Is the US Moving Towards the UN’s Exit Door?

Civil Society, Featured, Global, Global Governance, Headlines, International Justice, IPS UN: Inside the Glasshouse, TerraViva United Nations

Credit: United Nations

UNITED NATIONS, Jan 13 2026 (IPS) – Judging by the mass US withdrawal from 66 UN entities, including UN conventions and international treaties, is it remotely possible that the unpredictable Trump administration may one day decide to pull out of the UN, and force the Secretariat out of New York– despite the 1947 UN-US headquarters agreement?


Besides the 66, the withdrawals also include the pullouts from the Human Rights Council, the WHO, UNRWA and UNESCO– while imposing drastic reductions in funding for the remaining UN entities the US has not yet formally exited.

So, will the United Nations, which has come under heavy fire, be far behind?

That possibility is strengthened by the critical views of the UN both by President Trump and senior US officials.

Dr Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics, University of San Francisco, who has written extensively on issues relating to the United Nations, told IPS even the U.S. presidents most hostile to the United Nations– like Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush– recognized the importance of the world body in terms of advancing U.S. interests, including understanding the importance of maintaining the UN system as a whole, even while violating certain legal principles in particular cases.

Similarly, he pointed out, the United States was willing to participate in various UN bodies in an effort to wield influence, even while disagreeing with some of their policies or even their overall mandates.

“The Trump administration, however, appears to be rejecting the post-WWII international legal system as a whole. His statements, particularly since the attack on Venezuela, appear to be a throwback to the 19th-century imperial prerogatives and a rejection of modern international law.”

“As a result, it is possible that Trump could indeed pull the United States out of the United Nations and force the UN out of New York”, declared Dr Zunes.

Addressing the General Assembly last September, Trump remarked, “What is the purpose of the United Nations? It’s not even coming close to living up to [its] potential.”

Dismissing the U.N. as an outdated, ineffective organization, he boasted, “I ended seven wars, dealt with the leaders of each and every one of these countries, and never a phone call from the United Nations offering to help in finalizing the deal.”

Martin S. Edwards, Associate Dean of Academic and Student Affairs, School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, told IPS “this is dubious language about cutting inefficiency and fighting diversity wrapped up in red meat to feed President Trump’s base”.

It’s a ploy to use foreign affairs to distract voters for whom he has yet to deliver. The fact that the actual follow-up documents haven’t been received by the Secretary General tells you everything here. It fits a pattern of the President carving out maximalist positions and then getting very little in the end, he pointed out.

But it’s a bigger challenge, he said, on two fronts:

1. This is going to continue to REDUCE US influence at the UN rather than increase it. Stable foreign relations are based on credibility. The US continues to squander its reserves, and other countries will step into the vacuum.

2. This policy might have been a good social media post for voters, but makes little sense in practice. What the White House wants is a line-item veto over every single aspect of UN operations. But assessed contributions are not an ala carte menu, declared Edwards.

Mandeep S. Tiwana, Secretary General, CIVICUS, a global alliance of civil society organizations, told IPS retreat from international institutions by the Trump Administration is an attack on the legacy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt who gave the people of the United States the New Deal and envisioned a bold framework for the establishment of the UN to overcome the horrors of the Second World War.

“Many of the impacted international institutions were built through the blood, sweat and tears of Americans. Pulling out of these institutions is an affront to their sacrifices and reverses decades of multilateral cooperation on peace, human rights, climate change and sustainable development,” he said.

Meanwhile, the attacks on the UN have continued unabated.

In an interview with Breitbart News, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Mike Waltz said, “A quarter of everything the UN does, the United States pays for”.

“Is there money being well spent? I’d say right now, no, because it’s being spent on all of these other woke projects, rather than what it was originally intended to do, what President Trump wants it to do, and what I want it to do, which is focus on peace.”

Historically, the United States has been the largest financial contributor, typically covering around 22% of the UN’s regular budget and up to 28% of the peacekeeping budget.

Still, ironically, the US is also the biggest defaulter. According to the UN’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee, member states currently owe $1.87 billion of the $3.5 billion in mandatory contributions for the current budget cycle.

The former US House Republican Conference Chair Elise Stefanik of New York, a one-time nominee for the post of US Ambassador to the UN, was quoted as saying, “In the UN, Americans see a corrupt, defunct, and paralyzed institution more beholden to bureaucracy, process, and diplomatic niceties than the founding principles of peace, security, and international cooperation laid out in its charter.”

Meanwhile, in a veiled attack on the UN, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, “What we term the “international system” is now overrun with hundreds of opaque international organizations, many with overlapping mandates, duplicative actions, ineffective outputs, and poor financial and ethical governance.”

Even those that once performed useful functions, he pointed out, have increasingly become inefficient bureaucracies, platforms for politicized activism or instruments contrary to our nation’s best interests, he said.

“Not only do these institutions not deliver results, they obstruct action by those who wish to address these problems. The era of writing blank checks to international bureaucracies is over,” declared Rubio

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Our New Colonial Era

Civil Society, Global, Global Governance, Headlines, International Justice, IPS UN: Inside the Glasshouse, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

UN’s ‘responsibility to deliver’ will not waver, after US announces withdrawal from dozens of international organizations. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

 
“Take up the White Man’s burden — Send forth the best ye breed… By all ye cry or whisper, by all ye leave or do, [T]he silent, sullen peoples shall weigh your gods – and you…” — Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands (1899)

NEW YORK, Jan 12 2026 (IPS) – We’re living in an age where the world is loudly proclaiming the death of empire, yet reproducing its structures. This is not nostalgia for colonial postcards — it’s a reinvention of foreign policy, international governance and global economic power that resembles colonial logic far more than it does meaningful cooperation.


The term “New Colonialism” feels extreme until you look not at poetry, but at power in motion — from military takeovers and genocides, to diplomatic withdrawal, to institutions that still perpetuate inequality and human rights’ abuses under the guise of neutrality.

I – Where Are We Today

“Imperialism after all is an act of geographical violence through which virtually every space in the world is explored, charted, and finally brought under control.”
— Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (1993)

In January 2026, the United States executed what amounts to the most dramatic foreign intervention in Latin America in decades: a military incursion into Venezuela resulting in the abduction of President Nicolás Maduro. President Donald Trump openly declared that the U.S. would “run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition.” This is not coded language — it is overt control.

Critics and allies alike see the move not as a limited counternarcotics or law enforcement operation (as the Administration frames it), but as a return to the old playbook of hemispheric domination. Latin American governments from Mexico to Brazil condemned it as a violation of sovereignty — a modern mirror to the regime-change interventions of the 20th century.

Analysts at Foreign Policy have highlighted precisely how this intervention fits into a larger pattern of U.S. foreign policy ambition. Rishi Iyengar and John Haltiwanger note that under the banner of battling “narcoterrorism,” the United States has expanded the role of its military into actions that blur the distinction between security and political control — “adding bombing alleged drug traffickers to its ever-growing list of duties.”

Such actions reflect a foreign policy that is increasingly militarized and deeply unilateral in its execution.

This intervention was not an isolated blip. It fits into a broader dynamic which suggests Washington’s moves in Venezuela are less about drug interdiction and more about strategic positioning and resource control — especially Venezuela’s vast oil reserves.

In the context of a “World-Minus-One” global order where U.S. power is contested by China and Russia, interventionist impulses have resurfaced not as humanitarian projects but as geopolitical gambits.

Viewed through the lens of colonial critique, the language of “rescuing” Venezuelans from an accused dictator echoes Kipling’s exhortation to take up the supposed moral burden. But those centuries-old justifications masked violence and labour exploitation; today’s rhetoric masks geopolitical self-interest.

The U.S. claims to be liberating Venezuelans from authoritarianism, yet asserts control over governance and economic infrastructure — a 21st-century version of telling another nation it cannot govern itself without direction from Washington. The result is not liberation, but dependency — a hallmark of colonial relationships.

II. The U.S. Withdrawal from Multilateral Institutions

“The White Man’s Burden, which puts the blame of the new subjects upon themselves without acknowledging the real burden — the systematic, structural and often violent exploitation — is the oldest myth of empire.”

Kumari Jayawardena, The White Woman’s Other Burden: Western Women and South Asia During British Colonial Rule, (1995)

If the takeover of Venezuela reads like old-fashioned empire building, the withdrawal from multilateral institutions is a disengagement from the very forums meant to prevent that kind of unilateralism.

In early 2026, the United States signed a presidential memorandum seeking to withdraw support and participation from 66 international organizations — including numerous United Nations agencies and treaty frameworks seen as “contrary to U.S. interests.” This list contains both U.N. bodies and other treaty mechanisms, extending a pattern of U.S. disengagement from global governance structures.

Among the organizations targeted are the U.N.’s population agency and the framework treaty for international climate negotiations. Already, U.S. participation in historic climate agreements like the Paris Agreement has been rolled back, and the World Health Organization was officially exited — marking a return to a transactional, bilateral focus rather than deep multilateral cooperation.

U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres responded to the announcement with regret and a reminder of legal obligations: assessed contributions to the regular and peacekeeping budgets are binding under the U.N. Charter for all member states, including the United States. He also underscored that despite U.S. withdrawal, the agencies will continue their work for the communities that depend on them.

This move comes against a backdrop in which the U.N. and other institutions are already grappling with serious internal challenges — problems that critics argue undermine their legitimacy and point to deeper governance failures. For instance, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers and staff have repeatedly surfaced, with hundreds of cases documented and concerns raised about the trustworthiness of leadership responses.

In 2024 alone, peacekeeping and political missions reported over 100 allegations, and internal surveys showed troubling attitudes among staff toward misconduct.

Such abuses are not random flukes; scholars and advocates have documented persistent organizational cultures where power imbalances enable exploitation and harassment, and where transparency and accountability often lag.

These structural issues do not delegitimize the idea of multilateral cooperation — but they certainly challenge claims that these institutions function as equitable and effective global governance mechanisms.

International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are likewise under scrutiny. Critics point to cases where aid workers have perpetrated sexual abuse and exploitation or where organizational priorities have at times aligned more with donor interests than with local needs.

A 2024 study on sexual exploitation and harassment in humanitarian work highlights how power imbalances and weak enforcement mechanisms within the sector contribute to ongoing abuses that remain under-reported and inadequately addressed.

These issues — within the U.N. and the humanitarian sector — fuel frustration that multilateralism too often protects institutional reputation at the expense of victims and local communities. That frustration helps explain why some U.S. policymakers see these organizations as outdated or corrupt.

But the response of walking away rather than strengthening accountability mechanisms plays directly into the hands of those who would hollow out global governance altogether.

III. It Takes Two to Tango

So, is the United States the villain in this unfolding story of fractured cooperation and revived colonial impulses? Yes — but only partially.

There is no denying that recent U.S. foreign policy has made unilateral moves that harm global norms: military intervention in sovereign states, withdrawal from key treaties and organizations, and politicized rejection of multinational cooperation reflect a retreat from shared leadership. Yet, the belief that multilateral institutions are inherently effective, just and beyond reproach is equally misplaced.

Structural weaknesses in international governance — from slow, opaque accountability mechanisms to insufficient representation of Global South voices — have long been recognized by scholars and practitioners. These deficiencies leave global organizations vulnerable to political capture, ineffectiveness in crisis response and the perpetuation of inequalities they are meant to dismantle.

The failures inside the U.N. and the aid sector are not the sole fault of the United States, but of a global system that institutionalized power hierarchies sustained by western donors, from the beginning.

The New Colonialism era does not show up as 19th-century conquest; it’s woven into the language of “interest,” “security,” and “institutional reform.” Whether it is a powerful state flexing military might under humanitarian pretences or “self defence”, or powerful states walking away from agreements that protect smaller nations’ interests, the pattern is the same: power asserts itself where it can, and multilateral norms are treated as optional.

If this moment teaches us anything, it’s that saving multilateralism requires both accountability and renewal — not abandonment. Countries that champion global cooperation must address colonial legacies in governance, ensure institutions are transparent and accountable, and democratize decision-making.

Likewise, powerful states must recognize that withdrawing from shared systems or using them to further their own limited interests, does not reset power imbalances — it entrenches them.

In the end, meaningful global cooperation cannot be the project of a single nation or a network of powerful elites. It must be rooted in shared accountability and genuine equity — a coalition of efforts for the common good, prepared not only to compromise, but to sacrifice.

Azza Karam is President of Lead Integrity and Director of Occidental College’s Kahane UN Program.

IPS UN Bureau

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Excluding Food Systems From Climate Deal Is a Recipe for Disaster

Africa, Climate Change, Climate Change Justice, Conferences, COP30, Development & Aid, Editors’ Choice, Featured, Food and Agriculture, Food Systems, Global, Headlines, Latin America & the Caribbean, Population, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations | Analysis

Food Systems


Food solutions were on display everywhere around COP30—from the 80 tonnes of local and agroecological meals served to concrete proposals for tackling hunger—but none of this made it into the negotiating rooms or the final agreement. —Elisabetta Recine, IPES-Food panel expert

Agriculture is both a challenge and a solution for climate change. Busani Bafana/IPS

Agriculture is both a challenge and a solution for climate change. Busani Bafana/IPS

BULAWAYO, Jan 9 2026 (IPS) – As they ate catered meals, COP30 negotiators had no appetite for fixing broken food systems, a major source of climate pollution, experts warn.


Food systems are the complete journey food takes—from the farm to fork—which means its growing, processing, distribution, trade and consumption and even the waste.

The International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food) warns that the final COP30 agreement risks deepening climate and hunger crises.  It failed  to address global warming emissions from food systems and the escalating damages caused by fossil-fuel-dependent industrial agriculture.

Food appears only once in the negotiated text, as a narrow indicator on ‘climate resilient food production’ under the Global Goal on Adaptation, IPES-Food pointed out.

“There is no mention of food systems, no roadmap to tackle deforestation, and no recognition that industrial agriculture drives nearly 90 percent of forest loss worldwide,” noted the think tank, emphasizing that negotiators also weakened language in the Mitigation Work Programme from addressing the ‘drivers’ of deforestation to vague ‘challenges.’

IPES-Food argued that the omission of food systems in the COP30 agreement was in stark contrast to the summit itself, which was held in the heart of the Amazon. Thirty percent of all food served during COP30 came from agroecological family farmers and traditional communities, and concrete public policy proposals for a just transition of food systems were on full display, IPES-Food said.

By not supporting a transition to environmentally friendly and low-emission agriculture, the agreement has left the global food system—and the billions who depend on it—highly vulnerable to the very climate shocks it helps cause, experts said.

“Food solutions were on display everywhere around COP30—from the 80 tonnes of local and agroecological meals served to concrete proposals for tackling hunger—but none of this made it into the negotiating rooms or the final agreement,” said Elisabetta Recine, IPES-Food panel expert and president of the Brazilian National Food and Nutrition Security Council (Consea), in a statement.

“Despite all the talk, negotiators failed to act, and the lived realities of people most affected by hunger, poverty, and climate shocks went unheard.”

Big Oil and Big Ag, Bigger voice

More than 300 industrial agriculture lobbyists were registered as delegates to COP30. They  are blamed for influencing discussions and promoting false solutions to climate change.

“COP30 was supposed to be the Implementation COP—where words turned into action,” Danielle Nierenberg, an expert on sustainable agriculture and food issues and President of Food Tank, told IPS. “But once again, corporate interests won over people, nature, and the future of our food and agriculture systems as part of the solution to the climate crisis.”

Raj Patel, IPES-Food panel expert and professor at the University of Texas, argues that agribusiness lobbyists captured COP30 to influence outcomes favoring industrial agriculture and big oil interests.

“Food systems are second only to oil and gas as a driver of the climate crisis, and unlike oil wells, they are also the first victim of the chaos they create, Patel noted.

Obstacles and Opportunities

Scientists have warned that carbon emissions, including those from agriculture, must be cut considerably if the world is to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 2°C or less.

Even if fossil fuel emissions were eliminated immediately, emissions from the global food system alone would make it impossible to limit warming to 1.5°C and difficult even to realize the 2°C target, scientists have said.

Selorm Kugbega, a Research Fellow at the Stockholm Environment Institute, agrees that despite many promises made to tackle agriculture-linked emissions, COP30 turned out to be a damp squib for agrifood systems.

Initiatives such as RAIZ to restore 500 million hectares of degraded agricultural land by 2030 and TERRA to scale out climate solutions for smallholder farmers through blended finance, which were launched at COP30 omitted to highlight the effects of industrial food systems. Over 300 industrial agriculture lobbyists participated in discussions at COP30, leading to accusations of swaying the outcomes.

Analysts warn the final agreement at COP30 in Belém, Brazil, risks deepening climate and hunger crises. Credit: Raimundo Pacco/COP30

Analysts warn the final agreement at COP30 in Belém, Brazil, risks deepening climate and hunger crises. Credit: Raimundo Pacco/COP30

Kugbega observed that after several years of slow progress and momentum in integrating food systems in climate negotiations, COP30 should have been the opportunity to seal agriculture’s centrality in future COPs. However, it ended with no clear agreements on grant-based public finance for adaptation in agriculture or redirection of public funds that subsidize industrial systems.

The climate negotiations demonstrated power inequality in climate negotiations with the implicit protection of industrial agriculture interests, which weakened the credibility of any global efforts at mitigating agriculture-based emissions, Kugbega observed, highlighting that smallholders bear a high burden of climate risks and have little adaptation financing.

Kugbega argued the most powerful countries, which are generally less dependent on agriculture, tend to prioritize sectors such as energy and transport in climate negotiations. However, many least developed countries, particularly in Africa, are highly dependent on agriculture for employment and economic stability and face urgent climate risks.

“Yet these countries often lack the political influence to elevate agriculture and food systems as central issues in COP negotiations,” he said. “COP30 in Brazil presented a major opportunity to shift this imbalance, making the failure to position food systems at the center of the climate agenda particularly troubling.”

Frugal Financing for Food and Farmers

According to the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) and the UN’s Standing Committee on Finance, agriculture receives a small and insufficient share of total global climate finance.

Of the available approximate total global climate finance of USD 1.3 trillion per year on average, agriculture gets around USD 35 billion per year. This is a huge shortfall given that food systems are estimated to be responsible for roughly one-third of global greenhouse gas emissions and are one of the sectors most vulnerable to climate impacts, according to the CPI. Worse still, smallholder farmers, who produce up to 80 percent of food in developing countries, only receive 0.3 percent—a striking imbalance, yet they feed the world and are more exposed to climate impacts.

Will COP31 Deliver?

While COP30 highlighted the need to tackle climate change impacts through the transformation of food systems, such as highlighted in the Belém Declaration on Hunger, Poverty and Human-Centered Climate Action, it remains to be seen if COP31 will deliver a positive outcome on food systems.

Waiting for COP31 to save the world is surrendering because agribusiness lobbyists do not take holidays, argues IPES-Food panel’s Raj Patel.

“The test is not whether diplomats can craft better language in Antalya, but whether farmers’ movements, indigenous movements, and climate movements can generate enough political pressure to make governments fear inaction more than they fear confronting corporate power,” he said.

COP31, to be  hosted by Turkey with Australia as negotiations president in 2026 , is expected to prioritize an action agenda centered on adaptation finance, fossil fuel phase-out, adaptation in Small Island Developing States, and oceans.

While this agenda aligns with broader climate justice goals, it means food systems risk becoming indirectly addressed rather than explicitly championed, Kugbega said.

Given the stalled negotiations on financing sustainable agriculture transitions and the postponement of the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Agriculture, Kugbega said COP31 will likely focus more on developing new roadmaps and agreements than on full-scale implementation.

COP32 could be a greater opportunity for the implementation of the work program under Ethiopia’s COP32 presidency, given the country’s direct exposure to climate risks in agriculture, he noted.

“COP31 will likely shape whether the world arrives at COP32 ready to implement and operationalize sustainable food systems or once again be forced to renegotiate what is already known.”

This feature is published with the support of Open Society Foundations.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

A Year of High Expectations and Frustrations

Active Citizens, Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Global, Headlines, Human Rights, TerraViva United Nations, Youth

Opinion

DHAKA, Bangladesh, Jan 8 2026 (IPS) – As many of you know, out of the blue, I have been called in to assist the Interim Government led by Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus in stabilising the economy left in ruins by the fallen autocratic-kleptocratic regime that looted the banks, stole public money and robbed small investors in the capital market to siphon off billions of dollars out of the country. I had never served in a government; neither had I ever expected this opportunity. However, my UN experience and political economy understanding have been handy.


Anis Chowdhury

Reflecting back the year that we have just passed, I trust, you have been well as we wished each other at the start of 2025 the best of our health and spirit. Unfortunately, despite our earnest wish, the world was not peaceful during 2025.

Hopes and global disorder

Hopes kindled briefly for justice for the Palestinians as the European powers, including Australia (a European settler colony) were forced to recognise the Palestine State, and Narcissist Trump pushed for some peace in both Ukraine and Gaza in his mad desperation for a Nobel Peace Prize.

Yet Gaza is still being bombarded with Israel’s genocidal intent, making a mockery of deranged Trump’s rhetorical claim of achieving “peace in the Middle East for the first time in 3,000 years”, and the illegal occupation of the West Bank along with settler violence continues unabated with complete immunity in blatant violations of international laws.

Narcissist Trump sanctioned the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ) in his desperate attempt to save Israeli war criminals, including Benjamin Netanyahu and justify Israel’s genocide and settler violence. Trump upended his assault on the rule-based order with arbitrary so-called ‘reciprocal tariff’.

Bangladesh

As for the post-fascist Hasina Bangladesh, the year 2025 began with high expectations. And as for me, the year 2025 has been extra-ordinary.

Today, I am pleased to say that we have been able to avert a full-blown crisis. Heart-felt thanks to our ‘remittance fighters’ who whole-heartedly trusted the Interim Government’s various reform initiatives. Expatriate Bangladeshis sent a record $30.04 bn in remittances in the 2024–25 fiscal year, the highest amount ever received in a single fiscal year in the country’s history. Forex reserves surged to $33 bn, hitting 3-year high as December remittances crossed $3bn. You can get a report card by Finance Advisor, Dr. Salehuddin and myself, published in the Daily Star on 18 August 2025.

Of course, not everything has been rosy. The much-hoped systemic transition remains full of uncertainty. I see systemic transition as the process of total transformation of a caterpillar inside a cocoon. We still do not know whether the ‘caterpillar in the cocoon’ will turn out to be a butterfly or a moth. People are genuinely worried as the past systemic transition opportunities were wasted.

I myself found road-blocks at every turn. Bureaucratic inertia and resistance have frustrated my efforts for genuine reforms. It has been a real-life experience of the classic British political satire, “Yes, Minister”. Like Sir Humphrey Appleby, the bureaucrats will display outwardly extra-ordinary humbleness, but will politely defy citing rules of business. Bureaucratic resistance is the main stumbling block for achieving coordination, coherence and integration in policy making and implementation, thus, causing wasteful duplications, inefficiency and lack of effectiveness.

Nevertheless, I achieved some success. One of them is the agreement to expand the voluntary Bangladesh National Cadet Corps programme to cover ALL youths (aged 18) in 10-12 years, so that we can have a disciplined workforce to be readily deployed during any national emergency. Needless to say, that this is an imperative to realise demographic dividend. We are hoping to roll out the programme from July 2026 to coincide with the July Revolution anniversary.

Despite frustrations and uncertainties, I am hopeful as I can see a seismic shift in the political dynamics of the country. This coincides with the demographic shift – the youth (15-30 years) representing nearly 30% of the population. These youths have a different vocabulary of politics; they want justice, inclusion, self-respect, and dignity – they are fiercely nationalist.

Recently martyred Hadi is their embodiment. The establishment is understandably threatened and tried to silence the youth by assassinating Hadi; but they failed to extinguish the flame, instead, everyone has become a Hadi, standing unwavering in their commitment to carry out Hadi’s mission of building a just nation where citizens can live with dignity, free from fear, subjugation, and oppression. Hadi re-centred our national conscience on Insaf: justice, dignity, and fairness not as rhetorical slogans, but as non-negotiable ethical foundations of the State and society.

In an era of moral drift, Hadi reminded the nation that no political order can last without justice at its core. He ignited a generation with civic courage and moral responsibility. Free from fear, patronage, or transactional politics, young people saw in Hadi a new model of leadership: ethical, principled, and accountable. In doing so, he reshaped the future political character of Bangladesh and moved national thinking beyond entrenched legacy power structures toward people-centric, principled governance. He challenged the inevitability of corruption and coercion, insisting instead that politics could be reclaimed as a moral vocation. His life poses an enduring question to those who seek power: Will you serve justice, or merely rule?

Let me end this year-end message with my personal tribute to Khaleda Zia, who has recently passed away after a long illness imposed on her by the vindictive Hasina regime, falsely convicting her and imprisoning in a substandard cell. Like her husband, Shaheed President Zia, she was thrust into the whirlpool of history. They never sought power; but when the responsibility fell on their shoulders, they carried out their duties to the nation whole-heartedly and selflessly; thus, they became a true statesman (woman), winning hearts and minds of their people.

Perhaps Khaleda Zia’s most enduring legacy lies in her extraordinary restraint and dignified disposition, even under severe and prolonged adversity. Her self-restraint, rooted in grace rather than weakness, distinguished her from many of her contemporaries and offers a powerful lesson for today’s often abrasive and confrontational political culture.

Warmest regards and best wishes for the New Year

IPS UN Bureau

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Bombing and Ballots, Myanmar’s Contentious Election

Armed Conflicts, Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Editors’ Choice, Featured, Freedom of Expression, Headlines, Human Rights, Press Freedom, TerraViva United Nations

Human Rights

A man walks past a campaign poster for the military’s proxy party USDP ahead of strictly controlled elections in Myanmar. Credit: Guy Dinmore/IPS

A man walks past a campaign poster for the military’s proxy party USDP ahead of strictly controlled elections in Myanmar. Credit: Guy Dinmore/IPS

YANGON, Myanmar and BANGKOK , Jan 6 2026 (IPS) – With thousands of civilians killed in years of civil war and over 22,000 political prisoners still behind bars, no one was surprised that early results from Myanmar’s first but tightly controlled elections since the 2021 coup show the military’s proxy party speeding to victory.


“How can you hold elections and bomb civilians at the same time?” asked Khin Ohmar, a civil rights activist outside Myanmar who is monitoring what the resistance forces and a shadow government reject as “sham” polls.

The junta had already cleared the path towards its stated goal of a “genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system” by dissolving some 40 parties that refused to register for polls, which they regard as illegitimate, with their leaders and supporters still in prison.

These include the National League for Democracy (NLD) and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who won a landslide second term  in the 2020 elections – only for the results to be annulled by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, a coup leader and self-appointed acting president. Mass street protests were crushed in early 2021 and war spread across Myanmar.

Although these elections will deliver just a façade of the legitimacy craved by some of the generals, they did succeed in projecting a power and authority that was quickly slipping away just two years ago as long-standing ethnic armed groups and newly formed People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on the junta.

“The tide has turned in favour of the military,” commented a veteran Myanmar analyst in Yangon, crediting China, which reined in the ethnic groups on its shared border, fully embraced Min Aung Hlaing and, along with Russia, delivered the arms, technology and training needed to peg back the resistance.

Campaigners for the pro-military USDP canvas residents and check voters lists in Yangon ahead of the December 28 parliamentary election that excluded major anti-junta parties. Credit: Guy Dinmore/IPS

Campaigners for the pro-military USDP canvas residents and check voters lists in Yangon ahead of the December 28 parliamentary election that excluded major anti-junta parties. Credit: Guy Dinmore/IPS

The regime’s air power and newly acquired drones have been deployed to ruthless effect, often hitting civilian targets in relatively remote areas where the resistance has grassroots support. Air strikes were stepped up as the elections approached. Major cities like Yangon were calm; people subdued.

Bombs dropped on Tabayin township in the Sagaing Region on December 5 killed 18 people, including many in a busy tea shop, AFP reported. On December 10, air strikes on a hospital in the ancient capital of Mrauk-U in Rakhine State were reported to have killed 10 patients and 23 others. The regime accused the insurgent Arakan Army and PDFs of using it as a base.

“I don’t think that anyone believes that those elections will be free and fair,” UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres stated while visiting the region ahead of the polls. He called on the junta to end its “deplorable” violence and find “a credible path” back to civilian rule.

In contrast, the Trump administration declared in November that the junta’s election plans were “free and fair” and removed Temporary Protected Status from Myanmar refugees in the US, saying their country was safe for them to return to.

“I’ll be jailed if I don’t vote,” said Min, a Yangon taxi driver, only half-joking on the eve of voting in Yangon, the commercial capital. “And what difference does it make? We are ruled by China and Xi Jinping, not Min Aung Hlaing,” he added.

With the polls spread over three stages, the first 102 townships voted on December 28. Others will follow on January 11 and January 25 to make a total of 265 of Myanmar’s 330 townships scheduled to vote for the bicameral national parliament and assemblies in the 14 regions and states.

Residents in downtown Yangon check their names on the electoral register and then cast their votes in a polling station on December 28. Credit: Guy Dinmore/IPS

Residents in downtown Yangon check their names on the electoral register and then cast their votes in a polling station on December 28. Credit: Guy Dinmore/IPS

No voting is to be held at all in the remaining 65 townships that the election commission deemed too unsafe.

Voting in the first round in Yangon, an urban and semi-rural sprawl of seven million people, proceeded calmly and slowly on a quiet Sunday – despite intense efforts, and sometimes threats, by the regime to boost the turnout.

In 2020 and 2015 – when Myanmar arguably held the region’s most open and fair elections and the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), was soundly defeated – people gaily posted images of their ink-stained little fingers on social media as evidence of their vote after weeks of packed rallies and vibrant campaign rallies.

But not this time. Social media posts hurled insults, some comic and vulgar, at the regime. Those eager to support the resistance’s boycott but who were afraid of reprisals were relieved if they found their names had been omitted by mistake on electoral lists. Electronic voting machines in use for the first time made it impossible to leave a blank.

But as in past elections, a solid core of people close to the military and its web of powerful economic interests turned out to vote for the USDP.

“We are choosing our government,” declared one man exiting a polling station in central Yangon with his family, apparently USDP supporters. One proudly waved his little finger dipped in indelible ink.

How can you hold elections and bomb civilians at the same time? – Khin Ohmar, civil rights activist

Turnout for the first round was put by regime officials at 52 percent. This compares with about 70 percent in the past two elections. China’s special envoy – sent as an official observer, along with others from Russia, Belarus, Vietnam and Cambodia – praised the elections.

On January 2, the election commission unexpectedly issued partial results: the USDP, led by retired generals, had won 38 of 40 seats in the lower house where votes had been tallied to date. No one blinked.

The USDP campaign message focused on two main elements – get out and vote with all your family, and back a USDP government to restore stability and progress to Myanmar.

Its underlying message was a reminder that the last USDP administration, led by President Thein Sein introduced socio-economic and political reforms and ceasefire negotiations with ethnic groups after securing a large majority in the 2010 elections when the NLD and other opposition groups were also absent.

Aung San Suu Kyi, then under house arrest, was released just after the 2010 polls and went on to contest and win a seat in a 2012 by-election ahead of the NLD’s own sweeping victory in 2015. Aung San Suu Kyi governed in a difficult power-sharing arrangement with the military for the next five years and was thrown back into prison in the coup.

For now a large proportion of Myanmar’s population lives in areas under junta control, including all 14 of the state and regional capitals, swollen by an influx of people fleeing conflict.  The military also holds major seaports and airports and – to varying degrees – the main border crossings for China and Thailand.

But in terms of territory, over half of Myanmar is in the hands of disparate ethnic armed groups and resistance forces. Alliances are fluid and negotiable.

The shadow National Unity Government is trying to establish its own authority over liberated territory, looking to cement a consensus around the concept of a democratic and federal Myanmar free of the military’s interference – something that has eluded the country since independence from British colonial rule in 1948.

Front lines shift back and forth as the military struggles to regain control over the Bamar heartlands of central Myanmar, once considered their bastion, while stretched elsewhere after losing vast tracts of border areas since the coup. Several million people have fled the country or are internally displaced.

Once again there is some speculation that a “smooth” election and the formation of a USDP government in April will lead to a gesture signalling the military’s confidence, such as a possible ending of forced conscription and the release of some political prisoners. Project power, then collect legitimacy.

“Political prisoners are used as bait,” said Khin Ohmar, the civil rights activist in Bangkok. “The world would at least have to applaud.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

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When Democracy Freezes, Autocrats Rise

Civil Society, Democracy, Economy & Trade, Editors’ Choice, Global, Headlines, Human Rights, IPS UN: Inside the Glasshouse, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

When Democracy Freezes, Autocrats Rise

Pro-Democracy protesters gather in front of the headquarters of the Sudanese army in the capital, Khartoum. Credit: Masarib/Ahmed Bahhar via UN News

VIENNA, Austria, Jan 5 2026 (IPS) – Consider our political systems not merely as battlegrounds of passions, ideologies and economic interests, but as systematically functioning arrangements of interactions, akin to game theory. In recent decades, we have witnessed the dissolution of large homogeneous groups into numerous subgroups — a patchwork of minorities.


This fragmentation, compounded by individualisation and the resulting weakening of strong political bonds, has profound consequences for democratic governance.

In nations with majority voting systems, this process fragments the party system itself. As dissatisfaction with political parties grows – initially quietly but eventually becoming pronounced – new parties emerge, further splintering the political landscape.

This increasing fragmentation complicates government formation and makes majorities more precarious. Often, only coalitions that can agree on the lowest common denominator are formed. Consequently, the outcomes of politics do not necessarily improve; in most cases, they worsen.

A vicious circle

Decisive action, bold moves and clear leadership have become increasingly elusive. This reinforces dissatisfaction and the prevailing sentiment among voters that politicians are failing to achieve meaningful results. Doubts about the effectiveness of the political system become self-perpetuating, creating a situation where decisive politics is nearly impossible.

The rise of populists and right-wing extremists is both a consequence of this stagnation and a further catalyst — a ratchet effect. Right-wing agitators stoke discontent, transforming it into anger and outrage while exploiting negative emotions.

As they gain strength, democratic politics becomes more paralysed, often preoccupied with defending against radicalism, preventing the worst outcomes, and forming coalitions whose members can agree on little more than a lacklustre commitment to ‘more of the same’.

When social cohesion erodes, the radical right gains ground — which then leads to even more division. The perceived polarisation and alienation that accompanies the rise of right-wing extremism increases the perception of social disintegration and decay.

Democracy gives rise to its own threats

In a sense, right-wing radicalism is itself the problem that it then laments in a subsequent cycle. It is the disintegration that it denounces. In this way, it contributes to the chain of evidence that reinforces authoritarian reflexes. Authoritarianism feeds authoritarianism.

These framework conditions of political systems – fragmentation and the resulting weakness of action – lead German democracy theorist Veith Selk to diagnose that modernisation and social change are increasingly putting democracy under stress, making a reversal unlikely.

This presents a rather depressing diagnosis of decline: democracy gives rise to its own threats.

Additionally, globalisation necessitates ‘global governance’, which, even under favourable circumstances, has historically produced solutions at an unbearably slow pace and is now reaching its limits amid chaotic multilateralism.

Conversely, ‘de-globalisation’ – through national power politics, tariffs and trade wars – provides no relief and instead creates new problems, such as the loss of sales markets, disrupted supply chains and a consequent decline in economic growth, potentially destroying whole economic sectors.

Europe’s mounting crises

The emergencies of the future are already on the horizon. The climate catastrophe threatens not only our livelihoods but also has tangible economic repercussions. Crop failures due to droughts and floods are already contributing to rising inflation in the cost of living, particularly for vegetables and fruit.

This situation is certain to become much more severe. Even if successful, socio-economic transformation will be costly. Insurance companies may face financial difficulties, asset portfolios could lose value rapidly, and if we are unfortunate, a sudden ‘Minsky moment’ could trigger a downward spiral leading to a financial crisis.

Ageing populations are already straining public finances, with healthcare and care systems becoming increasingly expensive, pushing European welfare states to their financial limits.

Government debt is rising, and under current conditions, it will be more challenging to “grow out” of debt than it was in the past. Growth will be harder to mobilise, and austerity is not a viable alternative, as contraction strategies lead to dire consequences. These are all concerning prospects.

Here are a few highlights:

Germany’s economy has stagnated for six years, and private investment remains weak. France is facing a budget deficit of 5.8 per cent and a public debt ratio of 113 per cent of GDP, while sliding from one government crisis to another. Political actors are unable to achieve a socially just change of course that would reconcile savings in the pension system with additional revenue from wealth taxes.

Austria was projected to have a budget deficit of six per cent, prompting left-wing Keynesian Finance Minister Markus Marterbauer to assemble a package of tightening measures aimed at reducing the deficit to 4.5 per cent by 2025.

Ensuring that large fortunes contribute to costs through higher taxation is not only a matter of fairness but also an economic necessity — yet there is a lack of parliamentary majorities for decisive measures nearly everywhere.

There is a growing desire for politics to provide sensible solutions instead of getting bogged down in petty details.

A whole panorama of emergencies is unfolding before us. As noted earlier, most of those in power have little energy or flexibility to think and act beyond daily problems. This situation has tangible and psychopolitical effects: citizens feel that things are deteriorating and that serious trouble is brewing, while simultaneously sensing that those in power are merely tinkering with details.

For many, this leads to outright fear and a generally pessimistic mood, which in turn fuels the rise of right-wing radicals.

The political forces of the left and the conservative centre must, above all, demonstrate their ability to act together. A few years ago, the prevailing view was that various political camps should dare to engage in more conflict to make democratic life more vibrant.

At that time, there were complaints about everyone crowding into the centre and becoming interchangeable. However, we find ourselves in a different situation today.

There is a growing desire for politics to provide sensible solutions instead of getting bogged down in petty details or wasting time on pointless culture wars. The left may need to acknowledge that states are reaching their financial limits, while conservatives must recognise that clientele politics, which ensures free rides for the super-wealthy, is no longer viable.
Urgent issues require swift action, and all of this comes at a high cost.

Rhetoric is no longer effective, and pandering to the extreme right leads nowhere. Conservatives, in particular, need to understand this, as they sometimes give the impression that they view fascists as merely slightly more radical conservatives (or conservatives as moderate fascists).

This perception is not only misguided; it also highlights a significant identity crisis within traditional conservatism. Fortunately, some are beginning to realise that authoritarianism is not a relative; it is the enemy. The best way to undermine it is to demonstrate a commitment to action.

Robert Misik is a writer and essayist. He publishes in many German-language newspapers and magazines, including Die Zeit and Die Tageszeitung.

This is from a joint publication by Social Europe and IPS Journal.

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS), Brussels, Belgium

IPS UN Bureau

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