UN80: Three Tests to Make Reform About People, Not Spreadsheets

Armed Conflicts, Civil Society, Environment, Financial Crisis, Global, Global Geopolitics, Headlines, Human Rights, Inequality, Peace, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Sarah Strack is Forus Director and Christelle Kalhoulé is Forus Chair and civil society leader in Burkina Faso

Credit: Forus – UN High-Level Political Forum 2025

NEW YORK, Sep 26 2025 (IPS) – This September the UN turns 80, but the lessons of peace, justice, and cooperation are still unfinished. The world today faces the flames of inequality, conflict, ecological collapse and growing digital threats. In short, the very problems the UN was created to solve are once again staring us in the face.


That’s why the UN’s latest reform push, “UN80,” matters. Launched this spring, it promises to make the multilateral system more inclusive and accountable. But here’s the real question: can it align with 21st century’s needs? Will it be remembered as a budget drill or the start of a renewal that truly delivers for people where they live?

If this moment is going to count, three things must happen.

First, reforms must put people at the center, and we must avoid a reform by spreadsheet.

The UN is under financial strain. Geopolitical tensions are sky-high, negotiations are gridlocked, Member States are late on dues and membership fees, arrears run into the billions, and the UN’s mandate, efficiency, and effectiveness are under question.

“In a polycrisis world, shrinking the UN’s capacity is like cutting the fire brigade during wildfire season,” warns Christelle Kalhoulé, Forus Chair and civil society leader in Burkina Faso. “Reform cannot be about cutting corners. It must be about giving people the protection, rights, and solidarity they are being denied today.”

The UN80 Initiative marks the most sweeping reform effort in decades, with three tracks: streamlining services and consolidating IT and HR systems, reviewing outdated mandates, and exploring the consolidation of UN agencies into seven thematic “clusters.”

On paper, these reforms could bring overdue coherence. But the process has too often felt opaque, with key documents surfacing via leaks and staff unions flagging limited transparency and consultation.

Increasing the use of tools like AI is among the “solutions” being floated to “flag potential duplication” and shorten resolutions — yet without clear guardrails, there’s a risk of automating cuts and reinforcing bias rather than empowering people-first innovation. And the debate has too often been framed around cash flow, back payments, and cuts. The United States alone owes $1.5 billion in dues. Major donors are cutting ODA, and several UN humanitarian agencies are planning double-digit reductions in 2025 in their budgets.

As Arjun Bhattarai, Executive Director of the NGO Federation of Nepal warns: “Reform cannot be a synonym for austerity. Cutting budgets may make spreadsheets look tidy in New York, but it leaves communities in Kathmandu, Kampala, Khartoum, or Kyiv without support when they need it most.”

The danger is a reform focused on management efficiencies instead of reimagining what the UN must be to meet today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

Second, a better compass exists.

Despite its flaws, multilateralism remains indispensable. Without the UN, the world would be poorer when it comes to peace, cooperation, and collective problem-solving.

What makes the UN matter most, however, are not the halls of New York or Geneva, but the people and communities it exists to serve.

The UN was created “for the people and by the people”. Protecting, safeguarding and promoting healthy sustainable lives for communities must remain the core priority.

Our measure for reform is simple: a transformed UN must reduce inequalities, ensure fairer and more inclusive representation across its governance structures, deliver public goods fairly with accountability, and protect people better, faster, while safeguarding rights.

As Moses Isooba, Executive Director of the Uganda National NGO Forum, puts it: “A reformed UN must stand closer to the people than to the corridors of power. It must be measured not by the length of resolutions, but by the depth of hope it restores and the changes it makes for communities worldwide.”

If UN80 becomes a technocratic exercise in “doing less with less,” we will emerge with a smaller, weaker UN at precisely the moment we need it most.

If instead it becomes a justice-driven reimagining — linking architecture and finance to a clear vision of protection, equity, participation, and decentralization — it could renew the UN’s capacity to act as a backbone of international cooperation.

As Justina Kaluinaite, Policy and advocacy expert at the Lithuanian NGDO Platform, stresses: “The UN will survive another 80 years only if it learns to listen. True reform is not about doing more with less, but about doing better with those who have been left out.”

Third, put reforms through three simple tests.

When leaders meet in New York, we challenge them to have every reform proposal answering three questions:

    1. The Inequality Question: Does this reform measurably narrow gaps — by income, gender, geography, or status — in who is protected and who benefits?

    2. The Localisation Question: Does it move money, decisions, and accountability closer to communities, with transparent targets and timelines?

    3. The Rights Question: Does it strengthen — not dilute — protection, gender equality, and human rights?

As Christelle Kalhoulé, sums it up: “The measure of UN80 should not be how much paper it saves, but how many lives it protects. History and the legacy we leave to future generations will not ask whether the UN balanced its budget in 2025; it will ask whether it stood with people.”

If leaders embrace this moment, the UN can emerge sharper, stronger, and more inclusive, with a justice-driven renewal of multilateralism, reclaiming its place as the backbone of global cooperation. If not, UN80 may go down in history as the moment when multilateralism chose retreat over renewal.

If UN80 is going to matter, it must prevent crises before they explode, deliver for both people and planet, give underrepresented countries and communities a real voice, keep civil society free and strong, and fix financing so money reaches those on the frontlines. The real test isn’t how tidy the org chart looks, it’s whether lives are saved, trust is rebuilt, and the UN proves it can still rise to the moment and be fit to serve this 21st century world.

IPS UN Bureau

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‘Enabling Machines to Make Life and Death Decisions Is Morally Unjustifiable’

Active Citizens, Armed Conflicts, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Featured, Global, Global Geopolitics, Headlines, Human Rights, TerraViva United Nations

Jun 27 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses autonomous weapons systems and the campaign for regulation with Nicole van Rooijen, Executive Director of Stop Killer Robots, a global civil society coalition of over 270 organisations that campaigns for a new international treaty on autonomous weapons systems.


Nicole van Rooijen

In May, United Nations (UN) member states convened in New York for the first time to confront the challenge of regulating autonomous weapons systems, which can select and engage targets without human intervention. These ‘killer robots’ pose unprecedented ethical, humanitarian and legal risks, and civil society warns they could trigger a global arms race while undermining international law. With weapons that have some autonomy already deployed in conflicts from Gaza to Ukraine, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has set a 2026 deadline for a legally binding treaty.

What are autonomous weapons systems and why do they pose unprecedented challenges?

Autonomous weapons systems, or ‘killer robots’, are weapons that, once activated by a human, can select and engage targets without further human intervention. These systems make independent decisions – without the intervention of a human operator – about when, how, where and against whom to use force, processing sensor data or following pre-programmed ‘target profiles’. Rather than using the term ‘lethal autonomous weapons systems’, our campaign refers to ‘autonomous weapons systems’ to emphasise that any such system, lethal or not, can inflict serious harm.

The implications are staggering. These weapons could operate across all domains – air, land, sea and space – during armed conflicts and law enforcement or border control operations. They raise numerous ethical, humanitarian, legal and security concerns.

The most troubling variant involves anti-personnel systems triggered by human presence or individuals or groups who meet pre-programmed target profiles. By reducing people to data points for algorithmic targeting, these weapons are dehumanising. They strip away our inherent rights and dignity, dramatically increasing the risk of unjust harm or death. No machine, computer or algorithm can recognise a human as a human being, nor respect humans as inherent bearers of rights and dignity. Autonomous weapons cannot comprehend what it means to be in a state of war, much less what it means to have – or to end – a human life. Enabling machines to make life and death decisions is morally unjustifiable.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has noted it is ‘difficult to envisage’ scenarios where autonomous weapons wouldn’t pose significant risks of violating international humanitarian law, given the inevitable presence of civilians and non-combatants in conflict zones.

Currently, no international law governs these weapons’ development or use. As the technology advances rapidly, this legal vacuum creates a dangerous environment where autonomous weapons could be deployed in ways that violate existing international law while escalating conflicts, enabling unaccountable violence and harming civilians. This is what prompted the UN Secretary-General and the ICRC president to jointly call for urgent negotiations on a legally binding international instrument on autonomous weapons systems by 2026.

How have recent consultations advanced the regulatory agenda?

The informal consultations held in New York in May, mandated by UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 79/62, focused on issues raised in the UN Secretary-General’s 2024 report on autonomous weapons systems. They sought to broaden awareness among the diplomatic community and complement the work around the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), emphasising risks that extend far beyond international humanitarian law.

The UNGA offers a crucial advantage: universal participation. Unlike the CCW process in Geneva, it includes all states. This is particularly important for global south states, many of which are not a party to the CCW.

Over two days, states and civil society explored human rights implications, humanitarian consequences, ethical dilemmas, technological risks and security threats. Rich discussions emerged around regional dynamics and practical scenarios, examining how these weapons might be used in policing, border control and by non-state actors or criminal groups. While time constraints prevented exhaustive exploration of all issues, the breadth of engagement was unprecedented.

The Stop Killer Robots campaign found these consultations energising and strategically valuable. They demonstrated how UN processes in Geneva and New York can reinforce each other: while one forum provides detailed technical groundwork, particularly in developing treaty language, the other fosters inclusive political leadership and momentum. Both forums should work in tandem to maximise global efforts to achieve an international legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems.

What explains the global divide on regulation?

The vast majority of states support a legally binding treaty on autonomous weapons systems, favouring a two-tier approach that combines prohibitions with positive obligations.

However, roughly a dozen states oppose any form of regulation. Among them are some of the world’s most heavily militarised states and the primary developers, producers and likely users of autonomous weapons systems. Their resistance likely stems from the desire to preserve military superiority and protect economic interests, and the belief in inflated claims about these weapons’ supposed benefits promoted by big tech and arms industries. Or perhaps they simply favour force over diplomacy.

Whatever their motivations, this opposition underscores the urgent need for the international community to reinforce a rules-based global order that prioritises dialogue, multilateralism and responsible governance over unchecked technological ambition.

How do geopolitical tensions and corporate influence complicate international regulation efforts?

It is undeniable that geopolitical tensions and corporate influence are challenging the development of regulations for emerging technologies.

A handful of powerful states are prioritising narrow military and economic advantages over collective security, undermining the multilateral cooperation that has traditionally governed arms control. Equally troubling is the expanding influence of the private sector, particularly large tech companies that operate largely outside established accountability frameworks while wielding significant sway over political leaders.

This dual pressure is undermining the international rules-based order precisely when we most need stronger multilateral governance. Without robust regulatory frameworks that can withstand these pressures, development of autonomous weapons risks accelerating unchecked, with profound implications for global security and human rights.

How is civil society shaping this debate and advocating for regulation?

Anticipating the challenges autonomous weapons systems would pose, leading human rights organisations and humanitarian disarmament experts founded the Stop Killer Robots campaign in 2012. Today, our coalition spans over 270 organisations across more than 70 countries, working at national, regional and global levels to build political support for legally binding regulation.

We’ve played a leading role in shaping global discourse by highlighting the wide-ranging risks these technologies pose and producing timely research on weapons systems evolution and shifting state positions.

Our multi-level strategy targets all decision-makers who can influence this agenda, at local, regional and global levels. It’s crucial that political leaders understand how autonomous weapons might be used in warfare and other contexts, enabling them to advocate effectively within their spheres of influence for the treaty we urgently need.

Public pressure is key to our approach. Recent years have seen growing weapons systems autonomy and military applications, particularly in ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, alongside rising use of technologies such as facial recognition in civilian contexts. Public concern about the dehumanising nature of these technologies and the lack of regulation has grown online and offline. We frame these concerns along the whole spectrum of automated harm, with autonomous weapons representing the extreme, and highlight the critical need to close the gap between innovation and regulation.

We also collaborate with experts from arms, military and technology sectors to bring real-world knowledge and credibility to our treaty advocacy. It is crucial to involve those who develop and deploy autonomous weapons to demonstrate the gravity of current circumstances and the urgent need for regulation.

We encourage people to take action by signing our petition, asking their local political representatives to sign our Parliamentary Pledge or just spreading the word about our campaign on social media. This ultimately puts pressure on diplomats and other decision-makers to advance the legal safeguards we desperately need.

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VIETNAM: ‘Human Rights Conditions Will Likely Worsen as the Country Descends into a Police State’

Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Environment, Featured, Global Geopolitics, Headlines, Human Rights, Labour, TerraViva United Nations

Aug 29 2024 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses recent leadership changes in Vietnam with David Tran, coordinator of the Alliance for Vietnam’s Democracy, a civil society platform that promotes democracy in Vietnam and the region through international cooperation and the strengthening of local civil society.


On 3 August, President Tô Lâm was confirmed as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Vietnam’s top position, following the death of long-serving General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng. Lâm, who has been president since May, is known for leading an aggressive anti-corruption campaign that has seen many officials jailed and others forced to resign. He will continue as president while assuming the duties of general secretary, potentially enabling him to consolidate power ahead of the 2026 party congress, which will choose Vietnam’s top leaders for the next five years. Civil society fears the regime could become even more autocratic and repressive if Lâm retains both positions.

David Tran

What’s Vietnam’s political system like, and what’s the likely impact of the recent leadership change?

Vietnam is an authoritarian one-party state led by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). There are four key positions of authority: the president, who is the ceremonial head of state, the prime minister, who heads the government, the chair of the National Assembly, the unicameral legislature, and the most powerful, the general secretary of the VCP.

Although the president is elected by the National Assembly, this body is overwhelmingly made up of VCP members, who usually approve all incumbents unopposed. On 3 August, following the death of the last VCP general secretary, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Tô Lâm was confirmed as the new VCP leader.

This appointment is particularly significant because it puts a lot of power in the hands of one person. His dual role gives Tô Lâm considerable influence over the state and party, as well as greater control over the public security apparatus. While he appears set to continue the policies of his predecessor, there are several cracks beneath the surface. His power is likely to be challenged by several VCP members who’ve been forced into retirement by his ‘anticorruption’ campaign, effectively an initiative to eliminate competing factions. We can expect this infighting to continue and intensify.

What does Tô Lâm’s rise mean from a human rights perspective?

Tô Lâm has had a long career, including stints as minister of public security and a member of the politburo. The key role he played in the previous general secretary’s ‘anticorruption’ campaign saw him elected president in May, after his investigations into several high-profile politicians and businesspeople led to the resignation of his predecessor and other top officials.

The accumulation of power in the hands of the architect of a purge is unlikely to lead to improvements in civic space or human rights. Tô Lâm has been closely associated with the worsening human rights situation, as the Formosa and the Trinh Xuan Thanh cases clearly illustrate.

In April 2016, the Formosa company caused an environmental disaster when it discharged heavily polluted waste off Vietnam’s central coast. This caused widespread damage in at least four provinces and sparked protests. Instead of prosecuting Formosa, Tô Lâm, then minister of public security and in charge of the environmental police, suppressed peaceful protests and had 220 people sentenced to a total of 133 years in prison, not including probation after release. He said he was protecting Formosa from what he called ‘hostile forces’ – essentially anyone who criticised the company.

The second case involves Trinh Xuan Thanh, a former vice chair of Hau Giang Province, who fled to Germany in 2016 after being accused of ‘deliberately violating state regulations, causing serious consequences’. He was abducted on German soil by the Vietnamese secret service, which is under the Ministry of Public Security, and returned to Vietnam. Tô Lâm was directly involved in this operation, which Germany condemned as a ‘scandalous violation’ of its sovereignty and a ‘gross breach of international law’.

Given Tô Lâm’s track record, we expect human rights conditions to worsen under his leadership as Vietnam descends into a police state where human rights and the rule of law are ignored. The already limited space for civil society in Vietnam has shrunk under his watch, and we expect this trend to continue.

What are the challenges facing civil society in Vietnam?

Tô Lâm’s rise to power has been marked by his consistent efforts to stifle dissent. Under his leadership, the authorities, particularly the Ministry of Public Security, have increasingly tightened their grip on civil society organisations (CSOs). They have implemented new decrees that overregulate the registration and management of foreign CSOs and applied stricter rules to domestic organisations.

They have also weaponised tax laws and the criminal code to target civil society leaders, charging them with offences such as tax evasion and ‘abuse of democratic freedoms’. This has led to the imprisonment of prominent activists, including environmental and labour rights advocates.

Independent CSOs are subject to strict surveillance, with some being dismantled or forced to reorganise to conform to the authorities. This was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which the authorities used as a pretext to impose further restrictions on civil society under the guise of public health measures.

Despite this repressive environment, some social service CSOs and philanthropic groups continue to operate and strive to make a positive impact. But their independence is severely restricted as they and their activists are constantly targeted.

What international support does Vietnam’s civil society need?

Human rights organisations and international bodies have raised concerns about the shrinking space for civil society in Vietnam. They have called for respect for freedoms of assembly, association and expression and urged the authorities to ease restrictions. While these statements are important, they must be accompanied by trade sanctions and other enforcement mechanisms. Words alone are not enough.

Unfortunately, human rights in Vietnam are also falling victim to geopolitics. As tensions with China escalate, the USA is increasingly seeing Vietnam as a counterweight to China. In this context, human rights and civic space are often sidelined, if not ignored altogether. We believe that a democratic Vietnam would be the best partner and ally in promoting a peaceful, open and stable Indo-Pacific region.

Even if Tô Lâm has a long way to go before he reaches a position comparable to Xi Jinping’s in China, consolidation of power is a general trend we’re seeing among the region’s communist states. Oddly enough, given how these two leaders came to power, it could be a sign that pressure for human rights and civic space, both domestically and internationally, is working. If the authorities feel compelled to respond by consolidating power and positioning figures like Tô Lâm to counter these movements, there is still hope we are on the right track.

Civic space in Vietnam is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with the Alliance for Vietnam’s Democracy through its webpage or Facebook page.

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Kazakhstan Takes Lead in Global Push for Nuclear Disarmament Amid Heightened Tensions

Armed Conflicts, Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Conferences, Global, Global Geopolitics, Headlines, Health, Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Energy – Nuclear Weapons

Opinion

Central Downtown Astana with Bayterek tower. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

TOKYO/ASTANA, Aug 19 2024 (IPS) – In a world increasingly shadowed by the threat of nuclear conflict, Kazakhstan is stepping up its efforts in the global disarmament movement. On August 27-28, 2024, in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Kazakhstan will host a critical workshop in Astana. This gathering, the first of its kind in five years, is set to reinvigorate the five existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) and enhance cooperation and consultation among them.


This initiative aligns with UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s Agenda for Disarmament, particularly Action 5, which emphasizes the strengthening of NWFZs through enhanced collaboration between zones, urging nuclear-armed states to respect relevant treaties, and supporting the establishment of new zones, such as in the Middle East. This effort reflects the global community’s ongoing push to reduce the nuclear threat and foster regional and global peace.

Kazakhstan’s Historical Commitment to Disarmament

Kazakhstan’s vision for a nuclear-free world is deeply rooted in its leadership in global disarmament efforts. This vision is not just aspirational; it is grounded in the country’s lived experience of the devastating impact of nuclear weapons. The Semipalatinsk Test Site in northeastern Kazakhstan, often referred to as “the Polygon,” was the site of 456 nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1989. These tests exposed over 1.5 million people to radiation, resulting in severe health consequences, including cancer and birth defects, as well as environmental degradation.

Kazakhstan’s dedication to disarmament is further highlighted by its initiative to establish August 29 as the International Day against Nuclear Tests, recognized by the United Nations. This date commemorates both the first Soviet nuclear test at Semipalatinsk in 1949 and the closure of the site in 1991, serving as a reminder of the horrors of nuclear testing and a call to action for the global community.

The Role of NWFZs in Global Security

NWFZs are critical components of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. There are five established NWFZs, created through treaties: Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa), Treaty of Semey (Central Asia) In addition, Mongolia’s unique status as a self-declared nuclear-weapon-free state, recognized through a United Nations General Assembly resolution, exemplifies a national commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

These zones prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons within their territories, reinforced by international verification and control systems. NWFZs play a crucial role in maintaining regional stability, reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, and promoting global disarmament.

Astana Workshop: A Critical Gathering for Disarmament

The upcoming workshop in Astana is a critical opportunity for states-parties to the five NWFZ treaties, alongside representatives from international organizations, to engage in vital discussions aimed at overcoming the challenges facing these zones. This gathering is particularly timely, given the escalating geopolitical tensions in regions where nuclear capabilities remain central to national security.

A key focus of the workshop will be on enhancing cooperation among the NWFZs, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament. This includes facilitating consultation between the zones and encouraging nuclear-armed states to adhere to the protocols of these treaties. The workshop builds on the 2019 seminar titled “Cooperation Among Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia,” co-organized by UNODA and Kazakhstan in Nur-Sultan(Astana), which produced key recommendations aimed at revitalizing cooperation among NWFZs.

Participants will discuss strategies to advance the objectives of NWFZs, with an emphasis on strengthening security benefits for member states and fostering more robust consultation mechanisms. The workshop will also address the challenges posed by the reluctance of certain nuclear-armed states, particularly the United States, to ratify protocols related to several NWFZ treaties. Despite being a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the U.S. has yet to ratify protocols to treaties covering the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), and Central Asia. This reluctance has impeded the full realization of the security benefits these zones could offer.

Kazakhstan’s Leadership in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

Kazakhstan’s role in nuclear disarmament extends beyond NWFZs to include leadership in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). In March 2025, Kazakhstan will host the 3rd Meeting of State Parties to the TPNW at the United Nations, further solidifying its position as a champion of nuclear disarmament.

Kazakhstan has been a vocal advocate of the TPNW and has actively pushed for the creation of an international fund to support victims of nuclear testing and remediate environments affected by nuclear activities, in line with Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty.

The Vienna Action Plan, developed during the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW(1MSP), outlines actions for implementing these articles, including exploring the feasibility of an international trust fund and encouraging affected states parties to assess the impacts of nuclear weapons use and testing and to develop national plans for implementation.

At the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP), co-chaired by Kazakhstan and Kiribati, progress was made, but challenges remain. The informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation presented a report, and its mandate was renewed, with the goal of submitting recommendations for the establishment of an international trust fund at the 3rd Meeting of States Parties (3MSP). Kazakhstan’s leadership in this area underscores its commitment to addressing the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, drawing from its own experience with the devastating consequences of nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk.

Civil Society’s Crucial Role

As a part of the two day event, Soka Gakkai International (SGI) from Japan and the Center for International Security and Policy (CISP) will hold a side event in the evening of September 28 to screen the documentary “I Want to Live On: The Untold Stories of the Polygon,” highlighting the survivors of nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk. This documentary, produced by CISP with SGI’s support, was first shown at the UN during the second meeting of state parties to the TPNW in 2023. This side event is part of a broader initiative by SGI and Kazakhstan, which have co-organized several events focusing on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons at UN, Vienna, and Astana in recent years.

Also coinciding with the Astana workshop, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) will hold a conference convening civil society organizations and activists including Hibakusha from some countries. This confluence of governmental and civil society efforts in Astana marks a significant moment in the global disarmament movement. While diplomats and state representatives discuss policy and cooperation during the official workshop, the parallel activities organized by civil society will amplify the humanitarian message and emphasize the urgent need for a world free of nuclear weapons.

As global tensions rise, the Astana workshop represents a beacon of hope, a critical moment in the global journey toward disarmament. Through cooperation, dialogue, and a shared commitment to peace, the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons remains within reach. Kazakhstan, with the support of the international community, is at the forefront of this vital effort.

INPS Japan/IPS UN Bureau

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India Can Use The G20 to Fight Corruption and Reduce Global Inequalities

Civil Society, Economy & Trade, Global, Global Geopolitics, Global Governance, Headlines, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Despite unprecedented challenges, 2022 also opened windows of opportunity to move the needle around critical anti corruption issues, such as anti-money laundering, asset recovery, beneficial ownership, and renewable energy. Credit: Shutterstock.

Despite unprecedented challenges, 2022 also opened windows of opportunity to move the needle around critical anti-corruption issues, such as anti-money laundering, asset recovery, beneficial ownership, and renewable energy. Credit: Shutterstock.

Sanjeeta Pant, Jan 25 2023 (IPS) – The G20 India Presidency is marked by unprecedented geopolitical, environmental, and economic crises. Rising inflation threatens to erase decades of economic development and push more people into poverty. Violent extremism is also on the rise as a result of increasing global inequality, and the rule of law is in decline everywhere. All of these challenges impact the G20’s goal of realizing a faster and more equitable post-pandemic economic recovery.

But as India prioritizes its agenda for 2023, it is corruption that is at the heart of all of these other problems- and which poses the greatest threat to worldwide peace and prosperity.


An Idea Whose Time Has Come

Although the G20 has repeatedly committed to the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) anti-money laundering standards, member countries have been slow to implement policy reforms

Despite unprecedented challenges, 2022 also opened windows of opportunity to move the needle around critical anti-corruption issues, such as anti-money laundering, asset recovery, beneficial ownership, and renewable energy. When global leaders meet during the G20 Indian Presidency , they must prioritize and build on this progress, rather than make new commitments around these issues that they then fail to implement.

According to the UN, an estimated 2-5% of global GDP, or up to $2 trillion, is laundered annually. Although the G20 has repeatedly committed to the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) anti-money laundering standards, member countries have been slow to implement policy reforms. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and ineffective economic sanctions against Russian oligarchs, governments have started reexamining existing policy and institutional gaps, especially recognizing the role of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), also known as “gatekeepers.”

G20 member countries are responding to concerns and criticisms from their national counterparts regarding failures to adopt FATF recommendations and clamp down on “dirty money.” Grappling with the need to be able to prosecute money-laundering cases and recover billions of dollars worth of frozen assets, they are also amending national laws to be able to do so.

Lack of beneficial ownership transparency is also aiding the flow of laundered money globally. The G20 recognizes beneficial ownership data as an effective instrument to fight financial crime and “protect the integrity and transparency of the global financial system.”

The Russian invasion helped drive home this message, especially among countries that are popular destinations for those buying luxury goods and assets. FATF’s amendment of its beneficial ownership recommendations in early 2022 was timely. Member countries are also introducing new reporting rules, and fast-tracking policies and processes to set up beneficial ownership registers. While there are still gaps in the proposed policies – as identified here– these are important first steps.

Similarly, the transition to renewable energy, initially raised as an environmental issue and then as a national security concern is increasingly gaining attention from a resource governance perspective. Given the scale of the potential investment, there is a need to tackle corruption in the energy sector to avoid potential pitfalls resulting from a lack of open and accountable systems as we transition to a net zero economy.

The cross-cutting nature of the industry means a wide range of issues– from procurement and conflict of interest in the public sector to beneficial ownership transparency- need to be considered. The global energy crisis and the Indonesian Presidency’s prioritization of the issue have helped build momentum around corruption in the renewable energy transition, and this focus must continue.

Calling on India

Corruption-related issues identified here are transnational in nature and have global implications, including for India. For instance, with money laundering cases rising in India, it cannot afford to regard it as a problem limited to safe havens like the UK or the US. The same is true for the lack of beneficial ownership transparency or corruption in the renewable energy transition, which fuels illicit financial networks in India and beyond, and which often transcend national borders.

Finally, corruption has a disproportionate impact on the global poor. Almost 10% of the global population lives in extreme poverty, many of whom live in countries such as India. The G20, under the Indian Presidency, provides a unique opportunity to ensure the voices of the most vulnerable are heard at the global level. By prioritizing the anti-corruption agenda and building on past priority issues and commitments, the Indian government can lead efforts to bridge the North-South divide.

Sanjeeta Pant is Programs and Learning Manager at Accountability Lab. Follow the Lab on Twitter @accountlab

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Uyghur Violations a Litmus Test for Global Governance & Rules-based International Order

Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Featured, Global Geopolitics, Global Governance, Headlines, Human Rights, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Protesters in Washington, DC, march against the alleged killing of Uyghur Muslims. June 2022. Credit: Unsplash/Kuzzat Altay

NEW YORK, Oct 3 2022 (IPS) – This week is a momentous one for the world’s premier human rights body. At stake is a resolution to decide whether the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva can hold a debate on a recently released UN report.


The report concludes that rights violations by China’s government in its Xinjiang region ‘may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity’.

Unsurprisingly, China’s government is doing everything in its power to scotch plans for a debate on the report’s contents. Its tactics include intimidating smaller states, spreading disinformation and politicising genuine human rights concerns – the very thing the Human Rights Council was set up to overcome.

The historic report, which affirms that the rights of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslim population are being violated through an industrial-level programme of mass incarceration, systemic torture and sexual violence, attracted huge controversy before it was released on 31 August 2022, minutes before the end of the term of the outgoing High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet.

The report was supposedly ready in September 2021 but so great was the pressure exerted by the Chinese state that it took almost another year for it to be aired. Absurdly, the 46-page report includes a 122 page annex in the form of a rebuttal issued by China, rejecting the findings and calling into question the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The Office of the High Commissioner has asserted that the report is based on a rigorous review of documentary evidence with its credibility assessed in accordance with standard human rights methodology. The report’s recommendations are pretty straightforward: prompt steps should be taken to release all people arbitrarily imprisoned in Xinjiang, a full legal review of national security and counter-terrorism policies should be undertaken, and an official investigation should be carried into allegations of human rights violations in camps and detention facilities.

Nevertheless, a proposed resolution to hold a debate on the report’s contents in early 2023 is facing severe headwinds. A number of states inside and outside the Human Rights Council, united by their shared history of impunity for rampant human rights abuses – such as Cuba, Egypt, Laos, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Venezuela – have already rallied to China’s defence in informal negotiations on the brief resolution.

What is most worrying is that China appears to be leaning on smaller states that make up the 47-member Human Rights Council by inverting arguments about politicisation of global human rights issues and projecting itself as the victim of a Western conspiracy to undermine its sovereignty.

If China were to have its way, it would be a huge setback for the Human Rights Council, which was conceived in 2006 as a representative body of states designed to overcome the flaws of ‘declining credibility and lack of professionalism’ that marred the work of the body it replaced, the UN Commission on Human Rights.

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his ground-breaking In Larger Freedom report, lamented that states sought membership ‘not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others’.

Human Rights Council members are expected to uphold the highest standards in the protection and promotion of human rights. But our research at CIVICUS shows that eight of the Council’s 47 members have the worst possible civic space conditions for human rights defenders and their organisations to exist. In these countries – Cameroon, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan – human rights are routinely abused and anyone with the temerity to speak truth to power is relentlessly persecuted.

Regimes that serially abuse human rights may be motivated to block findings of investigations being aired on the international stage, but the international community has a collective responsibility to the victims. Civil society groups are urging Human Rights Council members to stand firm on the call for a debate on the China report.

Human Rights Council member states that assert the importance of human rights and democracy in their foreign policy are expected to vote in favour. Nevertheless, the influence of regional and geo-political blocs within the Council mean that the issue will essentially be settled by the decisions of states such as Argentina, Armenia, Benin, Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Senegal, Ukraine and Qatar.

China will undoubtedly pressure these states to try to get them to oppose or abstain in any vote that seeks to advance justice for the Uyghur people.

The stakes are particularly high for China’s mercurial leader, Xi Jinping, who is seeking to anoint himself as president for a third term – after abolishing term limits in 2018 – at the Chinese Communist Party’s Congress, which begins on 16 October.

Recognition of the systematic abuses to which Xi’s administration has subjected the Uyghur people would be considered an international affront to his growing power.

If China were to prevail at the Human Rights Council, it would be another blow to the legitimacy of the UN, which is already reeling from the UN Security Council’s inability to overcome Russia’s permanent member veto to block action on the invasion of Ukraine. So much – for the UN’s reputation, and for the hope that human rights violators, however powerful, will be held to account – is resting on the vote.

Mandeep S. Tiwana, is chief programmes officer and representative to the United Nations at global civil society alliance, CIVICUS.

IPS UN Bureau

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