‘Angola produces large quantities of oil and diamonds, yet most people don’t see the benefits’

Active Citizens, Africa, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Energy, Featured, Headlines, Human Rights, Labour, Natural Resources, TerraViva United Nations

Sep 5 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses recent protests in Angola with Florindo Chivucute, founder and executive director of Friends of Angola, a US-based civil society organisation established in 2014 that works to promote democracy, human rights and good governance in Angola.


The Angolan government’s 1 July decision to remove diesel subsidies, sharply pushing up public transport costs, triggered a series of protests. Angola is one of Africa’s biggest oil producers, but many have seen little benefit from its oil wealth and continue to live in poverty. People have taken to the streets in unprecedented numbers to demand an end to corruption and mismanagement, presenting the ruling party, in power for 50 years, with its biggest test. Security forces have responded to incidences of looting and vandalism with lethal violence. At least 30 people have been killed, 277 injured and over 1,500 arrested.

What triggered the protests?

Fuel subsidy cuts sparked the crisis. The protests began on 28 July, after the government’s decision to remove diesel subsidies immediately pushed up fuel prices. What started as a drivers’ strike in Luanda, the capital, quickly spread to other provinces and escalated into bigger protests.

The impact was devastating. For many families, even a small rise in fuel costs is crushing, because wages have been eroded by years of recession and currency devaluation. When transport costs rise, food prices and school fees rise too, leaving those already struggling unable to make ends meet.

But fuel was just the trigger. The unrest reflected much deeper frustrations, including high unemployment, particularly among young people, growing poverty and anger at corruption and mismanagement. People see public resources channelled into luxury spending and infrastructure deals benefiting a few powerful figures connected to the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), while basic services and jobs are neglected. Combined with the immediate shock of higher fuel prices, these grievances fuelled widespread anger.

Why are people struggling in such a resource-rich country?

This is the irony at the heart of the crisis. Angola produces large quantities of oil, along with diamonds, yet most people don’t see the benefits. Mismanagement and entrenched corruption are central to the problem. Revenues from natural resources have too often been captured by networks close to political power and channelled abroad or invested in ways that don’t create jobs.

Angola’s dependence on fuel imports makes the situation worse. We don’t have sufficient domestic refining capacity. Instead of using oil revenues to build refineries and strengthen local industry, a system emerged in which those with political connections profited from importing refined products back into the country. This removed incentives to invest in local processing or agriculture. The result is a tiny wealthy elite and a large majority with very low wages and limited access to services.

What do these protests reveal about the government’s grip on power?

The protests have marked a turning point. The MPLA has dominated politics since independence in 1975, and large-scale protests are not common. The fact that so many people were willing to take to the streets, particularly in and around the capital, shows growing discontent with the government and ruling party.

The authorities’ reaction has been heavy-handed. Security forces have used teargas and live ammunition in some cases, and carried out numerous arrests, including of union leaders and journalists. In some areas protests were accompanied by looting and, tragically, by deadly clashes with security forces. Civil society has since called for investigations into the killings and for accountability for those responsible.

The government’s strategy risks backfiring. By responding with force and detentions, it risks creating a greater sense of mistrust and frustration, which could influence how people engage with political processes as we approach the 2027 election.

How is civil society organising and what challenges does it face?

Civil society – including church groups, trade unions and local associations — has mobilised quickly to call for accountability and transparency. New coalitions are forming; for example, groups such as the Bishops’ Conference of Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe’s Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace, Friends of Angola, the Justice, Peace and Democracy Association and Pro Bono Angola are working with religious organisations to push for investigations into the killings and provide humanitarian support to families affected by the unrest.

But the environment is hostile. Funding for democracy and human rights work is scarce, so organisations struggle to pay staff or sustain programmes.

State surveillance creates another barrier. The state has invested heavily in surveillance infrastructure, and civil society organisations are often targeted by cyber intrusions and closely monitored. The legacy of communist authoritarian rule creates deep mistrust, which makes organising more difficult.

Language barriers limit international support. Much of the work happens in Portuguese, which limits reach to the wider international audience that often communicates in English, French or Spanish.

Additional restrictions threaten to further tighten civic space. Recent draconian measures include the 2024 National Security Bill and the Bill on the Crime of Vandalism of Public Goods and Services. In addition, the 2023 draft law on Non-Governmental Organizations, approved by presidential decree, imposed harsh regulations. These restrictive laws and policies undermine fundamental freedoms and, if fully implemented, risk worsening the already limited environment for civil society in Angola.

What would it take to address the underlying problems?

Strong political will is needed to tackle corruption and manage public finances transparently. This means opening up procurement and fiscal data, pursuing accountability for past abuses, and ensuring resource revenues are channelled into public priorities such as hospitals, local industry and schools. Investment in education, healthcare and small-scale agriculture would create jobs, strengthen livelihoods and reduce dependence on imports.

Institutional reform is equally vital. This means protecting property rights, improving the business environment so investment generates employment and strengthening an independent judiciary and electoral processes so people can seek change through democratic channels.

International partners have a role to play by supporting electoral transparency and demanding accountability from companies and governments that operate in Angola.

The 2027 election will offer a crucial test. The international community should pay close attention and support reforms that increase transparency and electoral integrity. Electoral reforms and the clear, public release of results at the local level would go a long way towards restoring confidence in democratic processes.

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SEE ALSO
Angola: ‘Criticising the government means risking arbitrary detention, intimidation and physical assault’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Pedro Paka 30.Jul.2025
Angola: Repressive new laws threaten civic space CIVICUS Monitor 15.Sep.2024
Angola: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Emilio José Manuel 01.Jan.2025

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Togo’s Young Generation Challenges Six Decades of Dynastic Rule

Active Citizens, Africa, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Energy, Featured, Headlines, Human Rights, Labour, Press Freedom, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Credit: Pascal.Van, licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Sep 2 2025 (IPS) – In late June, thousands flooded the streets of Lomé, Togo’s capital, presenting the ruling dynasty with its biggest challenge in decades.

The catalyst was constitutional manoeuvring by President Faure Gnassingbé to maintain his grip on power. In March 2024, his government pushed through constitutional amendments that transformed Togo from a presidential to a parliamentary system. This created a new position, the President of the Council of Ministers – effectively Togo’s chief executive – elected by parliament rather than by popular vote, and with no term limits. Gnassingbé assumed this new role in May, making it abundantly clear the changes were only about keeping him in power indefinitely.


This constitutional manoeuvre was the latest episode in a 58-year family saga that began when Faure’s father, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, seized power in a 1967 coup. For 25 years, the elder Gnassingbé ruled over a one-party state, staging ritual elections that reached absurd heights in 1986 when he claimed re-election with close to 100 per cent of votes on an implausible 99 per cent turnout. Even after nominal multiparty democracy arrived in 1992, elections remained charades with predetermined outcomes, as opposition parties faced systematic obstacles that made fair competition impossible.

When Eyadéma died in 2005, the military simply appointed his son Faure as successor, despite the constitution mandating immediate elections. International pressure forced a hastily organised vote, but this followed the familiar script of violence, fraud and repression. The pattern repeated in 2010, 2015 and 2020, with each election offering a veneer of legitimacy for continued authoritarian rule – and eliciting successive waves of protest that were either violently repressed or pre-emptively suppressed.

Now, two decades after Faure took power, this latest constitutional gambit has triggered the most significant challenge to his rule. The constitutional changes designed to keep him in power have instead galvanised opposition, creating a focal point for decades of accumulated grievances.

The current protests differ from their predecessors by being overwhelmingly led by young people who’ve never known any other leaders than the Gnassingbés. Raised on promises of multiparty democracy, they’ve witnessed systematic electoral fraud to perpetuate a government wholly unresponsive to their needs. They connect their daily struggles with unemployment, power outages and crumbling infrastructure with the long-term denial of their democratic freedoms.

The arrest in May of a popular rapper and TikToker, Aamron – for posting a video calling for street protests to coincide with Gnassingbé’s birthday on 6 June – galvanised discontent, turning simmering frustration into organised resistance. Aamron’s detention sparked the formation of the 6 June Movement (M66), led by young artists, bloggers, diaspora-based activists and civil society figures who rely heavily on social media to coordinate protests, bypassing state-controlled channels.

The government’s response, however, has followed a familiar path of authoritarian crackdown. In late June, security forces killed at least seven people, including 15-year-old Jacques Koami Koutoglo, and they’ve also used teargas, beatings and mass arrests against protesters. The regime has detained journalists, forced deletion of protest footage and imposed internet shutdowns during protests. It has suspended international media outlets including France 24 and RFI for their protest coverage. it has even issued international arrest warrants for M66 leaders based abroad, accusing them of terrorism and subversion.

Protests have continued despite repression. The leadership of young people, less intimidated by the security apparatus and better connected through social media, has allowed for the diversification of opposition tactics, with activists shifting between street protests, legal challenges and international advocacy as circumstances dictate. The diaspora is also playing a role, with Togolese communities abroad organising solidarity protests and advocating with international organisations for sanctions against the Gnassingbé regime.

Significant obstacles however remain. Gnassingbé controls all levers of power, including security forces, the electoral commission and the Constitutional Court. For a democratic transition to result, international pressure would need to intensify, including the imposition of targeted sanctions on regime officials and their economic interests. Regional bodies, particularly the Economic Community of West African States, would need to act, including by threatening to suspend Togo until democratic reforms are implemented.

Whether these protests trigger democratic change or become yet another chapter in the history of repressed dissent will ultimately depend on the ability of pro-democracy forces to sustain pressure and whether the international community finally decides to act. Gnassingbé’s constitutional manoeuvre may prove to be his final act, not because it succeeded in keeping him in power, but because it awakened a new generation. Togo’s young people have discovered the power of collective action—and that could prove decisive.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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‘After Decades of Making Huge Profits, Companies Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Leave Behind a Toxic Legacy’

Active Citizens, Africa, Civil Society, Climate Change, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Energy, Environment, Featured, Food and Agriculture, Headlines, Health, TerraViva United Nations

Jul 29 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS speaks with Matthew Renshaw, a partner at a UK law firm that represents Nigerian communities taking legal action against Shell over environmental damage caused by its operations in the Niger Delta.


Matthew Renshaw

Two Nigerian communities, Bille and Ogale, are suing Shell in the UK over decades of oil spills in the Niger Delta that have devastated their land, water and way of life. The High Court has ruled that Shell and its former Nigerian subsidiary can be held liable for ongoing environmental damage, even if caused by oil theft or sabotage, and regardless of how long ago the spills occurred. The decision builds on a 2021 Supreme Court ruling that allowed UK-based parent companies to be sued for harm abroad. A full trial is set for March 2027.

How has oil pollution affected these communities?

Each of the three communities we represent in the Niger Delta have been affected by Shell’s operations in different ways.

The Bodo community endured two major oil spills from Shell pipelines in 2008 that released over half a million barrels of oil, causing the largest devastation of mangrove habitat in history. Families who once depended on fishing can no longer provide for themselves. Even swimming in the waterways is dangerous due to oil contamination. Despite bringing the case before UK courts in 2011, the community is still demanding a proper cleanup that they say has never materialised.

As for the Bille and Ogale communities, they brought their cases against Shell in the UK in 2015. The Ogale community depends primarily on farming and fishing, but since the 1980s, Shell has recorded around 100 spills in and around the area that have resulted in serious contamination of the drinking water. The United Nations conducted tests in 2011 and declared a public health emergency, but very little was done in response. Shell briefly provided safe water to residents, but that ended years ago. With no alternative sources available, many people have been forced to use visibly polluted water to drink and bathe their children.

The Bille community lives on islands in a riverine area where residents depend heavily on fishing and harvesting shellfish. A major pipeline runs directly through the community, very close to where people live. Between 2011 and 2013, multiple oil spills from Shell destroyed mangrove habitats. As with the Bodo community, fishing has become impossible for many people, forcing some to abandon their homes and communities entirely.

Why sue in the UK rather than Nigeria?

The decision to sue Shell in the UK came from our clients. While Shell operates in Nigeria through a local subsidiary, the parent company is based in the UK and has profited immensely from its Niger Delta operations, so our clients view it as equally responsible for the pollution in their communities.

They also believe they can’t get justice in Nigeria. The Nigerian legal system is notoriously slow: cases can take decades to reach judgement due to automatic rights of appeal. Many people won’t live to see justice. Bringing this type of case before Nigerian courts is also prohibitively expensive, because it requires extensive expert evidence that’s inaccessible to most affected communities.

In contrast, UK funding mechanisms make it far more feasible for our clients to pursue justice. They also trust they’ll receive a fairer hearing in London. This approach has already shown results: in the Bodo case, Shell finally brought in international experts to attempt cleanup. International litigation generates meaningful outcomes that wouldn’t happen otherwise.

Even when Shell argued that the case should be heard in Nigeria, in 2021 the UK Supreme Court ruled that because Shell PLC may share responsibility with its subsidiary, the case could proceed in London.

How is Shell defending itself?

Shell claims that most Niger Delta pollution stems from oil theft by local criminals, commonly known as ‘bunkering’. According to Shell, these criminals steal oil from pipelines to sell directly or refine into fuel. The company insists its operations are clean and criminals are to blame, arguing it’s doing its best to stop theft and therefore shouldn’t be held responsible.

This defence is fundamentally flawed. While oil theft is certainly a significant problem in Nigeria, Shell’s claims are overstated. Numerous spills have nothing to do with theft. They’re caused simply by poorly maintained infrastructure and decades-old pipelines that are not fit for purpose. This stands in stark contrast to other countries where maintenance is taken far more seriously.

Even accepting Shell’s argument, our clients contend that Shell should have taken reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable theft. In other countries, pipelines are buried, fitted with detection systems and monitored closely to detect intrusion attempts or spills. Our clients contend that Shell has failed to implement these basic measures in the Niger Delta.

What did the recent court ruling say, and what do you hope to achieve?

The High Court sided with our position, ruling that if Shell failed to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm, it can be liable for pollution caused by bunkering. Significantly, the court also rejected Shell’s claims that it couldn’t be held liable for spills older than five years, ruling that if a spill has still not been cleaned up – even if it happened decades ago – the company can still be held accountable.

This ruling has far-reaching implications. It’s particularly significant for the Ogale case where pollution dates back to the 1980s, and it opens the door for many other Niger Delta communities affected by legacy spills dating to the 1970s or earlier. Beyond Nigeria, the ruling sends a warning to multinational companies attempting to divest from polluting operations without accepting responsibility for the damage left behind.

Our clients seek three main outcomes from the 2027 trial: proper cleanup and environmental remediation of their polluted lands, emergency provisions such as access to clean drinking water and compensation for lost livelihoods and damaged property.

A pressing concern is Shell’s recent divestment from its onshore operations in Nigeria. The company has sold its assets to a consortium and is attempting to walk away from decades of pollution. While the communities we represent have at least secured court proceedings, many others have been left behind with no cleanup and no accountability.

We’re determined to prevent Shell and other multinational companies from abandoning polluted sites without taking responsibility. Success in holding Shell accountable, including for decades-old spills, could establish crucial legal precedents. Legally, it would confirm that companies remain responsible for long-term environmental damage. Morally, it’s about basic fairness: after decades of extracting resources and making huge profits, companies shouldn’t be allowed to leave behind a toxic legacy.

While our case won’t create internationally binding precedents, it could significantly influence how similar claims are litigated in other countries, particularly in common law jurisdictions.

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Business and Human Rights Treaty: a decade of struggle for corporate accountability CIVICUS Lens 08.Mar.2025
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Peru’s oil spill raises corporate accountability questions CIVICUS Lens 01.Apr.2022

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Multi-Year Drought Gives Birth to Extremist Violence, Girls Most Vulnerable

Africa, Armed Conflicts, Biodiversity, Child Labour, Climate Change Finance, Climate Change Justice, Combating Desertification and Drought, Conferences, Development & Aid, Disaster Management, Editors’ Choice, Energy, Environment, Europe, Featured, Food and Agriculture, Gender Violence, Global, Headlines, Human Rights, Migration & Refugees, Peace, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations, Water & Sanitation, Women & Climate Change, Youth

Combating Desertification and Drought

In Nairobi’s Kibera, the largest urban informal settlement in Africa, girls and women wait their turn for the scarce water supply. Credit: Manipadma Jena/IPS

SEVILLE & BHUBANESWAR, Jul 2 2025 (IPS) – While droughts creep in stealthily, their impacts are often more devastating and far-reaching than any other disaster. Inter-community conflict, extremist violence, and violence and injustice against vulnerable girls and women happen at the intersection of climate-induced droughts and drought-impoverished communities.


Five consecutive years of failed rain in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya brought the worst drought in seventy years to the Horn of Africa by 2023. In Somalia, the government estimated 43,000 excess deaths in 2022 alone due to drought-linked hunger.

As of early current year, 4.4 million people, or a quarter of Somalia’s population, face crisis-level food insecurity, including 784,000 people expected to reach emergency levels. Together, over 90 million people across Eastern and Southern Africa face acute hunger. Some areas have been enduring their worst ever recorded drought, finds a United Nations-backed study, Drought Hotspots Around the World 2023-2025 released today at the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4).

UNCCD Executive Secretary Ibrahim Thiaw said "Drought is here, escalating, and demands urgent global cooperation" Photo courtesy: UNCCD

UNCCD Executive Secretary Ibrahim Thiaw noted that while drought is here and escalating, it demands urgent global cooperation. Photo courtesy: UNCCD

High tempera­tures and a lack of precipitation in 2023 and 2024 resulted in water supply shortages, low food supplies, and power rationing. In parts of Africa, tens of millions faced drought-induced food shortages, malnutrition, and displacement, finds the new 2025 drought analysis, Drought Hotspots Around the World 2023-2025, by the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and the U.S. National Drought Mitigation Center (NDMC).

It not just comprehensively synthesizes impacts on humans but also on biodiversity and wildlife within the most acute drought hotspots in Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, and Namibia), the Mediterranean (Spain, Morocco, and Türkiye), Latin America (Panama and the Amazon Basin) and Southeast Asia.

Desperate to Cope but Pulled Into a Spiral of Violence and Conflict

“The coping mechanisms we saw during this drought grew increasingly desperate,” says lead author Paula Guastello, NDMC drought impacts researcher. “Girls pulled from school and forced into marriage, hospitals going dark, and families digging holes in dry riverbeds just to find contaminated water. These are signs of severe crisis.”

Over one million Somalis in 2022 were forced to move in search of food, water for families and cattle, and alternative livelihoods. Migration is a major coping mechanism mostly for subsistence farmers and pastoralists. However, mass migration strains resources in host areas, often leading to conflict. Of this large number of displaced Somalis, many crossed into territory held by Islamic extremists.

Drought in a Sub-Saharan district leads to 8.1 percent lower economic activity and 29.0 percent higher extremist violence, an earlier study found. Districts with more months of drought in a given year and more years in a row with drought experienced more severe violence.

Drought expert and editor of the UNCCD study Daniel Tsegai told IPS at the online pre-release press briefing from the Saville conference that drought can turn into an extremist violence multiplier in regions and among communities rendered vulnerable by multi-year drought.

Climate change-driven drought does not directly cause extremist conflict or civil wars; it overlaps and exacerbates existing social and economic tensions, contributing to the conditions that lead to conflict and potentially influencing the rise of extremist violence, added Tsegai.

Extracting water from a traditional well using a manual pulley system. Credit: Abdallah Khalili / UNCCD

Extracting water from a traditional well using a manual pulley system. Credit: Abdallah Khalili / UNCCD

Though the effects of climate change on conflict are indirect, they have been seen to be quite severe and far-reaching. An example is the 2006-2011 drought in Syria, seen as the worst in 900 years. It led to crop failures, livestock deaths and mass rural displacement into cities, creating social and political stress. Economic disparities and authoritarian repression gave rise to extremist groups that exploited individuals facing unbearable hardships.

The UN study cites entire school districts in Zimbabwe that saw mass dropouts due to hunger and school costs. Rural families were no longer able to afford uniforms and tuition, which cost USD 25. Some children left school to migrate with family and work.

Drought-related hunger impact on children

Hungry and clueless about their dark futures, children become prime targets for extremists’ recruitment.

A further example of exploitation of vulnerable communities by extremists is cited in the UNCCD drought study. The UN World Food Programme in May 2023 estimated that over 213,000 more Somalis were at “imminent risk” of dying of starvation. Little aid had reached Somalia, as multiple crises across the globe spread resources thin.

However, al-Shabab, an Islamic extremist group tied to al-Qaida, allegedly prevented aid from reaching the parts of Somalia under its control and refused to let people leave in search of food.

Violent clashes for scarce resources among nomadic herders in the Africa region during droughts are well documented. Between 2021 and January 2023 in eastern Africa alone, over 4.5 million livestock had died due to droughts, and 30 million additional animals were at risk. Facing starvation of both their families and their livestock, by February 2025, tens of thousands of pastoralists had moved with their livestock in search of food and water, potentially into violent confrontations with host regions.

Tsegai said, “Drought knows no geographical boundaries. Violence and conflict spill over into economically healthy communities this way.”

Earlier drought researchers have emphasized to policymakers that “building resilience to drought is a security imperative.”

Women and Girls Worst Victims of Drought Violence

“Today, around 85 percent of people affected by drought live in low- and middle-income countries, with women and girls being the hardest hit,” UNCCD Deputy Executive Secretary Andrea Meza said.

“Drought might not know boundaries, but it knows gender,” Tsegai said. Women and girls in low-income countries are the worst victims of drought-induced societal instability.

Traditional gender-based societal inequalities are what make women and girl children par­ticularly vulnerable.

During the 2023-2024 drought, forced child marriages in sub-Saharan Africa more than doubled in frequency in the four regions hit hardest by the drought. Young girls who married brought their family income in the form of a dowry that could be as high as 3,000 Ethiopian birr (USD 56). It lessened the financial burden on girls’ parental families.

Forced child marriages, however, bring substantial risks to the girls. A hospital clinic in Ethiopia (which, though, it has outlawed child marriage) specifically opened to help victims of sexual and physi­cal abuse that is common in such marriages.

Girls gener­ally leave school when they marry, further stifling their opportunities for financial independence.

Reports have found desperate women exchanging sex for food or water or money during acute water scarcities. Higher incidence of sexual violence happens when hydropower-dependent regions are confronted with 18 to 20 hours without electricity and women and girls are compelled to walk miles to fetch household water.

“Proactive drought management is a matter of climate justice,” UNCCD Meza said.

Drought Hotspots Need to Be Ready for This ‘New’ Normal

“Drought is no longer a distant threat,” said UNCCD Executive Secretary Ibrahim Thiaw, adding, “It is here, escalating, and demands urgent global cooperation. When energy, food, and water all go at once, societies start to unravel. That’s the new normal we need to be ready for.”

“This is a slow-moving global catastrophe, the worst I’ve ever seen. This report underscores the need for systematic monitoring of how drought affects lives, livelihoods, and the health of the ecosystems that we all depend on,” said Mark Svoboda, report co-author and NDMC Founding Director.

“The struggles experienced by Spain, Morocco and Türkiye to secure water, food, and energy under persistent drought offer a preview of water futures under unchecked global warming. No country, regardless of wealth or capacity, can afford to be complacent,” he added.

Global Drought Outlook 2025 estimates the economic impacts of an average drought today can be up to six times higher than in 2000, and costs are projected to rise by at least 35% by 2035.

“It is calculated that $1 of investment in drought prevention results in bringing back $7 into the GDP lost to droughts. Awareness of the economics of drought is important for policymaking,” Tsegai said.

The report released during the International Drought Resilience Alliance (IDRA) event at the Saville conference aims to get public policies and international cooperation frameworks to urgently prioritize drought resilience and bolster funding.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

Make use of all urban waste, a utopia in Brazil?

Active Citizens, Development & Aid, Editors’ Choice, Energy, Environment, Green Economy, Headlines, Integration and Development Brazilian-style, Latin America & the Caribbean, Sustainability, Sustainable Development Goals

Sustainability

A recycling, biodigestion and composting complex is being installed next to the landfill of the Intermunicipal Consortium of the Middle Valley of the Itajaí River (Cimvi), to take advantage of all the solid waste from 19 municipalities in the southern Brazilian state of Santa Catarina. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

TIMBO / FLORIANOPOLIS, Brazil , Jun 13 2025 (IPS) – In 2014, Santa Catarina became the first and only state free of open-air garbage dumps in Brazil. Now, 14 of its municipalities are seeking to also free themselves from landfills and make use of nearly all urban solid waste.


The Intermunicipal Consortium of the Middle Itajaí Valley (Cimvi) expects to process in recycling, biodigestion and composting more than 90% of the garbage, surpassing the 65% benchmark reached by the Nordic countries of Europe, emphasized its executive director, Fernando Tomaselli.

“We have 36 landfills in the state, only three public, the rest are private and there is little interest in changing the system, because whoever dominates the landfill also dominates the garbage collection service”: Fernando Tomaselli.

“It is a utopia,” said the executive president of the Brazilian Association of Energy from Waste (Abren), Yuri Schmitke.

“The unrealistic goal compromises the project,” he warned. Several European countries, Japan and South Korea have already eliminated sanitary landfills – the areas for the final disposal of solid waste – but resort to incineration to generate energy with non-recyclable garbage, he added.

Cimvi rules out that alternative. Its goal is to expand recycling and the circular economy of waste to an unprecedented proportion. “Our obsession is to take advantage of everything, to prove that garbage does not exist,” said Tomaselli.

But recycling has limits. Europe, after many attempts and advances, covers 25 % of waste on average and 32 % in the exceptional case of Germany. In addition, 19% of the waste still goes to landfills, according to data from Abren, which had its sixth annual congress in Florianopolis, capital of Santa Catarina, on June 5 and 6.

Cimvi was created in 1998, with only five participating municipalities, to jointly manage several issues, but not yet garbage. It reached its current composition of 14 municipalities in 2017 after taking over the management of the sanitary landfill in 2016, previously in charge of the water and sewage authorities.

Its headquarters was installed in Timbo, a town of 46 099 people, according to the 2022 national census. The 14 municipalities had 283 594 residents that year, the most populous being Indaial, with 71 549.

Fernando Tomaselli, director of Cimvi, an intermunicipal initiative that promotes circular waste management in the southern Brazilian state of Santa Catarina. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

Fernando Tomaselli, director of Cimvi, an intermunicipal initiative that promotes circular waste management in the southern Brazilian state of Santa Catarina. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

Landfill and recycling

The landfill receives garbage from five other “partner” cities, in addition to the 14 in the consortium, with a total of between 5,000 and 7,000 tons per month. Environmental education campaigns in schools, businesses and the streets have gradually expanded selective waste collection.

Yellow sacks were popularized and disseminated where the population put recyclable waste which, collected by the municipalities, are taken to the Waste Assessment Center (CVR I) at the Cimvi headquarters, on the outskirts of Timbo.

“Today we recover 20 to 22% of recyclable waste, against a Brazilian average of 2%. We want to reach 27%,” Tomaselli told IPS.

“We receive an average of 60 tons a day, 24 hours a day, in three shifts, Monday to Monday,” said Rosane Valério, president of the Medio Vale Cooperative, hired to separate and send the waste to purchasing companies, at CVR I, where 87 recyclers are employed.

The cooperative has another unit to process waste from two other nearby cities, Ituporanga and Aurora, with a total of 33 300 people.

“Of the material received, we still discard 30% that comes mixed or dirty with food remains, sometimes blood that attracts mosquitoes, glass and other dangerous objects such as syringes and medicines, which generate major difficulties for recycling,” explained Valério.

A bench at the entrance of Cimvi's headquarters, made of thermoplastic produced from waste that was previously considered non-recyclable and destined for landfills. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

A bench at the entrance of Cimvi’s headquarters, made of thermoplastic produced from waste that was previously considered non-recyclable and destined for landfills. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

Thermoplastic

She regretted that “we do not know the origin, there is a lack of awareness of the population in the correct disposal”. In any case, half of that 30% of discarded waste can be used for the production of thermoplastic, a hard material like concrete, which is used to make benches for squares, sidewalks, pavements and walls.

The cooperative already operates a pilot plant, with experimental production that has not yet been sold externally. “The municipalities are the initial market for the thermoplastic plates, as well as for the compost from the composting,” says Tomaselli.

Abren’s president, Schmitke, is skeptical. The consortium municipalities have a limited, insufficient demand, and the population does not trust products made from garbage, he argued.

Jaqueline Wagenknetht and Maria Eduarda Pegoretti, Cimvi's environmental education and communication advisors, promote environmental education in the so-called European Valley to improve selective garbage collection and promote tourism and sustainable living. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

Jaqueline Wagenknetht and Maria Eduarda Pegoretti, Cimvi’s environmental education and communication advisors, promote environmental education in the so-called European Valley to improve selective garbage collection and promote tourism and sustainable living. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

But thermoplastic has been around for four decades and now there is equipment that facilitates its production at a high temperature, 160 degrees Celsius, and as an input, half of the plastic that is added to other waste, such as textiles, is enough, countered the director of Cimvi.

The use of local waste will take a leap forward with the inauguration of CVR II, which is expected in early 2026 and will use a large part of the organic waste for the production of biogas and biofertilizers. Another part will go to composting.

“The goal is to take advantage of 100% or 98%,” for which alternatives must be sought for waste, the “common garbage” for which there are still no ways to recycle, he said.

Cimvi headquarters, in the Sunflower Park, which combines ecotourism, sanitary landfill and urban waste utilization plants for biogas generation, recycling and composting. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

Cimvi headquarters, in the Sunflower Park, which combines ecotourism, sanitary landfill and urban waste utilization plants for biogas generation, recycling and composting. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

Bottlenecks

One stumbling block is selective collection, which needs to be perfected. “In Milan, Italy, five types of garbage are separated at the source, be it food, plastics, paper, metals or glass. Here, it’s harder because everything is mixed together,” said Tomaselli.

That is why Cimvi gives priority to environmental education, through several campaigns such as “Vale reciclar”, and sustainable tourism, which highlights the beauties of the so-called European Valley, which includes other municipalities in addition to the 14 consortium members.

The Girasol Park was also created for this purpose, a tourist complex that includes the landfill, the Cimvi facilities and the surrounding forest, with trails for walks, said Jaqueline Wagenknetht, environmental education advisor.

Design and poetry contests among local students seek to promote the valley, which is called European because its population includes many immigrants, especially Germans, Italians and Poles.

The name Sunflower was chosen for the park because, in addition to its beauty, the flower symbolizes sustainability, as a source of oil and biofuel, the advisor explained.

Design of the future Sunflower Park, in which the green buildings, in the center, are intended for recycling and energy biodigestion. In the background on the left is the landfill already covered, able to receive solar energy panels. Credit: Courtesy of Cimvi

Design of the future Sunflower Park, in which the green buildings, in the center, are intended for recycling and energy biodigestion. In the background on the left is the landfill already covered, able to receive solar energy panels. Credit: Courtesy of Cimvi

Cimvi benefits from the experiences of São Bento do Sul, a municipality of 83 277 people, 120 kilometers north of Timbo, which has a similar program that seeks to use up to 100% of the waste.

A process of dehydration of the organic part allows a better use of the waste, explained Jacó Phoren, consultant of the company 100lixo, which is involved in the project, during his speech at the Abren congress on June 6.

Fostering new companies that generate solutions for the waste industry is another focus of Cimvi, said Tomaselli.

In Curitibanos, a city 185 kilometers southwest of Timbo, with 40 045 people, the company Inventus Ambiental claims to have invented equipment that will facilitate the separation of garbage for better energy recovery or recycling, reducing the waste that makes landfills bigger.

Its pilot project will be inaugurated in a few months and is based on the use of 90-degree heat to treat organic material, informed Dirnei Ferri, director of the company.

Santa Catarina has already eliminated open dumps, although it is ignored if all of them have been cleaned up. Now it is a matter of “breaking the landfill trench”, said Tomaselli.

“We have 36 landfills in the state, only three public, the rest are private and there is little interest in changing the system, because whoever dominates the landfill also dominates the garbage collection service,” he concluded.

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Solar Energy Brings Water to Iconic Salvadoran Village of El Mozote

Civil Society, Development & Aid, Editors’ Choice, Energy, Headlines, Human Rights, Integration and Development Brazilian-style, Latin America & the Caribbean, Sustainability, Sustainable Development Goals, Women & Economy

Sustainability

More than 30 solar panels power the pumping plant in the village of El Mozote, in eastern El Salvador, providing water to around 360 families. Credit: Edgardo Ayala / IPS

More than 30 solar panels power the pumping plant in the village of El Mozote, in eastern El Salvador, providing water to around 360 families. Credit: Edgardo Ayala / IPS

EL MOZOTE, El Salvador , Jun 6 2025 (IPS) – The worst massacre of civilians in Latin America occurred in the Salvadoran village of El Mozote, where environmental projects are beginning to emerge, slowly fostering awareness about protecting the natural resources of this deeply symbolic site, embedded in the country’s historical memory.


Since early 2024, a small photovoltaic plant has been operating in El Mozote, in the district of Meanguera, eastern El Salvador, powering a municipal water system designed to supply around 360 families in the village and nearby areas.

“We used to wash clothes in those communal wells, which were built after the war, in ’94.” — Otilia Chicas

“The project’s goal was to minimize environmental impacts in the area by seeking cleaner energy sources, and with that in mind, the solar panel system was implemented,” Rosendo Ramos, the Morazán representative of the Salvadoran Health Promotion Association (ASPS), the NGO behind the project, explained to IPS.

The Spanish organization Solidaridad Internacional Andalucía also participated in launching the initiative.

El Mozote is located in the department of Morazán, a mountainous region in eastern El Salvador. During the civil war (1980-1992), the area was the scene of brutal clashes between leftist guerrillas and the army.

In December 1981, over several days, military units massacred around 1,000 peasants in the village and neighboring communities—including pregnant women and children—accusing them of being a support base for the rebels.

The conflict is estimated to have left more than 75,000 dead and 8,000 disappeared.

The photovoltaic system installed in El Mozote, eastern El Salvador, operates alongside the national distribution grid, so on cloudy days with low solar generation, the conventional power grid is activated. Credit: Courtesy of ASPS

The photovoltaic system installed in El Mozote, eastern El Salvador, operates alongside the national distribution grid, so on cloudy days with low solar generation, the conventional power grid is activated. Credit: Courtesy of ASPS

Sunlight to Distribute Water

The solar project consists of 32 panels capable of generating a total of 15 kilowatts—enough to power the equipment, primarily the 60-horsepower pump that pushes water up to the tank installed atop La Cruz mountain. From there, water flows down to households by gravity.

The photovoltaic system operates alongside the national power grid, so on cloudy days with low solar output, the conventional grid kicks in—though the goal is obviously to reduce reliance on it.

The project, costing US$28,000, was funded by the European Union as part of a larger environmental initiative that also included two nearby municipalities, Arambala and Jocoaitique, focusing on protecting the La Joya Pueblo micro-watershed.

Key aspects of the broader program include reducing the use of agrochemicals, plastic, and other disposable materials; and promoting rainwater harvesting.

The overall program reached 1,317 people (706 women and 611 men) across three municipalities and six communities, involving NGOs, schools, and local governments.

“The aim is to consume less energy from the national grid, thereby lowering pumping costs,” explained Ramos.

However, this cost reduction doesn’t necessarily translate into lower water bills for families in El Mozote and surrounding areas. That’s because the water system is municipally managed, and tariffs are set by local ordinances, making adjustments difficult—unlike community-run projects where residents and leaders can more easily agree on changes.

One benefit of the new system is that lower energy costs for the municipality free up funds to expand and improve other basic services—not just in Meanguera but also in places like El Mozote, Dennis Morel, the district director, told IPS.

The plaza of El Mozote, the iconic village in eastern El Salvador, was renovated, but local residents complain that the government-led construction work was not agreed upon with the community. Credit: Edgardo Ayala / IPS

The plaza of El Mozote, the iconic village in eastern El Salvador, was renovated, but local residents complain that the government-led construction work was not agreed upon with the community. Credit: Edgardo Ayala / IPS

Water in the postwar era

Otilia Chicas, a native of El Mozote, recalled what life was like in the village when there was no piped water service—back in the days following the end of the civil war in 1992, when people began returning to the area.

“We used to wash clothes in those communal wells. They were built after the war, in ’94,” said Chicas, pointing toward one of those now-empty wells, about 20 meters away from where she stood, inside a kiosk selling handicrafts, books, and T-shirts in El Mozote’s central plaza.

Next to the plaza is the mural bearing the names of the hundreds of people killed by the army—specifically, by units of the Atlacatl Battalion, trained in counterinsurgency by the United States.

“We used to fetch water from there and bathe there, but since these wells weren’t enough, we’d go to a spring, to ‘El Zanjo,’ as we called it,” she recounted.

She added that the drinking water project arrived between 2005 and 2006, finally bringing the resource directly into people’s homes.

“The community had to pitch in, and the hours people worked were counted as payment, as their contribution,” she noted while weaving colorful thread bracelets.

There is uncertainty over whether the kiosk in the village plaza will be removed. Several women from the El Mozote Historical Committee sell handicrafts and work as tour guides there. Credit: Edgardo Ayala / IPS

There is uncertainty over whether the kiosk in the village plaza will be removed. Several women from the El Mozote Historical Committee sell handicrafts and work as tour guides there. Credit: Edgardo Ayala / IPS

 Almost No One Was Spared 

Chicas, 45, was born in 1980, a year before the massacre. Now, she helps run the kiosk and works as a tour guide alongside other local women from the El Mozote Historical Committee, explaining to visitors the horrific events that took place in December 1981.

The artisan shared that her family lost several relatives in the 1981 massacre, as did nearly everyone here. The victims’ mural is filled with dozens of people bearing the last names Chicas, Márquez, Claros, and Argueta, among many others.

“My grandmother lost four of her children and 17 grandchildren,” she recalled.

Chicas’ father, in an attempt to save their lives, moved his family out of El Mozote before the massacre and resettled in Lourdes Colón, in the western part of the country. But the military ended up killing him in 1983 after discovering he was originally from Morazán and linking him to rebel groups.

“The National Guard came for him and two uncles—they saw they were from Morazán, a guerrilla zone,” she emphasized. “Before killing them, they forced them to dig their own graves. They were left by the roadside, in a place called El Tigre,” she explained.

The military operation that culminated in the massacre was planned and executed by the Salvadoran Army’s High Command, with support from Honduran soldiers and covered up by United States government officials, revealed Stanford University scholar Terry Karl in April 2021.

Karl testified as an expert witness during a hearing on the case held that April in San Francisco Gotera, the capital of Morazán.

Dormant in El Salvador’s judicial system since 1993, the case was reopened in September 2016. Among the accused are 15 soldiers—seven of them high-ranking Salvadoran officers—,the only surviving defendants from the original list of 33 military personnel.

The trial is currently in the investigative phase, where evidence is being gathered and examined before the judge decides whether to proceed to a full public trial.

A mural on the side of El Mozote’s plaza displays the names of the hundreds of people killed by the Salvadoran army in December 1981, marking the largest massacre of civilians in Latin America. Credit: Edgardo Ayala / IPS

A mural on the side of El Mozote’s plaza displays the names of the hundreds of people killed by the Salvadoran army in December 1981, marking the largest massacre of civilians in Latin America. Credit: Edgardo Ayala / IPS

Times of Uncertainty 

El Mozote’s central plaza has been renovated over the past three years as part of the government’s effort to give it a more orderly and modern appearance—a promise made by President Nayib Bukele when he visited the site in February 2021.

The town is also nearing completion of a Urban Center for Well-being and Opportunities (CUBO)—a government-sponsored community center designed to provide youth with access to reading materials, art, culture, and information and communication technologies.

However, some residents told IPS that these projects are being carried out without prior consultation or agreement with the community, in violation of the 2012 ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which called for justice, truth, and reparations for the victims.

The reconstruction work demolished the bandstand, a space highly valued by the community as a gathering place for meetings and collective organizing.

Despite this, Chicas said she supports the plaza’s renovations, as they have made it more inviting for young people to spend time there. Still, she noted that the remodeling affected her personally.

The construction forced her to dismantle her small food stall, made of corrugated metal sheets, where she used to make and sell pupusas—El Salvador’s most iconic dish, made of corn and stuffed with beans, cheese, or pork.

Chicas also mentioned the ongoing uncertainty about whether the kiosk where she and other women craft and sell their handicrafts will be removed.

“We’re left in limbo—we don’t know what’s going to happen,” she said.

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