Portugal: No Longer an Exception to Europe’s Far-right Rise

Posted on by admin

Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Europe, Featured, Financial Crisis, Gender, Headlines, LGBTQ, Migration & Refugees, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Credit: Zed Jameson/Anadolu via Getty Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 5 2025 (IPS) – For decades, Portugal stood as a beacon of democratic stability in an increasingly unsettled Europe. While neighbours grappled with political fragmentation and the rise of far-right movements, Portugal maintained its two-party system, a testament to the enduring legacy of the 1974 Carnation Revolution that peacefully transitioned the country from dictatorship to democracy. It was long believed that Portugal’s extensive pre-revolution experience of repressive right-wing rule had effectively inoculated it against far-right politics, but that assumption is now demonstrable outdated. An era of exceptionalism ended on 18 May, when the far-right Chega party secured 22.8 per cent of the vote and 60 parliamentary seats, becoming the country’s main opposition force.

This represents more than an electoral upset; it marks the collapse of five decades of democratic consensus and Portugal’s reluctant entry into the European mainstream of political polarisation. Chega could hold the balance of power. The centre-right Democratic Alliance, led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro, won the most parliamentary seats, but fell far short of the 116 needed for a majority. Meanwhile, the Socialist Party, which governed from 2015 to 2024, suffered its worst defeat since the 1980s, relegated to third place by a party that’s only six years old.

Chega’s meteoric rise from just 1.3 per cent of the vote and one seat in 2019 to its role as today’s main opposition demonstrates how quickly political landscapes can shift when mainstream parties fail to address people’s fundamental concerns. The roots of the transformation lie in a toxic combination of economic pressure and political failure that has systematically eroded public confidence in the political establishment.

Portugal has endured three elections in under four years, a sign of its novel state of chronic instability. The immediate trigger for the latest election was the collapse of Montenegro’s government following a confidence vote, with opposition parties citing concerns over potential conflicts of interest involving his family business. This followed the previous Socialist government’s fall in November 2023 amid corruption investigations, creating a recurring cycle of scandal, government crisis and electoral upheaval.

The political turmoil unfolds against a backdrop of mounting social challenges that mainstream parties have failed to adequately address. Despite its economy growing by 1.9 per cent in 2024, well above the European Union average, Portugal faces a severe housing crisis that has become the defining issue for many voters, particularly those from younger generations. Portugal now has the worst housing access rates of all 38 OECD countries, with house prices more than doubling over the past decade.

In Lisbon, rents have jumped by 65 per cent since 2015, making the capital the world’s third least financially viable city due to its punishing combination of soaring housing costs and traditionally low wages. This crisis, driven by tourism, foreign investment and short-term rentals, has pushed property ownership beyond most people’s reach, creating widespread frustration with governments perceived as ineffective or indifferent to everyday struggles.

Immigration has provided another flashpoint. The number of legal migrants tripled from under half a million in 2018 to over 1.5 million in 2025. This rapid demographic change has fuelled populist narratives about uncontrolled migration and its alleged impact on housing and employment markets. It was precisely these grievances that Chega, led by former TV commentator André Ventura, expertly exploited.

As an outsider party untainted by association with the cycle of scandals and governmental collapses, Chega positioned itself as the defender of ‘western civilisation’ and channelled anti-establishment anger into electoral success. It combines promises to combat corruption and limit immigration with a defence of what it characterises as traditional Portuguese values, including through extreme criminal justice policies such as chemical castration for repeat sexual offenders.

Despite Ventura’s insistence that Chega simply advocates equal treatment without ‘special privileges’, the party’s ranks include white supremacists and admirers of former dictator António Salazar. Its openly racist approach to immigration and hostility towards women, LGBTQI+ people, Muslims and Roma people reflects a familiar far-right playbook that has proven successful across Europe. Chega has cultivated significant connections with Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, Germany’s Alternative for Germany, and Spain’s Vox party, and Ventura was among the European far-right leaders invited to Donald Trump’s inauguration.

Montenegro has so far refused to work with Chega, which he has publicly characterised as demagogic, racist and xenophobic – a rejection that may have inadvertently strengthened Chega’s anti-establishment credentials. However, the arithmetic of Portugal’s fractured parliament suggests that any significant policy initiatives will require either Socialist abstention or, more controversially, Chega support, creating new opportunities for far-right influence, particularly on criminal justice and immigration policies.

Portugal’s experience offers sobering evidence that far-right influence should no longer be viewed as a passing fad but rather as an established feature of contemporary European politics. The speed of the shift offers a stark reminder that no democracy is immune to the populist pressures reshaping the continent.

The question now is whether Portugal’s institutions can adapt to govern effectively in this new fractured landscape while preserving democratic values. Portugal’s civil society has an increasingly vital part to play in holding newly influential far-right politicians to account and offering collective responses to populist challenges.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

  Source

African Countries Still Underfunding Health by as Much as 50 Percent

Posted on by admin

Africa, Aid, Civil Society, Development & Aid, Editors’ Choice, Featured, Financial Crisis, Gender, Health, Humanitarian Emergencies, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations, Women’s Health

Health

Health workers getting ready for duty at an mpox treatment center in Lwiro in DR Congo, a hotspot for the pandemic that CD Africa handled in 2024. Credit: WHO

Health workers getting ready for duty at an mpox treatment center in Lwiro in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, a hotspot for the pandemic that CD Africa handled in 2024. Credit: WHO

NAIROBI, Apr 24 2025 (IPS) – The majority of African countries are yet to commit 15 percent of their GDP to funding the health sector, despite the growing disease burden weighing down the continent and two decades after the coming into force of the Abuja declaration on health sector funding.

Only a few countries, including Rwanda, Botswana, and Cabo Verde, have consistently met the 15 percent target, with some countries allocating less than 10 percent of their budget to the crucial sector.

Under the Abuja Declaration of 2001, African Union (AU) member states made a commitment to end the continent’s health financing crisis, pledging to allocate at least 15 percent of national budgets to the sector. However, more than two decades later, only three countries—Rwanda, Botswana, and Cabo Verde—have consistently met or exceeded this target (WHO, 2023). In contrast, over 30 AU member states remain well below the 10 percent benchmark, with some allocating as little as 5–7 percent of their national budgets to health.

Countries including Nigeria, Chad, and the Central African Republic are allocating as little as 5–7 percent to the sector, thanks to a myriad of political and economic challenges, including a high debt burden and narrow tax base, according to Director General of Africa Centres for Disease Control (Africa CDC), Dr. Jean Kaseya.

Competing demands for security and infrastructure financing and limited coordination between ministries of health and finance, plus the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic “hit national budgets hard,” worsened by global economic instability, haven’t helped matters, he said, while commenting on the latest annual report of the continental health body and the 2025 concept paper on Africa’s Health Financing in a New Era, both released in April.

Wivine M'puranyi, a 30-year-old mother of six,from village of Karanda in D.R Congo's South Kivu reflects on the distressing days when her two daughters were diagnosed with mpox, one of the pandemics that hit Africa in 2024.

Wivine M’puranyi, a 30-year-old mother of six from the village of Karanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s South Kivu, reflects on the distressing days when her two daughters were diagnosed with mpox, one of the pandemics that hit Africa in 2024. Credit: WHO

“It also exposes just how costly underinvesting in health can be. The real story here is political will, where leaders prioritize health, and budgets follow,” he noted.

The report finds that only 16-29 percent of African countries currently have updated versions of the National Health Development Plan (NHDP) supported by a National Health Financing Plan (NHFP), the two documents being critical in driving internal resource mobilization.

“Updating National Health Development Plans (NHDPs) and National Health Financing Plans (NHFPs) is not just a matter of paperwork—it’s a heavy lift. Countries need robust data, skilled teams, funding, and strong inter-ministerial coordination,” he said.

Low funding has a consequence: it has led to many health departments being understaffed and overstretched, partly because some governments ‘deprioritize’ updating the two documents because they fear the plans won’t be implemented or be funded. “But without current, credible plans, it’s nearly impossible to make a case for more domestic or external investment. These documents are not bureaucratic checkboxes—they’re investment blueprints,” the DG told IPS.

He noted that countries that have updated and actively used their NHDPs and NHFPs have seen tangible benefits, one such country being Burkina Faso, where an updated NHFP had helped streamline funding and implementation for free healthcare policy.

In Senegal, incorporating macroeconomic forecasting into the NHFP improved budget predictability and donor alignment. “These tools are powerful when they are costly, realistic, and regularly monitored. But let’s be clear; plans must be funded and used—not just filed away—to make a real difference,” Kaseya added.

According to the documents, Africa continues to carry a disproportionate share of the global disease burden—25 percent—but with only 3 percent of the global health workforce, resulting in a “dangerously overstretched workforce,” according to the documents. Should this shortage be prioritized over all other health needs and deficiencies, or what should be addressed first?

The shortage of health workers remains a fundamental challenge, with Africa carrying 25 percent of the global disease burden but a disproportionate 3 percent of the global health workforce—a challenge that cannot be addressed “in isolation.”

Likobiso Posholi, 35, from Ha Sechele village in Mohale's Hoek in Lesotho who is recovering from a recent caesarean section. Many countries in Africa are yet to commit 15% of the national budgets so that women like Posholi can access affordable maternity services.

Likobiso Posholi, 35, from Ha Sechele village in Mohale’s Hoek in Lesotho, recovering from a recent cesarean section. Many countries in Africa are yet to commit 15 percent of the national budgets so that women like Posholi can access affordable maternity services. Credit: WHO

However, recruiting en masse without sustainable financing or strategic deployment can strain the system, and in some countries, trained professionals remain unemployed due to fiscal constraints or wage bill ceilings. “Kenya, for example, is piloting co-financing mechanisms between national and local governments to overcome this. The key is to tackle workforce gaps through integrated, context-specific reforms that link financing, recruitment, and health system needs,” Kaseya said.

The Africa CDC has drafted a three-pronged strategy and placed it at the forefront of a health financing revolution that could potentially represent a paradigm shift from dependency to self-determination. Some aspects of the strategy can be implemented immediately without being subjected to a lot of bureaucracy in view of the emergency brought about by cuts in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), he added.

Reductions in ODA went down by 70 percent between 2021 and 2025, exposing health systems to deep-rooted structural vulnerabilities and placing immense pressure on Africa’s already fragile health systems, with overseas financing being seen as the backbone of critical health programmes.

These include pandemic preparedness, maternal and child health services, and disease control initiatives, all of which are at risk, threatening Sustainable Development Goal 3 and Universal Health Coverage.

“Some components of our strategy can be rapidly deployed. Health taxes on products like tobacco, sugar, and alcohol are politically sensitive but technically straightforward and yield dual benefits, generating revenue and promoting healthier populations. Strengthening health financing units within ministries is a high-impact, low-cost intervention that can dramatically improve budget execution and efficiency,” Kaseya suggested.

Likewise, deploying digital tools—such as real-time dashboards to track financing flows—can happen quickly and with limited bureaucracy. Countries like Benin, South Africa, and Ethiopia are already implementing such reforms with measurable progress.

He pitched that digitization of the health sector is no longer a luxury, as it is foundational to the much-needed resilient, transparent, and efficient health systems.

On the other hand, the platforms improve decision-making, enable better resource tracking, and enhance service delivery. However, fragmentation of digital solutions remains a challenge, with many platforms developed in ‘silos,’ often “donor-driven and poorly integrated,” he commented.

He singled out Ghana, which offered a strong example of progress, having developed a national platform that integrates health and financing data. “The true value of digitization is realized when countries lead the process, ensure interoperability, and embed digital solutions into broader system reforms,” Kaseya said.

On the positive side, CDC Africa for the first time led an emergency response, putting in place a Joint Continental Incidence Management Support Team (IMST) co-led with the World Health Organization and bringing together over 28 partners to collaborate on the Mpox response. This work was done under the “One team with a One unified plan, One budget, and One monitoring framework.”

“This is a historic first that marked a significant milestone in Africa’s leadership of public health emergencies of continental significance,” the report observed.

It further supported national responses to “multiple major public health emergencies,” including the mpox outbreak in 20 AU member states and the Marburg virus disease outbreak in Rwanda. This was in declaring the former a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security (PHECS) on August 13, 2024, in consultation with the affected countries and relevant stakeholders.

Also on the positive side, the continental health body was advancing a comprehensive three-pillar strategy centered on domestic resource mobilization, innovative financing, and blended finance.

IPS UN Bureau Report

  Source

Funding Disruptions Are a Systemic Failure – Philanthropy Must Do What’s Right and Support Local Leadership

Posted on by admin

Civil Society, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Featured, Financial Crisis, Gender, Global, Headlines, Human Rights, Inequality, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

SORIA, Spain, Mar 17 2025 (IPS) – The slashing of US aid funding by Donald Trump and Elon Musk, and cuts or planned cuts in international support by several European states, threaten to cut off the oxygen supply to a civil society already in a critical condition. At CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance, activists and grassroots groups have shared with us time and again that shifting and volatile donor priorities are one of the top funding challenges they face, alongside limited resources for strategy and restricted funding.

Tais Siqueira

Local civil society in the global south is most affected by these challenges. Funding disruptions are no temporary matter. They reflect systemic failures and deep power and funding inequalities between the global north and global south. They undermine trust, shift power away from the communities most affected by global challenges and force local organisations into a reactive survival mode rather than enabling them to drive strategic action.

This is a critical moment for philanthropy to step up and put locally led development principles into practice. This means channelling more resources directly to local civil society, advocating for the meaningful participation of a diverse local civil society in policy spaces at all levels, ensuring their financial, legal and security resilience, and reimagining the role of philanthropy as being not just a funder, but an investor, catalyser and collaborator. As a starting point, philanthropic funders should do the following.

1. Commit to immediate, flexible, and sustained financial support

Local civil society is on the frontlines of addressing some of the world’s most pressing issues. Yet it’s often the first to feel the impact of funding disruptions. Philanthropy must act quickly to provide immediate, flexible and emergency grants to help local organisations survive funding gaps, including by increasing flexibility in existing grants to allow for operational reallocation to cover urgent needs, such as security-related expenses, salaries and insurance.

Unrestricted funding is also critical. Local groups need autonomy to allocate resources where they’re most needed, including for financial, legal and digital protection. Philanthropic funders should prioritise high-quality support – funding that is flexible, predictable and for core work – to support local civil society’s agency and autonomy and avoid orientation around donor priorities. Philanthropy must recognise that trust in local leadership is both the right and strategic thing to do.

2. Strengthen local civil society’s governance through collaboration and promote trust and support

Local leadership isn’t just about financial support; it’s about co-creating the systems and structures that enable local groups to thrive. Philanthropy can play a pivotal role in supporting local groups to strengthen their governance, risk management and compliance systems by fostering collaboration and innovation rather than imposing external standards. Support should be tailored, context specific and co-designed.

One key step is providing direct support to local groups to develop systems that prioritise accountability while trusting them to manage resources. This requires funders to move away from overly prescriptive conditions and toward models of support that acknowledge the leadership and agency of local civil society.

Philanthropy must also recognise that compelling narratives and ambitious policies are needed to stimulate trust and support local civil society. Progressive philanthropic funders can encourage others to follow suit.

3. Invest in infrastructure enabling diverse local civil society groups to collectively organise, share resources and strengthen resilience

In an increasingly interconnected world, the ability of local civil society groups to connect, collaborate and share resources is more important than ever. Investments in infrastructure can enable civil society to bravely defend and promote civic freedoms. Investment will facilitate collective influencing and knowledge-sharing networks, ensuring organisations are better prepared for further funding instability.

Philanthropic funders can earmark funds for emergency response, including for legal defence, audits and unforeseen security threats. Security in the digital sphere is also a critical need, and support can be provided for digital communications infrastructure, encrypted platforms and security audits.

Support for protection of civic space and promotion of civil society participation in decision-making will help enable strategic resistance against rollbacks of hard-won rights and gender, racial and social justice gains.

It’s also crucial to recognise that progressive local civil society groups and leaders are key enablers of locally led development and strengthen civil society’s support infrastructure. Investments in these infrastructures ensure that local groups have the necessary space, resources, agency and autonomy to shape and implement solutions that best fit their contexts.

CIVICUS’s Local Leadership Labs initiative addresses the political, technical and behavioural barriers that hinder governments, donors and other stakeholders from fully embracing and resourcing diverse civil society groups as legitimate participants in development. These labs support radically inclusive spaces, where local civil society groups can drive the development of policies and solutions, together with decision-makers and other key players. This cultivates spaces for collaboration, allowing diverse civil society groups and multi-stakeholder initiatives to share knowledge, reflect and strategise together.

A call to reaffirm commitment to locally led development

Philanthropic funders have unique convening authority, networks and partnerships that can be leveraged to advocate for locally led development. This isn’t just about funding; it’s about using influence to shift narratives and create an enabling environment where local civil society can thrive. Philanthropist must publicly reaffirm their commitment to the Donor Statement on Supporting Locally-Led Development and take real steps to put these principles into action.

The challenges are immense, but so too are the opportunities. By fostering an environment where local civil society has the resources, autonomy and trust to lead, philanthropy can move beyond financial transactions and become a transformative partner.

Tais Siqueira is Coordinator of CIVICUS’s Local Leadership Lab

  Source

Civil Society at the Finance in Common Summit Calls for Community-led, Equitable, and Human Rights-based Development

Posted on by admin

Civil Society, Climate Action, Climate Change, Development & Aid, Energy, Environment, Financial Crisis, Food and Agriculture, Global, Headlines, Human Rights, Inequality, Sustainability, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Civil society organisations and community leaders at the Finance in Common Summit 2023. Credit: Sebastian Barros/Forus

CAPE TOWN, South Africa, Feb 24 2025 (IPS) – As public development banks gather for the Finance in Common Summit (FiCS) in Cape Town, South Africa, civil society and community activists from across the world are demanding a shift to a community-led, equitable, and human rights-based development approach, that prioritise people and planet over profit, and a reform of the global financial architecture.

“With more than 10 % global investment flowing through them each year, public development banks hold immense responsibility—not only to fund infrastructure and development but to do so in a way that is just, inclusive, and sustainable. Development that does not listen to the voices of the people it affects is not true development; it deepens inequalities, harms ecosystems, and leaves communities behind. True development is not done for communities, but with them”, says Mavalow Christelle Kalhoule, Chair at Forus.

Since its first edition in 2020, civil society has been playing a critical role at FiCS in ensuring public development banks are accountable to the people they serve, and in amplifying the voices – too often ignored – of communities in the Global South who are most directly affected by development projects.

“Over the next few days, the world’s public development banks will be patting themselves on the back for all the good they’re doing around the world. But all that glitters is not gold. Way too often these institutions are replicating a neocolonial and neoliberal approach, dividing the world between those to be sacrificed and those to benefit from the sacrifices”, says Ony Soa Ratsifandrihamanana, Africa Regional Coordinator at the Coalition for Human Rights in Development.

Civil society organisations and community leaders at the Finance in Common Summit 2023. Credit: Sebastian Barros/Forus

Amidst rising inequality, debt crises, and the climate emergency, public development banks must move beyond rhetoric and commit to concrete, transformative actions. This is why over 300 civil society groups have joined forces to bring their demands at FiCS, calling on development banks to champion a new era of development finance, placing human rights, community leadership, and environmental sustainability at the core of all financing decisions.

“The world is passing through the most critical and testing times of its history and once again the solutions are being imposed without the consent, participation and engagement of citizens at large and representative civil society in particular. This is the time to think, reflect and act out of the box, and this opportunity of coming together at FiCS should not be considered business as usual,” says Zia ur Rehman, Secretary General and Director at the Asia Development Alliance.

In a context of shrinking civic space and increasing attacks against the human rights movement, development banks should also play a more decisive role to make sure people can actively and safely participate in decision-making processes and consultations.

“While development banks acknowledge the importance of civil society engagement, their frameworks often fall short in implementation, resulting in limited access to information, tokenistic public participation, and a lack of accountability for reprisals against activists,” says Manana Kochladze, Strategic Area Leader – Democratization and Human Rights at CEE Bankwatch Network. “There is a pressing need for development banks to collaboratively develop a unified and proactive approach to safeguarding and expanding civic space”.

More than 60 civil society organizations and community activists will also join the Summit in-person, to share their first-hand testimonies on the actual impact of development projects. From renewables in Kenya to green hydrogen projects in Chile, too often projects presented as sustainable are displacing local communities, polluting the environment, and failing to ensure that the benefits trickle down to those most in need.

Civil society organisations and community leaders at the Finance in Common Summit 2023. Credit: Sebastian Barros/Forus

“When decisions are made without the input of local voices, finance becomes an instrument of exclusion, perpetuating inequality and undermining true progress. We demand a comprehensive overhaul of global financial structures that prioritizes community rights. A shift to people-led finance will enable genuine economic transformation, lifting up every individual and fostering resilient, inclusive growth that benefits society as a whole,” says Ndeye Fatou Sy, Programs Manager at Lumière Synergie pour le Développement (Senegal).

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project, for instance, provides water to South Africa in exchange for royalties and generation of hydropower for Lesotho, but has led to devastating socio-economic and environmental impacts. Hundreds of families have been involuntarily resettled and more than 30,000 people lost their cropland and grazing land, with a particular impact on women.

“As we gather at the Finance in Common Summit, we remind public development banks that front-line communities should not bear the cost of development. Public development banks must create and use independent accountability mechanisms to hear directly from local communities and ensure that their land, livelihoods, and environment are protected,” says Robi Chacha Mosenda, Senior Associate at Accountability Counsel.

Civil society and community representatives participating at the Summit will also present viable and alternative solutions, such as small-scale and renewable energy solutions that are led by Indigenous communities themselves.

“Any form of financing by multilateral development banks should start with support to community-led planning initiatives that ascertain that decisions on energy alternatives centre the rights of affected persons and communities”, says Mwebe John, Africa Finance Campaigner at Recourse. “Multilateral development banks are investing more money than ever into renewable energy, but the scale and kind of projects matters if these investments are going to truly power people and protect the planet. Community-led projects are popping up everywhere – from rooftop solar in India, to micro hydropower in Indonesia, and rural mini grids in Rwanda and Tanzania. These are the types of projects to be supported,” adds Federico Sibaja, IMF Campaign Manager at Recourse.

These stories show that it is key for development banks to use FiCS as an opportunity to step out from their echo chamber, listen to those who are bearing the brunt of their investments, and strengthen the dialogue with civil society.

Lorena Cotza is Communications Lead, Coalition for Human Rights in Development

IPS UN Bureau

  Source

Civil Society Fights Against Budget Cuts Amid Calls for “Aid” Reform

Posted on by admin

Armed Conflicts, Civil Society, Climate Change, Conferences, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Financial Crisis, Global, Headlines, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Sarah Strack is Forus Director

“Woman crosses a local business in the streets of Kathmandu, Nepal” (Both Nomads)

NEW YORK, Oct 16 2024 (IPS) – Multiple conflicts, the climate emergency and other crises are destabilising many parts of the world and intensifying the strain on the resources needed to finance the global sustainable development agenda. Amid these challenges, data from 2023, shows that Official Development Assistance (ODA) reached a record-breaking US$223.7 billion, up from US$211 billion the previous year, according to Eurodad.

However, if one looks beyond the mere figures, worrying trends are emerging. Major donors like Germany and France are reducing their development budget and several countries are already announcing cuts for 2025.

This trend has prompted debate over the direction and quality of global aid, especially at a time when ODA is more crucial than ever in addressing global crises.

In France, with the campaign #StopàlabaisseAPD (#StoptheODACuts), NGOs are mobilising against further reductions in the 2025 budget, warning that such cuts could undermine international solidarity efforts and hit hardest those who are already left behind.

Coordination SUD, a coalition of 180 French NGOs, is raising the alarm over the potential impact of these cuts, which follow a 13% reduction in 2024, and which is seeing ODA funds slashed again by over 20% in 2025, as per the finance bill presented this Thursday

The first victims of this measure will be the most vulnerable populations. “ODA enables local and international NGOs to work daily with and alongside the most fragile communities,” reminds Olivier Bruyeron, President of Coordination SUD.

“Official development assistance has been used as a political football over recent years,” says Bond, the national platform of NGOs in the UK.

As a national civil society platform, they work to ensure UK aid reaches the communities “that need it most”.

“ODA is being used as a geopolitical tool with national interests in focus, when it should be a mechanism for redistributive justice,” said Alex Farley of Bond in a recent global event during the Summit of the Future hosted by the global civil society network Forus.

This debate is part of a larger global conversation on the future of ODA.

While the traditional 0.7% Gross National Income (GNI) target remains a key benchmark for donor countries, experts argue that ODA must evolve to better address the real needs of recipient communities, particularly in the Global South. As Oyebisi Oluseyi of the Nigerian Network of NGOs (NNNGO) points out, “While this target remains important, it’s no longer enough.”

Critics are calling for a redefinition of ODA that shifts powers toward recipient countries and communities. Zia ur Rehman, Coordinator of the Asia Development Alliance – a regional platform of NGOs, emphasizes the need for local actors to have more say in how funds are used.

Providing a perspective from the Pacific Islands, Emeline Siale from the civil society regional coalition PIANGO, echoes the need for local actors to play a leading role in ODA decision-making, “not merely as participants but as leaders”.

“Community participation itself is a healing process, and it’s become a central topic in many civil society discussions,” Siale explains.

As key international summits on development financing approach, the future of ODA—and its ability to meet the needs of the most vulnerable—hangs in the balance.

“The upcoming Fourth United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development presents a key opportunity for the development community to align with development effectiveness principles, rather than allowing them to be further diluted. Now, more than ever, civil society must play its role, shifting power and pushing for a new global governance of international aid that is more representative, democratic, inclusive, and transparent,” says civil society leader in Burkina Faso Mavalow Christelle Kalhoule and President of Forus, a global civil society network representing over 24,000 NGOs across the globe.

IPS UN Bureau

 

Kenya’s Protests: More than a Question of Tax

Posted on by admin

Africa, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Economy & Trade, Energy, Featured, Financial Crisis, Headlines, Labour, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Credit: Kabir Dhanji/AFPvia Getty Images

LONDON, Jul 23 2024 (IPS) – Kenya’s President William Ruto has withdrawn the tax-increasing Finance Bill that sparked mass protests. He has sacked his cabinet and the head of the police has resigned. But the anger many feel hasn’t gone away, and protests continue.

The protests have brought Kenya’s Gen Z onto the political stage, with young people – over 65 per cent of the population – at the forefront. Since the protests began, they’ve made full use of social media to share views, explain the impact of proposed changes, organise protests and raise funds to help those injured or arrested.

These protests have been different to those in the past, much more organic than previous opposition-organised demonstrations. The movement has brought people together across the ethnic lines politicians have so often exploited in the past.

People have protested even in the knowledge that security force violence is guaranteed. At least 50 people have died so far. As protests have continued, people have increasingly demanded accountability for the killings and the many other acts of state violence.

Out-of-touch elite

The Finance Bill would have imposed a levy on a range of everyday essentials such as bread, and taxes on internet use, mobile phones and money transfer services. Women would have been further hit by an increase in tax on menstrual products. For many, this was simply too much to bear in a context of high youth unemployment and rising costs.

The tax increases were among conditions demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in return for a US$3.9 billion package, along with the IMF’s usual prescription of spending cuts and privatisation that generally hit the poorest people hardest.

Ruto has continued to blame his predecessor, Uhuru Kenyatta, for lavish spending on grand projects. But Ruto was Kenyatta’s vice president, and only broke with his long-time ally after he wasn’t chosen as his party’s next presidential candidate.

To protesters, Ruto is as out of touch as the presidents before him. Opponents accuse him of trying to boost his presence on the world stage, including by offering to have Kenya lead an international policing mission to violence-torn Haiti, rather than addressing domestic problems. They see him as too willing to meet the demands of US-dominated financial institutions such as the IMF rather than stand up for Kenyans.

Problems such as corruption and patronage have run through multiple governments. Politicians are accused of enjoying lavish lifestyles insulated from people’s everyday problems. Kenya’s members of parliament are proportionally the second-highest paid in the world, earning 76 times average per capita GDP. Even so, corruption allegations are rife.

Ruto’s administration attempted to create another layer of government jobs a court ruled the move unconstitutional. He created new staffed offices for the first lady, deputy first lady and prime ministerial spouse, a decision dropped due to the protests. The proposed budget was filled with such examples of the government planning to spend more on itself.

Broken promises and state violence

For many, the sense of betrayal is heightened because when Ruto won an unexpected and narrow election victory in 2022, it was on a platform of being the champion of struggling people, promising to tackle the high cost of living. But costs kept increasing, and Ruto quickly reneged on promises to stop electricity price rises. He axed subsidies on energy, fuel and maize flour. The government’s 2023 Finance Act included a raft of new taxes and levies.

These measures sparked opposition-organised protests, and the reaction was state violence that left six people dead. The pattern is consistent. Kenyan security forces seem to know no response to protest other than violence.

On 25 June, the worst day of violence in the 2024 protests, security forces fired live ammunition at protesters, killing several, including some reportedly targeted by police snipers perched atop buildings. They’ve also used rubber bullets, teargas and water cannon, including against media and medical personnel. Protest leaders and social media influencers have been targeted for abduction and arrest.

On 25 June, some protesters briefly attempted to storm parliament and started fires, but there have been accusations that politicians have paid people to infiltrate the protest movement and instigate acts of violence to try to justify security force brutality. Media providing live coverage of protests have reported receiving threats from the authorities telling them to shut down and internet access has been disrupted. Influencers have had their accounts suspended.

Although Ruto eventually pledged to take action where there is video evidence of police violence, he’s also been criticised for saying little about protest deaths and previously praised police actions. He accused ‘organised criminals’ of hijacking the protests and called the attempt to storm parliament ‘treasonous’.

Politicians have repeatedly smeared civil society organisations, claiming they’re being used by foreign powers to fund protests. Ruto, without any evidence, has accused the US-based Ford Foundation of helping finance unrest.

Demands for change

Over a month on, protests demanding Ruto’s resignation continue. It’s not just about the economy, and it’s not just about Ruto. It’s about the rejection of a whole political class and its way of governing. Trust in the institutions of government is very low.

Dialogue has been promised, but many feel it will be superficial. The government’s response to the protests should be to listen and consult deeply – and then change. People have shown they have power. They’ve shown that a system where they elect a political elite every few years to make decisions for them isn’t enough. They’ve shown they want something better.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

  Source