Funding Disruptions Are a Systemic Failure – Philanthropy Must Do What’s Right and Support Local Leadership

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Civil Society, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Featured, Financial Crisis, Gender, Global, Headlines, Human Rights, Inequality, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

SORIA, Spain, Mar 17 2025 (IPS) – The slashing of US aid funding by Donald Trump and Elon Musk, and cuts or planned cuts in international support by several European states, threaten to cut off the oxygen supply to a civil society already in a critical condition. At CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance, activists and grassroots groups have shared with us time and again that shifting and volatile donor priorities are one of the top funding challenges they face, alongside limited resources for strategy and restricted funding.

Tais Siqueira

Local civil society in the global south is most affected by these challenges. Funding disruptions are no temporary matter. They reflect systemic failures and deep power and funding inequalities between the global north and global south. They undermine trust, shift power away from the communities most affected by global challenges and force local organisations into a reactive survival mode rather than enabling them to drive strategic action.

This is a critical moment for philanthropy to step up and put locally led development principles into practice. This means channelling more resources directly to local civil society, advocating for the meaningful participation of a diverse local civil society in policy spaces at all levels, ensuring their financial, legal and security resilience, and reimagining the role of philanthropy as being not just a funder, but an investor, catalyser and collaborator. As a starting point, philanthropic funders should do the following.

1. Commit to immediate, flexible, and sustained financial support

Local civil society is on the frontlines of addressing some of the world’s most pressing issues. Yet it’s often the first to feel the impact of funding disruptions. Philanthropy must act quickly to provide immediate, flexible and emergency grants to help local organisations survive funding gaps, including by increasing flexibility in existing grants to allow for operational reallocation to cover urgent needs, such as security-related expenses, salaries and insurance.

Unrestricted funding is also critical. Local groups need autonomy to allocate resources where they’re most needed, including for financial, legal and digital protection. Philanthropic funders should prioritise high-quality support – funding that is flexible, predictable and for core work – to support local civil society’s agency and autonomy and avoid orientation around donor priorities. Philanthropy must recognise that trust in local leadership is both the right and strategic thing to do.

2. Strengthen local civil society’s governance through collaboration and promote trust and support

Local leadership isn’t just about financial support; it’s about co-creating the systems and structures that enable local groups to thrive. Philanthropy can play a pivotal role in supporting local groups to strengthen their governance, risk management and compliance systems by fostering collaboration and innovation rather than imposing external standards. Support should be tailored, context specific and co-designed.

One key step is providing direct support to local groups to develop systems that prioritise accountability while trusting them to manage resources. This requires funders to move away from overly prescriptive conditions and toward models of support that acknowledge the leadership and agency of local civil society.

Philanthropy must also recognise that compelling narratives and ambitious policies are needed to stimulate trust and support local civil society. Progressive philanthropic funders can encourage others to follow suit.

3. Invest in infrastructure enabling diverse local civil society groups to collectively organise, share resources and strengthen resilience

In an increasingly interconnected world, the ability of local civil society groups to connect, collaborate and share resources is more important than ever. Investments in infrastructure can enable civil society to bravely defend and promote civic freedoms. Investment will facilitate collective influencing and knowledge-sharing networks, ensuring organisations are better prepared for further funding instability.

Philanthropic funders can earmark funds for emergency response, including for legal defence, audits and unforeseen security threats. Security in the digital sphere is also a critical need, and support can be provided for digital communications infrastructure, encrypted platforms and security audits.

Support for protection of civic space and promotion of civil society participation in decision-making will help enable strategic resistance against rollbacks of hard-won rights and gender, racial and social justice gains.

It’s also crucial to recognise that progressive local civil society groups and leaders are key enablers of locally led development and strengthen civil society’s support infrastructure. Investments in these infrastructures ensure that local groups have the necessary space, resources, agency and autonomy to shape and implement solutions that best fit their contexts.

CIVICUS’s Local Leadership Labs initiative addresses the political, technical and behavioural barriers that hinder governments, donors and other stakeholders from fully embracing and resourcing diverse civil society groups as legitimate participants in development. These labs support radically inclusive spaces, where local civil society groups can drive the development of policies and solutions, together with decision-makers and other key players. This cultivates spaces for collaboration, allowing diverse civil society groups and multi-stakeholder initiatives to share knowledge, reflect and strategise together.

A call to reaffirm commitment to locally led development

Philanthropic funders have unique convening authority, networks and partnerships that can be leveraged to advocate for locally led development. This isn’t just about funding; it’s about using influence to shift narratives and create an enabling environment where local civil society can thrive. Philanthropist must publicly reaffirm their commitment to the Donor Statement on Supporting Locally-Led Development and take real steps to put these principles into action.

The challenges are immense, but so too are the opportunities. By fostering an environment where local civil society has the resources, autonomy and trust to lead, philanthropy can move beyond financial transactions and become a transformative partner.

Tais Siqueira is Coordinator of CIVICUS’s Local Leadership Lab

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Belarus: A Sham Election That Fools No One

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Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Europe, Featured, Headlines, Human Rights, Nuclear Energy – Nuclear Weapons, Press Freedom, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Credit: Sergei Gapon/AFP via Getty Images

LONDON, Feb 7 2025 (IPS) – Alexander Lukashenko will soon begin his seventh term as president of Belarus. The official result of the 26 January election gave him 86.8 per cent of the vote, following an election held in a climate of fear. Only token opposition candidates were allowed, most of who came out in support of Lukashenko. Anyone who might have offered a credible challenge is in jail or in exile.

No repeat of 2020

In office since 1994 as the so far only president of independent Belarus, Lukashenko is by far Europe’s longest-serving head of state. The 1994 vote that brought the former Soviet official to power was the country’s only legitimate election. Each since has been designed to favour Lukashenko.

He only faced a serious threat in 2020, when an outsider candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, was able to run a campaign that captured the popular imagination. Lukashenko’s response was to arrest opponents, repress protests, restrict the internet, deny access for electoral observers and then blatantly steal the election.

When people took to the street in mass protests against electoral fraud, Belarus seemed on the brink of a democratic revolution. But Lukashenko’s government launched a brutal defence, using security forces to violently attack protesters and arresting over a thousand people. It dissolved opposition political parties and raided and shut down civil society organisations: over a thousand have been forcibly liquidated since 2020.

Lukashenko’s regime has gone after those in exile, kidnapping and allegedly killing Belarusians abroad. Belarus is among the 10 states most engaged in transnational repression. They authorities have also deprived the estimated 300,000 people who’ve fled since 2020 of their ability to vote.

By embracing repression, Lukashenko made a choice to abandon his policy of balancing between the European Union (EU) and Russia. When the EU imposed sanctions in response to the 2020 election fraud, Russia offered a package of loans. In 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale assault on Ukraine, some of its forces entered Ukraine from Belarus.

Shortly after Russia began its full-scale invasion, a constitutional referendum held in Belarus, marked by the same lack of democracy as its elections, formally ended the country’s neutrality and non-nuclear status. In December 2024, the two states signed a security treaty allowing the use of Russian nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Belarus, and Lukashenko confirmed that the country hosts dozens of Russian nuclear warheads.

Belarus has also been accused of instrumentalising migrants to try to destabilise neighbouring countries. In 2021, it relaxed its visa rules for people from Middle Eastern and North African countries and encouraged flights to Belarus. Thousands were taken to the borders with Lithuania and Poland and left to try to cross them in desperate conditions, freezing and without essentials, subjected to security force violence on both sides. Migrants were unwitting pawns in Lukashenko’s game to strike back at his neighbours. Attempted crossings and human rights violations have continued since.

Renewed crackdown

Just to be on the safe side, Lukashenko launched another crackdown in the months leading up to the election. The intent was clearly to ensure there’d be no repeat of the expression of opposition and protests of 2020.

Starting in July 2024, Lukashenko pardoned around 250 political prisoners, releasing them from jail. His likely aim was to soften international criticism in the run-up to the vote. But these weren’t the high-profile prisoners serving long sentences, such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Ales Bialiatski, a founder of the Viasna Human Rights Centre, who received a 10-year sentence in 2023, or protest leader Maria Kolesnikova, sentenced to 11 years in 2021. Those pardoned had to publicly acknowledge their guilt and repent.

The freed jail spaces were quickly filled, with over a hundred friends and relatives of political prisoners detained. In February 2024, authorities detained at least 12 lawyers who’d defended political prisoners. In December, they arrested seven independent journalists. Belarus has the world’s fourth highest number of jailed journalists.

People have been jailed merely for following Telegram channels deemed ‘extremist’ or making social media comments. Over 1,700 people reportedly faced charges for political activities in 2024. Prison conditions are harsh. People may be forced to do hard labour, kept in solitary confinement, sent to freezing punishment cells, denied access to their families and have medical care withheld.

On election day, Lukashenko’s dictatorial style was on full display. He held a press conference where he promised to ‘deal with’ opposition activists in exile and said they were endangering their families in Belarus, adding that some opponents ‘chose’ to go to prison. He also didn’t rule out the prospect of running for an eighth term in 2030.

Time for change

Lukashenko promises more of the same: continuing autocracy and closed civic space. For generations of Belarusians who’ve known nothing but his rule, and with opposition voices so ruthlessly suppressed, it may be hard to imagine anything else. The possibilities opened up in 2020 have been ruthlessly shut down.

But the wheels of history will keep turning, and the 70-year-old dictator won’t last forever. Some kind of cessation of hostilities in Ukraine may well come this year, forcing Lukashenko to make friends beyond Vladimir Putin. If Russia winds down its booming war economy, the ensuing economic shock in Belarus, which largely depends on Russia, could trigger public anger.

Meanwhile, potentially increased scrutiny could come from the International Criminal Court: in September 2024, the government of Lithuania requested an investigation into crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Belarusian authorities. If this move gains momentum, Lukashenko could find himself in an uncomfortable spotlight. States could also intensify sanctions: Canada and the UK have done so following the election.

If Belarus attempts to reengage with them, democratic states should insist that no thaw in relations is possible without tangible human rights progress . This should start with the release of all political prisoners, guarantees for the safety of exiled activists and a reversal of attacks on civic space.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org.

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Venezuela: The Democratic Transition That Wasn’t

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Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Economy & Trade, Featured, Headlines, Latin America & the Caribbean, Migration & Refugees, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Credit: Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 3 2025 (IPS) – Venezuela stands at a critical juncture as Nicolás Maduro begins a controversial third term as president. His 10 January inauguration, following a post-election period marked by widespread protests against election fraud and heightened repression, represents a significant setback for democratic aspirations in a country devastated by years of economic collapse and political oppression. Maduro’s confirmation at the helm is the latest chapter in a decades-long process that has transformed Venezuela from a beacon of leftist democratic aspirations into a full-blown authoritarian regime, where the last shred of legitimacy – popular election – has now vanished.

The implications of Venezuela’s crisis extend far beyond its borders, triggering the largest refugee exodus in the Americas and creating significant challenges for neighbouring countries. Almost eight million Venezuelans live abroad, with projections suggesting another two or three million might leave in the coming years.

This crisis comes at a moment when, unlike in the past, two key factors potentially leading to a democratic transition are present: unprecedented opposition unity capable of sustaining a protest movement and growing international support, with progressive Latin American governments increasingly distancing themselves from Maduro. However, Maduro’s willingness to use violent repression and his ability to maintain military loyalty suggest a difficult path ahead for democratic restoration.

Election fraud and post-election repression

The 2024 presidential election initially sparked hopes for democratic change. These hopes were crushed when Maduro declared himself the winner despite clear evidence that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia had secured a significant victory.

The election campaign unfolded against a backdrop of intensifying civic space restrictions and was far from free and fair. The government disqualified popular opposition leader María Corina Machado and blocked her proposed replacement, forcing the opposition to field González Urrutia. Additional irregularities included systematic persecution of opposition leaders, abuse of public resources, media manipulation and voter suppression tactics, particularly targeting the estimated four million Venezuelan voters abroad.

Despite these challenges, the opposition demonstrated unprecedented unity and organisation. Through its Plan 600K initiative, it mobilised around 600,000 volunteers to monitor polling stations, collect the tallies produced by voting machines and independently calculate results. Their parallel count revealed that González won around 67 per cent of votes compared to Maduro’s 29 per cent, figures supported by independent exit polls. However, the National Electoral Council stopped publishing results after counting 40 per cent of votes, eventually declaring an implausible Maduro victory without providing any supporting data.

Fraud sparked widespread unrest, with 915 spontaneous protests erupting across Venezuelan cities in the two days following the election. The regime’s response was swift and severe. It labelled protests a ‘fascist outbreak’ and charged many protesters with terrorism and incitement to hatred. Security forces used deadly force, resulting in at least 25 deaths, while pro-government paramilitaries engaged in intimidation and violence.

The crackdown extended beyond protesters to target opposition and civil society leaders. Several prominent figures were forced into hiding or exile, while others faced arbitrary detention. Repression intensified in the lead-up to Maduro’s inauguration, with 75 new political detentions in the first 11 days of January alone.

Inauguration day

Maduro’s inauguration reflected both the regime’s isolation and its increasingly authoritarian character. Only two presidents – from Cuba and Nicaragua – attended the ceremony, while other governments sent lower-level representatives. The swearing-in ceremony took place 90 minutes earlier than scheduled, out of fear that the opposition’s president-elect, in exile in Spain, could somehow materialise its declared intention to enter Venezuela and hold a parallel counter-inauguration.

The government implemented extraordinary security measures to make sure this wouldn’t happen, closing land borders with Brazil and Colombia, shutting down Venezuelan airspace and deploying an unprecedented number of security forces throughout Caracas. The militarisation extended to the closure of opposition-controlled neighbourhoods and the pre-emptive detention of dozens of opposition figures.

Maduro’s inaugural address and subsequent appearances were particularly confrontational. He announced plans for constitutional changes to further consolidate power and declared the beginning of a new phase of governance based on a strong alliance between civilian authorities, military forces, the police and the intelligence apparatus. He openly discussed Venezuela’s readiness to take up arms against intervention alongside Cuba and Nicaragua, framing political opposition as a threat to national sovereignty.

International responses and regional implications

In the Americas, only Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras and Nicaragua recognise Maduro as the legitimately elected president, with only an additional handful worldwide, including China, Iran and Russia, maintaining their support.

The USA responded to Maduro’s inauguration by increasing the reward it offers for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to US$25 million, while also targeting his inner circle with new sanctions. The European Union also imposed new sanctions. The G7’s foreign ministers and the High Representative of the European Union issued a joint statement condemning Maduro’s ‘lack of democratic legitimacy’ and the ongoing repression of civil society and the political opposition.

Most significantly, the positions of Latin American states appear to be slowly shifting, with some left-wing leaders, notably those of Brazil and Colombia, not automatically siding with the Maduro regime for the first time. However, Colombia’s pragmatic approach reveals the complexities faced by Venezuela’s neighbours: while not accepting the official election results at face value, Colombia has stopped short of condemnation and has been careful to maintain its diplomatic relations, citing the need to manage border issues and the refugee situation.

Prospects for democratic change

The path to democratic transition faces significant obstacles, with military support remaining crucial to Maduro’s hold on power. The regime has secured military loyalty through a combination of institutional integration, coercion and economic privilege, with high-ranking military officers reaping generous rewards. The regime has found additional layers of protection in security structures including the National Bolivarian Guard, special police units and pro-government militias, and the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, strongly backed by G2, Cuba’s secret service.

But the authoritarian regime has vulnerabilities. Growing international isolation, combined with continued economic deterioration, may eventually strain the system of patronage that maintains elite loyalty, including among the military. The opposition’s commitment to peaceful resistance, while seemingly ineffective in the short term, continues to earn it moral authority and international support.

While the combination of peaceful resistance, international pressure and potential internal divisions within the regime may eventually create conditions for change, the immediate future suggests a continuing struggle between an entrenched authoritarian system and a resilient democratic movement. The outcome will have profound implications for Venezuela and for all of Latin America.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org.

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‘The Closure of Meta’s US Fact-Checking Programme Is a Major Setback in the Fight Against Disinformation’

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Artificial Intelligence, Civil Society, Education, Featured, Global, Headlines, Press Freedom, TerraViva United Nations

Jan 24 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS speaks with Olivia Sohr about the challenges of disinformation and the consequences of the closure of Meta’s fact-checking programme in the USA. Olivia is the Director of Impact and New Initiatives at Chequeado, an Argentine civil society organisation working since 2010 to improve the quality of public debate through fact-checking, combating disinformation, promoting access to information and open data.

Olivia Sohr

In January 2025, Meta, the company that owns Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, announced the suspension of its US data verification programme. Instead, the company will implement a system where users can report misleading content. The decision came as Meta prepared for the start of the new Trump presidency. Explaining the change, Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg said the company was trying to align itself with its core value of free speech. Meta also plans to move some of its content moderation operations from California to Texas, which it says is in response to concerns about potential regional bias.

What led to Meta’s decision to end its fact-checking programme?

While the exact details of the process that led to this decision are unknown, in his announcement Zuckerberg alluded to a ‘cultural shift’ that he said was cemented in the recent US election. He also expressed concern that the fact-checking system had contributed to what he saw as an environment of ‘excessive censorship’. As an alternative, Zuckerberg is proposing a community rating system to identify fake content.

This decision is a setback for information integrity around the world. Worryingly, Meta justifies its position by equating fact-checking journalism with censorship. Fact-checking is not censorship; it’s a tool that provides data and context to enable people to make informed decisions in an environment where disinformation is rife. Decisions like this increase opacity and hamper the work of those focused on combatting disinformation.

The role of fact-checkers in Meta is to investigate and label content that is found to be false or misleading. However, decisions about the visibility or reach of such content will be made solely by the platform, which has assured that it will only reduce exposure and add context, not remove or censor content.

How the community grading system will work has not yet been specified, but the prospects are not promising. Experience from other platforms suggests that these models tend to increase disinformation and the spread of other harmful content.

What are the challenges of fact-checking journalism?

Fact-checking is extremely challenging. While those pushing disinformation can quickly create and spread completely false content designed to manipulate emotions, fact-checkers must follow a rigorous and transparent process that is time-consuming. They must constantly adapt to new and increasingly sophisticated disinformation strategies and techniques, which are proliferating through the use of artificial intelligence.

Meta’s decision to end its US verification programme makes our task even more difficult. One of the key benefits of this programme is that it has allowed us to reach out directly to those who spread disinformation, alerting them with verified information and stopping the spread at the source. Losing this tool would be a major setback in the fight against disinformation.

What are the potential consequences of this change?

Meta’s policy change could significantly weaken the information ecosystem, making it easier for disinformation and other harmful content to reach a wider audience. For Chequeado, this means we will have to step up our efforts to counter disinformation, within the platform and in other spaces.

In this scenario, verification journalism is essential, but it will be necessary to complement this work with media literacy initiatives, the promotion of critical thinking, the implementation of technological tools to streamline the work and research to identify patterns of disinformation and the vulnerability of different groups to fake news.

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Colombia’s Historic Child Marriage Ban

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Civil Society, Education, Featured, Gender, Gender Violence, Headlines, Health, Human Rights, Indigenous Rights, Latin America & the Caribbean, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations, Women’s Health

Opinion

Credit: Fundación Plan/Instagram

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jan 8 2025 (IPS) – Colombia has just marked a historic milestone in the global campaign against child marriage, with the Senate passing one of Latin America and the Caribbean’s most comprehensive bans on child marriage and early unions. In a country where one in five girls under 18 and one in 10 under 14 are married or live in marriage-like conditions, the new law raises the minimum age to 18 with no exceptions, eliminating a 137-year-old Civil Code provision that allowed children over 14 to marry with parental consent. This achievement aligns with goal 5 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which has a target of eliminating harmful practices like child marriage by 2030. The new law now awaits the signature of President Gustavo Petro to come into effect.

The breakthrough

Child marriage disproportionately affects Colombia’s most vulnerable communities, with rates of between 40 and 65 per cent among rural, Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations. In some communities, girls as young as 10 are married off. These early unions expose girls to unequal power relations, deny them education, limit their bodily and economic autonomy and lead to higher rates of gender-based violence and health issues linked to early pregnancy.

The passage of the #SonNiñasNoEsposas (‘They are girls, not wives’) bill reflected the power of persistent civil society advocacy. After several failed attempts since 2007, the bill, authored by two congresswomen, passed with unanimous support. This success was driven by a coalition of Colombian civil society organisations as part of the Girls Not Brides global network, including the Foundation for Gender and Family Development, Fundación Plan and Profamilia, working alongside international partners such as Equality Now and Plan International, with Girls Not Brides directly supporting legislative advocacy and media campaigns.

Beyond raising the marriage age, the new law establishes the National Comprehensive Programme for Life Projects for Children and Adolescents. This preventive initiative targets the structural causes of early unions – poverty and lack of education – particularly in remote rural areas. The programme includes the participation of Indigenous communities through their own governance structures, recognising the importance of cultural sensitivity in implementation.

The global landscape

Colombia is by no means alone in having a child marriage problem. Around the world, some 12 million girls are married each year, two million before the age of 15. While child marriage can affect boys as well, girls are six times more likely to be married as children than boys.

According to the Child Marriage Monitoring Mechanism, a collaborative initiative to generate evidence to support efforts to end child marriage, one in five young women worldwide are married before their 18th birthday, with rates highest in sub-Saharan Africa.

To tackle this problem, The Elders, a group of senior public figures, launched the global Girls Not Brides partnership in 2011. With over 1,400 member organisations in more than 100 countries, Girls Not Brides works to prevent under-age marriage, recognising it as both a human rights violation and an obstacle to development. It identifies four main drivers of child marriage: poverty, limited educational and economic opportunities, gender inequality and insecurity in conflict or disaster situations. It tackles the problem with awareness-raising campaigns, national and international policy advocacy and community engagement to challenge social norms that perpetuate child marriage.

Since then, efforts have multiplied. In 2016, the United Nations Population Fund and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) launched the Global Programme to End Child Marriage. Now in its third phase, set to run until 2030, the programme operates in 12 high-prevalence countries in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Working directly with governments, it has reached millions of adolescent girls, focusing on education, healthcare and economic opportunities.

Regional-level initiatives include the South Asian Initiative to End Violence Against Children, which works in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and the African Union’s Campaign to End Child Marriage in Africa, launched in 2014 in 10 high-prevalence countries and later expanded to 30.

Many more initiatives work at national and local levels. They combine multiple responses, including working with religious and community leaders to change social norms, supporting girls’ education and economic empowerment, engaging with men and boys on gender equality, advocating for stronger laws and their enforcement, providing support services to girls at risk of child marriage, using media and technology to raise awareness and change attitudes and building networks of young advocates and change-makers.

Progress and challenges

These efforts have contributed to a global decline in child marriage rates. According to UNICEF, the proportion of young women married as children has decreased from 25 per cent to 21 per cent over the past decade, meaning that 25 million child marriages have been prevented. However, the global number of child brides is still estimated at 650 million, including girls under 18 who have already married and adult women who married as children.

The average annual rate of reduction has been 0.7 per cent over the past 25 years and 1.9 per cent over the past decade, showing the impact of recent initiatives. But at this rate, the SDG target of eliminating the practice by 2030 won’t be achieved.

Setbacks have been caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, conflict and economic instability. Wherever insecurity rises, so does child marriage, as parents see early marriage of daughters as a financial and security solution. During Syria’s conflict, for example, the rate of child marriages shot up among refugees in countries such as Jordan and Lebanon.

Looking ahead

Colombia’s new law marks significant progress, but it’s just the beginning, as evidenced by the fact that many of the early marriages that take place in Colombia would have been illegal under the old law.

The real work of implementation begins now. Colombia’s efforts over the next few years will be crucial in demonstrating how legislative change can translate into real protection for vulnerable girls. For Latin America and the Caribbean, it should open up opportunities for strengthened cross-border cooperation and similar legislative reforms.

Colombia’s comprehensive approach could serve as a model for change in a region where many countries still have legal exceptions that allow child marriage under some circumstances, while others have strong laws that aren’t adequately implemented.

While the declining trend in global child marriage rates offers hope, the current pace of change remains far too slow. Colombia’s example shows that significant progress is possible through sustained, multi-stakeholder commitment and comprehensive approaches that change laws but also address underlying social dynamics. The international community must build on this momentum. This means scaling up successful initiatives, increasing funding for civil society organisations and maintaining political pressure.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org.

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‘Digital platforms amplify the Israeli narrative while systematically silencing Palestinian voices’

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Armed Conflicts, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Featured, Headlines, Human Rights, Middle East & North Africa, Migration & Refugees, Press Freedom, TerraViva United Nations

Jan 2 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses the challenges Palestinian civil society faces in resisting digital suppression and advocating for justice with Palestinian lawyer and researcher Dima Samaro.

As the director of Skyline International for Human Rights, Dima advocates for digital freedoms and human rights in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). She is a board member of Innovation for Change, MENA Hub, and the Surveillance in the Majority World Network, and volunteers with Resilience Pathways, which helps Palestinian civil society organisations (CSOs) reclaim the narrative amid Israeli efforts to manipulate public opinion, block funding and restrict civic space.

Dima Samaro

How are digital platforms influencing the narrative on Palestine?

Digital platforms have become key to shaping narratives about Palestine, often amplifying the Israeli narrative while systematically silencing Palestinian voices. Platforms such as Meta, TikTok and X, formerly Twitter, routinely remove Palestinian content under vague ‘policy violations’. This has intensified since October 2023, with the Israeli Cyber Unit issuing over 9,500 takedown requests, 94 per cent of which were approved. These actions have resulted in the removal of posts, shadow bans – a form of censorship that limits visibility of pro-Palestinian content without user notification – and account suspensions, and have extended to the censorship of hashtags such as #FreePalestine.

Algorithmic bias further marginalises Palestinian narratives. For example, Instagram once mistranslated the Arabic phrase ‘alhamdulillah’ – praise be to God – next to a Palestinian flag as ‘terrorists fighting for their freedom’. On WhatsApp, AI-generated images depicted militarised scenes as illustrations for ‘Palestinian’ but benign cartoons for terms such as ‘Israeli boy’ or ‘Israeli army’. While these incidents are often dismissed as technical errors, they reveal a systemic bias.

Policies such as Meta’s Dangerous Organisations and Individuals framework are heavily influenced by US terrorism designations and stifle Palestinian discourse by prohibiting expressions of ‘praise’ or ‘support’ for major political movements. Meanwhile, hate speech targeting Palestinians – including posts celebrating violence or calling for the destruction of Gaza – often goes unchecked. While ads inciting violence against Palestinians are allowed, the use of terms like ‘Zionist’ is flagged as hate speech. This double standard silences Palestinian voices while enabling propaganda that justifies collective punishment and shields atrocities from scrutiny.

Platform complicity goes beyond censorship. In April, +972 Magazine reported that WhatsApp, which belongs to Meta, played a role in supporting the Israeli AI surveillance system Lavender, which has been linked to the killing of civilians in Gaza. These disturbing revelations suggest direct corporate complicity in violations of international law.

Digital platforms are distorting narratives, dehumanising Palestinians and normalising violence against an already oppressed and besieged population. They actively suppress efforts to document war crimes and manipulate information. They must be held accountable for this.

What challenges does Palestinian civil society encounter?

Palestinian CSOs work under immense pressure, facing arbitrary arrests, travel bans, funding cuts and violence. In October 2021, Israel designated six prominent Palestinian human rights groups as terrorist organisations. These unfounded accusations delegitimised their work, fuelling defamation campaigns and enabling harassment and other restrictions on their work.

Many human rights defenders have also become targets of digital surveillance. Pegasus spyware, developed by the Israeli company NSO Group, has been used to hack the devices of Palestinian activists and human rights defenders, putting their safety and work at risk. This surveillance has been widely condemned by organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

But the crackdown on Palestinian civil society goes beyond digital tactics: human rights defenders are harassed, arbitrarily detained and physically attacked. In Gaza, the situation has worsened after October 2023. Several civil society workers have been killed, injured or detained, and many have been displaced by the ongoing bombardment. The destruction of infrastructure has further hampered their work.

Journalists also face violence. Gaza has become the world’s deadliest place for journalists, with 195 media workers killed to date, many of them deliberately targeted while carrying out their duties. This loss of independent reporting creates a massive information gap, leaving human rights violations unreported and unchecked.

To make matters worse, international donors such as Germany, Sweden and Switzerland have suspended funding over unsubstantiated allegations of links to terrorism. The European Union’s imposition of ‘anti-incitement’ clauses also stigmatises Palestinian CSOs by forcing them to prove their neutrality, limiting their ability to document human rights violations without risking their safety.

How is Skyline International helping address these challenges?

We work at the intersection of technology, social media and human rights in Palestine and the region. We track, monitor and document human rights violations committed by states and corporations, particularly in the digital sphere. This includes tracking digital surveillance, analysing the ethical implications of AI in conflict settings and advocating for the protection of fundamental online rights such as freedom of expression, access to information and the right to privacy.

In Palestine, we support civil society activists and journalists by tackling online censorship and digital bias. We work closely with human rights defenders to document cases of over-enforcement of policies, content takedowns, account suspensions and algorithmic bias by social media platforms, as well as the illegal use of spyware and new technologies to target media workers. We also condemn Israel’s use of digital tools to target journalists in Gaza and Lebanon. Our aim is to draw national and international attention to these violations and advocate for the protection of press and online freedoms, ensuring that journalists can report without fear of retribution.

We also hold technology companies to account for their impact on human rights. In September, for example, we sent an open letter to Binance, a leading cryptocurrency exchange, expressing serious concerns about allegations of a mass seizure of Palestinian crypto wallets at Israel’s request. These actions exacerbate the economic and financial blockade of Gaza, making it even more difficult to access essential resources such as water, food and medical supplies. We demanded transparency regarding the criteria used to determine which accounts were frozen and immediate action to mitigate the humanitarian impact on Palestinian users. Although Binance responded, it didn’t provide a clear explanation or take any action.

What can the international community do to support Palestinian civil society?

Support for the work of Palestinian civil society is crucial to documenting abuses and advocating for justice. But this support must go beyond expressions of solidarity or charity. We need our allies to support our struggle for freedom and dignity.

The international community must move beyond empty rhetoric and take tangible action. It must also do more than just provide financial aid: it must put political pressure on Israel to end its occupation and respect Palestinian human rights. This includes protecting activists, fighting Israel’s constant attempts to criminalise and silence our work and holding accountable those who profit from the ongoing genocide. It means stopping arms exports to Israel and holding tech platforms accountable for their complicity in suppressing Palestinian voices, amplifying hate speech and facilitating Israeli surveillance and repression.

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SEE ALSO
Palestine: ‘The international community has failed to stop the genocide, not because it can’t, but because it won’t’ Interview with Tahreer Araj 26.Nov.2024
‘AI-powered weapons depersonalise the violence, making it easier for the military to approve more destruction’ Interview with Sophia Goodfriend 23.Nov.2024
Palestine: ‘Ending impunity for violations of Palestinians’ rights would strengthen global norms that protect all humanity’ Interview with Kifaya Khraim 11.Nov.2024

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