VIETNAM: ‘Human Rights Conditions Will Likely Worsen as the Country Descends into a Police State’

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Aug 29 2024 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses recent leadership changes in Vietnam with David Tran, coordinator of the Alliance for Vietnam’s Democracy, a civil society platform that promotes democracy in Vietnam and the region through international cooperation and the strengthening of local civil society.

On 3 August, President Tô Lâm was confirmed as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Vietnam’s top position, following the death of long-serving General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng. Lâm, who has been president since May, is known for leading an aggressive anti-corruption campaign that has seen many officials jailed and others forced to resign. He will continue as president while assuming the duties of general secretary, potentially enabling him to consolidate power ahead of the 2026 party congress, which will choose Vietnam’s top leaders for the next five years. Civil society fears the regime could become even more autocratic and repressive if Lâm retains both positions.

David Tran

What’s Vietnam’s political system like, and what’s the likely impact of the recent leadership change?

Vietnam is an authoritarian one-party state led by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). There are four key positions of authority: the president, who is the ceremonial head of state, the prime minister, who heads the government, the chair of the National Assembly, the unicameral legislature, and the most powerful, the general secretary of the VCP.

Although the president is elected by the National Assembly, this body is overwhelmingly made up of VCP members, who usually approve all incumbents unopposed. On 3 August, following the death of the last VCP general secretary, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Tô Lâm was confirmed as the new VCP leader.

This appointment is particularly significant because it puts a lot of power in the hands of one person. His dual role gives Tô Lâm considerable influence over the state and party, as well as greater control over the public security apparatus. While he appears set to continue the policies of his predecessor, there are several cracks beneath the surface. His power is likely to be challenged by several VCP members who’ve been forced into retirement by his ‘anticorruption’ campaign, effectively an initiative to eliminate competing factions. We can expect this infighting to continue and intensify.

What does Tô Lâm’s rise mean from a human rights perspective?

Tô Lâm has had a long career, including stints as minister of public security and a member of the politburo. The key role he played in the previous general secretary’s ‘anticorruption’ campaign saw him elected president in May, after his investigations into several high-profile politicians and businesspeople led to the resignation of his predecessor and other top officials.

The accumulation of power in the hands of the architect of a purge is unlikely to lead to improvements in civic space or human rights. Tô Lâm has been closely associated with the worsening human rights situation, as the Formosa and the Trinh Xuan Thanh cases clearly illustrate.

In April 2016, the Formosa company caused an environmental disaster when it discharged heavily polluted waste off Vietnam’s central coast. This caused widespread damage in at least four provinces and sparked protests. Instead of prosecuting Formosa, Tô Lâm, then minister of public security and in charge of the environmental police, suppressed peaceful protests and had 220 people sentenced to a total of 133 years in prison, not including probation after release. He said he was protecting Formosa from what he called ‘hostile forces’ – essentially anyone who criticised the company.

The second case involves Trinh Xuan Thanh, a former vice chair of Hau Giang Province, who fled to Germany in 2016 after being accused of ‘deliberately violating state regulations, causing serious consequences’. He was abducted on German soil by the Vietnamese secret service, which is under the Ministry of Public Security, and returned to Vietnam. Tô Lâm was directly involved in this operation, which Germany condemned as a ‘scandalous violation’ of its sovereignty and a ‘gross breach of international law’.

Given Tô Lâm’s track record, we expect human rights conditions to worsen under his leadership as Vietnam descends into a police state where human rights and the rule of law are ignored. The already limited space for civil society in Vietnam has shrunk under his watch, and we expect this trend to continue.

What are the challenges facing civil society in Vietnam?

Tô Lâm’s rise to power has been marked by his consistent efforts to stifle dissent. Under his leadership, the authorities, particularly the Ministry of Public Security, have increasingly tightened their grip on civil society organisations (CSOs). They have implemented new decrees that overregulate the registration and management of foreign CSOs and applied stricter rules to domestic organisations.

They have also weaponised tax laws and the criminal code to target civil society leaders, charging them with offences such as tax evasion and ‘abuse of democratic freedoms’. This has led to the imprisonment of prominent activists, including environmental and labour rights advocates.

Independent CSOs are subject to strict surveillance, with some being dismantled or forced to reorganise to conform to the authorities. This was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which the authorities used as a pretext to impose further restrictions on civil society under the guise of public health measures.

Despite this repressive environment, some social service CSOs and philanthropic groups continue to operate and strive to make a positive impact. But their independence is severely restricted as they and their activists are constantly targeted.

What international support does Vietnam’s civil society need?

Human rights organisations and international bodies have raised concerns about the shrinking space for civil society in Vietnam. They have called for respect for freedoms of assembly, association and expression and urged the authorities to ease restrictions. While these statements are important, they must be accompanied by trade sanctions and other enforcement mechanisms. Words alone are not enough.

Unfortunately, human rights in Vietnam are also falling victim to geopolitics. As tensions with China escalate, the USA is increasingly seeing Vietnam as a counterweight to China. In this context, human rights and civic space are often sidelined, if not ignored altogether. We believe that a democratic Vietnam would be the best partner and ally in promoting a peaceful, open and stable Indo-Pacific region.

Even if Tô Lâm has a long way to go before he reaches a position comparable to Xi Jinping’s in China, consolidation of power is a general trend we’re seeing among the region’s communist states. Oddly enough, given how these two leaders came to power, it could be a sign that pressure for human rights and civic space, both domestically and internationally, is working. If the authorities feel compelled to respond by consolidating power and positioning figures like Tô Lâm to counter these movements, there is still hope we are on the right track.

Civic space in Vietnam is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Alliance for Vietnam’s Democracy through its webpage or Facebook page.

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Cambodia’s Young Environmental Activists Pay a Heavy Price

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Credit: Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP via Getty Images

LONDON, Aug 1 2024 (IPS) – It’s risky to try to protect the environment in authoritarian Cambodia. Ten young activists from the Mother Nature environmental group have recently been given long jail sentences. Two were sentenced to eight years on charges of plotting and insulting the king. Another seven were sentenced to six years for plotting, while one, a Spanish national banned from entering Cambodia, was sentenced in absentia.

Four of the activists were then violently dragged away from a peaceful sit-in they’d joined outside the court building. The five who’ve so far been jailed have been split up and sent to separate prisons, some far away from their families.

This is the latest in a long line of attacks on Mother Nature activists. The group is being punished for its work to try to protect natural resources, prevent water pollution and stop illegal logging and sand mining.

An autocratic regime

Cambodia’s de facto one-party regime tolerates little criticism. Its former prime minister, Hun Sen, ruled the country from 1985 until 2023, when he handed over to his son. This came shortly after a non-competitive election where the only credible opposition party was banned. It was the same story with the election in 2018. This suppression of democracy required a crackdown on dissenting voices, targeting civil society as well as the political opposition.

The authorities have weaponised the legal system. They use highly politicised courts to detain civil society activists and opposition politicians for long spells before subjecting them to grossly unfair trials. Campaigners for environmental rights, labour rights and social justice are frequently charged with vaguely defined offences under the Criminal Coder such as plotting and incitement. Last year, nine trade unionists were convicted of incitement after going on strike to demand better pay and conditions for casino workers.

In 2015 the government introduced the restrictive Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO), which requires civil society organisations to submit financial records and annual reports, giving the state broad powers to refuse registration or deregister organisations. In 2023, Hun Sen threatened to dissolve organisations if they failed to submit documents.

The state also closely controls the media. People close to the ruling family run the four main media groups and so they mostly follow the government line. Independent media outlets are severely restricted. Last year the authorities shut down one of the last remaining independent platforms, Voice of Democracy. Self-censorship means topics such as corruption and environmental concerns remain largely uncovered.

This extensive political control is closely entwined with economic power. The ruling family and its inner circle are connected to an array of economic projects. Landgrabs by state officials are common. These means land and Indigenous people’s rights activists are among those targeted.

In 2023, courts sentenced 10 land activists to a year in jail in response to their activism against land grabbing for a sugar plantation. That same year, three people from the Coalition of Cambodian Farmer Community, a farmers’ rights group, were charged with incitement and plotting. The LANGO has also been used to prevent unregistered community groups taking part in anti-logging patrols.

The activity that saw the Mother Nature activists charged with plotting involved documenting the flow of waste into a river close to the royal palace in the capital, Phnom Pen. It’s far from the first time the group’s environmental action has earned the state’s ire. The government feels threatened by the fact that Mother Nature’s activism resonates with many young people.

Three of the group’s activists were convicted on incitement charges in 2022 after organising a protest march to the prime minister’s residence to protest against the filling in of a lake for construction. In 2023, Mother Nature delivered a petition urging the government to stop granting land to private companies in Kirirom National Park; there’s evidence of licences going to people connected to ruling party politicians. In response, the Ministry of Environment said Mother Nature was an illegal organisation and that its actions were ‘against the interests of Cambodian civil society’.

Media also get in trouble if they report on the sensitive issue of land exploitation. In 2023, the authorities revoked the licences of three media companies for publishing reports on a senior official’s involvement in land fraud. In 2022, two teams of reporters covering a deforestation operation were violently arrested.

Regional challenges

Repression of environmental activism isn’t limited to Cambodia. In neighbouring Vietnam, the one-party communist state is also cracking down on climate and environmental activists. In part this is because, as in Cambodia, climate and environmental activism is increasingly shining a light on the environmentally destructive economic practices of authoritarian leaders.

Cambodia’s creeping use of the charge of insulting the king to stifle legitimate dissent also echoes a tactic frequently used in Thailand, where the authorities have jailed young democracy campaigners for violating an archaic lèse majesté law that criminalises criticism of the king. Other repressive states are following its lead – including Cambodia, where the law on insulting the king was introduced when the crackdown was well underway in 2018.

Cambodia provides ample evidence of how the denial of democracy and the repression that comes with it enable environmentally destructive policies that further affect people’s lives and rights. The solution to protect the environment and prevent runaway climate change is less repression, more democracy and a more enabled civil society.

Cambodia’s international partners should emphasise this in their dealings with the state. They should press the authorities to release the jailed Mother Nature activists, who deserve to spend the coming years helping make their country a better place, not rotting in prison.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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SUMMIT OF THE FUTURE: ‘The UN Secretary-General Underestimated the Difficulty of Reaching Consensus’

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Jul 30 2024 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses the upcoming Summit of the Future with Renzo Pomi, who represents Amnesty International at the United Nations (UN) in New York.

Renzo Pomi

In September, world leaders will gather at the UN World Summit of the Future to adopt the Pact for the Future. Ahead of the summit, civil society, academia and the private sector have contributed to the pact’s zero draft. Civil society sees the process as an opportunity to strengthen commitments on the environment, human rights and social justice, and CIVICUS advocates for the inclusion of language on the protection and expansion of civic space. But much work remains to be done before, during and after the summit to ensure ambitious commitments are adopted and then realised.

How did the Summit of the Future come about?

In September 2021, the UN Secretary-General released a report, ‘Our Common Agenda’, outlining global challenges and proposing a summit for world leaders to address them. Originally scheduled for September 2023, the summit was postponed due to a lack of consensus and will now take place in September 2024. Just before the opening of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, world leaders will gather in New York to discuss the future and adopt by consensus an action-oriented document, the Pact for the Future.

The pact and its two annexes – the Global Digital Compact and the Declaration on Future Generations – will be the summit’s main outcome. It aims to address our global challenges through commitments in five thematic areas: sustainable development and financing for development, international peace and security, science, technology and innovation, youth and future generations, and transforming global governance. The pact will address a wide range of challenges facing humanity and the international system, and will seek to make intergovernmental institutions such as the UN more fit for the purpose they were created for.

What has the process towards the draft pact been like, and what role has civil society played in it?

The drafting process has been largely a state-owned and state-exclusive process. Germany and Namibia have co-facilitated the negotiations and presented the zero draft in January and subsequent revisions in May and July 2024.

Civil society participation has been very limited. We rely mostly on friendly states for information, as we are not in the room when negotiations take place. After each draft was released, we were invited to submit our recommendations and participate in virtual consultations to discuss the content. But, while we value these opportunities, nothing replaces the chance to be actively involved in negotiations. When you hold a virtual meeting like this, what you get is a series of hasty statements, not a real dialogue. As a result, we’ve had to lobby states to champion our issues, and it’s unclear whether our views will be reflected in the pact.

While the co-facilitators are often blamed for this, the truth is that the process was agreed by all states. The UN Charter recognises civil society as an important stakeholder, as does the Secretary-General, but many states believe the UN should be exclusively state-run and civil society shouldn’t have a place in discussing important issues.

Further, relations between civil society and the UN in New York are particularly strained compared to Geneva, where there is a more established tradition of including civil society in discussions. And the UN’s financial crisis means there’s no investment in hybrid meetings, which allow civil society organisations (CSOs) that can’t afford to travel to have a voice in meetings.

What did you advocate should be including in the pact?

We made two submissions, one before the zero draft was circulated and the other commenting on it. We analysed the whole document and focused on ensuring that a human rights perspective was adopted in every measure. Our proposals covered issues from Security Council reform to increased civil society participation in the UN.

We have long argued that Security Council permanent members should refrain from vetoing or blocking credible resolutions on serious violations such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Unfortunately, this proposal is not accurately reflected on the draft. States may at the end agree to expand the Security Council, but otherwise most of the language simply reaffirms existing commitments, such as Article 27.3 of the Charter, which prevents states involved in conflicts voting on related resolutions but is currently ignored.

We also highlighted that CSOs face several barriers to engaging with the UN. The Economic and Social Council’s NGO Committee, which reviews applications for consultative status, often acts as a gatekeeper, unfairly denying access to CSOs that challenge the positions of particular states. We have proposed dismantling this committee and setting up an independent expert mechanism to assess applications on the basis of merit rather than political considerations. However, this proposal is unlikely to be included in the pact’s final draft.

How much real impact do you think the pact will have?

We hope some of our recommendations will be included in the pact, but the geopolitical climate suggests many will not. The Secretary-General has correctly identified the challenges, but he has underestimated the difficulty of reaching consensus on meaningful commitments. International cooperation is now almost non-existent. Today’s context resembles the Cold War, where there was no room for agreement on even basic issues. In the current circumstances, it was unrealistic for the Secretary-General to think he could launch such a massive undertaking and get an action-oriented document with real commitments for reform adopted.

It is said that even in the worst moments you have to push for the best. We may not get actionable commitments, but we may still get some good language and a minimum common denominator every country can agree on.

For the pact to have a real impact, global civil society needs to push for the strongest possible commitments and their implementation. In 2005, a similar summit ended with a decision to create the Human Rights Council in place of the discredited Commission on Human Rights. Now it’s very difficult to foresee getting commitments this specific, and as we approach the summit, proposals are being watered down. Civil society will have to be very creative in finding ways to use the watered-down language to demand change.

What’s next for civil society ahead of the summit?

In the days leading up to the summit, Summit of the Future Action Days will allow civil society, states and UN bodies to propose side events. Getting selected is very difficult, as requirements include sponsorship by two member states and one UN entity, and support by a coalition or network of CSOs. As a result, only a few side events will be approved.

As the summit approaches, civil society should focus on reviewing the second revision of the pact and identifying advocacy opportunities. Chances to advance our agenda will become more limited as September approaches. States will struggle to reach consensus on a final document and there will be no space to reopen closed discussions.

Once the pact is adopted, civil society will need to continue to push for critical issues and stay vigilant in monitoring its implementation.

Get in touch with Amnesty International through its website or Facebook and Instagram pages, and follow @amnesty on Twitter.

This interview was conducted as part of the ENSURED Horizon research project funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the interviewee only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

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USA: ‘The Stakes in the 2024 Election Are Incredibly High for the Fate of US Democracy’

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Jul 25 2024 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses the recent US Supreme Court ruling on presidential immunity and its potential impact on the 5 November presidential election with Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, a professor of Law at Stetson University College of Law.

On 1 July, the US Supreme Court ruled that presidents have absolute immunity for the exercise of their core constitutional powers and are entitled to a presumption of immunity for other official acts, although they don’t enjoy immunity for unofficial acts. The decision comes as Donald Trump faces criminal charges for trying to overturn his 2020 election loss to Joe Biden. The question now is whether Trump’s actions will be considered official or unofficial. But it’s unlikely he’ll be tried before the election, and if he returns as president he could pardon himself. Critics claim the Supreme Court ruling violates the spirit of the US Constitution by placing the president above the law.

What are the main points of the Supreme Court ruling on presidential immunity?

This is a ruling in the federal case against Trump for trying to overturn his loss to Biden in the 2020 election. He is accused of pressuring state officials to overturn the results, spreading lies about voter fraud and using the Capitol riot of 6 January 2021 to delay Biden’s certification and stay in power. Trump pleaded not guilty and asked the US Supreme Court to dismiss the entire case, arguing that he was acting in his role as president and was therefore immune from prosecution.

The Supreme Court didn’t do that, but instead created three new categories of presidential immunity: complete immunity for official acts involving core constitutional powers, potential immunity for acts within the ‘outer perimeter’ of official duties and no immunity for private, unofficial acts.

The key question now is whether Trump’s actions will be deemed official, giving him immunity, or unofficial, leaving him open to prosecution. This is the first case of its kind, as Trump is the first American president to be prosecuted.

How does this ruling affect Trump’s other criminal cases?

This immunity ruling is likely to delay all four of his criminal cases, as judges will have to apply these new rules and drop any charges that involve the use of core presidential powers, as these can no longer be used as evidence against him.

As well as being accused of trying to overturn his 2020 defeat, Trump is also accused of paying adult film actress Stormy Daniels hush money during the 2016 election and not properly accounting for it in his business records. This case is unlikely to be affected by the ruling, as his actions don’t involve either core or peripheral presidential powers. Judge Merchan will have to decide whether any of his 34 felony business fraud convictions will stand or be thrown out.

But some of his other crimes occurred during his time in the Oval Office. Trump is accused of conspiring to overturn his 2020 loss in Georgia by asking the state’s top election official to ‘find 11,780 votes’. Trump has pleaded not guilty and could be prosecuted in his personal capacity, as presidents have no role in administering US elections. As in the Capitol case, this was a private action he took as a candidate and it would be difficult to fit into the category of presidential immunity.

The fourth case Trump faces is the Mar-a-Lago classified documents case. Trump is accused of mishandling classified documents by taking them to his Mar-a-Lago residence after leaving office and refusing to return them to the National Archives when he could no longer lawfully possess them. As his alleged crimes took place when he was no longer president, this case shouldn’t be affected by the immunity ruling. However, he could argue he possessed the documents while in office and ask that his case be treated differently from other defendants. This case was dismissed by Judge Cannon. However, the Mar-a-Lago criminal case could come back to life if the 11th Circuit reverses her dismissal.

What are the broader implications of this case for the presidential election?

After this decision, the American public should think about the consequences of who they elect as president, because the presidency can become a wellspring of crime.

An honest president wouldn’t be affected by the Trump v. US decision, because an honest person doesn’t need criminal immunity. Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court has invited future presidents to go on a crime spree. But what is certain is that only US voters can keep criminals out of the White House. So, as I write in my new book, Corporatocracy, the stakes in the 2024 election are incredibly high for the fate of US democracy.

Civic space in the USA is rated ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

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Kenya’s Protests: More than a Question of Tax

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LONDON, Jul 23 2024 (IPS) – Kenya’s President William Ruto has withdrawn the tax-increasing Finance Bill that sparked mass protests. He has sacked his cabinet and the head of the police has resigned. But the anger many feel hasn’t gone away, and protests continue.

The protests have brought Kenya’s Gen Z onto the political stage, with young people – over 65 per cent of the population – at the forefront. Since the protests began, they’ve made full use of social media to share views, explain the impact of proposed changes, organise protests and raise funds to help those injured or arrested.

These protests have been different to those in the past, much more organic than previous opposition-organised demonstrations. The movement has brought people together across the ethnic lines politicians have so often exploited in the past.

People have protested even in the knowledge that security force violence is guaranteed. At least 50 people have died so far. As protests have continued, people have increasingly demanded accountability for the killings and the many other acts of state violence.

Out-of-touch elite

The Finance Bill would have imposed a levy on a range of everyday essentials such as bread, and taxes on internet use, mobile phones and money transfer services. Women would have been further hit by an increase in tax on menstrual products. For many, this was simply too much to bear in a context of high youth unemployment and rising costs.

The tax increases were among conditions demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in return for a US$3.9 billion package, along with the IMF’s usual prescription of spending cuts and privatisation that generally hit the poorest people hardest.

Ruto has continued to blame his predecessor, Uhuru Kenyatta, for lavish spending on grand projects. But Ruto was Kenyatta’s vice president, and only broke with his long-time ally after he wasn’t chosen as his party’s next presidential candidate.

To protesters, Ruto is as out of touch as the presidents before him. Opponents accuse him of trying to boost his presence on the world stage, including by offering to have Kenya lead an international policing mission to violence-torn Haiti, rather than addressing domestic problems. They see him as too willing to meet the demands of US-dominated financial institutions such as the IMF rather than stand up for Kenyans.

Problems such as corruption and patronage have run through multiple governments. Politicians are accused of enjoying lavish lifestyles insulated from people’s everyday problems. Kenya’s members of parliament are proportionally the second-highest paid in the world, earning 76 times average per capita GDP. Even so, corruption allegations are rife.

Ruto’s administration attempted to create another layer of government jobs a court ruled the move unconstitutional. He created new staffed offices for the first lady, deputy first lady and prime ministerial spouse, a decision dropped due to the protests. The proposed budget was filled with such examples of the government planning to spend more on itself.

Broken promises and state violence

For many, the sense of betrayal is heightened because when Ruto won an unexpected and narrow election victory in 2022, it was on a platform of being the champion of struggling people, promising to tackle the high cost of living. But costs kept increasing, and Ruto quickly reneged on promises to stop electricity price rises. He axed subsidies on energy, fuel and maize flour. The government’s 2023 Finance Act included a raft of new taxes and levies.

These measures sparked opposition-organised protests, and the reaction was state violence that left six people dead. The pattern is consistent. Kenyan security forces seem to know no response to protest other than violence.

On 25 June, the worst day of violence in the 2024 protests, security forces fired live ammunition at protesters, killing several, including some reportedly targeted by police snipers perched atop buildings. They’ve also used rubber bullets, teargas and water cannon, including against media and medical personnel. Protest leaders and social media influencers have been targeted for abduction and arrest.

On 25 June, some protesters briefly attempted to storm parliament and started fires, but there have been accusations that politicians have paid people to infiltrate the protest movement and instigate acts of violence to try to justify security force brutality. Media providing live coverage of protests have reported receiving threats from the authorities telling them to shut down and internet access has been disrupted. Influencers have had their accounts suspended.

Although Ruto eventually pledged to take action where there is video evidence of police violence, he’s also been criticised for saying little about protest deaths and previously praised police actions. He accused ‘organised criminals’ of hijacking the protests and called the attempt to storm parliament ‘treasonous’.

Politicians have repeatedly smeared civil society organisations, claiming they’re being used by foreign powers to fund protests. Ruto, without any evidence, has accused the US-based Ford Foundation of helping finance unrest.

Demands for change

Over a month on, protests demanding Ruto’s resignation continue. It’s not just about the economy, and it’s not just about Ruto. It’s about the rejection of a whole political class and its way of governing. Trust in the institutions of government is very low.

Dialogue has been promised, but many feel it will be superficial. The government’s response to the protests should be to listen and consult deeply – and then change. People have shown they have power. They’ve shown that a system where they elect a political elite every few years to make decisions for them isn’t enough. They’ve shown they want something better.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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BRAZIL: ‘The Law Should Protect Women and Girls, Not Criminalise Them’

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Jul 18 2024 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses abortion rights in Brazil with Guacira Oliveira, director of the Feminist Centre for Studies and Advice (CFEMEA). CFEMEA is an anti-racist feminist organisation that defends women’s rights, collective care and self-care and monitors developments in Brazil’s National Congress.

In June, thousands of women took to the streets of São Paulo and other cities to protest against a bill that would classify abortion after 22 weeks as homicide, punishable by six to 20 years in prison. Protests began when the lower house of Congress fast-tracked the bill, limiting debate. Abortion is currently legal in Brazil only in cases of rape, foetal malformation or danger to the life of a pregnant person. The proposed bill, promoted by evangelical representatives, would criminalise people who have abortions more severely than rapists. Public reaction has slowed down the bill’s progress and its future is now uncertain.

How would this new anti-abortion law, if passed, affect women?

Currently, abortion is legal in Brazil only in cases of rape, danger to a pregnant person’s life and severe foetal malformation. However, current legislation doesn’t set a maximum gestational age for access to legal abortion. The proposed bill would equate abortion after 22 weeks of pregnancy with homicide, punishing the person seeking the abortion and the health professionals who perform it.

This would particularly affect girls, as over 60 per cent of rape victims are children under the age of 13. In more than 64 per cent of these cases, the rapist is someone close to the girl’s family, making it difficult to identify the rape and the resulting pregnancy.

Another perverse aspect of the problem is racial inequality. Forty per cent of rape victims are Black children and adolescents, and of those under 13, more than 56 per cent are Black girls. Of 20,000 girls under the age of 14 who give birth each year, 74 per cent are Black. In addition, Black women are 46 per cent more likely to have an abortion than white women. The passage of this bill would make Black women and girls even more vulnerable than they already are. The law should protect these women and girls, not criminalise them.

How has civil society mobilised against the bill?

CFEMEA has been monitoring threats to legal abortion for decades and is part of the National Front Against the Criminalisation of Women and for the Legalisation of Abortion. Threats increased with the rise of the far right to the presidency in 2018, and feminist movements mobilised over cases of girls who were victims of sexual violence and faced institutional barriers to accessing legal abortion.

In 2023, in response to regressive legislation, they launched the ‘A child is not a mother‘ platform, recently reactivated as the new anti-abortion bill was submitted as a matter of urgency. More than 345,000 people signed up to the campaign and sent messages to parliamentarians. They also applied pressure on social media through posts and hashtags such as #criançanémãe (#ChildNotMother), #PLdagravidezinfantil (#CongressForChildPregnancy) and #PLdoestupro (#CongressForRape).

We also campaigned through face-to-face actions and other collectively defined strategies, led mainly by state-level alliances against the criminalisation of women and for the legalisation of abortion. In May, we laid a symbolic wreath in front of the Federal Council of Medicine, which in April had published a resolution banning foetal asystole, a procedure recommended by the World Health Organization for legal abortions after 22 weeks. By doing so we symbolised our grief for all the women and girls whose lives are cut short due to lack of access to a legal abortion. We reenacted this outside the official residence of the President of the Chamber of Deputies, just before the fast-track request for the anti-abortion bill was approved, on the evening of 12 June.

The following day, the first public protests took place in several Brazilian state capitals. These continued over subsequent days, culminating in a nationwide action on 27 June. The issue is still on the agenda in July and demonstrations are still going strong.

Why is Brazil moving against the regional trend towards legalisation?

Brazil has seen advances by the religious fundamentalist far right since 2016, when President Dilma Rousseff was removed from office through a legal-parliamentary manoeuvre that amounted to a political coup. The violent ethnocentric, LGBTQI+-phobic, neopatriarchal and racist reaction intensified in 2018 with the victory of Jair Bolsonaro in an election marred by disinformation.

Conservatives view the rights to diverse and plural ways of life as a threat to their existence. In this sense, their regressive proposals are a direct response to women’s struggles against patriarchy and all forms of women’s oppression.

Even after its defeat in the 2022 presidential election, the far right has become stronger in the National Congress, where extremists have obtained majorities in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. This has led to the revival of a bill known as the ‘Statute of the Unborn Child’, aimed at granting ‘personhood’ to the foetus in order to criminalise abortion.

Many factors explain the conservative reaction in Brazil and around the world. For fascists in power and in society, violence is justified against groups considered to be ‘enemies of the people’, which can include any dissenting voices – those of women, Black people, Indigenous peoples and LGBTQI+ people. In the case of women, they are trying to re-domesticate us, to send us back home, subservient to the command and judgement of patriarchs. Control over reproduction and our bodies is a crucial part of this strategy.

What are the forces for and against sexual and reproductive rights in Brazil?

The main force against sexual and reproductive rights is religious fundamentalism, which positions itself as a harbinger of control over women’s bodies and gender dissidents and is strongly represented in the National Congress. The defence of these rights lies in the progressive camp, represented by the political left and the feminist, women’s and LGBTQI+ movements.

But it’s worth noting that even with a Congress besieged by anti-rights groups, most people have a less punitive and more empathetic understanding of feminist struggles and women’s rights. A survey we carried out in 2023, in collaboration with the Observatory of Sex and Politics and the Centre for Studies and Public Opinion of the State University of Campinas, showed that 59 per cent were against the criminalisation and possible imprisonment of women who have abortions.

What are the main demands of the Brazilian feminist movement?

The feminist movement is plural and diverse, but what it has in common is the fight to end all forms of violence against women. CFEMEA seeks to transform the world through anti-racist feminism and by taking a stand against all gender inequalities and oppression. This is our position when we enter dialogue with society and make demands of governments. We demand public policies that reduce inequalities between men, women and people with other gender identities, considered in their intersectional dimensions of age, creed, ethnicity, nationality, physical abilities and race, among others.

A fundamental issue is the sexual and racial division of labour, a powerful structure that maintains and exacerbates the inequalities experienced by women. After all, the care work they do, despite being rendered invisible and devalued by patriarchal capitalism, is an indispensable condition for human life and the construction of collective good living. The manifesto of the Anti-Racist Feminist Forum for a National Care Policy, signed by dozens of movements and organisations, affirms the need for social reproduction activities to be recognised and shared by the state. This means that care work, which is currently unpaid and done at the family and community levels almost exclusively by women, must be effectively taken over by the state, because care is a human need.

We demand that governments allocate public investment to combat gender inequalities in areas as diverse as care, culture, education, the environment, health, justice, labour, leisure and wellbeing. It is the state, not the market, that can and must combat such inequalities.

Civic space in Brazil is rated ‘obstructed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with CFEMEA via its website or its Facebook or Instagram page, and follow @cfemea on Twitter.

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