A Global Retreat from Solidarity

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Credit: CIVICUS

PARIS, Feb 17 2025 (IPS) – The world is witnessing a dangerous retreat from international solidarity by Global Minority countries. From Washington to Brussels, governments are slashing funds that sustain human rights, democracy, and humanitarian initiatives.

The U.S. foreign aid freeze, the European Union’s cut in development spending, and Belgium’s reduction in foreign aid all reflect a broader trend in countries with far-right elected governments of prioritizing domestic politics over global responsibility and solidarity.

Some may argue this is simply an abstract budgetary issue. But these funding cuts translate into real-life lost jobs, shuttered programs, and the most marginalized communities being left without vital support.

They send a clear signal: governments, even those once seen as champions of human rights, are redefining their external priorities and turning inward. The consequences will be devastating, particularly for Global Majority countries, where local organizations are already struggling to survive.

But this crisis is not inevitable. Philanthropy, civil society, and remaining international allies must step up not just to fill financial gaps but to rethink global solidarity and how civil society is funded, protected, and sustained in the long term.

The dangerous trend around funding cuts

Far-right governments and their growing global influence are driving these decisions. The U.S. foreign aid suspension is part of a broader pattern of governments scaling back support for civil society and humanitarian initiatives.

Similarly, the European Union’s decision to cut its development spending by 2 billion euros over the next three years will reduce aid to the world’s lowest-income countries by 35%, exacerbating existing inequalities.

Belgium’s 25% cut in foreign aid mirrors this shift, as does the Netherlands’ move to reduce funding for NGOs, prioritizing themes that serve its national interests over global needs. These disruptions weaken trust in international partnerships and force organizations further into survival mode rather than allowing for long-term strategic action.

The long-term impact of the foreign aid cuts

This comes at a time when the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are severely off track, and the world keeps experiencing, year after year, the consequences of “the hottest year on record”.

The withdrawal of funding not only to civil society and humanitarian organizations, but also to multilateral institutions will further hinder efforts to address economic inequality and climate change for all.

Although it will take time to fully assess the impact of these recent decisions, we can already foresee their magnitude in terms of humanitarian assistance, but also in terms of human rights, democracy and global governance.

The U.S. 90-day foreign aid freeze alone has halted critical funding for international development organizations and federal contractors delivering humanitarian assistance worldwide. Thousands of jobs will be lost, and many organizations may not survive the freeze due to a lack of reserve funds.

Programs focused on combating HIV/AIDS, child health, food security, and education with reverberating impacts on all Americas have been abruptly thrown into uncertainty.

Beyond economic devastation, the crisis is deeply human. Hospitals that once provided essential care are shutting down, perishable food supplies are going to waste, and communities are left without lifesaving support.

The full impact on human rights and democracy may take longer to materialize, but we already see the warning signs: fewer resources for independent media, greater exposure for vulnerable activists, and increasing shrinking spaces for civil society.

This funding retreat is particularly dangerous for civil society organizations operating in repressive environments. Countries where civic space is already under immense pressure will become even more vulnerable, putting human rights defenders and activists at higher risk.

According to the CIVICUS Monitor, 72.4% of the world’s population lives in countries where civic space is repressed or closed. The message these funding cuts send to authoritarian and repressive states is clear: civil society is no longer a priority for Western democracies that once invested in the protection and promotion of civic space.

The role of philanthropy

Private foundations and philanthropic institutions must fill the gaps left by bilateral funders, providing flexible and rapid funding to sustain critical work. While the shortfall is vast, philanthropy must rise to the occasion to prevent the collapse of vital organizations and initiatives.

Emergency grants are needed to sustain operations, protect staff, and support security-related expenses such as safe houses, legal aid and physical and digital protection. Without this intervention, our ability to advocate for democracy, justice, and human rights for all will be severely diminished. Investments must prioritize local actors, ensuring they have the resources to lead, innovate, and sustain their work beyond donor-driven priorities.

Rethinking global solidarity

This moment calls for a fundamental rethinking of global solidarity. The traditional donor-recipient model is currently showing its limits. In this time of crisis, we must recognize that the challenges faced by civil society globally are shared, and the responsibility to support those in need should be mutually distributed rather than concentrated in a few high-income countries.

We should foster collaborative, co-designed solutions where all partners, North and South, large and small, share the risks and rewards of international development efforts.

This is where the power of coalitions and alliances like CIVICUS comes in. In the face of growing fear and retribution, many individuals and organizations, both in the U.S. and abroad, are afraid to speak out. CIVICUS and other global alliances and coalitions must step in to amplify the voices of those who fear retaliation and support those on the ground fighting for justice.

This moment demands not just financial resources but a renewed commitment to our shared values. This crisis might be ripping the guts out of the international aid system, but it cannot take the heart out of solidarity.

Conclusion

This moment is a stress test for global civil society. If donor-driven priorities continue to dictate the fate of grassroots organizations, social and activist movements, and civil society organizations, we will see the erosion of human rights, justice, and democracy worldwide.

The question is not just how to survive these cuts, but how to build a model of solidarity that is independent of political whims.

At the same time, this is a moment for introspection and transformation within civil society itself. Circumstances demand that we explore alternative means of resource mobilization, adapt to new challenges, and build resilience that is not solely dependent on traditional funding structures.

Now more than ever, we must reaffirm our commitment to global solidarity not as a charitable act, but as an existential necessity for a just and sustainable future.

Jessica Corredor Villamil is Chief Officer, Advocacy and Solidarity Action at CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance. She is based in Paris.

IPS UN Bureau

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Venezuela: The Democratic Transition That Wasn’t

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Opinion

Credit: Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 3 2025 (IPS) – Venezuela stands at a critical juncture as Nicolás Maduro begins a controversial third term as president. His 10 January inauguration, following a post-election period marked by widespread protests against election fraud and heightened repression, represents a significant setback for democratic aspirations in a country devastated by years of economic collapse and political oppression. Maduro’s confirmation at the helm is the latest chapter in a decades-long process that has transformed Venezuela from a beacon of leftist democratic aspirations into a full-blown authoritarian regime, where the last shred of legitimacy – popular election – has now vanished.

The implications of Venezuela’s crisis extend far beyond its borders, triggering the largest refugee exodus in the Americas and creating significant challenges for neighbouring countries. Almost eight million Venezuelans live abroad, with projections suggesting another two or three million might leave in the coming years.

This crisis comes at a moment when, unlike in the past, two key factors potentially leading to a democratic transition are present: unprecedented opposition unity capable of sustaining a protest movement and growing international support, with progressive Latin American governments increasingly distancing themselves from Maduro. However, Maduro’s willingness to use violent repression and his ability to maintain military loyalty suggest a difficult path ahead for democratic restoration.

Election fraud and post-election repression

The 2024 presidential election initially sparked hopes for democratic change. These hopes were crushed when Maduro declared himself the winner despite clear evidence that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia had secured a significant victory.

The election campaign unfolded against a backdrop of intensifying civic space restrictions and was far from free and fair. The government disqualified popular opposition leader María Corina Machado and blocked her proposed replacement, forcing the opposition to field González Urrutia. Additional irregularities included systematic persecution of opposition leaders, abuse of public resources, media manipulation and voter suppression tactics, particularly targeting the estimated four million Venezuelan voters abroad.

Despite these challenges, the opposition demonstrated unprecedented unity and organisation. Through its Plan 600K initiative, it mobilised around 600,000 volunteers to monitor polling stations, collect the tallies produced by voting machines and independently calculate results. Their parallel count revealed that González won around 67 per cent of votes compared to Maduro’s 29 per cent, figures supported by independent exit polls. However, the National Electoral Council stopped publishing results after counting 40 per cent of votes, eventually declaring an implausible Maduro victory without providing any supporting data.

Fraud sparked widespread unrest, with 915 spontaneous protests erupting across Venezuelan cities in the two days following the election. The regime’s response was swift and severe. It labelled protests a ‘fascist outbreak’ and charged many protesters with terrorism and incitement to hatred. Security forces used deadly force, resulting in at least 25 deaths, while pro-government paramilitaries engaged in intimidation and violence.

The crackdown extended beyond protesters to target opposition and civil society leaders. Several prominent figures were forced into hiding or exile, while others faced arbitrary detention. Repression intensified in the lead-up to Maduro’s inauguration, with 75 new political detentions in the first 11 days of January alone.

Inauguration day

Maduro’s inauguration reflected both the regime’s isolation and its increasingly authoritarian character. Only two presidents – from Cuba and Nicaragua – attended the ceremony, while other governments sent lower-level representatives. The swearing-in ceremony took place 90 minutes earlier than scheduled, out of fear that the opposition’s president-elect, in exile in Spain, could somehow materialise its declared intention to enter Venezuela and hold a parallel counter-inauguration.

The government implemented extraordinary security measures to make sure this wouldn’t happen, closing land borders with Brazil and Colombia, shutting down Venezuelan airspace and deploying an unprecedented number of security forces throughout Caracas. The militarisation extended to the closure of opposition-controlled neighbourhoods and the pre-emptive detention of dozens of opposition figures.

Maduro’s inaugural address and subsequent appearances were particularly confrontational. He announced plans for constitutional changes to further consolidate power and declared the beginning of a new phase of governance based on a strong alliance between civilian authorities, military forces, the police and the intelligence apparatus. He openly discussed Venezuela’s readiness to take up arms against intervention alongside Cuba and Nicaragua, framing political opposition as a threat to national sovereignty.

International responses and regional implications

In the Americas, only Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras and Nicaragua recognise Maduro as the legitimately elected president, with only an additional handful worldwide, including China, Iran and Russia, maintaining their support.

The USA responded to Maduro’s inauguration by increasing the reward it offers for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to US$25 million, while also targeting his inner circle with new sanctions. The European Union also imposed new sanctions. The G7’s foreign ministers and the High Representative of the European Union issued a joint statement condemning Maduro’s ‘lack of democratic legitimacy’ and the ongoing repression of civil society and the political opposition.

Most significantly, the positions of Latin American states appear to be slowly shifting, with some left-wing leaders, notably those of Brazil and Colombia, not automatically siding with the Maduro regime for the first time. However, Colombia’s pragmatic approach reveals the complexities faced by Venezuela’s neighbours: while not accepting the official election results at face value, Colombia has stopped short of condemnation and has been careful to maintain its diplomatic relations, citing the need to manage border issues and the refugee situation.

Prospects for democratic change

The path to democratic transition faces significant obstacles, with military support remaining crucial to Maduro’s hold on power. The regime has secured military loyalty through a combination of institutional integration, coercion and economic privilege, with high-ranking military officers reaping generous rewards. The regime has found additional layers of protection in security structures including the National Bolivarian Guard, special police units and pro-government militias, and the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, strongly backed by G2, Cuba’s secret service.

But the authoritarian regime has vulnerabilities. Growing international isolation, combined with continued economic deterioration, may eventually strain the system of patronage that maintains elite loyalty, including among the military. The opposition’s commitment to peaceful resistance, while seemingly ineffective in the short term, continues to earn it moral authority and international support.

While the combination of peaceful resistance, international pressure and potential internal divisions within the regime may eventually create conditions for change, the immediate future suggests a continuing struggle between an entrenched authoritarian system and a resilient democratic movement. The outcome will have profound implications for Venezuela and for all of Latin America.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org.

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Civil Society Trends for 2025: Nine Global Challenges, One Reason for Hope

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LONDON / MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Dec 24 2024 (IPS) – It’s been a tumultuous year, and a tough one for struggles for human rights. Civil society’s work to seek social justice and hold the powerful to account has been tested at every turn. Civil society has kept holding the line, resisting power grabs and regressive legislation, calling out injustice and claiming some victories, often at great cost. And things aren’t about to get any easier, as key challenges identified in 2024 are likely to intensify in 2025.

Andrew Firmin

1. More people are likely to be exposed to conflict and its consequences, including humanitarian and human rights disasters, mass displacement and long-term trauma. The message of 2024 is largely one of impunity: perpetrators of conflict, including in Israel and Russia, will be confident they can resist international pressure and escape accountability. While there may be some kind of ceasefire in Gaza or halt to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, those responsible for large-scale atrocities are unlikely to face justice. Impunity is also likely to prevail in the conflicts taking place largely off the global radar, including in Myanmar and Sudan. There will also be growing concern about the use of AI and automated weapons in warfare, a troublingly under-regulated area.

As recent events in Lebanon and Syria have shown, changing dynamics, including shifting calculations made by countries such as Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkey and the USA, mean that frozen conflicts could reignite and new ones could erupt. As in Syria, these shifts could create sudden moments of opportunity; the international community and civil society must respond quickly when these come.

Inés M. Pousadela

2. The second Trump administration will have a global impact on many current challenges. It’s likely to reduce pressure on Israel, hamper the response to the climate crisis, put more strain on already flawed and struggling global governance institutions and embolden right-wing populists and nationalists the world over. These will bring negative consequences for civic space – the space for civil society, which depends on the freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly. Funding for civil society is also likely to be drastically reduced as a result of the new administration’s shifting priorities.

3. 2025 is the year that states are required to develop new plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change under the Paris Agreement. The process will culminate in the COP30 climate summit in Brazil, likely the world’s last chance to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees above preindustrial levels. This will only happen if states stand up to fossil fuel companies and look beyond narrow short-term interests. Failing that, more of the debate may come to focus on adaptation. The unresolved question of who will pay for climate transition will remain central. Meanwhile, extreme weather events such as heatwaves and floods can be expected to continue to devastate communities, impose high economic costs, drive migration and exacerbate conflicts.

4. Globally, economic dysfunction is likely to increase, with more people struggling to afford basic necessities, increasingly including housing, as prices continue to rise, with climate change and conflict among the causes. The gap between the struggling many and the ultra-wealthy few will become more visible, and anger at rising prices or taxes will drive people – particularly young people deprived of opportunities – onto the streets. State repression will often follow. Frustration with the status quo means people will keep looking for political alternatives, a situation right-wing populists and nationalists will keep exploiting. But demands for labour rights, particularly among younger workers, will also likely increase, along with pressure for policies such as wealth taxes, a universal basic income and a shorter working week.

5. A year when the largest number of people ever went to the polls has ended – but there are still plenty of elections to come. Where elections are free and fair, voters are likely to keep rejecting incumbents, particularly due to economic hardship. Right-wing populists and nationalists are likely to benefit the most, but the tide will eventually turn: once they’ve been around long enough to be perceived as part of the political establishment, they too will see their positions threatened, and they can be expected to respond with authoritarianism, repression and the scapegoating of excluded groups. More politically manipulated misogyny, homophobia, transphobia and anti-migrant rhetoric can be expected as a result.

6. Even if developments in generative AI slow as the current model reaches the limits of the human-generated material it feeds on, international regulation and data protection will likely continue to lag behind. The use of AI-enabled surveillance, such as facial recognition, against activists is likely to increase and become more normalised. The challenge of disinformation is likely to intensify, particularly around conflicts and elections.

Several tech leaders have actively taken the side of right-wing populists and authoritarians, putting their platforms and wealth at the service of their political ambitions. Emerging alternative social media platforms offer some promise but are likely to face similar problems as they grow.

7. Climate change, conflict, economic strife, repression of LGBTQI+ identities and civil and political repression will continue to drive displacement and migration. Most migrants will remain in difficult and underfunded conditions in global south countries. In the global north, right-wing shifts are expected to drive more restrictive and repressive policies, including the deportation of migrants to countries where they may be at risk. Attacks on civil society working to defend their rights, including by assisting at sea and land borders, are also likely to intensify.

8. The backlash against women’s and LGBTQI+ rights will continue. The US right wing will continue to fund anti-rights movements in the global south, notably in Commonwealth African countries, while European conservative groups will continue to export their anti-rights campaigns, as some Spanish organisations have long done throughout Latin America. Disinformation efforts from multiple sources, including Russian state media, will continue to influence public opinion. This will leave civil society largely on the defensive, focused on consolidating gains and preventing setbacks.

9. As a result of these trends, the ability of civil society organisations and activists to operate freely will remain under pressure in the majority of countries. Just when its work is most needed, civil society will face growing restrictions on fundamental civic freedoms, including in the form of anti-NGO laws and laws that label civil society as agents of foreign powers, the criminalisation of protests and increasing threats to the safety of activists and journalists. Civil society will have to devote more of its resources to protecting its space, at the expense of the resources available to promote and advance rights.

10. Despite these many challenges, civil society will continue to strive on all fronts. It will continue to combine advocacy, protests, online campaigns, strategic litigation and international diplomacy. As awareness grows of the interconnected and transnational nature of the challenges, it will emphasise solidarity actions that transcend national boundaries and make connections between different struggles in different contexts.

Even in difficult circumstances, civil society achieved some notable victories in 2024. In the Czech Republic, civil society’s efforts led to a landmark reform of rape laws, and in Poland they resulted in a law making emergency contraception available without prescription, overturning previous restrictive legislation. After extensive civil society advocacy, Thailand led the way in Southeast Asia by passing a marriage equality law, while Greece became the first predominantly Christian Orthodox country to legalise same-sex marriage

People defended democracy. In South Korea, people took to the streets in large numbers to resist martial law, while in Bangladesh, protest action led to the ousting of a longstanding authoritarian government. In Guatemala, a president committed to fighting corruption was sworn in after civil society organised mass protests to demand that powerful elites respect the election results, and in Venezuela, hundreds of thousands organised to defend the integrity of the election, defeated the authoritarian government in the polls and took to the streets in the face of severe repression when the results weren’t recognised. In Senegal, civil society mobilised to prevent an attempt to postpone an election that resulted in an opposition win.

Civil society won victories in climate and environmental litigation – including in Ecuador, India and Switzerland – to force governments to recognise the human rights impacts of climate change and do more to reduce emissions and curb pollution. Civil society also took to the courts to pressure governments to stop arms sales to Israel, with a successful verdict in the Netherlands and others pending.

In 2025, the struggle continues. Civil society will keep carrying the torch of hope that a more peaceful, just, equal and sustainable world is possible. This idea will remain as important as the tangible impact we’ll continue to achieve despite the difficult circumstances.

Andrew Firmin is Editor-in-Chief and Inés M. Pousadela is Senior Research Specialist at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The two are co-directors and writers for CIVICUS Lens and co-authors of the State of Civil Society Report.

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South Korea’s Democracy Defended

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LONDON, Dec 20 2024 (IPS) – Democracy is alive and well in South Korea. When President Yoon Suk Yeol tried to impose martial law, the public and parliamentarians united to defend it. Now Yoon must face justice for his power grab.

President under pressure

Yoon narrowly won the presidency in an incredibly tight contest in March 2022, beating rival candidate Lee Jae-myung by a 0.73 per cent margin. That marked a political comeback for one of South Korea’s two main political parties, the rebranded centre-right People Power Party, and a defeat for the other, the more progressive Democratic Party.

In a divisive campaign, Yoon capitalised on and helped inflame a backlash among many young men against the country’s emerging feminist movement.

South Korea had a MeToo moment in 2018, as women started to speak out following high-profile sexual harassment revelations. South Korea is one of the worst performing members on gender equality of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: it ranks third lowest for women’s political representation and last for its gender pay gap.

Some modest steps forward in women’s rights brought a disproportionate backlash. Groups styling themselves as defending men’s rights sprang up, their members claiming they were discriminated against in the job market. Yoon played squarely to this crowd, pledging to abolish the gender equality ministry. Exit polls showed that over half of young male voters backed him.

Human rights conditions then worsened under Yoon’s rule. His administration was responsible for an array of civic space restrictions. These included harassment and criminalisation of journalists, raids on trade union offices and arrests of their leaders, and protest bans. Media freedoms deteriorated, with lawsuits and criminal defamation laws having a chilling effect.

But the balance of power shifted after the 2024 parliamentary election, when the People Power Party suffered a heavy defeat. Although the Democratic Party and its allies fell short of the two-thirds majority required to impeach Yoon, the result left him a lame-duck president. The opposition-dominated parliament blocked key budget proposals and filed 22 impeachment motions against government officials.

Yoon’s popularity plummeted amid ongoing economic woes and allegations of corruption – sadly nothing new for a South Korean leader. The First Lady, Kim Keon Hee, was accused of accepting a Dior bag as a gift and of manipulating stock prices. It seems clear that Yoon, backed into a corner, lashed out and took an incredible gamble – one that South Korean people didn’t accept.

Yoon’s decision

Yoon made his extraordinary announcement on state TV on the evening of 3 December. Shamefully, he claimed the move was necessary to combat ‘pro-North Korean anti-state forces’, smearing those trying to hold him to account as supporters of the totalitarian regime across the border. Yoon ordered the army to arrest key political figures, including the leader of his party, Han Dong Hoon, Democratic Party leader Lee and National Assembly Speaker Woo Won Shik.

The declaration of martial law gives the South Korean president sweeping powers. The military can arrest, detain and punish people without a warrant, the media are placed under strict controls, all political activity is suspended and protests are widely banned.

The problem was that Yoon had clearly exceeded his powers and acted unconstitutionally. Martial law can only be declared when there are extraordinary threats to the nation’s survival, such as invasion or armed rebellion. A series of political disputes that put the president under uncomfortable scrutiny clearly didn’t fit the bill. And the National Assembly was supposed to remain in session, but Yoon tried to shut it down, deploying armed forces to try to stop representatives gathering to vote.

But Yoon hadn’t reckoned with many people’s determination not to return to the dark days of dictatorship before multiparty democracy was established in 1987. People also had recent experience of forcing out an evidently corrupt president. In the Candlelight Revolution of 2016 and 2017, mass weekly protests built pressure on President Park Guen-hye, who was impeached, removed from office and jailed for corruption and abuse of power.

People massed outside the National Assembly in protest. As the army blocked the building’s main gates, politicians climbed over the fences. Protesters and parliamentary staff faced off against heavily armed troops with fire extinguishers, forming a chain around the building so lawmakers could vote. Some 190 made it in, and they unanimously repealed Yoon’s decision.

Time for justice

Now Yoon must face justice. Protesters will continue to urge him to quit, and a criminal investigation into the decision to declare martial law has been launched.

The first attempt to impeach Yoon was thwarted by political manoeuvring. People Power politicians walked out to prevent a vote on 7 December, apparently hoping Yoon would resign instead. But he showed no sign of stepping down, and a second vote on 14 December decisively backed impeachment, with 12 People Power Party members supporting the move. The vote was greeted with scenes of jubilation from the tens of thousands of protesters massed in freezing conditions outside the National Assembly.

Yoon is now suspended, with Prime Minister Han Duck-soo the interim president. The Constitutional Court has six months to hold an impeachment process. Polls show most South Koreans back impeachment, although Yoon still claims his move was necessary.

Democracy defended

South Korea’s representative democracy, like most, has its flaws. People may not always be happy with election results. Presidents may find it hard to work with a parliament that opposes them. But imperfect though it may be, South Koreans have shown they value their democracy and will defend it from the threat of authoritarian rule – and can be expected to keep mobilising if Yoon evades justice.

Thankfully, Yoon’s attacks on civic space hadn’t got to the stage where civil society’s ability to mobilise and people’s capacity to defend democracy had been broken down. Recent events and South Korea’s uncertain future make it all the more important that the civic space restrictions imposed by Yoon’s administration are reversed as quickly as possible. To defend against backsliding and deepen democracy, it’s vital to expand civic space and invest in civil society.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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African Public Transport Struggles To Match Urban Growth

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Sustainable Development Goals

A congested street in Bulawayo where public transporters pick up passengers at an undesignated point. Credit: Ignatius Banda/IPS

A congested street in Bulawayo where public transporters pick up passengers at an undesignated point. Credit: Ignatius Banda/IPS

BULAWAYO, Dec 18 2024 (IPS) – As the population in African cities grows, governments are struggling to provide sustainable public transport solutions, conditions that have led to gridlock in major business districts.

Projections show rapid growth of urban populations across the continent, and town planners are hard-pressed for time on how new spaces and infrastructure will be created for efficient public transport.

A growing number of cities are expected to hit a population of more than 10 million people by 2035, but social services are failing to match the overload on existing infrastructure, with public transport being one of the major sticking points.

In countries such as Zimbabwe, where government-owned transport utilities have been overtaken by thousands of illegal taxi operators, local authorities are fighting an uphill battle to bring order out of the urban chaos.

In the country’s two major cities, Harare and Bulawayo, municipalities have put in place measures to decongest the public transport sector, but these have fallen flat as both registered and unregistered operators have routinely ignored the decrees to work from designated points.

For example, in 2015, the city of Bulawayo awarded a multimillion-dollar contract for the construction of what was hoped to be a futuristic public transport terminus, but operators have shunned it, claiming its positioning in the central business district is bad for business.

While the Egodini Mall Taxi Rank and Informal Traders Market was also expected to provide trading space for vendors in anticipation of business from travelers, it is marked by empty vending bays, with traders preferring crowded CBD sidewalks instead.

City mayor David Coltart has conceded that the project risks becoming a white elephant, and construction of the next phase of the project has been halted to deal with these challenges, highlighting the challenge growing cities face in their efforts to modernise amenities.

Zimbabwe’s public transport headaches come against the backdrop of the Second World Sustainable Transport Day this November, where policymakers and agencies rethink urban mobility.

Other pertinent issues include ways of incorporating public transport into the broader improvement of “safety and security, reducing pollution and CO2 emissions while increasing the attractiveness of urban environments,” according to a United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) briefing during the 2023 World Sustainable Transport Day.

According to UN Habitat, the day was declared by the UN General Assembly “in recognition of the important role of safe, affordable, accessible, and sustainable transport systems for all in supporting sustainable economic growth, improving the social welfare of people, and enhancing international cooperation and trade among countries.”

However, to achieve this, UNECA says African governments must put in place “remedial measures” that will ensure the continent’s transportation systems are more sustainable and environmentally friendly.

“African governments must prioritize inclusive urban planning,” said Atkeyelsh Persson, chief of the Urbanization and Development Section at the Economic Commission for Africa.

“Key areas of focus should include upgrading infrastructure such as roads and utilities,” Persson told IPS.

This comes as Zimbabwe and other regional countries seem to be going backwards in realising UNECA’s goals as they are struggling to cope with rapid urbanisation and provide sustainable urban transport solutions for city dwellers.

During last year’s inaugural World Sustainable Transport Day, UNECA said the continent was in urgent need of developing sustainable and resilient public transport infrastructure if Africa is to “optimise the development of interconnected highways, railways, waterways, and airways.”

The agency noted that Africa’s rapid urbanisation was also a call to escalate sustainable urban transport solutions, but with government cuts in public spending and also the drying up of private investors in the sector, public transportation has only deteriorated.

“Despite this growth in urban populations, the rate of growth in housing, infrastructure, and basic amenities has not kept pace with this urban growth,” said Nyovani Madise, a demographics professor and President of the Union for African Population Studies.

“This has resulted in mushrooming of urban informal settlements, waste and pollution, congestion on the roads and overcrowding,” Madise told IPS.

While UNECA has called for the optimisation of interconnected transportation, Zimbabwe’s once thriving railways has become virtually nonexistent, with the National Railways suspending its passenger train service citing operational challenges.

As part of desperate efforts to deal with the shrinking space for public transport, the Bulawayo municipality is planning to take over parking space at the National Railways of Zimbabwe train station for use as a long-distance bus terminus.

The unusual move was triggered by an increasing number of long-distance buses in Bulawayo who have joined smaller pirate taxis picking up passengers in undesignated points.

These developments have further highlighted the difficulties some African countries face in balancing urban population growth and public transport needs, which could be a missed opportunity towards UNECA’s proposed “socially inclusive, environmentally sustainable, and well-governed continent.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Breaking Latin America’s Cycle of Low Growth and Violence

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Credit: Syldavia/iStock by Getty Images via IMF

WASHINGTON DC, Dec 12 2024 (IPS) – Violent crime and insecurity have a disproportionate impact on Latin America and the Caribbean, with severe consequences for socioeconomic development.

Despite representing just 8% of the world’s population, the region accounts for nearly one-third of global homicides. This as well as other alarming statistics highlight the urgent need for comprehensive strategies to address the far-reaching effects of crime and violence.

New research by the IDB and IMF highlights how crime, insecurity and low growth reinforce each other in a vicious cycle that stifles investment, reduces tourism, and accelerates emigration.

Macroeconomic instability—recessions, inflation spikes, and rising inequality—is associated with increased violence. Easily available firearms and organized crime amplify these effects, undermining institutions and the rule of law.

Quantifying the Costs of Crime

A recent IDB paper quantifies the direct losses, estimating that crime and violence cost the region 3.4 percent of GDP annually. These costs stem from productivity losses due to lives lost, injuries, and imprisonment; private-sector expenditures on security; and public spending on police, justice, and prisons.

This is equivalent to 80 percent of the region’s public education budgets and double its social assistance spending. But the impact of crime doesn’t end there. It discourages investment, reduces tourism, and drives emigration, further weakening economic resilience and constraining the region’s future growth.

IMF research reveals that crime hampers innovation and reduces firm productivity, compounding economic stagnation over time. Leveraging geo-localized data on nightlights, the study finds that halving homicide rates in violent municipalities could increase their economic output by up to 30 percent.

At the regional level, as shown in last year’s IMF research, reducing homicide rates to the global average could boost Latin America and the Caribbean’s annual GDP growth by 0.5 percentage points.

Conversely, macroeconomic instability often fuels spikes in violence: a recession in LAC is associated with a 6 percent increase in homicides the following year, while inflation spikes above 10 percent are linked to a 10 percent rise in homicides the year after. Growing inequality further exacerbates the link between economic stagnation and crime.

How can policymakers help break the cycle?

Breaking this vicious circle requires a deeper understanding of its root causes and impacts. Rigorous research and better data are essential for designing public policies that effectively reduce crime. Institutions like the IDB and IMF can generate evidence, monitor crime dynamics, advise member countries, and facilitate discussions.

As the topic has become macro critical in the region, the institutions brought together experts and policymakers in a joint conference a few weeks back.

First, sound economic policy plays a preventive role. Stability, low inflation, robust social safety nets, and opportunities that reduce inequality and expand access to education and employment are critical to breaking the cycle of violence and stagnation.

Financial authorities are also uniquely positioned to weaken criminal networks by addressing illicit markets, curtailing financial flows, and tackling money laundering—cutting off resources that sustain organized crime.

Second, because the impact of crime extends far beyond direct economic costs, economic policymakers must adopt a broader role by targeting high-risk groups, improving crime monitoring, and enhancing interagency coordination.

Effective interventions can deliver transformative results. With IMF support, Jamaica implemented reforms that protected public investment and social spending while successfully halving debt between 2012 and 2022. Community-based interventions supported by the IDB reduced gang violence in 68% of affected neighborhoods.

In Rosario province, Argentina implemented a comprehensive strategy to combat crime, including territorial control of high-risk neighborhoods by the Federal Police, stricter prison systems for high-profile offenders, and collective prosecution of criminal groups under new legislation like the anti-mafia law.

These efforts, alongside progress on a juvenile penal code to deter drug traffickers from recruiting minors, have led to 65% reduction homicides in 11 months. In Honduras, strategic security reforms contributed to a 14% decline in the homicide rate and an 8% increase in public confidence in law enforcement.

Policymakers must prioritize using resources effectively, given the scope of the challenge. Public spending on security in the region is already high—around 1.9 percent of GDP, or 7.4 percent of total public expenditure—and may be even greater where the military and subnational governments are involved.

Finance ministers and fiscal authorities need a full understanding of these costs, covering police, courts, prisons, and related institutions, to ensure funds are allocated efficiently to areas with the highest impact. They also need to monitor them in the same way they surveil other large spending tickets, evaluating their impact and pressing for results.

Transnational Crime Demands Regional Cooperation

Tackling crime solely at the national level isn’t sufficient. Criminal groups operate across borders, making isolated responses ineffective and fragmented. To address this shared challenge, countries must collaborate more closely to develop stronger, more coordinated solutions.

Recognizing the transnational nature of crime, the IDB’s Alliance for Security, Justice, and Development seeks to unite governments, civil society, and private-sector actors. This alliance not only aims to strengthen institutions and enhance cooperation but also supports public policies and mobilizes resources to implement evidence-based solutions that effectively combat organized crime and violence.

Regional collaboration is crucial for disrupting the sophisticated, interconnected networks of organized crime that undermine the rule of law and economic stability. By fostering unified efforts, institutions like the IMF and IDB alongside governments and civil society, have a critical role to play in this effort.

With people’s lives on the line, the true impact of these efforts must be felt on the ground—by creating safer streets, restoring hope in communities, and offering individuals a real chance to thrive economically in a future free from violence.

Ilan Goldfajn was elected president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on November 20, 2022, and took office on December 19, 2022. He previously served as director of the Western Hemisphere Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2022, where he supported countries in implementing IMF programs and contributed to climate change policy dialogue. Earlier, he was an economist at the IMF from 1996 to 1999.

Rodrigo Valdés, a national of Chile, is director of the Western Hemisphere Department since May 2023. Prior to this, Rodrigo was a professor of economics in the School of Government at the Catholic University of Chile. He also held the position of Chile’s Minister of Finance from 2015 to 2017. At the IMF, he also was a deputy director of the IMF European and WHD departments.

Source: IMF Blog

IPS UN Bureau

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