Democracy under Attack: Why the World Needs a New UN Special Rapporteur

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Opinion

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BRUSSELS, Belgium / MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 2 2025 (IPS) – When tanks rolled through Myanmar’s streets in 2021, civil society groups worldwide sounded the alarm. When Viktor Orbán systematically dismantled Hungary’s free press, democracy activists demanded international action. And as authoritarianism returns to Tanzania ahead of elections, it’s once again civil society calling for democratic freedoms to be respected.

Around the world, authoritarian populists have learned to maintain democratic language and rituals while gutting democracy’s substance. They hold fraudulent elections with no real opposition and crack down on civil society when it tries to uphold democratic freedoms. As a result, more than 70 per cent of the world’s population lives in countries where civic space is routinely repressed.

In response, over 175 civil society organisations and 500 activists have united behind a demand to help improve respect for democratic freedoms, calling on the UN to establish a Special Rapporteur on Democracy.

The proposal isn’t coming from diplomatic corridors or academia; it’s a grassroots call from the frontlines of a global democratic struggle. Democracy defenders who face harassment, imprisonment and violence have identified a gap in international oversight that emboldens authoritarians and lets down those fighting for democratic rights when they most need support.

Critical blind spots

While the UN investigates everything from torture to toxic waste through specialised rapporteurs, democracy – supposedly a core UN principle – receives no systematic international oversight. This is a blind spot civil society wants to change.

Today’s threats to democracy are often more subtle than outright coups and blatant election rigging. Repressive leaders have mastered the art of legal authoritarianism, using constitutional amendments to extend term limits, judicial re-engineering to capture courts and media laws to silence critics, all while maintaining a facade of democratic governance.

In countries from Belarus to Venezuela, elections have been turned into elaborate ceremonies emptied of competition. Even established democracies face growing challenges, with foreign influence and disinformation campaigns documented across dozens of recent elections, often amplified by AI that creates deepfakes faster than fact-checkers can debunk them.

The rise of right-wing populism across Europe and in the USA shows how easily democratic processes can elevate leaders who systematically undermine democratic institutions from within, weaponising the law to concentrate executive authority, criminalise opposition and restrict civic space.

These evolving threats expose fundamental gaps in how the international community monitors and responds to democratic regression. The proposed UN Special Rapporteur on Democracy would help fill this gap: unlike current mandates that focus on specific rights, this role would examine how democratic systems function as a whole.

Existing UN Special Rapporteurs have recognised the urgent need for dedicated democracy oversight, with the Special Rapporteurs on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, freedom of opinion and expression, and the independence of judges and lawyers highlighting how democratic backsliding undermines the rights they’re mandated to protect.

A democracy rapporteur could investigate the full spectrum of threats that escape international attention: how electoral systems become compromised through legal manipulation, how parliamentary oversight gets systematically weakened while maintaining constitutional appearances, how judicial independence is eroded through seemingly legitimate reforms, and how meaningful participation beyond elections gets stifled through bureaucratic restrictions.

Crucially, the mandate could document not just obvious authoritarian crackdowns but the subtler forms of democratic erosion that often escape international notice until democratic institutions are compromised, offering early warnings about gradual processes that transform vibrant democracies into hollow shells.

Legal foundations

The proposal builds on solid legal foundations. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that ‘public authority must derive from the will of the people’, while article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognises every citizen’s right to participate in public affairs and vote in free, fair and clean periodic elections.

Regional mechanisms provide valuable precedents. The Inter-American Democratic Charter explicitly states that ‘the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it’. Building on this, Guatemala has recently requested an advisory opinion to clarify whether democracy constitutes a fundamental human right and what tangible obligations this imposes on states.

These foundations provide an actionable definition of democracy that respects diverse democratic models while upholding universal principles, sidestepping cultural relativist arguments that some authoritarian governments use to avoid accountability.

Momentum building

The proposal has generated remarkable momentum. On the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a broad coalition of civil society groups and think tanks published a joint statement calling for the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on Democracy.

Civil society leadership reflects widespread frustration among democracy activists who work under increasingly dangerous conditions and demand better institutional responses. Budget-conscious states should find this proposal attractive given the remarkable cost-effectiveness of the UN mandates system. Following standard UN practice, the new position would be unpaid, relying on voluntary funding from supportive states.

During its recent 58th session, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, conferring multilateral legitimacy on governments that want to support stronger democracy oversight. The window for action is open, but it won’t stay open indefinitely.

A test for international institutions

No single initiative will reverse global democratic decline. But this new role would enable systematic documentation, trend spotting and the sustained international attention democracy defenders desperately need. The rapporteur could investigate not just obvious authoritarian crackdowns but early signs of subtler democratic erosion, while highlighting innovations and good practices that others could adapt.

The debate over a UN Special Rapporteur on Democracy offers a test of whether international institutions can adapt to contemporary challenges or will remain trapped in outdated approaches while democracy crumbles. Creating this mandate would communicate that the international community takes democratic governance seriously enough to monitor it systematically – a signal that matters to democracy activists who need international support and serves as a warning to authoritarian leaders who thrive when nobody is watching.

With hundreds of civil society groups leading this charge from the frontlines of democratic struggle, the question isn’t whether this oversight is needed, but whether the UN will act before it’s too late.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, and Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, writer at CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Poland’s Democratic Deadlock

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Opinion

Credit: Kacper Pempel/Reuters via Gallo Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 25 2025 (IPS) – Poland’s embattled Prime Minister Donald Tusk emerged bruised but still standing after his government survived a parliamentary vote of confidence on 11 June. He’d called the vote, which he won by 243 to 210, just days after the presidential candidate of his Civic Platform (PO) party suffered an unexpected defeat.

Karol Nawrocki, an independent nationalist conservative backed by the former ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) defeated liberal pro-European Union (EU) Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski in a nail-biting presidential runoff. The result offers a broader test of Poland’s democratic resilience that could have implications across the EU.

The electoral blow

Nawrocki’s path to victory was anything but predictable. The 42-year-old former president of Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance had never held elected office before emerging as PiS’s chosen candidate. Yet his populist message resonated with frustrated voters.

Economic grievances provided fertile ground for nationalist appeals. Despite Poland’s relatively low unemployment, youth unemployment of over 10 per cent is an understandable source of anxiety for younger voters. Increasingly, they’re reacting by rejecting mainstream political offerings.

This helped cause the fragmented results of the 18 May first round. Trzaskowski won only 31.36 per cent of the vote and Nawrocki took 29.54 per cent. The combined vote share of right-wing candidates – Nawrocki and far-right politicians Grzegorz Braun and Sławomir Mentzen – exceeded polling expectations. Braun and Mentzen took over 21 per cent between them, thanks to the support of many young voters.

The 1 June runoff saw Nawrocki win 50.89 per cent to Trzaskowski’s 49.11 per cent, a margin of under two percentage points. Nawrocki took 64 per cent of the rural vote while Trzaskowski commanded 67 per cent in urban centres – an established geographic divide that reflects an enduring ideological division between a conservative, nationalist Poland and its liberal, cosmopolitan counterpart.

Election interference

Disinformation is helping fuel polarisation. The election campaign unfolded against a backdrop of foreign interference concerns that echoed troubling developments across the region – particularly in Romania, where the Supreme Court cancelled the 2024 presidential election due to evidence of Russian interference.

Just days before the first round, Poland’s Research and Academic Computer Network discovered evidence of potentially foreign-funded Facebook ads targeting all major candidates. According to an investigation by fact-checking organisation Demagog, TikTok was flooded with disinformation, particularly but not exclusively against Trzaskowski. The platform’s algorithm displayed far-right content twice as often as centrist or left-wing content to new users, with pro-Nawrocki videos appearing four times more frequently than pro-Trzaskowski content. Over 1,200 fake accounts systematically attacked Trzaskowski, while another 1,200 promoted Nawrocki.

The influence operation extended beyond individual character assassination to sowing distrust in the democratic process and sharing broader far-right narratives. Fake accounts systematically promoted anti-Ukrainian sentiment and anti-immigration conspiracy theories.

Donald Trump also gave Nawrocki an unprecedented level of support: he received him at the White House just before the election and sent his Homeland Security Secretary to campaign for him in Poland as she attended the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC). This year, CPAC, a US conservative platform, held two international events, in Hungary and Poland. The Polish one, timed to coincide with the runoff, offered a clear indication of how the nationalist far right has become internationalised.

Institutional paralysis

The viability of Tusk’s ideologically diverse coalition and his own political future have been called into question by the result. With critics in the Civic Coalition blaming the election defeat on the government’s communication failures and Tusk’s personal unpopularity, the confidence vote became a key test.

But even though Tusk has survived the confidence vote, it will be a tall order to implement the reforms needed to restore the democratic institutions that came under strain during the PiS administration. In eight years in power, PiS dismantled judicial independence, made public media its propaganda mouthpiece and undermined women’s rights by introducing one of Europe’s harshest anti-abortion laws. The new government’s attempts to reckon with this legacy had already been hampered by outgoing President Andrzej Duda, who used his veto power to block key reforms. Nawrocki will continue that, leaving Tusk unable to realise his promises to Polish voters and the EU.

The European Commission had counted on Tusk completing promised judicial reforms as it unlocked billions in pandemic recovery funds frozen over rule-of-law concerns during PiS rule. With progress now unlikely, the Commission faces the difficult decision of whether to maintain its funding even if the government’s unable to deliver promised changes.

Beyond the EU, Nawrocki’s foreign policy positions threaten to complicate Poland’s previously staunch backing of Ukraine. Although supportive of continued aid, Nawrocki has pledged to block any prospects of Ukraine joining NATO and prioritise Polish interests over refugee support.

High stakes

The razor-thin margin of victory in the presidential election, combined with record turnout of 72.8 per cent, tells a complex story of a divided society. While high participation suggests robust civic engagement, the deep polarisation reflected in the results reveals faultlines that extend far beyond conventional political disagreements.

The outcome offers further evidence that, when economic grievances aren’t addressed, institutional trust is allowed to erode and information environments are left vulnerable to manipulation, opportunistic politicians will exploit social divisions and anti-establishment anger.

For Poland, the coming years will test whether democratic institutions can withstand the pressures of sustained political deadlock. Poland faces potential institutional paralysis that could further erode public trust in democratic governance. Poland’s institutions will need to try to demonstrate their continuing effectiveness, and civil society and independent media will need to maintain their credibility, to help protect and nurture democratic values.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Portugal: No Longer an Exception to Europe’s Far-right Rise

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Opinion

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MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 5 2025 (IPS) – For decades, Portugal stood as a beacon of democratic stability in an increasingly unsettled Europe. While neighbours grappled with political fragmentation and the rise of far-right movements, Portugal maintained its two-party system, a testament to the enduring legacy of the 1974 Carnation Revolution that peacefully transitioned the country from dictatorship to democracy. It was long believed that Portugal’s extensive pre-revolution experience of repressive right-wing rule had effectively inoculated it against far-right politics, but that assumption is now demonstrable outdated. An era of exceptionalism ended on 18 May, when the far-right Chega party secured 22.8 per cent of the vote and 60 parliamentary seats, becoming the country’s main opposition force.

This represents more than an electoral upset; it marks the collapse of five decades of democratic consensus and Portugal’s reluctant entry into the European mainstream of political polarisation. Chega could hold the balance of power. The centre-right Democratic Alliance, led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro, won the most parliamentary seats, but fell far short of the 116 needed for a majority. Meanwhile, the Socialist Party, which governed from 2015 to 2024, suffered its worst defeat since the 1980s, relegated to third place by a party that’s only six years old.

Chega’s meteoric rise from just 1.3 per cent of the vote and one seat in 2019 to its role as today’s main opposition demonstrates how quickly political landscapes can shift when mainstream parties fail to address people’s fundamental concerns. The roots of the transformation lie in a toxic combination of economic pressure and political failure that has systematically eroded public confidence in the political establishment.

Portugal has endured three elections in under four years, a sign of its novel state of chronic instability. The immediate trigger for the latest election was the collapse of Montenegro’s government following a confidence vote, with opposition parties citing concerns over potential conflicts of interest involving his family business. This followed the previous Socialist government’s fall in November 2023 amid corruption investigations, creating a recurring cycle of scandal, government crisis and electoral upheaval.

The political turmoil unfolds against a backdrop of mounting social challenges that mainstream parties have failed to adequately address. Despite its economy growing by 1.9 per cent in 2024, well above the European Union average, Portugal faces a severe housing crisis that has become the defining issue for many voters, particularly those from younger generations. Portugal now has the worst housing access rates of all 38 OECD countries, with house prices more than doubling over the past decade.

In Lisbon, rents have jumped by 65 per cent since 2015, making the capital the world’s third least financially viable city due to its punishing combination of soaring housing costs and traditionally low wages. This crisis, driven by tourism, foreign investment and short-term rentals, has pushed property ownership beyond most people’s reach, creating widespread frustration with governments perceived as ineffective or indifferent to everyday struggles.

Immigration has provided another flashpoint. The number of legal migrants tripled from under half a million in 2018 to over 1.5 million in 2025. This rapid demographic change has fuelled populist narratives about uncontrolled migration and its alleged impact on housing and employment markets. It was precisely these grievances that Chega, led by former TV commentator André Ventura, expertly exploited.

As an outsider party untainted by association with the cycle of scandals and governmental collapses, Chega positioned itself as the defender of ‘western civilisation’ and channelled anti-establishment anger into electoral success. It combines promises to combat corruption and limit immigration with a defence of what it characterises as traditional Portuguese values, including through extreme criminal justice policies such as chemical castration for repeat sexual offenders.

Despite Ventura’s insistence that Chega simply advocates equal treatment without ‘special privileges’, the party’s ranks include white supremacists and admirers of former dictator António Salazar. Its openly racist approach to immigration and hostility towards women, LGBTQI+ people, Muslims and Roma people reflects a familiar far-right playbook that has proven successful across Europe. Chega has cultivated significant connections with Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, Germany’s Alternative for Germany, and Spain’s Vox party, and Ventura was among the European far-right leaders invited to Donald Trump’s inauguration.

Montenegro has so far refused to work with Chega, which he has publicly characterised as demagogic, racist and xenophobic – a rejection that may have inadvertently strengthened Chega’s anti-establishment credentials. However, the arithmetic of Portugal’s fractured parliament suggests that any significant policy initiatives will require either Socialist abstention or, more controversially, Chega support, creating new opportunities for far-right influence, particularly on criminal justice and immigration policies.

Portugal’s experience offers sobering evidence that far-right influence should no longer be viewed as a passing fad but rather as an established feature of contemporary European politics. The speed of the shift offers a stark reminder that no democracy is immune to the populist pressures reshaping the continent.

The question now is whether Portugal’s institutions can adapt to govern effectively in this new fractured landscape while preserving democratic values. Portugal’s civil society has an increasingly vital part to play in holding newly influential far-right politicians to account and offering collective responses to populist challenges.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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‘Our Weak and Corrupt Institutions Acted Too Late to Address Manipulation That Destabilised Democracy’

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May 14 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses Romania’s presidential election with Anda Serban, Executive Director of Resource Center for Public Participation (CERE), a civil society organisation (CSO) that focuses on public participation and transparency in decision-making processes.

Romania has experienced a dramatic shift in its political landscape following the presidential election rerun held on 4 May. The Constitutional Court ordered a new election after it annulled the December 2024 vote and disqualified far-right frontrunner Călin Georgescu due to electoral violations and alleged foreign interference. A new far-right candidate, George Simion, took first place in the first round of the rerun election, sending further shockwaves through Romania’s political establishment. A runoff vote between Simion and centrist Bucharest Mayor Nicușor Dan is scheduled for 18 May.

Anda Serban

What factors led to the decision to annul the first election?

Romania’s weak and corrupt institutions acted too late to address manipulation that destabilised our democracy. The court pointed to three main reasons for annulment: foreign interference in political campaigns, authorities failing to act on available information and the risky, short-sighted strategies employed by political parties seeking to undermine their opponents.

Judges found that illegal digital campaigning, foreign interference and campaign finance violations compromised the integrity of the election and decided a full rerun was necessary. Unlike other countries facing similar challenges, Romania’s response has been notably inadequate. While France, Moldova and the USA have tackled similar problems and some steps have been taken at the European level, Romania took far too long to act. In typical Romanian political and bureaucratic fashion, once information came out, politicians did nothing right away. Instead of following clear steps to act quickly, officials waited and tried to see how they could use it to their advantage.

How did this affect public trust in Romania’s democratic institutions?

This crisis exists within a broader context of eroding democratic norms. Trust was already low before the annulment, and with good reason. The government increasingly uses emergency ordinances to legislate, Bucharest’s city hall opens less than three per cent of its proposals for public debate and local authorities systematically ignore civic input. This comes on top of a poorly managed pandemic and a war in Ukraine across our border, with the aggressor’s voice amplified in social media.

Authorities have done nothing to reverse this trend. On the contrary, they have increasingly tried to restrict civic space and human rights. So when the election was suddenly annulled, it became the spark that ignited an already volatile situation. This ongoing institutional failure has had a profound impact on the credibility of the entire electoral process.

The aftermath of the court’s decision further damaged public confidence. Distrust intensified because authorities acted too slowly and inadequately. No senior official was held accountable. Without a public, transparent review, many people didn’t see this annulment as a real defence of democracy.

What role have established political parties played in the crisis?

The current situation stems partly from cynical political calculations by mainstream parties. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Liberal Party believed they could ride the wave of far-right and sovereigntist sentiment, represented by Georgescu, without serious consequences. They’ve maintained power for over 35 years. They assumed they could face him in a runoff and easily defeat him. But his support proved much stronger than they expected.

This miscalculation has now transformed the political landscape. Georgescu’s disqualification turned him into an anti-system symbol, despite being an insider and having held public jobs. Every candidate tried to claim the anti-system role, some more aggressively than others.

The resulting polarisation is unprecedented. Some Georgescu backers hoped to repeat a situation similar to the attack on the US Capitol on 6 January 2021. We’ve seen some insurrectionary slogans, such as ‘second round back’, fuelled by both real supporters and bots seeking to erode trust in the process.

Who were the leading candidates in the rerun first round?

Although the ballot looked very different from December, the ideological spectrum remained largely conservative. Most candidates appealed to the same pool of Christian-Orthodox voters. The biggest dividing line was foreign policy: some were pro-European Union (EU), others pro-USA, particularly pro-Trump, and a few pushed anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian narratives.

The race effectively narrowed to five significant contenders. George Simion of the Alliance of Union of Romanians (AUR) emerged as Georgescu’s political heir. No one was able to fully capture Georgescu’s support base, but Simion came closest by copying his style and behaviour. He skipped all three official presidential debates, in one case staging a dramatic walkout with supporters, just as Georgescu did in 2024. While this showed a lack of respect for voters, Simion may have felt he had nothing to gain and only votes to lose. This strategy won him first place with 40.96 per cent of the vote.

Simion and AUR represent a clear threat to Romania’s European orientation. They are conservative on family and immigration, oppose human rights advances and are pro-Russian in foreign policy. The EU is under pressure from many fronts, and Simion’s rise adds to that strain.

The other candidates positioned themselves within this disrupted landscape. Bucharest’s mayor, Nicușor Dan, ran as an independent with the Save Romania Union’s support. He cast himself as the ‘lone wolf’ anti-system figure. During his mayoral term, he built coalitions in the city council for reforms. He received 20.99 per cent of the vote and will now compete with Simion in the runoff.

The three other candidates were Elena Lasconi, Crin Antonescu and Victor Ponta. Lasconi maintained that she should have been the rightful challenger to Georgescu in the previous runoff. She targeted Dan’s voters, accusing him of ‘stealing’ them. Antonescu, in contrast, represented continuity with the governing coalition. He relied on his rhetorical skills to fill the ‘calm statesman’ role Georgescu once sought. He showed a lot of pragmatism, expressing willingness to form any coalition – even with the far right – to stay in power. And Ponta emerged as a troubling surprise. He staged a political comeback with provocative proposals, adopting a Romanian version of Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ discourse.

How has disinformation shaped the electoral environment?

Online disinformation is moving at a scale we’ve never seen. In every election, parties try to shape the agenda, but when legions of bots flood social media to do it too, the rules change. Even if all parties use such tactics, it ends up being a matter of who has most resources to spread disinformation.

Media manipulation isn’t new, but its scale is unprecedented. We are constantly analysing campaign visuals and debating images of one candidate shared by another, while armies of trolls are flooding social media with copy-pasted comments on political and non-political posts alike.

Fortunately, civil society is fighting back against these information threats. CSOs are working with teachers to incorporate media literacy in schools, running workshops that equip young people to spot fake news and operating fact-checking services to debunk viral lies. As part of the NGOs for Citizens coalition, CERE launched an offline civic forum focused on TikTok’s role in this campaign to give voters the tools they need to navigate this flood of disinformation.

What are the prospects for the runoff?

Dan now battles for the support of first-round non-voters. Even if he manages to secure most of the votes received by all the other candidates, his electoral prospects appear limited unless he can attract a significant influx of new supporters. The key questions are how many of the 38 per cent who rejected Simeon Dan can persuade to participate and support him, and how effectively an anti-Simeon campaign can mobilise those who previously abstained.

A particularly notable development involves the PSD, Romania’s largest party, which has withdrawn from government and declared neutrality in the runoff, endorsing neither candidate. One optimistic interpretation suggests Dan asked political parties to keep a distance, believing them responsible for the substantial anti-system vote, and perhaps PSD agreed. We must also consider that anti-PSD sentiment has persisted for over a decade, particularly among diaspora voters, making the impact of its potential endorsement uncertain. More likely, however, a weakened PSD is simply distancing itself from the turmoil it helped create, hoping to return strengthened in eight to 10 months. Meanwhile, its loyal voting base now lacks direction, raising questions about whether they will gravitate toward Dan or Simion.

What remains unquestionably clear is that Romania’s continued alignment with Europe hinges entirely on achieving substantial voter participation in this pivotal runoff election.

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SEE ALSO
Romania: ‘People saw this election as an opportunity for change and expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Luliana Lliescu 28.Dec.2024
Romania: Protests erupt after court annuls presidential elections results CIVICUS Monitor 10.Jan.2025
Romania: Protests in Bucharest over election irregularities; government workers go on strike CIVICUS Monitor 30.Jul.2024

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New Forms of Power-Sharing are Needed to Uphold Rights of Indigenous Peoples

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KATHMANDU, Nepal, May 7 2025 (IPS) – A UN groundbreaking report published in 1982 laid the legal ground for defining the inalienable rights of Indigenous Peoples.

The document, written by José Martínez Cobo, a United Nations Special Rapporteur, analyzed the complex discrimination patterns faced by Indigenous Peoples.

If the international community is serious about protecting and safeguarding their rights, then it is indispensable to go back to one of the central questions raised in that report: the identity of indigenous people has always been intrinsically interconnected to their lands.

This tenant, now a legal concept mainstreamed in the international human rights jurisprudence, is with few exceptions, unheeded.

Disregarding and violating the rights of Indigenous Peoples to their own lands had led to disenfranchisement, alienation and countless suffering.

The relationship of Indigenous Peoples with their lands with all the measures needed to be enforced to protect it, are the foundations of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted by the General Assembly on 13 September 2007.

Upholding the Declaration’s principles and ensuring its implementation remains one of the key challenges faced by Indigenous Peoples worldwide. It was also the theme of this year’s United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, (UNPFII) the most important UN sanctioned gathering of Indigenous Peoples.

In its 24th session, hosted at the UN HQ in New York from 21 April to 2 May 2025, discussions were focused on how power sharing should underpin any quests of implementing the UNDRIP.

Because, essentially and let’s not forget it, the UNDRIP, is about recognizing Indigenous Peoples’ power. Ensuring Indigenous Peoples’ rights to their lands is paramount if we really want to ensure an inclusive form of governance that respects them.

Discussions over more inclusive forms of governance for Indigenous Peoples should yield to venues for them to have a much stronger saying over their own affairs. After many years of advocacy and legal battles, there have been some victories.

New Zealand, before the rise to power of its current conservative government, and Canada made major strides to respect and uphold the sovereign rights of their Indigenous Peoples.

There have also been strides also on other fronts, more locally.

A research presented at last year’s session of the Forum, showed some encouraging practices. For example, the Sami Parliament in Norway, the concept of Indigenous Autonomies in Mexico City and some traditions from the Tharu and Newar Peoples of Nepal, do offer some models of self-governance.

But, overall, the picture is grim.

Despite the legal framework that has been established and despite many declarations, still, the right to self-determination of Indigenous Peoples, paramount to their quest towards autonomous decision making, is contested and fought back.

And the only way to ensure its realization is when states will accept that in case of governance, whenever the rights of Indigenous Peoples are implied, it should be shared.

To be clear, this process should not be seen as a devolution of power. Rather it should be understood as a legitimate reclamation of power. The just concluded UNPFII tried to underscore this concept.

One of the conclusions of this year’s session underscored that “there has been growing recognition of the need for formal UN mechanisms that ensure Indigenous Peoples’ meaningful participation in global governance”.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, acknowledged, in his opening remarks at the Forum, the violations and abuses faced by Indigenous Peoples.

“The difficulties facing Indigenous Peoples around the world are an affront to dignity and justice. And a source of deep sorrow for me personally”.

The daunting challenges posed by climate warming and the imperative to transition to a net zero economy are going to further challenge the compliance of the UNDRIP.

At the 24th Session, a central focus was the role of Indigenous Peoples in the context of the extraction of critical minerals that are indispensable to ensure a just transition.

On this aspect, a major study, submitted by Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim and Hannah McGlad, two members of the Forum, highlighted that there is no quest for critical minerals nor any just transition unless Indigenous Peoples are put at the front of this epochal shift.

One of the key questions is to think how governments, already pressed by geopolitical imperatives and in many cases already not compliant with the UNDRIP, can really involve, engage and consult with Indigenous Peoples.

The principle of Free, Prior, Informed Consent (FPIC) a foundational pillar of the UNDRIP, is normally only paid lip service to. But without respecting the FPIC, there won’t be a “Just Transition”.

In this regard, the worst performers in upholding this right are often multilateral and bilateral banks. Some difficult questions must be solved.

What could be done to ensure that Indigenous Peoples are at the center of the decision making whenever their lives and lands are concerned?

How to shift from a legal landscape in which the few positive exceptions become the norm? How can Indigenous Peoples better channel their grievances and come forward with their own solutions?

The UNPFII remains the only major platform that Indigenous Peoples can leverage. Yet, no matter its relevance, we are still dealing with a tool driven by symbolism that holds no binding powers.

Certainly, we cannot forget the existence of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples.

If the former can offer valuable insights, the latter, as all the special procedures within the United Nations Human Rights Council, lacks teeth and enforceable powers.

One of the major requests at UNPFII, since several years, has been the appointment of a Special Representative or Advisor on Indigenous Issues to the Secretary General. Yet, even if this demand were to be fulfilled, such a new role would not lead to any substantial impact.

Even within the UNFCCC process, Indigenous issues do struggle to get attention. The recently approved Baku Work Plan could be seen just as unambitious document and the existing

The UNFCCC Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) is not only designed to dilute the voice of Indigenous Peoples but it is made ineffective by purpose.

More promising it is the upcoming debate to create an Indigenous Voice, the so called on Article 8(j), within the framework of the UN Convention on Biodiversity but the negotiations are going to be contentious.

The real crux is how to engage the many governments that, even now, do not recognize the unique identities of Indigenous Peoples. But here is still a lot that the United Nations system could do on its own.

This was a major point of discussion at UNPFII because UN agencies and programs must do a much better job at involving and engaging Indigenous Peoples beyond tokenism.

The probable restructuring process that the UN might be forced to undertake following the cuts in official aid by the new American Administration, should simplify its governance. But such redesign should lead to imagining new spaces that, at minimum, would enable Indigenous Peoples to have their voice heard.

The call for a “Second World Conference on Indigenous Peoples” to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the UNDRIP in September 2027, offers an important opportunity for Indigenous Peoples.

But the advocacy work needed to hold such a historic event would only be justified if the focus in 2027 will be on measures to return the decision making to Indigenous Peoples. Essentially, any new World Conference on Indigenous Peoples should be centered on new forms of governance and power sharing.

These are the two key but inconvenient concepts that must be analyzed and discussed and ultimately internalized with the overarching goal of finally giving back Indigenous Peoples what is due.

Simone Galimberti writes about the SDGs, youth-centered policy-making and a stronger and better United Nations.

IPS UN Bureau

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Shaken and Strained: Myanmar’s Earthquake Adding to the Misery of 4 Years of Conflict

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Opinion

Titon Mitra is Resident Representative, UNDP Myanmar

The 7.7 magnitude earthquake, which struck central Myanmar, has created an even deeper crisis for a country and a people who were already suffering from conflict and displacement. Credit: UNDP Myanmar/Su Sandi Htein Win

NAYPYIDAW, Myanmar, Apr 21 2025 (IPS) – As I walked through the streets of Sagaing and Mandalay, the scenes unfolding in the wake of the 7.7 earthquake were hard to comprehend.

Tall buildings and hundreds of homes are now lying in rubble. Of those that are still standing, many are lurching at dangerous angles, defying gravity for now, but could collapse at any moment.

In Sagaing, 80 percent of buildings have been destroyed and entire sections of one of the main bridges over the Irrawaddy River have snapped off and sunk into the water, like a child’s broken toy. Roads have deep fissures that could swallow cars.

Everywhere you look, families are living on the streets in temperatures that can reach 40°C. Even if their homes are still standing, they are fearful to enter them.

Disease always follows disaster, and in Sagaing and Mandalay, many people are forced to defecate in open spaces and clean water is scarce. Reports of cholera, hepatitis, and typhoid are surfacing, even among aid workers.

Hospitals, already understaffed due to ongoing civil unrest, are overwhelmed and urgently need critical medical supplies like trauma kits and antiseptics. Buildings are unsafe and patients are now housed in carparks.

Local markets are mostly closed and transport links relying on useable roads and bridges are severely affected. If there is food available, it’s extremely expensive, and jobs and incomes have been disrupted so many people can’t even buy food.

The human toll is heart breaking and will likely get worse. One week on, the focus is now grimly shifting from rescue to recovery, as the chances of finding survivors fast dwindles. It’s expected that the death toll, now at around 3,000, will increase significantly.

This is an absolutely devastating and ever deeper crisis for a country and a people who were already suffering from conflict and displacement. Myanmar’s devastated economy, still reeling from the shocks of COVID-19, last year’s typhoons, and years of conflict, has produced hyperinflation, high unemployment, and crushing levels of poverty, particularly amongst children.

The poor and vulnerable simply have no further to fall.

A UNDP report has found that 75 percent of the population or over 40 million people are living near to, or well below, subsistence levels. Myanmar’s middle class has shrunk by an astounding 50 percent in recent years. Even life’s basics are unattainable luxuries for most.

And more than 1.3 million people are internally displaced in Sagaing alone, fleeing the conflict, with little to sustain them, and never entirely safe in their refuge.

In Sagaing, 80 percent of buildings have been destroyed, including one of the main bridges across the Irrawaddy River. Credit: UNDP Myanmar/Su Sandi Htein Win

The sheer scale of the disaster, compounding the pre-existing deep vulnerability, requires a massive and sustained international response.

As in all emergencies, over the first few weeks or month, urgent needs in health, water and sanitation, food, and shelter must be met. But this is a crisis where many of those affected are in urban areas or where farming was taking place, even if at a very basic level.

Areas where it is important to quickly transition from emergency relief to economic and social service support and reconstruction. So, provision of medicines and medical supplies should be quickly followed by making hospitals and health clinics functional.

Distributing water must quickly shift to rehabilitating water supply infrastructure. General food distributions need to transition to targeted supplementary feeding and creation of jobs, incomes, and functioning of markets.

Temporary shelter should be replaced with repair of housing. Most of all, dignity and agency must be preserved – a helping hand up is so much better than perpetual handouts.

UNDP’s focus is twofold—to provide for immediate essential needs while also looking to the future. Despite extensive damage to infrastructure, UNDP teams are distributing shelter materials, clean water, and solar kits to some 500,000 people.

We are providing cash for work to the poor and working with the private sector to remove debris safely and recycle what they can. We are providing equipment and expertise to workers handling hazardous materials like asbestos without proper protection.

We are providing temporary shelters, assessing damaged homes and working with local tradespeople to effect repairs.

But we are also laying the groundwork for the longer term—restarting small businesses, repairing vital public service infrastructure and training young people so that they can get jobs in the huge amount of reconstruction that will be required.

The other thing I noticed walking around Sagaing and Mandalay were the huge, gilded ancient pagodas and statues of Buddha now also in rubble. Not so long ago, they stood grand and seemingly removed from the chaos engulfing the country. They stood as symbols of detachment and compassion.

One of the key tenets of Buddhism is the understanding that life is connected to suffering (dukkha). But how much more can the people of Myanmar suffer? And how much more can those who are suffering depend on the compassion of the ordinary people and first responders who are trying their best to ease the suffering?

Just like the pagodas and statues, resilience of the people of Myanmar cannot be assumed or a given. They desperately need the help of the international community to cope with the compounding crises. The cameras that are now focused on Myanmar will soon turn away. But one hopes that Myanmar will not continue to be the neglected crisis it is.

The international community must come together and meet the resolve and courage of Myanmar and its people, and to imagine a better future. We can at least try to make sure that when disaster strikes again, its blow will not cut so deep.

The long road to recovery will require a concerted effort to rebuild infrastructure, restore livelihoods, and address the many existing needs of the vulnerable. The world’s attention, and sustained commitment, will be crucial in helping the people of Myanmar navigate this devastating chapter.

UNDP’s response to the earthquake in Myanmar, and its work in other crisis contexts, is made possible by the support of core funding partners.

Source: UN Development Programme (UNDP)

IPS UN Bureau

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