rather than top-down leadership from governments. Just as with harm reduction and decriminalisation reforms over the past decades, civil society is showing the leadership where elected politicians so often fall down. This will doubtless continue to be the case going forward. This is the moment to step up the fight, not to cower in the face of rising authoritarianism,” said Rolles.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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International Humanitarian Law is at Breaking Point – but not Beyond Repair

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Opinion

Credit: UNICEF/Eyad El Baba

 
What is international humanitarian law? Families flee their shattered homes in Tal al-Hawa neighbourhood in Gaza city. While aid workers serving conflict-affected civilian populations depend on a set of laws to protect them, some warring parties violate these global agreements, from targeting hospitals and schools to blocking aid workers from reaching civilians with lifesaving goods and services. Source: UN News

GENEVA, Feb 17 2026 (IPS) – International humanitarian law is at a breaking point, as rampant impunity for serious violations is enabling even greater abuses against civilians and detainees.


Across today’s wars, violations are no longer concealed or exceptional. They are increasingly open, systematic, and unpunished, with catastrophic consequences for those whom the law is supposed to protect.

New analysis of 23 situations of armed conflict between July 2024 and the end of 2025 reveals a consistent pattern: civilians are being killed, abused and starved at scale, while accountability mechanisms either falter or are actively undermined. Genocidal violence in Gaza, a renewed risk of genocide in Sudan, and mass atrocities elsewhere are not isolated horrors. Taken together, they point to a deeper failure – the collapse of meaningful restraint in the conduct of hostilities.

Conflict-related sexual violence has reached epidemic levels. Rape, sexual slavery, and sexual violence used as punishment or as a tool of territorial control have been documented across multiple conflicts, including in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, and Sudan. Particularly alarming is the growing number of cases involving attacks children, including victims as young as one.

These are not by-products of war, but violations long prohibited under international humanitarian law, now committed with near-total impunity. This occurs with the complicity of many other States, which have a duty to respect and ensure respect international humanitarian law.

This erosion of civilian protection is not primarily the result of gaps in legal knowledge. The rules exist. The problem is political choice – and a persistent failure to enforce, clarify and update the law where it no longer offers meaningful restraint.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the global arms trade. The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty has been widely ratified, including by major exporters such as China, France, and the United Kingdom. In theory, it requires its member States to deny arms transfers where there is a clear risk that weapons will be used to commit serious violations of international law. In practice, legal risk assessments are all too often overridden by strategic and political considerations.

Continued arms exports to Israel, Russia, and others, despite overwhelming evidence of civilian harm, have had devastating consequences on the ground.

Closing this gap does not require a raft of new rules in the short term. It requires the consistent application of existing ones: enforceable, evidence-based export controls; independent scrutiny of licensing decisions; and real accountability where transfers are authorised despite a clear risk that the law will be breached by the recipient.

Certain categories of weapons are though incompatible with the protection of civilians, but do not necessarily violate the already permissive standards. Repeated firing into populated areas of gravity ordnance from the air and inaccurate long-range artillery from the ground has been a major driver of civilian casualties across multiple conflicts.

There is a fundamental lack of clarity on two key rules: first, how close an attack may be launched to a military target while still complying with the law; and second, how much incidental civilian harm is permissible when targeting a military objective.

On both issues, the law urgently requires clarification. Restricting air-delivered weapons to precision-guided munitions alone would already make a measurable difference to civilian survival. Achieving this, however, requires States to clarify and update the rules of international humanitarian law that were drafted in the 1970s.

In State-on-State conflicts such as in Kherson province in Ukraine, drones have been used by Russian forces – and others – to target civilians, sometimes with real-time video footage disseminated online by the perpetrators.

At the same time, armed drones are no longer the preserve of States. Their use by non-State armed groups is increasing rapidly, including by JNIM in the Sahel, Islamic State in Somalia, and the Arakan Army in Myanmar. There is an urgent need for stronger mechanisms to attribute, investigate, and prosecute unlawful drone and autonomous weapon attacks.

Impunity on this scale is not inevitable. It is the product of sustained political and financial neglect. Institutions designed to promote compliance with international humanitarian law – including domestic courts and international tribunals – are under severe strain, with some facing paralysis or closure due to lack of resources.

Judges at bodies such as the International Criminal Court have even been sanctioned simply for carrying out their mandates. If States are serious about protecting civilians, political and financial support for these institutions must be treated as a core obligation and a policy priority, not an optional gesture.

The current moment represents a critical test for international humanitarian law itself. The international lawyer Hersch Lauterpacht once warned that the law existed at the “vanishing point” of international law. That warning is no longer theoretical.

Whether humanitarian law continues to function as a real constraint on warfare, or recedes into symbolic rhetoric, will depend on the political choices states make now – and on whether civilian protection is treated as a legal duty rather than a discretionary one.

Stuart Casey-Maslen is an international lawyer and lead author of War Watch: International Humanitarian Law in Focus at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights

IPS UN Bureau

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IRAN: ‘Sustainable Change Will Depend on Domestic Organisational Capacity, Not External Force’

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Feb 16 2026 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses the recent protests in Iran with Sohrab Razaghi, executive director of Volunteer Activists, a Netherlands-based diaspora organisation empowering Iranian civil society.


IRAN: ‘Sustainable Change Will Depend on Domestic Organisational Capacity, Not External Force’

Sohrab Razaghi

Protests triggered by economic grievances erupted across Iran on 28 December, quickly evolving into broader anti-regime protests. The crackdown that followed resulted in what may be the largest massacre in modern Iranian history.

What sparked the protests, and in what ways were they different from previous ones?

Rising prices and the collapse of the national currency initially sparked the protests, but these quickly expanded beyond economic grievances. At least in part, this is because the economy is no longer seen as a purely technical issue but as a measure of the state’s ability to govern. A central question among social groups now is whether the government can manage crises and provide sustainable solutions.

Anger has built up, reflecting broken promises and lost futures. Over the past three decades, four major protest waves – in 2009, 2017, 2019 and 2022 – were met with repression, denial or superficial reforms. This pattern has produced a strong sense of humiliation and political voicelessness.

But perhaps the most decisive factor in the latest wave of protests has been the role of Generation Z, a generation that did not experience the 1979 revolution or the war with Iraq and does not have the ideological attachments of earlier generations. The dividing line is not just age but also expectations, lifestyles and values. While previous generations used to hope for gradual reform within the system, now many young people see no viable future within the current framework. For them, the most rational responses to what they perceive as a structural dead end are disengagement, migration or radical protest.

Recent protests, particularly those of 8 and 9 January, also reflected shifts in protest dynamics, with higher levels of violence visible in both rhetoric and practice. This escalation likely reflects accumulated frustration and political deadlock, but doesn’t necessarily indicate that the state has weakened. Security forces so far appear cohesive and operationally effective, and there are no clear signs of fragmentation inside the coercive apparatus.

But the rise in violence is troubling for democratic forces and civil society. When violent tactics become prominent, organised civic initiatives are marginalised and security-driven narratives prevail, weakening sustained civic action.

Additionally, Israeli and US statements expressing support for protesters and threatening military action had contradictory and largely negative effects.

While such rhetoric initially generated hope among some protesters, the lack of follow-up produced disillusionment and scepticism. Most importantly, statements by foreign governments, including Israel and the USA, strengthened the regime’s narrative. They enabled the authorities to frame protests as the products of foreign interference and protesters as instruments of external powers, including claims of involvement by Mossad agents. This narrative was very useful to justify securitisation and repression.

How have civil society and the media documented human rights violations amid internet shutdowns?

During near-total internet blackouts, local and community-based groups played crucial roles. They recorded the time and location of incidents, collected testimonies from multiple sources and preserved legal, medical and visual documentation while observing basic digital security principles.

When limited internet access became available, information was shared securely with international partners and diaspora networks. These networks helped archive data, liaise with human rights organisations and media and reduce pressure on activists operating inside Iran. International human rights organisations then cross-checked and verified reports before incorporating them into official documentation. Because communication shutdowns, security risks and restricted access to evidence prevented full documentation, they typically presented casualty figures and details of repression conservatively. At the same time, fake news and baseless casualty figures are also prevalent in diaspora and international media reports. It is essential to interrogate such reporting to preserve the credibility of fact-checked, evidence-based reports.

Under severe restrictions, independent and evidence-based documentation has been essential to preserve truth, counter denial and lay the groundwork for future accountability.

What’s limiting sustained pressure for change?

Recent protests have not expanded into broader forms of social organisation. Participation by labour unions, local networks and professional associations has been limited, restricting the potential for sustained institutionalised pressure. Without stronger organisational structures, documentation of abuses won’t necessarily translate into coordinated civic action. Social media-based coordination and mobilisation are effective for the start and first phase of protests, but on-the-ground leadership, networks and organising capacity are instrumental for sustaining protests and increasing pressure for change.

At the discursive level, significant attention has focused on appeals for foreign pressure rather than on building internal coalitions among social groups. In some cases, rhetoric has centred on state collapse rather than democratic transition, a framework that risks instability and further social fragmentation. The use of profanity and violent language – both inside Iran and among the diaspora community – has also alienated families and moderate groups, narrowing rather than broadening support.

Ultimately, for protests to evolve into movements capable of exerting sustained pressure for change, what’s needed is inclusive organisation, coalition-building and a unifying narrative.

What should the international community do to strengthen Iranian civil society?

Sustainable change will depend on domestic organisational capacity, leadership and representation, not external force. So international leaders should avoid war rhetoric and avoid engaging in any form of military intervention. Historical experience suggests that even limited foreign military intervention is unlikely to weaken domestic repression. Instead, it may well increase regime cohesion, at least in the short term, intensify nationalist sentiment and raise the costs faced by civil society activists, who can be easily portrayed as collaborators and traitors.

When supporting Iranian civil society, international allies should prioritise independent, nonviolent civil society organisations rather than opposition groups advocating violence. Narratives of ‘collapse at any cost’ marginalise civic initiatives and undermine the prospects of democratisation.

Long-term investment in capacity strengthening is essential. This includes supporting civic organising skills, digital security, democratic advocacy, nonviolent action and secure communication tools. Over recent decades, resources and repertoires for change within civil society have been weakened. Sustained engagement is required to rebuild these capacities, with up-to-date resources, techniques and tools.

Monitoring, documentation and evidence-based reporting grounded in credible local sources are among the most effective forms of support. Accurate reporting strengthens prospects for accountability and limits the space for propaganda.

Ultimately, sustainable democratic change in Iran will depend on civil society acting independently, rooted in domestic capacities and supported by context-aware, non-interventionist international engagement.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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