VIETNAM: ‘Human Rights Conditions Will Likely Worsen as the Country Descends into a Police State’

Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Environment, Featured, Global Geopolitics, Headlines, Human Rights, Labour, TerraViva United Nations

Aug 29 2024 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses recent leadership changes in Vietnam with David Tran, coordinator of the Alliance for Vietnam’s Democracy, a civil society platform that promotes democracy in Vietnam and the region through international cooperation and the strengthening of local civil society.


On 3 August, President Tô Lâm was confirmed as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Vietnam’s top position, following the death of long-serving General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng. Lâm, who has been president since May, is known for leading an aggressive anti-corruption campaign that has seen many officials jailed and others forced to resign. He will continue as president while assuming the duties of general secretary, potentially enabling him to consolidate power ahead of the 2026 party congress, which will choose Vietnam’s top leaders for the next five years. Civil society fears the regime could become even more autocratic and repressive if Lâm retains both positions.

David Tran

What’s Vietnam’s political system like, and what’s the likely impact of the recent leadership change?

Vietnam is an authoritarian one-party state led by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). There are four key positions of authority: the president, who is the ceremonial head of state, the prime minister, who heads the government, the chair of the National Assembly, the unicameral legislature, and the most powerful, the general secretary of the VCP.

Although the president is elected by the National Assembly, this body is overwhelmingly made up of VCP members, who usually approve all incumbents unopposed. On 3 August, following the death of the last VCP general secretary, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Tô Lâm was confirmed as the new VCP leader.

This appointment is particularly significant because it puts a lot of power in the hands of one person. His dual role gives Tô Lâm considerable influence over the state and party, as well as greater control over the public security apparatus. While he appears set to continue the policies of his predecessor, there are several cracks beneath the surface. His power is likely to be challenged by several VCP members who’ve been forced into retirement by his ‘anticorruption’ campaign, effectively an initiative to eliminate competing factions. We can expect this infighting to continue and intensify.

What does Tô Lâm’s rise mean from a human rights perspective?

Tô Lâm has had a long career, including stints as minister of public security and a member of the politburo. The key role he played in the previous general secretary’s ‘anticorruption’ campaign saw him elected president in May, after his investigations into several high-profile politicians and businesspeople led to the resignation of his predecessor and other top officials.

The accumulation of power in the hands of the architect of a purge is unlikely to lead to improvements in civic space or human rights. Tô Lâm has been closely associated with the worsening human rights situation, as the Formosa and the Trinh Xuan Thanh cases clearly illustrate.

In April 2016, the Formosa company caused an environmental disaster when it discharged heavily polluted waste off Vietnam’s central coast. This caused widespread damage in at least four provinces and sparked protests. Instead of prosecuting Formosa, Tô Lâm, then minister of public security and in charge of the environmental police, suppressed peaceful protests and had 220 people sentenced to a total of 133 years in prison, not including probation after release. He said he was protecting Formosa from what he called ‘hostile forces’ – essentially anyone who criticised the company.

The second case involves Trinh Xuan Thanh, a former vice chair of Hau Giang Province, who fled to Germany in 2016 after being accused of ‘deliberately violating state regulations, causing serious consequences’. He was abducted on German soil by the Vietnamese secret service, which is under the Ministry of Public Security, and returned to Vietnam. Tô Lâm was directly involved in this operation, which Germany condemned as a ‘scandalous violation’ of its sovereignty and a ‘gross breach of international law’.

Given Tô Lâm’s track record, we expect human rights conditions to worsen under his leadership as Vietnam descends into a police state where human rights and the rule of law are ignored. The already limited space for civil society in Vietnam has shrunk under his watch, and we expect this trend to continue.

What are the challenges facing civil society in Vietnam?

Tô Lâm’s rise to power has been marked by his consistent efforts to stifle dissent. Under his leadership, the authorities, particularly the Ministry of Public Security, have increasingly tightened their grip on civil society organisations (CSOs). They have implemented new decrees that overregulate the registration and management of foreign CSOs and applied stricter rules to domestic organisations.

They have also weaponised tax laws and the criminal code to target civil society leaders, charging them with offences such as tax evasion and ‘abuse of democratic freedoms’. This has led to the imprisonment of prominent activists, including environmental and labour rights advocates.

Independent CSOs are subject to strict surveillance, with some being dismantled or forced to reorganise to conform to the authorities. This was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which the authorities used as a pretext to impose further restrictions on civil society under the guise of public health measures.

Despite this repressive environment, some social service CSOs and philanthropic groups continue to operate and strive to make a positive impact. But their independence is severely restricted as they and their activists are constantly targeted.

What international support does Vietnam’s civil society need?

Human rights organisations and international bodies have raised concerns about the shrinking space for civil society in Vietnam. They have called for respect for freedoms of assembly, association and expression and urged the authorities to ease restrictions. While these statements are important, they must be accompanied by trade sanctions and other enforcement mechanisms. Words alone are not enough.

Unfortunately, human rights in Vietnam are also falling victim to geopolitics. As tensions with China escalate, the USA is increasingly seeing Vietnam as a counterweight to China. In this context, human rights and civic space are often sidelined, if not ignored altogether. We believe that a democratic Vietnam would be the best partner and ally in promoting a peaceful, open and stable Indo-Pacific region.

Even if Tô Lâm has a long way to go before he reaches a position comparable to Xi Jinping’s in China, consolidation of power is a general trend we’re seeing among the region’s communist states. Oddly enough, given how these two leaders came to power, it could be a sign that pressure for human rights and civic space, both domestically and internationally, is working. If the authorities feel compelled to respond by consolidating power and positioning figures like Tô Lâm to counter these movements, there is still hope we are on the right track.

Civic space in Vietnam is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Alliance for Vietnam’s Democracy through its webpage or Facebook page.

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Kazakhstan Takes Lead in Global Push for Nuclear Disarmament Amid Heightened Tensions

Armed Conflicts, Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Conferences, Global, Global Geopolitics, Headlines, Health, Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Energy – Nuclear Weapons

Opinion

Central Downtown Astana with Bayterek tower. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

TOKYO/ASTANA, Aug 19 2024 (IPS) – In a world increasingly shadowed by the threat of nuclear conflict, Kazakhstan is stepping up its efforts in the global disarmament movement. On August 27-28, 2024, in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Kazakhstan will host a critical workshop in Astana. This gathering, the first of its kind in five years, is set to reinvigorate the five existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) and enhance cooperation and consultation among them.


This initiative aligns with UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s Agenda for Disarmament, particularly Action 5, which emphasizes the strengthening of NWFZs through enhanced collaboration between zones, urging nuclear-armed states to respect relevant treaties, and supporting the establishment of new zones, such as in the Middle East. This effort reflects the global community’s ongoing push to reduce the nuclear threat and foster regional and global peace.

Kazakhstan’s Historical Commitment to Disarmament

Kazakhstan’s vision for a nuclear-free world is deeply rooted in its leadership in global disarmament efforts. This vision is not just aspirational; it is grounded in the country’s lived experience of the devastating impact of nuclear weapons. The Semipalatinsk Test Site in northeastern Kazakhstan, often referred to as “the Polygon,” was the site of 456 nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1989. These tests exposed over 1.5 million people to radiation, resulting in severe health consequences, including cancer and birth defects, as well as environmental degradation.

Kazakhstan’s dedication to disarmament is further highlighted by its initiative to establish August 29 as the International Day against Nuclear Tests, recognized by the United Nations. This date commemorates both the first Soviet nuclear test at Semipalatinsk in 1949 and the closure of the site in 1991, serving as a reminder of the horrors of nuclear testing and a call to action for the global community.

The Role of NWFZs in Global Security

NWFZs are critical components of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. There are five established NWFZs, created through treaties: Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa), Treaty of Semey (Central Asia) In addition, Mongolia’s unique status as a self-declared nuclear-weapon-free state, recognized through a United Nations General Assembly resolution, exemplifies a national commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

These zones prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons within their territories, reinforced by international verification and control systems. NWFZs play a crucial role in maintaining regional stability, reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, and promoting global disarmament.

Astana Workshop: A Critical Gathering for Disarmament

The upcoming workshop in Astana is a critical opportunity for states-parties to the five NWFZ treaties, alongside representatives from international organizations, to engage in vital discussions aimed at overcoming the challenges facing these zones. This gathering is particularly timely, given the escalating geopolitical tensions in regions where nuclear capabilities remain central to national security.

A key focus of the workshop will be on enhancing cooperation among the NWFZs, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament. This includes facilitating consultation between the zones and encouraging nuclear-armed states to adhere to the protocols of these treaties. The workshop builds on the 2019 seminar titled “Cooperation Among Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia,” co-organized by UNODA and Kazakhstan in Nur-Sultan(Astana), which produced key recommendations aimed at revitalizing cooperation among NWFZs.

Participants will discuss strategies to advance the objectives of NWFZs, with an emphasis on strengthening security benefits for member states and fostering more robust consultation mechanisms. The workshop will also address the challenges posed by the reluctance of certain nuclear-armed states, particularly the United States, to ratify protocols related to several NWFZ treaties. Despite being a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the U.S. has yet to ratify protocols to treaties covering the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), and Central Asia. This reluctance has impeded the full realization of the security benefits these zones could offer.

Kazakhstan’s Leadership in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

Kazakhstan’s role in nuclear disarmament extends beyond NWFZs to include leadership in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). In March 2025, Kazakhstan will host the 3rd Meeting of State Parties to the TPNW at the United Nations, further solidifying its position as a champion of nuclear disarmament.

Kazakhstan has been a vocal advocate of the TPNW and has actively pushed for the creation of an international fund to support victims of nuclear testing and remediate environments affected by nuclear activities, in line with Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty.

The Vienna Action Plan, developed during the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW(1MSP), outlines actions for implementing these articles, including exploring the feasibility of an international trust fund and encouraging affected states parties to assess the impacts of nuclear weapons use and testing and to develop national plans for implementation.

At the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP), co-chaired by Kazakhstan and Kiribati, progress was made, but challenges remain. The informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation presented a report, and its mandate was renewed, with the goal of submitting recommendations for the establishment of an international trust fund at the 3rd Meeting of States Parties (3MSP). Kazakhstan’s leadership in this area underscores its commitment to addressing the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, drawing from its own experience with the devastating consequences of nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk.

Civil Society’s Crucial Role

As a part of the two day event, Soka Gakkai International (SGI) from Japan and the Center for International Security and Policy (CISP) will hold a side event in the evening of September 28 to screen the documentary “I Want to Live On: The Untold Stories of the Polygon,” highlighting the survivors of nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk. This documentary, produced by CISP with SGI’s support, was first shown at the UN during the second meeting of state parties to the TPNW in 2023. This side event is part of a broader initiative by SGI and Kazakhstan, which have co-organized several events focusing on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons at UN, Vienna, and Astana in recent years.

Also coinciding with the Astana workshop, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) will hold a conference convening civil society organizations and activists including Hibakusha from some countries. This confluence of governmental and civil society efforts in Astana marks a significant moment in the global disarmament movement. While diplomats and state representatives discuss policy and cooperation during the official workshop, the parallel activities organized by civil society will amplify the humanitarian message and emphasize the urgent need for a world free of nuclear weapons.

As global tensions rise, the Astana workshop represents a beacon of hope, a critical moment in the global journey toward disarmament. Through cooperation, dialogue, and a shared commitment to peace, the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons remains within reach. Kazakhstan, with the support of the international community, is at the forefront of this vital effort.

INPS Japan/IPS UN Bureau

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India Can Use The G20 to Fight Corruption and Reduce Global Inequalities

Civil Society, Economy & Trade, Global, Global Geopolitics, Global Governance, Headlines, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Despite unprecedented challenges, 2022 also opened windows of opportunity to move the needle around critical anti corruption issues, such as anti-money laundering, asset recovery, beneficial ownership, and renewable energy. Credit: Shutterstock.

Despite unprecedented challenges, 2022 also opened windows of opportunity to move the needle around critical anti-corruption issues, such as anti-money laundering, asset recovery, beneficial ownership, and renewable energy. Credit: Shutterstock.

Sanjeeta Pant, Jan 25 2023 (IPS) – The G20 India Presidency is marked by unprecedented geopolitical, environmental, and economic crises. Rising inflation threatens to erase decades of economic development and push more people into poverty. Violent extremism is also on the rise as a result of increasing global inequality, and the rule of law is in decline everywhere. All of these challenges impact the G20’s goal of realizing a faster and more equitable post-pandemic economic recovery.

But as India prioritizes its agenda for 2023, it is corruption that is at the heart of all of these other problems- and which poses the greatest threat to worldwide peace and prosperity.


An Idea Whose Time Has Come

Although the G20 has repeatedly committed to the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) anti-money laundering standards, member countries have been slow to implement policy reforms

Despite unprecedented challenges, 2022 also opened windows of opportunity to move the needle around critical anti-corruption issues, such as anti-money laundering, asset recovery, beneficial ownership, and renewable energy. When global leaders meet during the G20 Indian Presidency , they must prioritize and build on this progress, rather than make new commitments around these issues that they then fail to implement.

According to the UN, an estimated 2-5% of global GDP, or up to $2 trillion, is laundered annually. Although the G20 has repeatedly committed to the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) anti-money laundering standards, member countries have been slow to implement policy reforms. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and ineffective economic sanctions against Russian oligarchs, governments have started reexamining existing policy and institutional gaps, especially recognizing the role of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), also known as “gatekeepers.”

G20 member countries are responding to concerns and criticisms from their national counterparts regarding failures to adopt FATF recommendations and clamp down on “dirty money.” Grappling with the need to be able to prosecute money-laundering cases and recover billions of dollars worth of frozen assets, they are also amending national laws to be able to do so.

Lack of beneficial ownership transparency is also aiding the flow of laundered money globally. The G20 recognizes beneficial ownership data as an effective instrument to fight financial crime and “protect the integrity and transparency of the global financial system.”

The Russian invasion helped drive home this message, especially among countries that are popular destinations for those buying luxury goods and assets. FATF’s amendment of its beneficial ownership recommendations in early 2022 was timely. Member countries are also introducing new reporting rules, and fast-tracking policies and processes to set up beneficial ownership registers. While there are still gaps in the proposed policies – as identified here– these are important first steps.

Similarly, the transition to renewable energy, initially raised as an environmental issue and then as a national security concern is increasingly gaining attention from a resource governance perspective. Given the scale of the potential investment, there is a need to tackle corruption in the energy sector to avoid potential pitfalls resulting from a lack of open and accountable systems as we transition to a net zero economy.

The cross-cutting nature of the industry means a wide range of issues– from procurement and conflict of interest in the public sector to beneficial ownership transparency- need to be considered. The global energy crisis and the Indonesian Presidency’s prioritization of the issue have helped build momentum around corruption in the renewable energy transition, and this focus must continue.

Calling on India

Corruption-related issues identified here are transnational in nature and have global implications, including for India. For instance, with money laundering cases rising in India, it cannot afford to regard it as a problem limited to safe havens like the UK or the US. The same is true for the lack of beneficial ownership transparency or corruption in the renewable energy transition, which fuels illicit financial networks in India and beyond, and which often transcend national borders.

Finally, corruption has a disproportionate impact on the global poor. Almost 10% of the global population lives in extreme poverty, many of whom live in countries such as India. The G20, under the Indian Presidency, provides a unique opportunity to ensure the voices of the most vulnerable are heard at the global level. By prioritizing the anti-corruption agenda and building on past priority issues and commitments, the Indian government can lead efforts to bridge the North-South divide.

Sanjeeta Pant is Programs and Learning Manager at Accountability Lab. Follow the Lab on Twitter @accountlab

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Uyghur Violations a Litmus Test for Global Governance & Rules-based International Order

Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Featured, Global Geopolitics, Global Governance, Headlines, Human Rights, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Protesters in Washington, DC, march against the alleged killing of Uyghur Muslims. June 2022. Credit: Unsplash/Kuzzat Altay

NEW YORK, Oct 3 2022 (IPS) – This week is a momentous one for the world’s premier human rights body. At stake is a resolution to decide whether the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva can hold a debate on a recently released UN report.


The report concludes that rights violations by China’s government in its Xinjiang region ‘may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity’.

Unsurprisingly, China’s government is doing everything in its power to scotch plans for a debate on the report’s contents. Its tactics include intimidating smaller states, spreading disinformation and politicising genuine human rights concerns – the very thing the Human Rights Council was set up to overcome.

The historic report, which affirms that the rights of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslim population are being violated through an industrial-level programme of mass incarceration, systemic torture and sexual violence, attracted huge controversy before it was released on 31 August 2022, minutes before the end of the term of the outgoing High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet.

The report was supposedly ready in September 2021 but so great was the pressure exerted by the Chinese state that it took almost another year for it to be aired. Absurdly, the 46-page report includes a 122 page annex in the form of a rebuttal issued by China, rejecting the findings and calling into question the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The Office of the High Commissioner has asserted that the report is based on a rigorous review of documentary evidence with its credibility assessed in accordance with standard human rights methodology. The report’s recommendations are pretty straightforward: prompt steps should be taken to release all people arbitrarily imprisoned in Xinjiang, a full legal review of national security and counter-terrorism policies should be undertaken, and an official investigation should be carried into allegations of human rights violations in camps and detention facilities.

Nevertheless, a proposed resolution to hold a debate on the report’s contents in early 2023 is facing severe headwinds. A number of states inside and outside the Human Rights Council, united by their shared history of impunity for rampant human rights abuses – such as Cuba, Egypt, Laos, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Venezuela – have already rallied to China’s defence in informal negotiations on the brief resolution.

What is most worrying is that China appears to be leaning on smaller states that make up the 47-member Human Rights Council by inverting arguments about politicisation of global human rights issues and projecting itself as the victim of a Western conspiracy to undermine its sovereignty.

If China were to have its way, it would be a huge setback for the Human Rights Council, which was conceived in 2006 as a representative body of states designed to overcome the flaws of ‘declining credibility and lack of professionalism’ that marred the work of the body it replaced, the UN Commission on Human Rights.

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his ground-breaking In Larger Freedom report, lamented that states sought membership ‘not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others’.

Human Rights Council members are expected to uphold the highest standards in the protection and promotion of human rights. But our research at CIVICUS shows that eight of the Council’s 47 members have the worst possible civic space conditions for human rights defenders and their organisations to exist. In these countries – Cameroon, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan – human rights are routinely abused and anyone with the temerity to speak truth to power is relentlessly persecuted.

Regimes that serially abuse human rights may be motivated to block findings of investigations being aired on the international stage, but the international community has a collective responsibility to the victims. Civil society groups are urging Human Rights Council members to stand firm on the call for a debate on the China report.

Human Rights Council member states that assert the importance of human rights and democracy in their foreign policy are expected to vote in favour. Nevertheless, the influence of regional and geo-political blocs within the Council mean that the issue will essentially be settled by the decisions of states such as Argentina, Armenia, Benin, Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Senegal, Ukraine and Qatar.

China will undoubtedly pressure these states to try to get them to oppose or abstain in any vote that seeks to advance justice for the Uyghur people.

The stakes are particularly high for China’s mercurial leader, Xi Jinping, who is seeking to anoint himself as president for a third term – after abolishing term limits in 2018 – at the Chinese Communist Party’s Congress, which begins on 16 October.

Recognition of the systematic abuses to which Xi’s administration has subjected the Uyghur people would be considered an international affront to his growing power.

If China were to prevail at the Human Rights Council, it would be another blow to the legitimacy of the UN, which is already reeling from the UN Security Council’s inability to overcome Russia’s permanent member veto to block action on the invasion of Ukraine. So much – for the UN’s reputation, and for the hope that human rights violators, however powerful, will be held to account – is resting on the vote.

Mandeep S. Tiwana, is chief programmes officer and representative to the United Nations at global civil society alliance, CIVICUS.

IPS UN Bureau

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On Nuclear Weapons, Actions Belie Reassuring Words

Armed Conflicts, Civil Society, Featured, Global, Global Geopolitics, Global Governance, Headlines, IPS UN: Inside the Glasshouse, Nuclear Energy – Nuclear Weapons, Peace, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Credit: Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament/Henry Kenyon

WASHINGTON DC, Jan 13 2022 (IPS) – On Jan. 3, the leaders of the five nuclear-armed members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) issued a rare joint statement on preventing nuclear war in which they affirmed, for the first time, the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev maxim that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”


The U.S., Chinese, French, Russian, and UK effort was designed in part to create a positive atmosphere for the 10th NPT review conference, which has been delayed again by the pandemic. It also clearly aims to address global concerns about the rising danger of nuclear conflict among states and signals a potential for further cooperation to address this existential threat.

The question now is, do they have the will and the skill to translate their laudable intentions into action before it is too late?

U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price hailed the statement as “extraordinary.” A more sober reading shows that it falls woefully short of committing the five to the policies and actions necessary to prevent nuclear war.

In fact, the statement illustrates how their blind faith in deterrence theories, which hinge on a credible threat of using nuclear weapons, perpetuates conditions that could lead to nuclear catastrophe.

The statement asserts that “nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war.” Yet, such broad language suggests they might use nuclear weapons to “defend” themselves against a wide range of threats, including non-nuclear threats.

Given the indiscriminate and horrific effects of nuclear weapons use, such policies are dangerous, immoral, and legally unjustifiable.

At the very least, if the leaders of these states are serious about averting nuclear war, they should formally adopt no-first-use policies or, as U.S. President Joe Biden promised in 2020, declare that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter or possibly respond to a nuclear attack.

Even this approach perpetuates circumstances that could lead to nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. The only way to ensure nuclear weapons are never used is “to do away with them entirely,” as President Ronald Reagan argued in 1984, and sooner rather than later.

But on disarmament, the statement only expressed a “desire to work with all states to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all.” This vague, caveated promise rings hollow after years of stalled disarmament progress and an accelerating global nuclear arms race.

A year ago, Russia and the United States extended the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, but they have not begun negotiations on a follow-on agreement. Meanwhile, both spend billions of dollars annually to maintain and upgrade their nuclear forces, which far exceed any rational concept of what it takes to deter a nuclear attack.

China is on pace to double or triple the size of its land-based strategic missile force in the coming years. Worse still, despite past promises “to engage in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” Chinese leaders are rebuffing calls to engage in arms control talks with the United States and others. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, announced last year it would increase its deployed strategic warhead ceiling.

Fresh statements by the five NPT nuclear-armed states reaffirming their “intention” to fulfill their NPT disarmament obligations are hardly credible in the absence of time-bound commitments to specific disarmament actions.

At the same time, the five, led by France, have criticized the good faith efforts by the majority of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to advance the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Contrary to claims by the nuclear-armed states, the TPNW reinforces the NPT and the norm against possessing, testing, and using nuclear weapons.

Rather than engage TPNW leaders on their substantive concerns, U.S. officials are pressuring influential states, including Sweden, Germany, and Japan, not to attend the first meeting of TPNW states-parties as observers. Such bullying will only reinforce enthusiasm for the TPNW and undermine U.S. credibility on nuclear matters.

The leaders of the nuclear five, especially Biden, can and must do better. Before the NPT review conference later this year, Russia and the United States should commit to conclude by 2025 negotiations on further verifiable cuts in strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces and on constraints on long-range missile defenses.

China, France, and the UK should agree to join nuclear arms control talks no later than 2025 and to freeze their stockpiles as Washington and Moscow negotiate deeper cuts in theirs.

Instead of belittling the TPNW, the five states need to get their own houses in order. Concrete action on disarmament is overdue. It will help create a more stable and peaceful international security environment and facilitate the transformative move from unsustainable and dangerous deterrence doctrines toward a world free of the fear of nuclear Armageddon.

Source: Arms Control Today

Daryl G. Kimball is Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, Washington DC.

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Mother of Summits: Sweet and Sour Diplomacy, but Nothing Cooked!

Conferences, Economy & Trade, Featured, Global, Global Geopolitics, Global Governance, Headlines, TerraViva United Nations

SINGAPORE, Nov 22 2021 (IPS) – It has been said that when Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of war. The summit of the leaders of world’s two strongest powers, the United States and China, came face to face at long last. Albeit virtually. Still, this was undoubtedly the “mother of summits” this year. There were two telephone conversations earlier, but according to US officials this nearly four hours of summitry was far more “candid intense, and deeper interaction”. If there was one single take-away from this meeting, it was the establishment beyond all reasonable doubt of the incontrovertible fact that the US and China were indeed the two most influential global state actors. The decisions between the two, represented by their leaders, would profoundly impact the rest of humanity far into the future.


Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury

Given that in terms of deliverables, the consensus among all analysts was that nothing significant was expected, the event was important in that it put to rest the bickering between the subordinates that was pushing the world towards a precipice. It was about time the supreme political masters, Joe Biden of the US and Xi Jinping assumed the reins of control of the most important relationship of our times. Both sides were intellectually convinced that the stiffest possible competition between the two was on the cards. The challenge was to manage this in a way to prevent a conflict that would be catastrophic. This was one point on which, luckily, there was understanding on both sides.

There was not much on anything else. Prior to the meeting that Biden was focussed on writing the rules of the engagement of China “in a way that is favourable to our interests and our values and those of our allies and partners”. Unsurprisingly, Xi and the Chinese did not play ball. Both sides basically emphatically stated their positions on issues and showed nary an inclination to concede an inch to the other. In the end, as was expected, there were no breakthroughs. The irreconcilable positions remained in- tact, with a vague call by both sides for more cooperation.

A virtual meeting is bereft of the positive influences of informal chats, banquets, and the opportunity of developing personal camaraderie. Still, both leaders exuded friendly demeanours, and Xi called Biden “an old friend”. On Taiwan, the dialogue was tough. Xi reminded Biden of the US position on the Peoples ‘Republic being the sole legitimate government of China , reinforced by here communiques issued in 1972, 1979 and 1982. Following the talks the White House clarified that the “One China’ was also guided by the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances committing the US to opposing” unilateral efforts to change the status quo”. Xi made it clear that Taiwan for China was a “core issue”; it was a province of China, and any support to its independence was akin to playing with fire. “Whoever plays with fire will get hurt” was a message he strongly underscored.

There seemed a glimmer of hope on one front, though. In the past China has refused to be drawn into any nuclear arms control agreements given that its arsenal was far smaller than those of the US and Russia. But recent significant qualitative improvements of its capabilities have been worrying the US. At the meeting China showed willingness to talk on the subject. However, there is no possibility of agreements beyond the rim of the saucer because the Chinese will naturally demand steep cuts in US numbers which will be unacceptable to Washington. However, there could be forward movement through diplomatic engagements on matters such as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), will the positivity that would entail.

There is a fundamental difference in the approach of China and the US to negotiations. The US believes in a kind of “a la carte” method of choosing areas where it believes there is scope for collaboration while competition, and even confrontation, continues others. The Chinese on the other hand reject this as “cherry picking” and see the agenda as a comprehensive package. What is the use of understanding on one subject, while differences on another cam lead to war? Unless this basic divergence is resolved, negotiations are unlikely to be able to yield any worthwhile results. Discussions will continue to be both sweet and sour, as the summit deliberations were, but nothing seriously palatable will get cooked!

Xi has in the meanwhile has consolidated his own power in China to a point that he may be set obtain a third term of office. More importantly, he is viewed as the navigator in the journey towards national rejuvenation leading to China becoming a modern fully developed nation by 2049 which will bring him yet closer to the status of the Great helmsman, Chairman Mao Zedong, himself. All these were the outcome of the Sixth plenum of the Chinese Communist Party which met last week and adopted a “historical resolution” that buttressed Xi’s power and position.

Incidentally, in the history of the party this was the third historical resolution. The first was adopted in 1945 under Mao four years prior to the revolutionary victory, and the second by the ‘reformist” Deng Xiaoping. While Mao was the one who restored a sense of pride among the Chinese people enabling them “to stand up” and Deng made them rich through his reforms, Xi, by the dint of this “thought” (which supersedes “theory” in Chinese political lexicon) gave them strength and shared prosperity. In an abstruse political milieu where the count of numbers means a great deal, a Xinhua communique on the meeting mentioned Xi’s name at least fourteen times, compared to seven of Mao and Five of Deng. That tells a lot.

Consequently, it is now all but certain that Xi will be elected to an unprecedented third term in office as party General Secretary at the 20th Party Congress next year. There is also some talk that he may assume the title of “Chairman” as well which will bring him at par with Mao. The plenum also elevated Xi Jinping Thought to 21st Century Marxism, completing the process of “Sinicization” of Marxist philosophy. Xi has been pragmatic in welding the conservatism of Mao, but shunning his repressive methods, with the reforms of Deng, correcting the “capitalist excesses”, and bringing China on a socialist path that would lead to a “modern society” with “shared prosperity “. Small wonder that many Chinese observers are beginning to see him as a “Philosopher King” in the mould of Plato in the West and Confucius in the East, a perfect mix for the cauldron of power and authority. An interesting footnote is that the Chinese Communist Party formally announced its third “historical resolution”, cementing Xi’s powers hours after the Summit, though it was leaked earlier, which pointed to a thought-through calibrated set of actions.

Nowhere the same degree, Joe Biden also seems to have achieved a modicum of success of his own despite powerful head winds. He has managed to create a sense of cohesion among America’s allies, though his path has had numerous pitfalls and bumps. Importantly he has managed to secure the passage into law of the massive legislation in terms of the US $1.2 trillion bill on a revamp of infrastructures, to “build back better”, a campaign pledge. This for him is no mean achievement, proving that persistence pays. But for him and his Democratic Party the future is not as rosy as that what appears to be for his Chinese counterpart. A Republican win in the Presidential race is a distinct possibility. That could lead to turmoil and backlash in US domestic politics, requiring the identification of a common foe to rally the nation. China is the obvious candidate. If, consequently, the “ultimate red line” for China, such as on the issue of Taiwan is crossed, a catastrophe could follow.

Surely the Chinese have made those calculations. From now to then, China and Xi will, while seeking to avoid an immediate conflict, be preparing to, in the words of the Global Times seen as a State media outlet, “to deal with the biggest storms in the world, the most powerful and comprehensive siege from the US and its allies”. Halfway down this decade it will be high- risk for one to wager too much in favour of peace!

Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is the Honorary Fellow at the Institute of South Asia Studies, NUS. He is a former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh and President & Distinguished Fellow of Cosmos Foundation. The views addressed in the article are his own. He can be reached at: isasiac @nus.edu.sg

This story was originally published by Dhaka Courier.