‘Freedom Always Returns – but Only If We Hold Fast to Our Values and Sustain the Struggle’

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Jan 23 2026 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS speaks with Belarusian activist, blogger and journalist Mikola Dziadok about his experiences as a two-time political prisoner and the repression of dissent in Belarus. Mikola was jailed following mass protests in 2020.

CIVICUS speaks with Belarusian activist, blogger and journalist Mikola Dziadok about his experiences as a two-time political prisoner and the repression of dissent in Belarus

Mikola Dziadok

Amid continued repression, Belarus experienced two limited waves of political prisoner releases in 2025. In September, authorities freed around 50 detainees following diplomatic engagement, and in December they pardoned and released over 120, including Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski and opposition figure Maria Kolesnikova. Many were forced into exile. Human rights groups stress that releases appear driven by geopolitical bargaining rather than systemic reform, with over 1,200 political prisoners believed to remain behind bars.

Why were you arrested following protests in 2020?

I was arrested because I was not silent and I was visible. During the 2020 uprising, I ran Telegram and YouTube channels where I shared political analysis, explained what was happening and gave people advice on how to resist repression. I talked about strategies to protect ourselves, counter state violence and survive under authoritarian pressure. The regime viewed this as extremely threatening.

By that time, I had around 17 years of experience in the anarchist movement, which is a part of a broader democratic movement in Belarus. But most people who joined the protests weren’t political at all: they’d never protested before, never faced repression, never dealt with police violence. They were desperate for guidance, particularly as there was an information war between regime propaganda, pro-Kremlin narratives and independent voices.

Authorities made a clear distinction between ‘ordinary people’ who apologised and promised never to protest again, who were released, and activists, organisers and others who spoke publicly, who were treated as enemies. I was imprisoned because I belonged to the second category.

What sparked the 2020 uprising?

By 2020, Belarus had already lived through five fraudulent elections. We only had one election the international community recognised as legitimate, held in 1994. After that, President Alexander Lukashenko changed the constitution so he could rule indefinitely.

For many years, people believed there was nothing they could do to make change happen. But in 2020, several things came together. The COVID-19 pandemic left the state’s complete failure exposed. As authorities did nothing to protect people, civil society stepped in. Grassroots initiatives provided information and medical help. People suddenly saw they could do what the state couldn’t. From the regime’s perspective, this was a very dangerous realisation.

But what truly ignited mass mobilisation was violence. In the first two days after the 9 August presidential election, over 7,000 protesters were detained. Thousands were beaten, humiliated, sexually abused and tortured. When they were released and showed their injuries, the images spread through social media and Telegram, and people were shocked. This brought hundreds of thousands onto the streets, protesting against both election fraud and violence against protesters.

What’s the situation of political prisoners?

Since 2020, over 50,000 people have spent time in detention, in a country of only nine million. There have been almost 4,000 officially recognised political prisoners, and there are now around 1,200, although the real number is higher. Many prisoners ask not to be named publicly because they fear retaliation against themselves or their families.

Repression has never subsided. Civil society organisations, human rights groups and independent media have been destroyed or forced into exile. Belarussians live under constant pressure, not a temporary crackdown.

Political prisoners are treated much worse than regular prisoners. I spent 10 years as a political prisoner: five years between 2010 and 2015, and another five years after 2020. During my second sentence, I spent two and a half years in solitary confinement. This is deliberate torture designed to break people physically and psychologically.

How did your release happen?

My release was a political transaction. Lukashenko has always used political prisoners as bargaining chips. He arrests people, waits for international pressure to reach its peak and then offers releases in exchange for concessions. This time, international negotiations, unexpectedly involving the USA, triggered a limited release.

The process itself was terrifying. I was taken suddenly from prison, handcuffed, hooded and transferred to the KGB prison in the centre of Minsk. I was placed in an isolation cell and not told what would happen. It was only when I saw other well-known political prisoners being brought into the same space that I realised we were going to be freed, most likely by forced expulsion.

No formal conditions were announced, but our passports were confiscated and we were forced into exile. We were transported under armed guard and handed over at the Lithuanian border. Many deportees still fear for relatives who remain in the country, because repression often continues through family members. That’s why I asked my wife to leave Belarus as quickly as possible.

What should the international community and civil society do now?

First, they should make sure Belarus continues receiving international attention. Lukashenko is afraid of isolation, sanctions and scrutiny. Any attempt to normalise relations with Belarus without real change will only strengthen repression and put remaining prisoners at greater risk.

Second, they should financially support independent Belarusian human rights organisations and media. Many are struggling to survive, particularly after recent funding cuts. Without them doing their job, abuses will remain hidden and prisoners will be forgotten.

Most importantly, activists should not lose hope. We are making history. Dictatorships fall and fear eventually breaks. Freedom always returns – but only if we hold fast to our values and sustain the struggle.

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SEE ALSO
‘Belarus is closer than ever to totalitarianism, with closed civic space and repression a part of daily life’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Human Rights House 14.Oct.2025
Belarus: ‘The work of human rights defenders in exile is crucial in keeping the democratic movement alive’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Natallia Satsunkevich 15.Feb.2025
Belarus: a sham election that fools no one CIVICUS Lens 31.Jan.2025

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Guinea’s Path to Electoral Autocracy

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Opinion

Credit: Luc Gnago/Reuters via Gallo Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jan 20 2026 (IPS) – In December, the dust settled on Guinea’s first presidential election since the military took control in a 2021 coup. General Mamady Doumbouya stayed in power after receiving 87 per cent of the vote. But the outcome was never in doubt: this was no a democratic milestone; it was the culmination of Guinea’s denied transition to civilian rule.

Doumbouya has successfully performed an act of political alchemy, turning a military autocracy into an electoral one. By systematically dismantling the opposition, silencing the press and rewriting laws to suit his ambitions, he has made sure to shield his grip on power with a thin veil of electoral legitimacy.

The architecture of autocracy

The path to this moment was paved with precision. In April 2025, Doumbouya announced a constitutional referendum, a move that may have looked like it would herald the beginning of the end of military rule. But it was something else entirely. By June, Doumbouya had further centralised control by creating a new General Directorate of Elections. This body, placed firmly under the thumb of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, reversed previous efforts to establish an independent electoral institution.

The constitution was drafted in the shadows by the National Council of the Transition, the junta-appointed legislative body. While early drafts reportedly contained safeguards against lifetime presidencies, these were stripped away before the final text reached the public. The result was a document that removed a ban on junta members running for office, extended presidential terms from five to seven years and granted the president the power to appoint a third of the newly created Senate.

When the referendum was held on 21 September, it rubber-stamped de facto rule. Official figures claimed 89 per cent support with an 86 per cent turnout, numbers that defied the reality of a widespread opposition boycott and a palpable lack of public enthusiasm.

A climate of fear

With a blanket ban on protests in effect since May 2022, those who’ve dared challenge the junta’s controlled transition have been met with security force violence. On 6 January 2025, security forces killed at least three people, including two children, during demonstrations called by the opposition coalition Forces Vives de Guinée.

The political landscape was further cleared through administrative and judicial means. In October 2024, the government dissolved over 50 political parties. By August 2025, major opposition groups such as the Rally of the People of Guinea had been suspended. Key challengers, including former Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo, remain in exile, while others, among them Aliou Bah, have been sentenced to prison – in Bah’s case, for allegedly insulting Doumbouya.

The atmosphere of fear has been reinforced by a brutal crackdown on the media. Guinea plummeted 25 places in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, the year’s largest fall. Independent outlets have had their licences revoked and journalists have been detained. Those still working have learned to practise strict self-censorship to avoid becoming the next target. This meant that as voters went to the polls, there was nobody to provide diverse perspectives, scrutinise the process, investigate irregularities or hold authorities accountable.

Coup contagion

Guinea is no outlier. Since 2020, a coup contagion has swept through Africa, with military takeovers in Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Sudan. In each instance, the script has been similar: military leaders seize power promising to ‘correct’ the failures of the previous regime, only to break their promises of a return to civilian rule.

Guinea is now the third country among this recent wave to move from a military dictatorship to an electoral autocracy. It follows in the footsteps of Chad, where Mahamat Idriss Déby secured victory in May 2024 after the suspicious killing of his main opponent, and Gabon, where General Brice Oligui Nguema won a 2025 election with a reported 90 per cent of the vote.

The international community does little. Doumbouya routinely ignored deadlines and sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States, which once prided itself on a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy for coups, and no consequences ensued. The African Union and the United Nations offered rhetorical concern, but their warnings were not accompanied by tangible diplomatic or economic repercussions.

The world’s willingness to maintain business as usual while Doumbouya steered through a fake transition sends a dangerous message to other aspiring autocrats, in the region and beyond.

Democracy denied

When Doumbouya seized power in 2021, he was greeted with a degree of cautious optimism. His predecessor, Alpha Condé, had controversially amended the constitution to secure a third term amid violent protests and corruption and fraud allegations. Doumbouya promised to fix things, but instead became a mirror image of the man he ousted, using the same tactics of constitutional revision and repression to secure his power.

The statistics of the December election – an 87 per cent victory on a claimed 80 per cent turnout – do not reflect a genuine mandate but rather a vacuum: with no independent media to scrutinise the process and no viable opposition allowed to run, the election was a technicality.

The prospects for real democracy in Guinea appear remote. Doumbouya has secured a seven-year mandate through an election that eliminated the essential infrastructure needed for democracy. In the absence of stronger international pressure and tangible support for Guinean civil society, Guinea faces prolonged authoritarian rule behind a democratic facade, with dismal human rights prospects.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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‘Zambia Has Environmental Laws and Standards on Paper – the Problem Is Their Implementation’

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Dec 29 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses environmental accountability in Zambia with Christian-Geraud Neema, Africa editor at the China Global South Project, an independent journalism initiative that covers and follows China’s activities in global south countries.

Zambia has environmental laws and standards on paper – the problem is their implementation’

Christian-Geraud Neema

A group of 176 Zambian farmers has filed a US$80 billion lawsuit against a Chinese state-owned mining company over a major toxic spill. In February, the collapse of a dam that was supposed to control mining waste released 50 million litres of toxic wastewater into the Kafue River system, killing fish, destroying crops and contaminating water sources for thousands of people. The compensation demand highlights broader questions about mining governance, environmental oversight and corporate accountability.

What’s this lawsuit about, and why are farmers seeking US$80 billion?

The farmers are suing Sino-Metals Leach Zambia, a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group, because on 18 February, the company’s tailings dam collapsed, releasing an estimated 50 million litres of acidic, toxic wastewater and up to 1.5 million tonnes of waste material into the Kafue River. This led to water pollution affecting communities in Chambishi and Kitwe, far beyond the immediate mining area.

The lawsuit reflects real harm and frustration. From the farmers’ perspective, the company is clearly responsible. Their livelihoods have been destroyed, their land contaminated and their future made uncertain. In that context, seeking accountability through the courts is a rational response.

That said, the US$80 billion figure is likely exaggerated. It shows the absence of credible damage assessments rather than a precise calculation. When no one provides clear data on losses, communities respond by anchoring their claims in worst-case scenarios.

This case also highlights a broader accountability gap. Mining companies should be held responsible, but governments must also be questioned. These projects are approved, inspected and regulated by state authorities. If a dam was unsafe, why was it authorised? Why was oversight insufficient?

It should be noted that Zambia’s legal framework allows communities to bring such cases domestically, which is a significant step forward compared to earlier cases where affected communities had to sue foreign companies in courts abroad.

What caused the toxic spill?

There is no single, uncontested explanation. There were clear structural weaknesses in the tailings dam. Reports from civil society and media suggest the dam was not built to the required standards under Zambian regulations. But the company argues the dam complied with existing standards and that it was encroachment by surrounding communities that weakened the structure over time.

These two narratives are not mutually exclusive. Even if community interactions with the site occurred, the primary responsibility still lies with the company. Mining operations take place in complex social environments, and companies are expected to anticipate these realities and design infrastructure that is robust enough to withstand them. Ultimately, this incident reflects governance and regulatory failures. It was not an isolated accident.

What were the consequences of the spill?

The impacts have been severe and multidimensional. The spill polluted large sections of the Kafue River, reportedly extending over 100 kilometres. It killed large numbers of fish, contaminated riverbeds and disrupted ecosystems. Agriculturally, farmers using river water for irrigation saw their crops destroyed or rendered unsafe. Livestock and soil quality were also affected. Acidic and toxic substances entered water sources used daily for cooking, drinking and washing, and communities were exposed to serious health risks.

What makes the situation particularly troubling is the lack of reliable and independent data. There has been no transparent and comprehensive assessment released by the government, the company or an independent body. This absence has left communities uncertain about long-term environmental damage and health effects, and fuelled emotionally charged debates instead of evidence-based responses.

Was the disaster preventable?

Absolutely. At a technical level, stronger infrastructure, better-quality materials and stricter adherence to safety standards could have significantly reduced the risk. At an operational level, companies know mining sites are rarely isolated, and community proximity, informal access and social dynamics must be factored in when designing and securing tailings dams.

But prevention also depends heavily on governance. Mining companies are profit-driven entities, and in weak governance environments, the temptation to cut costs is high. This is not unique to Chinese firms. The main difference in how companies operate is not their origin but their context: the same companies often operate very differently in countries with weak or strong regulatory oversight. Where rules are enforced, behaviour improves; where oversight is weak, shortcuts become the norm.

The key issue here is enforcement. Zambia has good environmental laws and standards on paper. The problem is their implementation.

Could this case set a precedent?

This case has the potential to strengthen existing accountability mechanisms rather than create a new precedent. Zambia has seen similar cases before, including lawsuits involving western mining companies. What is different now is the increased legal space for communities to act locally.

If successful, the case could reinforce civil society advocacy for responsible mining, greater transparency and stronger enforcement of environmental regulations. It could also raise awareness among communities living near mining sites about their rights and the risks they face.

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SEE ALSO
South Africa: ‘Environmental rights are enforceable and communities have the right to be consulted and taken seriously’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with The Green Connection 12.Dec.2025
DRC: ‘International demand for coltan is linked to violence in the DRC’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Claude Iguma 09.Jul.2025
Ghana: ‘We demand an immediate ban on illegal mining and strict enforcement of environmental laws’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Jeremiah Sam 29.Oct.2024

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A Grim Year for Democracy and Civic Freedoms – but in Gen Z There Is Hope

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Opinion

People take part in an anti-corruption protest in Kathmandu, Nepal on 8 September 2025. Credit: Navesh Chitrakar/Reuters via Gallo Images

NEW YORK, Dec 24 2025 (IPS) – 2025 has been a terrible year for democracy. Just over 7 per cent of the world’s population now live in places where the rights to organise, protest and speak out are generally respected, according to the CIVICUS Monitor, a civil society research partnership that measures civic freedoms around the world. This is a sharp drop from over 14 per cent this time last year.

Civic freedoms underpin healthy democracies, and the consequences of this stifling of civil society are apparent. At the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, the world is experiencing 19th century levels of economic inequality. The wealth of the richest 1 per cent is surging while some 8 per cent of the world’s population – over 670 million people – suffer from chronic hunger. Weapons-producing firms, closely intertwined with political elites, are reaping windfall profits as death and destruction rains down in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan, Ukraine and many other places. It should surprise no one that the political leaders fomenting these conflicts are also squashing civic freedoms to avert questions about their motivations.

From Lima to Los Angeles, Belgrade to Dar es Salaam and Jenin to Jakarta, far too many people are being denied the agency to shape the decisions that impact their lives. Yet these places have also been the site of significant protests against governments this year. Even as authoritarianism appears to be on the march, people are continuing to pour onto the streets to insist on their freedoms. As we speak people in Sofia in Bulgaria are demonstrating in large numbers against endemic corruption which recently forced the government to resign.

History shows that mass demonstrations can lead to major advances. In the 20th century, people’s mobilisations helped achieve women’s right to vote, liberation of colonised peoples and adoption of civil rights legislation to address race-based discrimination. In the 21st century, advances have been made in marriage equality and other LGBTQI+ rights, and in highlighting the climate crisis and economic inequality through protests. But in 2025, the right to protest, precisely because it can be effective, is under assault by authoritarian leaders. Around the world, the detention of protesters is the number one recorded violation of civic freedoms, closely followed by arbitrary detentions of journalists and human rights defenders who expose corruption and rights violations.

This backsliding is now happening in major established democracies. This year, the CIVICUS Monitor downgraded Argentina, France, Germany, Italy and the USA to an ‘obstructed’ civic space rating, meaning the authorities impose significant constraints on the full enjoyment of fundamental rights. This regression is being driven by anti-rights nationalist and populist forces determined to degrade constitutional checks and balances and advance ballot box majoritarianism that denies minorities a fair say in economic, political and social life.

The push to degrade democracy by anti-rights forces now coming to fruition has been many years in the making. It accelerated this year with the return of Donald Trump. His administration immediately withdrew support to international democracy support programmes and instead built links to politicians responsible for crushing civic freedoms and committing grotesque human rights violations. Trump has laid out of the red carpet to El-Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, Hungary’s Victor Orbán, Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, ushering in a new era of values-free might-is-right diplomacy that threatens to undermine decades of painstaking progress achieved by civil society.

The fallout is clear. Many wealthy democratic governments that traditionally fund civil society activities have significantly reduced their contributions. At the same time, they have linked their remaining support for civil society to narrowly defined strategic military and economic interests. In doing so, they have played directly into the hands of powerful authoritarian states such as China, Egypt, Iran, Nicaragua and Venezuela that seek to discredit domestic calls for accountability. Countries including Ecuador and Zimbabwe have introduced laws to limit the ability of civil society organisations to receive international funding.

All these developments are negatively impacting on civil society efforts for equality, peace and social justice. Yet the story of 2025 is also one of persistent resistance, and some successes. The courage demonstrated by Generation Z protesters has inspired people around the world. In Nepal, protests triggered by a social media ban led to the fall of the government, offering hope for a much-needed political reset. In Kenya, young protesters continued to take to the streets to demand political reform despite state violence. In Moldova, a cash-rich disinformation campaign run by a fugitive oligarch failed to sway the course of the national election away from human rights values. In the USA, the number of people joining the No-Kings protests just keeps on growing.

With over 90 per cent of the world’s population living with the institutional denial of full civic freedoms, anti-rights forces must be feeling pretty smug right now. But democratic dissent is brewing, particularly among Generation Z, denied political and economic opportunities but understanding that another world – one more equal, just, peaceful and environmentally sustainable – is possible. It’s far from game over yet, and even in difficult times, people will demand freedoms – and breakthroughs may be just around the corner.

Mandeep S Tiwana is Secretary General of CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance.

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Myanmar’s Sham Election: Trump Legitimises Murderous Military Dictatorship

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Opinion

Credit: Issei Kato/Reuters via Gallo Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Dec 22 2025 (IPS) – Myanmar is heading for an election, beginning on 28 December, that’s ostensibly an exercise in democracy – but it has clearly been designed with the aim of conferring more legitimacy on its military junta.

Almost five years after its February 2021 coup, the regime continues to fight pro-democracy forces and ethnic armed organisations, barely controlling a fifth of Myanmar’s territory. The junta has acknowledged that voting won’t be possible in much of the country.

The upcoming election fails every test of democratic legitimacy. The main democratic parties — the National League for Democracy and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy — are banned. What remains is the Union Solidarity and Development Party, the military’s puppet party, plus minor groups that won no seats in the democratic election held in 2020. Independent media outlets have been crushed, journalists are arrested and intimidated daily and internet access is heavily restricted. In areas that resist military rule, civilians face escalating violence and arbitrary detention.

This election is designed not to reflect the popular will but to entrench military power. It comes as the regime continues its systematic campaign of violence against civilians: weeks before the junta announced the vote, Myanmar’s air force bombed a school in Oe Htein Kwin village, killing two teachers and 22 children, the youngest only seven years old.

The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners has confirmed 6,231 civilians have been killed by the military since the coup, though true figures could be much higher. Nearly half of all civilian deaths are estimated to have been caused by airstrikes. These are not indiscriminate military operations where civilians are collateral damage; they are deliberate attacks where civilians are the targets. The majority of locations of airstrikes have been sites with protected status under international law: camps for displaced people, churches, clinics and schools, often with no presence of armed groups nearby.

The junta has some powerful international allies. China backs it with billions in aid and advanced weapons. Russia supplies the fighter jets that drop bombs on civilians. India quietly sells arms. The three have long provided diplomatic cover and shielded the junta from international accountability. Meanwhile, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues pursuing its failed Five-Point Consensus agreed with the regime in April 2021, despite its systematic violation of every commitment. Regional powers have negotiated exclusively with the junta without input from the National Unity Government — the government in exile formed by democratically elected lawmakers — effectively treating the military regime as Myanmar’s legitimate rulers.

Now recent decisions by the Trump administration threaten to tip the balance decisively in favour of legitimising military rule. Trump has lifted sanctions, cut independent media funding and eliminated the protections formerly afforded to Myanmar’s refugees in the USA. Consistent with his transactional approach, he’s choosing access to rare earth minerals over democracy.

The concern now is that ASEAN member states may follow suit, using the sham election as justification to normalise relations with the military regime. Some have already started moving in this direction, with the junta leader invited to regional meetings.

Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces continue to resist despite the shifting international context. The People’s Defence Forces and ethnic armed groups maintain coordinated operations across most of the country. Civil society continues documenting violations, providing aid to displaced people and advocating for international action. They deserve better than to watch the world legitimise their oppressors.

The junta’s control on the ground remains tenuous, but its diplomatic position is strengthening. Whether this consolidation continues depends on how the world responds to the election. The international community must be clear that treating the election as legitimate would signal to authoritarians everywhere that democratic institutions can be overthrown with impunity, war crimes carry no real consequences and regimes that bomb schools and imprison elected leaders can secure international acceptance.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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‘No Solution Will Work If the Institutions Responsible for Abuses Remain in Charge of Implementing It’

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Oct 13 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS discusses enforced disappearances in Mexico with a member of the International Network of Associations of Missing Persons.

The crisis of disappearances in Mexico has reached alarming proportions, with over 52,000 unidentified bodies in morgues and mass graves. On 1 July, the Mexican Congress approved controversial changes to the General Law on Disappearances, which promise to modernise the search process through a national biometric system, but which human rights organisations and victims’ groups claim could establish an unprecedented system of mass surveillance.

What are the main changes and how will they affect searches?

The changes seek to strengthen the mechanisms for searching for, locating and identifying missing persons. The main innovations include the creation of a National Investigation File Database and a Single Identity Platform that will integrate various databases. The revised law also provides for the strengthening of the Unique Population Registry Code (CURP) through the incorporation of biometric data such as iris scans, photographs and fingerprints.

The law obliges authorities and individuals to provide information useful for search processes and incorporates new institutions such as the National Guard and the Ministry of Security into the National Search System. It also increases the penalties for the crime of enforced disappearance.

The new system aims to ensure faster and more efficient searches through technology and inter-institutional coordination. It also provides for the use of satellite imagery and advanced identification technologies, under the coordination of the National Search System.

What risks are posed by the authorities’ access to biometric data?

There are serious concerns that the changes give security and justice institutions, including prosecutors’ offices, the National Guard and the National Intelligence Centre, immediate and unrestricted access to public and private databases, including those containing biometric information. The official argument is that this will speed up searches.

However, civil society warns that the Single Identity Platform and the biometric CURP could become instruments of mass surveillance. It is feared the authorities could misuse the information and, instead of helping to find missing persons, use it to help control the population, putting the rights to privacy and security at risk.

How have victims’ groups reacted?

Victims’ collectives have rejected the reform as opaque and rushed. They complain that, although round table discussions were organised, these were merely symbolic and their proposals were not taken into account.

The families of missing persons argue the changes focus on technological solutions that don’t address the underlying structural problems of corruption, cronyism, organised crime and impunity. But no technological solution will work as long as the institutions responsible for abuses and cover-ups remain in charge of implementing it.

This law runs the risk of repeating the mistakes of the 2017 General Law on Enforced Disappearances. That was an important step forward, as it criminalised the offence, created a national search system and sought to guarantee the participation of families in locating and identifying missing persons. Unfortunately, it was never properly implemented. There are fears this new law, in the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms, will only deepen frustration and perpetuate impunity.

What alternatives do victims’ groups propose?

Their demands go beyond legislative changes: they demand truth and justice through thorough investigations, the prosecution of those responsible in state institutions and organised crime groups and an effective search in the field, with the coordination and active participation of victims’ groups.

The collectives also stress the urgency of identifying the over 52,000 unnamed people in morgues and mass graves, and are calling for the creation of an Extraordinary Forensic Identification Mechanism. And they demand real protection for those searching for their relatives, who continue to face threats and attacks.

Above all, they demand an end to impunity through the dismantling of the networks of corruption and collusion between authorities and organised crime. As one local activist summed it up, at the end of the day, without a genuine National Plan for Missing Persons, none of this will work. Each state also needs its own plan. Otherwise, we will remain in the same situation: without results, without reports and without answers about our disappeared.

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Mexico’s judicial elections consolidate ruling party power CIVICUS Lens 23.Jun.2025
The disappeared: Mexico’s industrial-scale human rights crisis CIVICUS Lens 22.Apr.2025
‘The discovery of the torture centre exposed the state’s complicity with organised crime’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Anna Karolina Chimiak 09.Apr.2025

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