‘After Decades of Making Huge Profits, Companies Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Leave Behind a Toxic Legacy’

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Jul 29 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS speaks with Matthew Renshaw, a partner at a UK law firm that represents Nigerian communities taking legal action against Shell over environmental damage caused by its operations in the Niger Delta.

Matthew Renshaw

Two Nigerian communities, Bille and Ogale, are suing Shell in the UK over decades of oil spills in the Niger Delta that have devastated their land, water and way of life. The High Court has ruled that Shell and its former Nigerian subsidiary can be held liable for ongoing environmental damage, even if caused by oil theft or sabotage, and regardless of how long ago the spills occurred. The decision builds on a 2021 Supreme Court ruling that allowed UK-based parent companies to be sued for harm abroad. A full trial is set for March 2027.

How has oil pollution affected these communities?

Each of the three communities we represent in the Niger Delta have been affected by Shell’s operations in different ways.

The Bodo community endured two major oil spills from Shell pipelines in 2008 that released over half a million barrels of oil, causing the largest devastation of mangrove habitat in history. Families who once depended on fishing can no longer provide for themselves. Even swimming in the waterways is dangerous due to oil contamination. Despite bringing the case before UK courts in 2011, the community is still demanding a proper cleanup that they say has never materialised.

As for the Bille and Ogale communities, they brought their cases against Shell in the UK in 2015. The Ogale community depends primarily on farming and fishing, but since the 1980s, Shell has recorded around 100 spills in and around the area that have resulted in serious contamination of the drinking water. The United Nations conducted tests in 2011 and declared a public health emergency, but very little was done in response. Shell briefly provided safe water to residents, but that ended years ago. With no alternative sources available, many people have been forced to use visibly polluted water to drink and bathe their children.

The Bille community lives on islands in a riverine area where residents depend heavily on fishing and harvesting shellfish. A major pipeline runs directly through the community, very close to where people live. Between 2011 and 2013, multiple oil spills from Shell destroyed mangrove habitats. As with the Bodo community, fishing has become impossible for many people, forcing some to abandon their homes and communities entirely.

Why sue in the UK rather than Nigeria?

The decision to sue Shell in the UK came from our clients. While Shell operates in Nigeria through a local subsidiary, the parent company is based in the UK and has profited immensely from its Niger Delta operations, so our clients view it as equally responsible for the pollution in their communities.

They also believe they can’t get justice in Nigeria. The Nigerian legal system is notoriously slow: cases can take decades to reach judgement due to automatic rights of appeal. Many people won’t live to see justice. Bringing this type of case before Nigerian courts is also prohibitively expensive, because it requires extensive expert evidence that’s inaccessible to most affected communities.

In contrast, UK funding mechanisms make it far more feasible for our clients to pursue justice. They also trust they’ll receive a fairer hearing in London. This approach has already shown results: in the Bodo case, Shell finally brought in international experts to attempt cleanup. International litigation generates meaningful outcomes that wouldn’t happen otherwise.

Even when Shell argued that the case should be heard in Nigeria, in 2021 the UK Supreme Court ruled that because Shell PLC may share responsibility with its subsidiary, the case could proceed in London.

How is Shell defending itself?

Shell claims that most Niger Delta pollution stems from oil theft by local criminals, commonly known as ‘bunkering’. According to Shell, these criminals steal oil from pipelines to sell directly or refine into fuel. The company insists its operations are clean and criminals are to blame, arguing it’s doing its best to stop theft and therefore shouldn’t be held responsible.

This defence is fundamentally flawed. While oil theft is certainly a significant problem in Nigeria, Shell’s claims are overstated. Numerous spills have nothing to do with theft. They’re caused simply by poorly maintained infrastructure and decades-old pipelines that are not fit for purpose. This stands in stark contrast to other countries where maintenance is taken far more seriously.

Even accepting Shell’s argument, our clients contend that Shell should have taken reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable theft. In other countries, pipelines are buried, fitted with detection systems and monitored closely to detect intrusion attempts or spills. Our clients contend that Shell has failed to implement these basic measures in the Niger Delta.

What did the recent court ruling say, and what do you hope to achieve?

The High Court sided with our position, ruling that if Shell failed to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm, it can be liable for pollution caused by bunkering. Significantly, the court also rejected Shell’s claims that it couldn’t be held liable for spills older than five years, ruling that if a spill has still not been cleaned up – even if it happened decades ago – the company can still be held accountable.

This ruling has far-reaching implications. It’s particularly significant for the Ogale case where pollution dates back to the 1980s, and it opens the door for many other Niger Delta communities affected by legacy spills dating to the 1970s or earlier. Beyond Nigeria, the ruling sends a warning to multinational companies attempting to divest from polluting operations without accepting responsibility for the damage left behind.

Our clients seek three main outcomes from the 2027 trial: proper cleanup and environmental remediation of their polluted lands, emergency provisions such as access to clean drinking water and compensation for lost livelihoods and damaged property.

A pressing concern is Shell’s recent divestment from its onshore operations in Nigeria. The company has sold its assets to a consortium and is attempting to walk away from decades of pollution. While the communities we represent have at least secured court proceedings, many others have been left behind with no cleanup and no accountability.

We’re determined to prevent Shell and other multinational companies from abandoning polluted sites without taking responsibility. Success in holding Shell accountable, including for decades-old spills, could establish crucial legal precedents. Legally, it would confirm that companies remain responsible for long-term environmental damage. Morally, it’s about basic fairness: after decades of extracting resources and making huge profits, companies shouldn’t be allowed to leave behind a toxic legacy.

While our case won’t create internationally binding precedents, it could significantly influence how similar claims are litigated in other countries, particularly in common law jurisdictions.

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Bangladesh’s Democratic Promise Hangs in the Balance

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Opinion

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MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 7 2025 (IPS) – When Bangladesh’s streets erupted in protest in mid-2024, few could have predicted how swiftly Sheikh Hasina’s regime would crumble. The ousting of the prime minister last August, after years of mounting authoritarianism and growing discontent, was heralded as a historic opportunity for democratic renewal. Almost a year on, the question remains whether Bangladesh is genuinely evolving towards democracy, or if one form of repression is replacing another.

The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, confronts enormous challenges in delivering meaningful change. While it has taken significant steps – releasing political prisoners, initiating constitutional reforms, signing international human rights treaties and pursuing accountability for past violations – persistent abuses, political exclusion and economic instability continue to cast long shadows over the transition. The coming months will prove decisive in determining whether Bangladesh can truly break from its authoritarian past.

From electoral fraud to revolution

The roots of Bangladesh’s current upheaval trace back to the deeply flawed general election of 7 January 2024. The vote, which saw Hasina’s Awami League (AL) secure a fourth consecutive term, was widely dismissed as a foregone conclusion. The main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party boycotted the election in protest at the government’s refusal to reinstate a neutral caretaker system.

The government unleashed an intense crackdown ahead of the vote. It imprisoned thousands of opposition activists and weaponised the criminal justice system to silence dissent, leading to deaths in police custody and enforced disappearances. This repression extended to civil society, with human rights activists and journalists facing harassment, arbitrary detention and violence. The government sponsored fake opposition candidates to create an illusion of competition, resulting in plummeting voter turnout and a crisis of legitimacy.

When opposition rallies occurred, they were met with overwhelming force. On 28 October 2023, police responded to a major opposition protest in Dhaka with rubber bullets, teargas and stun grenades, resulting in at least 16 deaths, with thousands injured and detained.

The situation deteriorated further after the election. In June 2024, the reinstatement of a controversial quota system for public sector jobs triggered mass student-led protests that would ultimately topple Hasina’s government. These protests rapidly evolved into a broader revolt against entrenched corruption, economic inequality and political impunity.

The government’s response was systematically brutal. According to a United Nations fact-finding report, between July and August security forces killed as many as 1,400 people, including many children, often shooting protesters at point-blank range. They denied the injured medical care and intimidated hospital staff. The scale of violence eventually led the military to refuse further involvement, forcing Hasina to resign and flee Bangladesh.

Reform efforts amid political discord

The interim government identified three core priorities: institutional reforms, trials of perpetrators of political violence and elections. Its initial months brought significant progress. The government released detained protesters and human rights defenders, signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and established a commission of inquiry into enforced disappearances.

This commission documented around 1,700 complaints and found evidence of systematic use of enforced disappearances to target political opponents and activists, with direct complicity by Hasina and senior officials. In October, the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal issued arrest warrants for Hasina and 44 others for massacres during the 2024 protests, although the tribunal has a troubled history and retains the death penalty, contrary to international norms.

The Constitution Reform Commission has proposed expanding fundamental rights, with a bicameral parliament and term limits for top offices. However, the process has been undermined by the exclusion of major political players – most notably the AL – and minority groups.

Political tensions escalated as the interim government faced mounting pressure to set a general election date. Opposition parties accused it of deliberate stalling. The army chief publicly demanded elections by the end of 2025, while student groups sought postponement until reforms and justice were secured. After initial uncertainty, the government announced the election would occur in April 2026.

The most dramatic escalation came in May, when the interim government banned all AL activities under the Anti-Terrorism Act following renewed protests. The Election Commission subsequently suspended the AL’s registration, effectively barring it from future elections and fundamentally altering Bangladesh’s political landscape.

Economic challenges compound these political difficulties. Bangladesh remains fragile after devastating floods in 2024, while the banking sector faces stress from surging non-performing loans. Inflation continues outpacing wage growth and economic austerity measures agreed with the International Monetary Fund have sparked fresh protests.

Authoritarian patterns persist

Despite promises of change, old patterns of repression prove stubborn. Human rights groups document ongoing security forces abuses, including arbitrary arrests of opposition supporters and journalists, denial of due process and continued lack of accountability for past crimes. In the first two months of 2025 alone, over 1,000 police cases were filed against tens of thousands of people, mainly AL members or perceived supporters. A February crackdown on Hasina’s supporters led to over 1,300 arrests.

Press freedom remains severely threatened. In November, the interim government revoked the accreditation of 167 journalists. Around 140 journalists viewed as aligned with the previous regime have faced charges, with 25 accused of crimes against humanity, forcing many into hiding. Attacks on media outlets continue, including vandalism of newspaper offices.

The draft Cyber Protection Ordinance, intended to replace the repressive Cyber Security Act, has drawn criticism for retaining vague provisions criminalising defamation and ‘hurting religious sentiments’ while granting authorities sweeping powers for warrantless searches. Rights groups warn this law could stifle dissent in the run-up to elections.

Uncertain path forward

Bangladesh’s journey demonstrates that democratic transitions are inherently difficult, nonlinear and deeply contested processes. Democracy isn’t a guaranteed outcome, but the chances improve when political leaders are genuinely committed to reform and inclusive dialogue, and political players, civil society and the public practise sustained vigilance.

While the interim government has achieved steps unthinkable under the previous regime, the persistence of arbitrary arrests, attacks on journalists and the exclusion of key political players suggests authoritarianism’s shadow still looms large.

The upcoming general election will provide a crucial test of whether Bangladesh can finally turn the page on authoritarianism. The answer lies in whether Bangladeshis across government, civil society and beyond are able to build something genuinely new. The stakes are high in a country where many have already sacrificed much for the promise of democratic freedom.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Democracy under Attack: Why the World Needs a New UN Special Rapporteur

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Cover photo by OHCHR

BRUSSELS, Belgium / MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 2 2025 (IPS) – When tanks rolled through Myanmar’s streets in 2021, civil society groups worldwide sounded the alarm. When Viktor Orbán systematically dismantled Hungary’s free press, democracy activists demanded international action. And as authoritarianism returns to Tanzania ahead of elections, it’s once again civil society calling for democratic freedoms to be respected.

Around the world, authoritarian populists have learned to maintain democratic language and rituals while gutting democracy’s substance. They hold fraudulent elections with no real opposition and crack down on civil society when it tries to uphold democratic freedoms. As a result, more than 70 per cent of the world’s population lives in countries where civic space is routinely repressed.

In response, over 175 civil society organisations and 500 activists have united behind a demand to help improve respect for democratic freedoms, calling on the UN to establish a Special Rapporteur on Democracy.

The proposal isn’t coming from diplomatic corridors or academia; it’s a grassroots call from the frontlines of a global democratic struggle. Democracy defenders who face harassment, imprisonment and violence have identified a gap in international oversight that emboldens authoritarians and lets down those fighting for democratic rights when they most need support.

Critical blind spots

While the UN investigates everything from torture to toxic waste through specialised rapporteurs, democracy – supposedly a core UN principle – receives no systematic international oversight. This is a blind spot civil society wants to change.

Today’s threats to democracy are often more subtle than outright coups and blatant election rigging. Repressive leaders have mastered the art of legal authoritarianism, using constitutional amendments to extend term limits, judicial re-engineering to capture courts and media laws to silence critics, all while maintaining a facade of democratic governance.

In countries from Belarus to Venezuela, elections have been turned into elaborate ceremonies emptied of competition. Even established democracies face growing challenges, with foreign influence and disinformation campaigns documented across dozens of recent elections, often amplified by AI that creates deepfakes faster than fact-checkers can debunk them.

The rise of right-wing populism across Europe and in the USA shows how easily democratic processes can elevate leaders who systematically undermine democratic institutions from within, weaponising the law to concentrate executive authority, criminalise opposition and restrict civic space.

These evolving threats expose fundamental gaps in how the international community monitors and responds to democratic regression. The proposed UN Special Rapporteur on Democracy would help fill this gap: unlike current mandates that focus on specific rights, this role would examine how democratic systems function as a whole.

Existing UN Special Rapporteurs have recognised the urgent need for dedicated democracy oversight, with the Special Rapporteurs on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, freedom of opinion and expression, and the independence of judges and lawyers highlighting how democratic backsliding undermines the rights they’re mandated to protect.

A democracy rapporteur could investigate the full spectrum of threats that escape international attention: how electoral systems become compromised through legal manipulation, how parliamentary oversight gets systematically weakened while maintaining constitutional appearances, how judicial independence is eroded through seemingly legitimate reforms, and how meaningful participation beyond elections gets stifled through bureaucratic restrictions.

Crucially, the mandate could document not just obvious authoritarian crackdowns but the subtler forms of democratic erosion that often escape international notice until democratic institutions are compromised, offering early warnings about gradual processes that transform vibrant democracies into hollow shells.

Legal foundations

The proposal builds on solid legal foundations. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that ‘public authority must derive from the will of the people’, while article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognises every citizen’s right to participate in public affairs and vote in free, fair and clean periodic elections.

Regional mechanisms provide valuable precedents. The Inter-American Democratic Charter explicitly states that ‘the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it’. Building on this, Guatemala has recently requested an advisory opinion to clarify whether democracy constitutes a fundamental human right and what tangible obligations this imposes on states.

These foundations provide an actionable definition of democracy that respects diverse democratic models while upholding universal principles, sidestepping cultural relativist arguments that some authoritarian governments use to avoid accountability.

Momentum building

The proposal has generated remarkable momentum. On the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a broad coalition of civil society groups and think tanks published a joint statement calling for the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on Democracy.

Civil society leadership reflects widespread frustration among democracy activists who work under increasingly dangerous conditions and demand better institutional responses. Budget-conscious states should find this proposal attractive given the remarkable cost-effectiveness of the UN mandates system. Following standard UN practice, the new position would be unpaid, relying on voluntary funding from supportive states.

During its recent 58th session, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, conferring multilateral legitimacy on governments that want to support stronger democracy oversight. The window for action is open, but it won’t stay open indefinitely.

A test for international institutions

No single initiative will reverse global democratic decline. But this new role would enable systematic documentation, trend spotting and the sustained international attention democracy defenders desperately need. The rapporteur could investigate not just obvious authoritarian crackdowns but early signs of subtler democratic erosion, while highlighting innovations and good practices that others could adapt.

The debate over a UN Special Rapporteur on Democracy offers a test of whether international institutions can adapt to contemporary challenges or will remain trapped in outdated approaches while democracy crumbles. Creating this mandate would communicate that the international community takes democratic governance seriously enough to monitor it systematically – a signal that matters to democracy activists who need international support and serves as a warning to authoritarian leaders who thrive when nobody is watching.

With hundreds of civil society groups leading this charge from the frontlines of democratic struggle, the question isn’t whether this oversight is needed, but whether the UN will act before it’s too late.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, and Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, writer at CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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‘Enabling Machines to Make Life and Death Decisions Is Morally Unjustifiable’

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Jun 27 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses autonomous weapons systems and the campaign for regulation with Nicole van Rooijen, Executive Director of Stop Killer Robots, a global civil society coalition of over 270 organisations that campaigns for a new international treaty on autonomous weapons systems.

Nicole van Rooijen

In May, United Nations (UN) member states convened in New York for the first time to confront the challenge of regulating autonomous weapons systems, which can select and engage targets without human intervention. These ‘killer robots’ pose unprecedented ethical, humanitarian and legal risks, and civil society warns they could trigger a global arms race while undermining international law. With weapons that have some autonomy already deployed in conflicts from Gaza to Ukraine, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has set a 2026 deadline for a legally binding treaty.

What are autonomous weapons systems and why do they pose unprecedented challenges?

Autonomous weapons systems, or ‘killer robots’, are weapons that, once activated by a human, can select and engage targets without further human intervention. These systems make independent decisions – without the intervention of a human operator – about when, how, where and against whom to use force, processing sensor data or following pre-programmed ‘target profiles’. Rather than using the term ‘lethal autonomous weapons systems’, our campaign refers to ‘autonomous weapons systems’ to emphasise that any such system, lethal or not, can inflict serious harm.

The implications are staggering. These weapons could operate across all domains – air, land, sea and space – during armed conflicts and law enforcement or border control operations. They raise numerous ethical, humanitarian, legal and security concerns.

The most troubling variant involves anti-personnel systems triggered by human presence or individuals or groups who meet pre-programmed target profiles. By reducing people to data points for algorithmic targeting, these weapons are dehumanising. They strip away our inherent rights and dignity, dramatically increasing the risk of unjust harm or death. No machine, computer or algorithm can recognise a human as a human being, nor respect humans as inherent bearers of rights and dignity. Autonomous weapons cannot comprehend what it means to be in a state of war, much less what it means to have – or to end – a human life. Enabling machines to make life and death decisions is morally unjustifiable.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has noted it is ‘difficult to envisage’ scenarios where autonomous weapons wouldn’t pose significant risks of violating international humanitarian law, given the inevitable presence of civilians and non-combatants in conflict zones.

Currently, no international law governs these weapons’ development or use. As the technology advances rapidly, this legal vacuum creates a dangerous environment where autonomous weapons could be deployed in ways that violate existing international law while escalating conflicts, enabling unaccountable violence and harming civilians. This is what prompted the UN Secretary-General and the ICRC president to jointly call for urgent negotiations on a legally binding international instrument on autonomous weapons systems by 2026.

How have recent consultations advanced the regulatory agenda?

The informal consultations held in New York in May, mandated by UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 79/62, focused on issues raised in the UN Secretary-General’s 2024 report on autonomous weapons systems. They sought to broaden awareness among the diplomatic community and complement the work around the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), emphasising risks that extend far beyond international humanitarian law.

The UNGA offers a crucial advantage: universal participation. Unlike the CCW process in Geneva, it includes all states. This is particularly important for global south states, many of which are not a party to the CCW.

Over two days, states and civil society explored human rights implications, humanitarian consequences, ethical dilemmas, technological risks and security threats. Rich discussions emerged around regional dynamics and practical scenarios, examining how these weapons might be used in policing, border control and by non-state actors or criminal groups. While time constraints prevented exhaustive exploration of all issues, the breadth of engagement was unprecedented.

The Stop Killer Robots campaign found these consultations energising and strategically valuable. They demonstrated how UN processes in Geneva and New York can reinforce each other: while one forum provides detailed technical groundwork, particularly in developing treaty language, the other fosters inclusive political leadership and momentum. Both forums should work in tandem to maximise global efforts to achieve an international legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems.

What explains the global divide on regulation?

The vast majority of states support a legally binding treaty on autonomous weapons systems, favouring a two-tier approach that combines prohibitions with positive obligations.

However, roughly a dozen states oppose any form of regulation. Among them are some of the world’s most heavily militarised states and the primary developers, producers and likely users of autonomous weapons systems. Their resistance likely stems from the desire to preserve military superiority and protect economic interests, and the belief in inflated claims about these weapons’ supposed benefits promoted by big tech and arms industries. Or perhaps they simply favour force over diplomacy.

Whatever their motivations, this opposition underscores the urgent need for the international community to reinforce a rules-based global order that prioritises dialogue, multilateralism and responsible governance over unchecked technological ambition.

How do geopolitical tensions and corporate influence complicate international regulation efforts?

It is undeniable that geopolitical tensions and corporate influence are challenging the development of regulations for emerging technologies.

A handful of powerful states are prioritising narrow military and economic advantages over collective security, undermining the multilateral cooperation that has traditionally governed arms control. Equally troubling is the expanding influence of the private sector, particularly large tech companies that operate largely outside established accountability frameworks while wielding significant sway over political leaders.

This dual pressure is undermining the international rules-based order precisely when we most need stronger multilateral governance. Without robust regulatory frameworks that can withstand these pressures, development of autonomous weapons risks accelerating unchecked, with profound implications for global security and human rights.

How is civil society shaping this debate and advocating for regulation?

Anticipating the challenges autonomous weapons systems would pose, leading human rights organisations and humanitarian disarmament experts founded the Stop Killer Robots campaign in 2012. Today, our coalition spans over 270 organisations across more than 70 countries, working at national, regional and global levels to build political support for legally binding regulation.

We’ve played a leading role in shaping global discourse by highlighting the wide-ranging risks these technologies pose and producing timely research on weapons systems evolution and shifting state positions.

Our multi-level strategy targets all decision-makers who can influence this agenda, at local, regional and global levels. It’s crucial that political leaders understand how autonomous weapons might be used in warfare and other contexts, enabling them to advocate effectively within their spheres of influence for the treaty we urgently need.

Public pressure is key to our approach. Recent years have seen growing weapons systems autonomy and military applications, particularly in ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, alongside rising use of technologies such as facial recognition in civilian contexts. Public concern about the dehumanising nature of these technologies and the lack of regulation has grown online and offline. We frame these concerns along the whole spectrum of automated harm, with autonomous weapons representing the extreme, and highlight the critical need to close the gap between innovation and regulation.

We also collaborate with experts from arms, military and technology sectors to bring real-world knowledge and credibility to our treaty advocacy. It is crucial to involve those who develop and deploy autonomous weapons to demonstrate the gravity of current circumstances and the urgent need for regulation.

We encourage people to take action by signing our petition, asking their local political representatives to sign our Parliamentary Pledge or just spreading the word about our campaign on social media. This ultimately puts pressure on diplomats and other decision-makers to advance the legal safeguards we desperately need.

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Facial recognition: the latest weapon against civil society CIVICUS Lens 23.May.2025
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Poland’s Democratic Deadlock

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Credit: Kacper Pempel/Reuters via Gallo Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 25 2025 (IPS) – Poland’s embattled Prime Minister Donald Tusk emerged bruised but still standing after his government survived a parliamentary vote of confidence on 11 June. He’d called the vote, which he won by 243 to 210, just days after the presidential candidate of his Civic Platform (PO) party suffered an unexpected defeat.

Karol Nawrocki, an independent nationalist conservative backed by the former ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) defeated liberal pro-European Union (EU) Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski in a nail-biting presidential runoff. The result offers a broader test of Poland’s democratic resilience that could have implications across the EU.

The electoral blow

Nawrocki’s path to victory was anything but predictable. The 42-year-old former president of Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance had never held elected office before emerging as PiS’s chosen candidate. Yet his populist message resonated with frustrated voters.

Economic grievances provided fertile ground for nationalist appeals. Despite Poland’s relatively low unemployment, youth unemployment of over 10 per cent is an understandable source of anxiety for younger voters. Increasingly, they’re reacting by rejecting mainstream political offerings.

This helped cause the fragmented results of the 18 May first round. Trzaskowski won only 31.36 per cent of the vote and Nawrocki took 29.54 per cent. The combined vote share of right-wing candidates – Nawrocki and far-right politicians Grzegorz Braun and Sławomir Mentzen – exceeded polling expectations. Braun and Mentzen took over 21 per cent between them, thanks to the support of many young voters.

The 1 June runoff saw Nawrocki win 50.89 per cent to Trzaskowski’s 49.11 per cent, a margin of under two percentage points. Nawrocki took 64 per cent of the rural vote while Trzaskowski commanded 67 per cent in urban centres – an established geographic divide that reflects an enduring ideological division between a conservative, nationalist Poland and its liberal, cosmopolitan counterpart.

Election interference

Disinformation is helping fuel polarisation. The election campaign unfolded against a backdrop of foreign interference concerns that echoed troubling developments across the region – particularly in Romania, where the Supreme Court cancelled the 2024 presidential election due to evidence of Russian interference.

Just days before the first round, Poland’s Research and Academic Computer Network discovered evidence of potentially foreign-funded Facebook ads targeting all major candidates. According to an investigation by fact-checking organisation Demagog, TikTok was flooded with disinformation, particularly but not exclusively against Trzaskowski. The platform’s algorithm displayed far-right content twice as often as centrist or left-wing content to new users, with pro-Nawrocki videos appearing four times more frequently than pro-Trzaskowski content. Over 1,200 fake accounts systematically attacked Trzaskowski, while another 1,200 promoted Nawrocki.

The influence operation extended beyond individual character assassination to sowing distrust in the democratic process and sharing broader far-right narratives. Fake accounts systematically promoted anti-Ukrainian sentiment and anti-immigration conspiracy theories.

Donald Trump also gave Nawrocki an unprecedented level of support: he received him at the White House just before the election and sent his Homeland Security Secretary to campaign for him in Poland as she attended the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC). This year, CPAC, a US conservative platform, held two international events, in Hungary and Poland. The Polish one, timed to coincide with the runoff, offered a clear indication of how the nationalist far right has become internationalised.

Institutional paralysis

The viability of Tusk’s ideologically diverse coalition and his own political future have been called into question by the result. With critics in the Civic Coalition blaming the election defeat on the government’s communication failures and Tusk’s personal unpopularity, the confidence vote became a key test.

But even though Tusk has survived the confidence vote, it will be a tall order to implement the reforms needed to restore the democratic institutions that came under strain during the PiS administration. In eight years in power, PiS dismantled judicial independence, made public media its propaganda mouthpiece and undermined women’s rights by introducing one of Europe’s harshest anti-abortion laws. The new government’s attempts to reckon with this legacy had already been hampered by outgoing President Andrzej Duda, who used his veto power to block key reforms. Nawrocki will continue that, leaving Tusk unable to realise his promises to Polish voters and the EU.

The European Commission had counted on Tusk completing promised judicial reforms as it unlocked billions in pandemic recovery funds frozen over rule-of-law concerns during PiS rule. With progress now unlikely, the Commission faces the difficult decision of whether to maintain its funding even if the government’s unable to deliver promised changes.

Beyond the EU, Nawrocki’s foreign policy positions threaten to complicate Poland’s previously staunch backing of Ukraine. Although supportive of continued aid, Nawrocki has pledged to block any prospects of Ukraine joining NATO and prioritise Polish interests over refugee support.

High stakes

The razor-thin margin of victory in the presidential election, combined with record turnout of 72.8 per cent, tells a complex story of a divided society. While high participation suggests robust civic engagement, the deep polarisation reflected in the results reveals faultlines that extend far beyond conventional political disagreements.

The outcome offers further evidence that, when economic grievances aren’t addressed, institutional trust is allowed to erode and information environments are left vulnerable to manipulation, opportunistic politicians will exploit social divisions and anti-establishment anger.

For Poland, the coming years will test whether democratic institutions can withstand the pressures of sustained political deadlock. Poland faces potential institutional paralysis that could further erode public trust in democratic governance. Poland’s institutions will need to try to demonstrate their continuing effectiveness, and civil society and independent media will need to maintain their credibility, to help protect and nurture democratic values.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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Pandemic Agreement: Important Step but Big Decisions Deferred

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Opinion

Credit: WHO/Christopher Black

BRUSSELS, Belgium, Jun 11 2025 (IPS) – When the next pandemic strikes, the world should be better prepared. At least, that’s the promise states made at the World Health Organization’s (WHO) World Health Assembly on 19 May when they adopted the first global pandemic treaty. This milestone in international health cooperation emerged from three years of difficult negotiations, informed by the harsh lessons learned from COVID-19’s devastating global impacts.

Yet this step forward in multilateralism comes at a deeply difficult moment. The WHO, as the organisation tasked with implementing the agreement, faces its starkest ever financial crisis following the withdrawal of the USA, its biggest donor. Meanwhile, disagreements between states threaten to undermine the treaty’s aspirations. Some of the big decisions that would make the experience of the next pandemic a more equitable one for the world’s majority are still to be negotiated.

A treaty born from COVID-19’s failures

Processes to negotiate the Pandemic Agreement came as a response to the disjointed international reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic. When the virus spread across borders, global north countries hoarded vaccines for their populations but left much of the world unprotected – an approach that as well as being manifestly unfair enabled the virus to further mutate. The treaty’s text emphasises the need for proper pandemic prevention, preparedness and response in all states, with the potential to enhance multilateral cooperation during health crises.

With 124 countries voting in favour, 11 abstaining and none voting against, many diplomats presented the agreement’s finalisation as a victory for global cooperation. It comes at a time when multilateralism is being severely tested, with powerful governments tearing up international rules, pulling out of international bodies and slashing funding. The window of opportunity to reach some kind of agreement was rapidly closing.

A major absence loomed large over the final negotiations. Upon his inauguration in January, President Trump announced the USA would withdraw from the WHO and halt all funding. The withdrawal of a superpower like the USA harms the WHO’s legitimacy and sends a signal to other populist governments that withdrawal is an option. Argentina is following its lead and Hungary may too.

Funding crisis

US withdrawal will leave an enormous funding gap. In the pre-Trump era, the USA was the WHO’s biggest contributor: it provided US$1.28 billion in 2022-2023, amounting to 12 per cent of the WHO’s approved budget and roughly 15 per cent of its actual budget.

As the treaty was agreed, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus painted a disturbing picture of the organisation’s financial situation. Its 2022-2023 budget showed a US$2 billion shortfall and its current salary gap is over US$500 million. The proposed budget for 2026-2027 has already been slashed by 21 per cent, and this reduced budget is expected to receive only around 60 per cent of the funding needed. The WHO will likely have to cut staff and close offices in many countries.

This reflects a lack of political will: states are making the choice of cutting down on global cooperation while boosting their defence spending. The current WHO funding gap of US$2.1 billion is the equivalent of just eight hours of global military expenditure.

Big issues kicked down the road

Deteriorating political realities made it crucial to reach an agreement as soon as possible, even if this meant kicking some difficult decisions down the road. As a result, the text of the agreement has severe weaknesses.

The treaty lacks dedicated funding and robust enforcement mechanisms, which means the blatant inequalities that defined the global response to COVID-19 are likely to remain unconfronted. It doesn’t tackle the most critical and contested issues, including the international sharing of pathogens and vaccine access.

The treaty will open for ratification following the negotiation of an annex on a pathogen access and benefit-sharing system, a process that could take a further two years. This means implementation is likely still a long way away.

The current impasse reflects an enduring faultline between global south states that need better access to affordable health products and technologies, and global north states siding with powerful pharmaceutical corporations that want their assets protected. Wealthy governments are making their decisions safe in the knowledge they’ll be at the front of the line when the next pandemic starts, while the world’s poorest people will again face the brunt of the devastation.

Political will needed

The Pandemic Agreement is a step forward at a time when international cooperation faces increasing attacks. That 124 countries demonstrated their commitment to multilateral action on global health threats offers hope. But substantial work remains if the treaty is to enable a truly global and fair response to the next health crisis.

For that to happen, the world’s wealthiest states need to put narrow self-interest calculations aside. States also need to address the issue of long-term funding. Right now, global leaders have agreed on the need for coordinated pandemic preparedness, but the institution meant to lead this doesn’t have the resources needed to put goals into action.

The next pandemic will test not just scientific capabilities, but also collective commitment to the shared global values the treaty is supposed to represent. Political will and funding are needed to turn lofty aspirations into meaningful action.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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