Spotlight on Landlocked Developing Countries Ahead of Third UN Conference

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Sustainable Development Goals

Uganda's Malaba town borders Kenya to the east and is a major entry point for goods destined for landlocked Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan from Kenya's Mombasa Port. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS

Uganda’s Malaba town borders Kenya to the east and is a major entry point for goods destined for landlocked Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan from Kenya’s Mombasa Port. Credit: Joyce Chimbi/IPS

NAIROBI, Aug 1 2025 (IPS) – Landlocked developing countries face a unique set of challenges. Without coastal ports, they rely on transit nations, causing higher trade costs and delays.


To explore solutions to these complex hurdles, the Third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) or LLDC3, will take place in Awaza, Turkmenistan, 5–8 August 2025.

May Yaacoub, LLDC3 spokesperson and head of Advocacy and Outreach at the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UNOHRLLS), told IPS that the conference is “an opportunity to unlock the full potential of landlocked countries and address the challenges faced by some of the world’s most marginalized countries.”

“In every LLDC the map itself shapes the economy. Without a coastline, even the simplest export, whether cotton lint, copper cathode or cloud‑based software, must first cross at least one foreign border and frequently an entire transit corridor before it reaches a port,” Tomás Manuel González Álvarez, Senior Programme Management Officer and LLDC Team Lead at UNOHRLLS told IPS.

“The UN estimates that this physical detour means average transport costs in LLDCs are about 1.4 times higher than in comparable coastal economies. Those added costs depress profit margins, narrow the range of viable products and deter investors who value just‑in‑time delivery.”

Against this backdrop and while lacking direct sea access causes and exacerbates hurdles in trade, connectivity, and development, Yaacoub says LLDCs host vibrant communities with untapped potential and that these countries “have the ideas and know what they need to prosper. By supporting them at LLDC3 with partnerships, innovations and cooperation, we can help to build a more equitable and prosperous future for all.”

“This conference comes at the heels of the expiration of the Vienna Programme of Actions, which was adopted in Vienna, Austria, in November 2014, during LLDC2. LLDC3 will continue the work of LLDC2 and serve as a platform to explore innovative solutions, build meaningful and strategic partnerships, and increase the investment in LLDCs,” she observed.

The theme of the conference is ‘Driving Progress through Partnerships’, which she says underscores a shift from donor-recipient dynamics to mutual accountability and co-investment. And, that this includes a stronger role for transit countries, enhanced multilateral cooperation, and alignment with the SDGs, Paris Agreement and the Pact of the Future.

Álvarez emphasizes that this key, landlockedness, is experienced very differently and that the conference agenda reflects an understanding of these complexities. In Africa, “for countries such as Niger or Zambia, the critical pain point is the sheer length and fragility of overland routes—1,800 km from Niamey to Cotonou; 1,900 km from Lusaka to Durban.”

“Road and rail bottlenecks meet frequent customs stops and, in parts of the Sahel, insecurity. The result is chronic delays and freight rates that can exceed the f.o.b. (a term that defines who pays for the transportation costs) value of low‑margin agricultural commodities.”

He says in Asia, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan possess better road and rail grids yet face. At the same time, these economies are accelerating an energy transition, moving from hydrocarbons to renewables and green hydrogen so they now need corridors that can carry high‑voltage electricity and fiber as well as bulk ore.

“Bolivia and Paraguay rely on the 3,300‑km Paraguay–Paraná waterway for almost four‑fifths of their trade. Low river levels during recent droughts have stranded barges and cost Paraguay an estimated USD 300 million in 2024 alone. Moreover, new tolls levied by Argentina highlight the vulnerability that comes with dependence on a single transit state,” he says.

Within this context, Yaacoub says LLDC3 represents a major change in both scope and ambition compared to its predecessors—LLDC1 held in Almaty in 2003, which was a ministerial meeting, and LLDC2 in Vienna in 2014. The first conference of this nature, or LLDC1 focused primarily on transit policy, infrastructure development, international trade, and technical and financial assistance.

LLDC2 expanded to include structural economic transformation, regional integration, and means of implementation. Notably, she says, LLDC3 “introduces a more holistic and forward-looking agenda, emphasizing climate resilience and adaptation, digital transformation and technology access, sustainable industrialization, reforming the global financial architecture, shock-resilience and disaster risk reduction.”

Yaacoub says the LLDC3 agenda reflects the unprecedented global complexities of the current era—climate change, pandemics, geopolitical tensions, and economic shocks. Key thematic areas include climate vulnerability and financing, with an emphasis on operationalizing the Loss and Damage Fund, doubling adaptation finance, and ensuring access to concessional resources.

Álvarez says the conference is particularly focused on converting the narrative from landlocked to land‑linked and that unlocking these countries potential relies on a strategy built on mutually reinforcing pillars that include “how Multibillion‑dollar investments in regional corridors, the Central and Northern Corridors in East Africa, the Trans‑Caspian route into Europe, and new dry‑ports on the Paraguay‑Paraná system can cut door‑to‑port time by 30 percent within the decade.”

He says building climate resilience is critical due to a “heavy reliance of LLDCs on agriculture, especially rain-fed agriculture, as a primary source of income, employment, and sustenance. Climate variability has already begun to disrupt agricultural cycles, reduce crop yields, and threaten food security. These effects ripple across rural economies, deepening poverty and forcing difficult choices for households.”

Álvarez says these issues are critical, as the same remoteness that inflates freight costs also hampers relief when drought, flood or storm strikes. Many LLDCs suffer disproportionately from climate‑related disasters because they lack redundant road and telecom links, and that “as extreme weather intensifies, production shocks travel quickly through thinly diversified economies and can wipe out years of growth.”

Overall, he says, “collectively these headwinds jeopardize progress on at least six Sustainable Development Goals—most visibly Goals 1 (No Poverty), 9 (Industry and Infrastructure) and 13 (Climate Action). Unless structural constraints are eased, many LLDCs risk missing the 2030 milestones by a full generation.”

Álvarez says the “developmental drag created by geography is not merely inconvenient; it is systemic.”

Stressing that high logistics costs shrink the set of competitive exports and that “many LLDCs remain reliant on two or three unprocessed commodities, leaving them vulnerable to price swings and limiting the spill‑overs that normally accompany industrial clustering.”

He says limited fiscal space means that governments struggle to finance education, health and social protection at scale. LLDCs as a group record poverty rates 50–60 percent higher than the global developing‑country average and score lower on the World Bank’s human‑capital index, 0.36 versus 0.48 in 2024.

Yaacoub confirms that all these issues will be explored in depth across key thematic areas that also include the private sector, civil society and youth engagement to foster inclusive partnerships and South-South and Triangular Cooperation with an emphasis on regional and interregional collaboration.

“This inclusive process ensures that the new Awaza Programme of Action is grounded in the lived realities of LLDCs and their partners,” she observes.

After all is said and done, Yaacoub says the most desirable outcome from the Third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries would be the global endorsement and operationalization of the Awaza Programme of Action, which is a transformative and actionable framework that empowers LLDCs to overcome their structural challenges and thrive in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

Stressing that LLDC3 will serve as “a high-level platform to present, promote, and mobilize support for the implementation of the Awaza PoA that was adopted in December 2024. The second outcome would be the mobilization of resources and investment commitments from development partners to support infrastructure, climate resilience, and digital transformation.”

Ultimately, she is optimistic that the conference will lead to strengthened partnerships and regional cooperation to renew and expand transit agreements and regional integration initiatives, including enhanced South-South and Triangular Cooperation frameworks and commitments to multilateral collaboration aligned with the SDGs, the Paris Agreement and the pact of the Future.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

‘After Decades of Making Huge Profits, Companies Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Leave Behind a Toxic Legacy’

Active Citizens, Africa, Civil Society, Climate Change, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Energy, Environment, Featured, Food and Agriculture, Headlines, Health, TerraViva United Nations

Jul 29 2025 (IPS) –  
CIVICUS speaks with Matthew Renshaw, a partner at a UK law firm that represents Nigerian communities taking legal action against Shell over environmental damage caused by its operations in the Niger Delta.


Matthew Renshaw

Two Nigerian communities, Bille and Ogale, are suing Shell in the UK over decades of oil spills in the Niger Delta that have devastated their land, water and way of life. The High Court has ruled that Shell and its former Nigerian subsidiary can be held liable for ongoing environmental damage, even if caused by oil theft or sabotage, and regardless of how long ago the spills occurred. The decision builds on a 2021 Supreme Court ruling that allowed UK-based parent companies to be sued for harm abroad. A full trial is set for March 2027.

How has oil pollution affected these communities?

Each of the three communities we represent in the Niger Delta have been affected by Shell’s operations in different ways.

The Bodo community endured two major oil spills from Shell pipelines in 2008 that released over half a million barrels of oil, causing the largest devastation of mangrove habitat in history. Families who once depended on fishing can no longer provide for themselves. Even swimming in the waterways is dangerous due to oil contamination. Despite bringing the case before UK courts in 2011, the community is still demanding a proper cleanup that they say has never materialised.

As for the Bille and Ogale communities, they brought their cases against Shell in the UK in 2015. The Ogale community depends primarily on farming and fishing, but since the 1980s, Shell has recorded around 100 spills in and around the area that have resulted in serious contamination of the drinking water. The United Nations conducted tests in 2011 and declared a public health emergency, but very little was done in response. Shell briefly provided safe water to residents, but that ended years ago. With no alternative sources available, many people have been forced to use visibly polluted water to drink and bathe their children.

The Bille community lives on islands in a riverine area where residents depend heavily on fishing and harvesting shellfish. A major pipeline runs directly through the community, very close to where people live. Between 2011 and 2013, multiple oil spills from Shell destroyed mangrove habitats. As with the Bodo community, fishing has become impossible for many people, forcing some to abandon their homes and communities entirely.

Why sue in the UK rather than Nigeria?

The decision to sue Shell in the UK came from our clients. While Shell operates in Nigeria through a local subsidiary, the parent company is based in the UK and has profited immensely from its Niger Delta operations, so our clients view it as equally responsible for the pollution in their communities.

They also believe they can’t get justice in Nigeria. The Nigerian legal system is notoriously slow: cases can take decades to reach judgement due to automatic rights of appeal. Many people won’t live to see justice. Bringing this type of case before Nigerian courts is also prohibitively expensive, because it requires extensive expert evidence that’s inaccessible to most affected communities.

In contrast, UK funding mechanisms make it far more feasible for our clients to pursue justice. They also trust they’ll receive a fairer hearing in London. This approach has already shown results: in the Bodo case, Shell finally brought in international experts to attempt cleanup. International litigation generates meaningful outcomes that wouldn’t happen otherwise.

Even when Shell argued that the case should be heard in Nigeria, in 2021 the UK Supreme Court ruled that because Shell PLC may share responsibility with its subsidiary, the case could proceed in London.

How is Shell defending itself?

Shell claims that most Niger Delta pollution stems from oil theft by local criminals, commonly known as ‘bunkering’. According to Shell, these criminals steal oil from pipelines to sell directly or refine into fuel. The company insists its operations are clean and criminals are to blame, arguing it’s doing its best to stop theft and therefore shouldn’t be held responsible.

This defence is fundamentally flawed. While oil theft is certainly a significant problem in Nigeria, Shell’s claims are overstated. Numerous spills have nothing to do with theft. They’re caused simply by poorly maintained infrastructure and decades-old pipelines that are not fit for purpose. This stands in stark contrast to other countries where maintenance is taken far more seriously.

Even accepting Shell’s argument, our clients contend that Shell should have taken reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable theft. In other countries, pipelines are buried, fitted with detection systems and monitored closely to detect intrusion attempts or spills. Our clients contend that Shell has failed to implement these basic measures in the Niger Delta.

What did the recent court ruling say, and what do you hope to achieve?

The High Court sided with our position, ruling that if Shell failed to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm, it can be liable for pollution caused by bunkering. Significantly, the court also rejected Shell’s claims that it couldn’t be held liable for spills older than five years, ruling that if a spill has still not been cleaned up – even if it happened decades ago – the company can still be held accountable.

This ruling has far-reaching implications. It’s particularly significant for the Ogale case where pollution dates back to the 1980s, and it opens the door for many other Niger Delta communities affected by legacy spills dating to the 1970s or earlier. Beyond Nigeria, the ruling sends a warning to multinational companies attempting to divest from polluting operations without accepting responsibility for the damage left behind.

Our clients seek three main outcomes from the 2027 trial: proper cleanup and environmental remediation of their polluted lands, emergency provisions such as access to clean drinking water and compensation for lost livelihoods and damaged property.

A pressing concern is Shell’s recent divestment from its onshore operations in Nigeria. The company has sold its assets to a consortium and is attempting to walk away from decades of pollution. While the communities we represent have at least secured court proceedings, many others have been left behind with no cleanup and no accountability.

We’re determined to prevent Shell and other multinational companies from abandoning polluted sites without taking responsibility. Success in holding Shell accountable, including for decades-old spills, could establish crucial legal precedents. Legally, it would confirm that companies remain responsible for long-term environmental damage. Morally, it’s about basic fairness: after decades of extracting resources and making huge profits, companies shouldn’t be allowed to leave behind a toxic legacy.

While our case won’t create internationally binding precedents, it could significantly influence how similar claims are litigated in other countries, particularly in common law jurisdictions.

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SEE ALSO
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Bangladesh’s Democratic Promise Hangs in the Balance

Active Citizens, Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Crime & Justice, Democracy, Economy & Trade, Featured, Headlines, Human Rights, Inequality, Labour, Press Freedom, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Credit: Abdul Goni/Reuters via Gallo Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 7 2025 (IPS) – When Bangladesh’s streets erupted in protest in mid-2024, few could have predicted how swiftly Sheikh Hasina’s regime would crumble. The ousting of the prime minister last August, after years of mounting authoritarianism and growing discontent, was heralded as a historic opportunity for democratic renewal. Almost a year on, the question remains whether Bangladesh is genuinely evolving towards democracy, or if one form of repression is replacing another.


The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, confronts enormous challenges in delivering meaningful change. While it has taken significant steps – releasing political prisoners, initiating constitutional reforms, signing international human rights treaties and pursuing accountability for past violations – persistent abuses, political exclusion and economic instability continue to cast long shadows over the transition. The coming months will prove decisive in determining whether Bangladesh can truly break from its authoritarian past.

From electoral fraud to revolution

The roots of Bangladesh’s current upheaval trace back to the deeply flawed general election of 7 January 2024. The vote, which saw Hasina’s Awami League (AL) secure a fourth consecutive term, was widely dismissed as a foregone conclusion. The main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party boycotted the election in protest at the government’s refusal to reinstate a neutral caretaker system.

The government unleashed an intense crackdown ahead of the vote. It imprisoned thousands of opposition activists and weaponised the criminal justice system to silence dissent, leading to deaths in police custody and enforced disappearances. This repression extended to civil society, with human rights activists and journalists facing harassment, arbitrary detention and violence. The government sponsored fake opposition candidates to create an illusion of competition, resulting in plummeting voter turnout and a crisis of legitimacy.

When opposition rallies occurred, they were met with overwhelming force. On 28 October 2023, police responded to a major opposition protest in Dhaka with rubber bullets, teargas and stun grenades, resulting in at least 16 deaths, with thousands injured and detained.

The situation deteriorated further after the election. In June 2024, the reinstatement of a controversial quota system for public sector jobs triggered mass student-led protests that would ultimately topple Hasina’s government. These protests rapidly evolved into a broader revolt against entrenched corruption, economic inequality and political impunity.

The government’s response was systematically brutal. According to a United Nations fact-finding report, between July and August security forces killed as many as 1,400 people, including many children, often shooting protesters at point-blank range. They denied the injured medical care and intimidated hospital staff. The scale of violence eventually led the military to refuse further involvement, forcing Hasina to resign and flee Bangladesh.

Reform efforts amid political discord

The interim government identified three core priorities: institutional reforms, trials of perpetrators of political violence and elections. Its initial months brought significant progress. The government released detained protesters and human rights defenders, signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and established a commission of inquiry into enforced disappearances.

This commission documented around 1,700 complaints and found evidence of systematic use of enforced disappearances to target political opponents and activists, with direct complicity by Hasina and senior officials. In October, the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal issued arrest warrants for Hasina and 44 others for massacres during the 2024 protests, although the tribunal has a troubled history and retains the death penalty, contrary to international norms.

The Constitution Reform Commission has proposed expanding fundamental rights, with a bicameral parliament and term limits for top offices. However, the process has been undermined by the exclusion of major political players – most notably the AL – and minority groups.

Political tensions escalated as the interim government faced mounting pressure to set a general election date. Opposition parties accused it of deliberate stalling. The army chief publicly demanded elections by the end of 2025, while student groups sought postponement until reforms and justice were secured. After initial uncertainty, the government announced the election would occur in April 2026.

The most dramatic escalation came in May, when the interim government banned all AL activities under the Anti-Terrorism Act following renewed protests. The Election Commission subsequently suspended the AL’s registration, effectively barring it from future elections and fundamentally altering Bangladesh’s political landscape.

Economic challenges compound these political difficulties. Bangladesh remains fragile after devastating floods in 2024, while the banking sector faces stress from surging non-performing loans. Inflation continues outpacing wage growth and economic austerity measures agreed with the International Monetary Fund have sparked fresh protests.

Authoritarian patterns persist

Despite promises of change, old patterns of repression prove stubborn. Human rights groups document ongoing security forces abuses, including arbitrary arrests of opposition supporters and journalists, denial of due process and continued lack of accountability for past crimes. In the first two months of 2025 alone, over 1,000 police cases were filed against tens of thousands of people, mainly AL members or perceived supporters. A February crackdown on Hasina’s supporters led to over 1,300 arrests.

Press freedom remains severely threatened. In November, the interim government revoked the accreditation of 167 journalists. Around 140 journalists viewed as aligned with the previous regime have faced charges, with 25 accused of crimes against humanity, forcing many into hiding. Attacks on media outlets continue, including vandalism of newspaper offices.

The draft Cyber Protection Ordinance, intended to replace the repressive Cyber Security Act, has drawn criticism for retaining vague provisions criminalising defamation and ‘hurting religious sentiments’ while granting authorities sweeping powers for warrantless searches. Rights groups warn this law could stifle dissent in the run-up to elections.

Uncertain path forward

Bangladesh’s journey demonstrates that democratic transitions are inherently difficult, nonlinear and deeply contested processes. Democracy isn’t a guaranteed outcome, but the chances improve when political leaders are genuinely committed to reform and inclusive dialogue, and political players, civil society and the public practise sustained vigilance.

While the interim government has achieved steps unthinkable under the previous regime, the persistence of arbitrary arrests, attacks on journalists and the exclusion of key political players suggests authoritarianism’s shadow still looms large.

The upcoming general election will provide a crucial test of whether Bangladesh can finally turn the page on authoritarianism. The answer lies in whether Bangladeshis across government, civil society and beyond are able to build something genuinely new. The stakes are high in a country where many have already sacrificed much for the promise of democratic freedom.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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FFD4 Must Deliver for the World’s Most Vulnerable Nations

Aid, Climate Action, Climate Change, Conferences, Development & Aid, Economy & Trade, Education, Environment, Global, Headlines, Health, Poverty & SDGs, Sustainability, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

OHRLLS Office Banner. Credit: OHRLLS

UNITED NATIONS, Jul 1 2025 (IPS) – Five years from the 2030 deadline for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), we face a development emergency. The promise to eradicate poverty, combat climate change, and build a sustainable future for all is slipping away. The SDG financing gap has ballooned to over $4 trillion annually—a crisis compounded by declining aid, rising trade barriers, and a fragile global economy.


At the heart of this crisis is a systemic failure: the world’s most vulnerable nations—Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), and Small Island Developing States (SIDS)—are being left behind. The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) in Seville is a historic chance to correct course.

We must seize it.

LDCs: Progress Stalled, Financing Denied

Three years into the Doha Programme of Action, LDCs are lagging precariously. Growth averages just 4.1%, far below the 7% target. FDI remains stagnant at a meager 2.5% of global flows, while ODA to LDCs fell by 3% in 2024. Worse, 29 LDCs now spend more on debt than health, and eight spend more on debt than education.

USG Rabab Fatima

These numbers demand action: scaled-up concessional finance, deep debt relief, and innovative tools like blended finance to unlock private investment. Without urgent measures, the 2030 Agenda will fail its most marginalized beneficiaries.

LLDCs: Trapped by Geography, Strangled by Finances

Six months after adopting the ambitious Awaza Programme of Action, LLDCs remain hamstrung by structural barriers. Despite hosting 7% of the world’s people, they account for just 1.2% of global trade, with export costs 74% higher than coastal nations. FDI has plummeted from $36 billion in 2011 to $23 billion in 2024, while ODA continues its downward spiral. Official Development Assistance (ODA) has also declined significantly from $38.1 billion in 2020 to $32 billion in 2023, with projections indicating continued downward trends.

The Awaza Programme outlines solutions—trade facilitation, infrastructure, and resilience—but these will remain empty promises without financing. FFD4 must align with its priorities, ensuring LLDCs get the investment they need to transform their economies.

I seize the opportunity to warmly invite all of you to continue these critical discussions at the Third United Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC3), to be held in Awaza, Turkmenistan, from 5 to 8 August 2025 under the theme “Driving Progress through Partnerships”.

SIDS: Debt, Disasters, and a Broken System

For SIDS, the crisis is existential. Over 40% are in or near debt distress; 70% exceed sustainable debt thresholds. Between 2016 and 2020, they paid 18 times more in debt servicing than they received in climate finance. This is unconscionable. Countries on the frontlines of the climate crisis should not be left on the margins of global finance. Nations drowning in rising sea level – which they did not contribute to – should not be drowning in debt.

We can continue patching over cracks in a broken system. Or we can build a more equitable foundation for sustainable development, and for that addressing debt sustainability is not only an economic necessity, but also a development imperative. No country should be forced to choose between servicing debt and protecting its future.

The Way Forward: Solidarity in Action

FFD4 must deliver:

    1. Debt relief and restructuring for LDCs, LLDCs, and SIDS to free up resources for development.
    2. Scaling up concessional finance and honoring ODA commitments.
    3. Mobilizing private capital through de-risking instruments and blended finance.
    4. Climate finance justice, ensuring SIDS and LDCs receive grants and concessional finance, not loans, to build resilience.

The moral case is clear, but so is the strategic one: A world where billions are left in poverty and instability, should be a world of shared risks and responsibilities. FFD4 must be the moment we choose a different path—one of equity, urgency, and action. The time for excuses is over. The agreement on the Compromiso de Sevilla is the start – the real test will be its implementation.

As we move forward on those important responsibilities s and necessary actions, my Office, UN-OHRLLS, is with you every step of the way.

Rabab Fatima, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States

IPS UN Bureau

 

Rising Temperatures, Rising Inequalities: How a New Insurance Protects India’s Poorest Women

Asia-Pacific, Civil Society, Climate Action, Climate Change, Climate Change Finance, Climate Change Justice, Economy & Trade, Editors’ Choice, Environment, Featured, Gender, Headlines, Sustainable Development Goals, TerraViva United Nations, Women & Economy, Women’s Health

Climate Change Justice

For streetside sellers of artificial jewelry and for recyclers toiling under the increasingly torrid temperatures caused by climate change, innovative insurance means not all is lost when their wares are ruined or it is too hot to work. But is this a panacea or an opportunity for the authorities to ignore their responsibilities to the poorest workers of India?

Street vendor Deviben Dhaundhaliya waits by her iron-frame mobile ‘shop’ to be shifted to the marketplace for evening-time sales in Ahmedabad city in Gujarat state. Credit: Manipadma Jena/IPS

Street vendor Deviben Dhaundhaliya waits by her iron-frame mobile ‘shop’ to be shifted to the marketplace for evening-time sales in Ahmedabad city in Gujarat state. Credit: Manipadma Jena/IPS

BHUBANESWAR/AHMEDABAD, India, Jun 26 2025 (IPS) – As Deviben Dhaundhaliya, 45, a streetside seller of artificial jewelry, waits for her husband Devabhai to arrive and help her shift their iron-frame mobile ‘shop’ to the Bhadra Fort open-air marketplace in Ahmedabad city, she tells of how “as heat increased, my wares started melting under the direct exposure to the sun, or they got discolored.”


It was not the first time Deviben’s wares got heat-damaged. It has been happening most years ever since Gujarat’s Ahmedabad city in May 2010 experienced an unprecedented week-long deadly heat wave spiking to 46.8°C. Deviben says she feels an unrelenting anxiety deep within her as summer approaches.

“For over a decade our income plummets, sickness stalks us through the hottest months.”

However, succour has arrived in India in the form of a newer kind of income protection insurance against extreme heat. A parametric microinsurance has informal sector self-employed women like Deviben covered, building their resilience to growing extreme heat in India.

Parametric insurance depends on one or a few predetermined indexes or parameters, and if these are triggered, a pre-agreed payout happens quickly, which is its attraction. The payout is regardless of the quantum of loss. This creates a much lower risk and time-effort for daily-wage-dependent insurance participants. Whereas traditional indemnity-based insurances necessitate a loss-assessing survey, taking months for compensation payout.

Parametric insurance beneficiaries often pay a small premium, which is subsidized in these initial stages, but group insurers like SEWA visualize beneficiaries realizing benefits and eventually paying.

“Livelihoods and incomes decrease by 30-50 percent due to decreased work efficiency, reduced work hours, increased raw material expenses, spoilage of goods, loss of customers, and reduced workdays due to heat-related illnesses,” according to Sahil Hebbar, Senior Coordinator in charge of the parametric micro-insurance pilot at Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA).

WMO chart: The 1991-2024 warming average trend has almost doubled from that of 1961-1990.

WMO chart: The 1991-2024 warming average trend has almost doubled from that of 1961-1990.

The World Meteorological Organization’s (WMO) just-released State of the Climate in Asia 2024 finds that in 2024, Asia’s average temperature was about 1.04°C above the 1991–2020 average, ranking as the warmest or second warmest year on record, depending on the (final) dataset.

WMO warns that the region is warming nearly twice as fast as the global average, driving more extreme weather and posing serious threats to lives, ecosystems, and economies. The 1991-2024 warming average trend has almost doubled from that of 1961-1990.

Extreme heat is one of the deadliest climate risks, responsible for almost half a million deaths per year globally, said Swiss RE one of the world’s leading providers of reinsurance. It partnered with SEWA’s group insurance in 2024.

Beyond the impacts on worker health and well-being, extreme heat can also cause a myriad of economic impacts. Globally, 675 billion hours are lost every year because of excessive heat and humidity, amounting to roughly 1.7% of global GDP, according to Swiss RE.

Women in informal employment face climate heat and exclusion

Waste recycler Hansaben Ahir checks a discarded tarpaulin sheet in Ahmedabad city, Gujarat state. Credit: Manipadma Jena/IPS

Waste recycler Hansaben Ahir checks a discarded tarpaulin sheet in Ahmedabad city, Gujarat state. Credit: Manipadma Jena/IPS

Around 90 percent of women workers participate in the informal employment sector in India. If they are unable to go out to work due to extreme heat conditions, they lose their daily wages. Overall, developing nations are the most exposed to the frequency of climate shocks and chronic onset of mainly extreme heat and floods. Women workers are the most impacted.

A workers’ union, SEWA members total 2.9 million informal sector women workers. Salt-pan workers, recyclers from ship-breaking yards, construction site workers, street vendors, farmers, street waste recyclers, head loaders and home-based workers are included as beneficiaries. These women survive from one day to another on daily wages averaging 150-450 rupees (USD 1.74 –  USD 5.22).

Deviben sells bangles, neck pieces and eardrops of brightly colored fiber material inset in crudely worked metal and gaudy wristwatches with Tissot or CK emblazoned on their dials.

“Because we all streetside sellers sit directly exposed to the sun, dehydration is common. Sometimes my head reels like a carnival merry-go-round; I can barely stand. I go under a tree shade but for only a short while, fearing I’d lose customers,” Deviben said.

When it is really bad, she buys a packet of Oral Dehydration Solution but cannot always afford the 20 rupees (US 0.23 cents) cost.

Hansaben Ahir, 49, a waste collector and recycler, has been a SEWA member for 15 years. She said dehydration, a resultant urinary tract infection, and sudden heat cramps in her legs are so painful, she just has to sit herself down, even if on a road. Last summer she also developed hypertension, mainly stressing over a rising-cost home loan and plummeting income.

“Late-March till the end of June almost every year, my daily earnings fall to 250 rupees (USD 2.90), just half of my normal income, because customer footfall drops drastically,” Deviben, the street vendor, said.

Out-of-pocket medical expenses for the entire family take a chunk from their meager savings. “The insurance payout helps us meet medical expenses,” she said.

Where traditional insurance hesitates, parametric climate insurance can spread its reach

Home-based worker Dipikaben with her teenage friends in Odni Chawl slum, gluing stones and beads on a fabric length in Ahmedabad city in Gujarat. Credit: Manipadma Jena/IPS

Home-based worker Dipikaben with her teenage friends in Odni Chawl slum, gluing stones and beads on a fabric length in Ahmedabad city in Gujarat. Credit: Manipadma Jena/IPS

While SEWA’s 2023 parametric heat insurance pilot was a non-starter, nevertheless, “It was a pilot, and we learned a lot of lessons,” Sahil Hebbar told IPS earlier when the parametric insurance failed to trigger any payout although 2023 was the second warmest on record in the country since 1901 according to the India Meteorological Department.

The single parameter that was considered for the 6-week pilot was satellite-determined maximum daytime temperature. Only when a consecutive 3-day average temperature topped 45-46 degrees Celsius would the women have seen a payout.

Hebbar said there is a difference between satellite-recorded temperature and that on the ground where SEWA women worked. Wet-bulb effect, that dangerous effect of heat combined with humidity that inhibits sweating to cool off the body, should be another parameter. So should high nighttime temperature, which is more harmful for health than daytime heat. Hebbar is also a consulting physician with SEWA.

The challenge, in this case of extreme temperatures, was that the perception of heat and its tolerance can be relative, with significant degrees of variation depending on the location (even within the same Indian province). Somehow local climate variations need to be reflected in the final design of the solution, according to Swiss RE which designed SEWA’s 2024 parametric insurance.

That year, with modifications to design, mainly using locale-by-locale historic temperature data, the parametric insurance was scaled up to 50,000 members across 22 districts in three provinces—Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra—up from the pilot’s 21,000 members across just 5 districts in Gujarat alone.

From getting zero payout in 2023 because of the unrealistically high trigger of 45-46 degrees Celsius, in 2024, the insurance was triggered in 17 out of the 22 districts, and 46,339 SEWA members received payouts ranging from 151-1651 rupees (USD 1.75-USD 19).

In 2023 the climate adaptation equipment that the insurance beneficiaries got for the USD 3 premium they paid were umbrellas and cooler water flasks for urban workers, while rural workers got tarpaulin and solar lanterns. In the summer of 2024, these were replaced by a cash assistance layer that triggered in all 22 districts, and members received cash assistance of 400 rupees (USD 4.64).

The two-layered combination of insurance payouts and a direct cash assistance programme helps reduce marginalized women workers’ burden of income losses from climate events.

Similarly, another Gujarat women-centric non-profit, Mahila Housing Trust (MHT), has also, in 2024 introduced parametric heat insurance as a financial safety net for urban poor communities vulnerable to extreme heat.

However, parametric insurance is now also bailing out extreme monsoon victims, and this time not non-profits but a provincial government itself, the first in India, has disaster-insured the entire State of Nagaland in India’s northeast.

Nagaland’s annual rainfall averages between 70 and 100 inches, concentrated over May to September. However, torrential rainfall squeezed into just a few days can cause havoc, triggering landslides and home and crop damage in the mountainous topography.

The pre-agreed payouts here are based on high, medium, or low flood risk zones. The parametric monsoon coverage by the Nagaland State Disaster Management Authority (NSDMA) is provided under the Disaster Risk Transfer Parametric Insurance Solution (DRTPS). It saw its first successful payout in May this year for damages during the monsoons of 2024.

However, the new insurance may not be the panacea it’s being visualized to be. A section of policy experts and climate activists questions the long-term sustainability of parametric insurance.

Such mechanisms nudge governments to abdicate responsibility, providing social safeguards

“In the face of escalating climate impacts, the notion that insurance can serve as a panacea is not only misguided but dangerous. As climate impacts grow more severe, large areas of our planet are becoming impossible to insure. This means that the safety net of insurance is disappearing, even in the most developed parts of the world. Moreover, the structure of parametric insurance, which disburses funds based on predetermined triggers rather than actual losses, starkly fails those in dire need, often leaving them with a fraction of what is required to rebuild their lives,” climate activist Harjeet Singh told IPS.

“Such mechanisms not only deepen existing inequalities but also perilously nudge governments towards abdicating their duty to provide essential social safeguards. These very protections are vital for communities to rebuild their livelihoods and homes after disasters,” Singh, a lead campaigner for the United Nations’s Loss and Damage movement, added.

“We must pivot towards social protection mechanisms, such as unconditional cash transfers post-disaster, subsidized food grains, guaranteed wage employment for the able-bodied, and financial support for reconstructing homes, livelihoods, and ecosystem restoration. These not only assist in immediate recovery but also strike at the heart of vulnerability, fostering a resilient recovery from the climate-induced devastation,” he said.

“This is not merely a matter of policy preference but a fundamental human right for communities on the front line of the climate crisis. Robust social protection is required for genuine resilience and a fairer, more equitable response to the climate emergency,” he asserted.

Note: This feature is published with the support of Open Society Foundations.

PS UN Bureau Report

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Poland’s Democratic Deadlock

Civil Society, Democracy, Economy & Trade, Europe, Featured, Gender, Headlines, Human Rights, Migration & Refugees, Press Freedom, TerraViva United Nations

Opinion

Credit: Kacper Pempel/Reuters via Gallo Images

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 25 2025 (IPS) – Poland’s embattled Prime Minister Donald Tusk emerged bruised but still standing after his government survived a parliamentary vote of confidence on 11 June. He’d called the vote, which he won by 243 to 210, just days after the presidential candidate of his Civic Platform (PO) party suffered an unexpected defeat.


Karol Nawrocki, an independent nationalist conservative backed by the former ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) defeated liberal pro-European Union (EU) Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski in a nail-biting presidential runoff. The result offers a broader test of Poland’s democratic resilience that could have implications across the EU.

The electoral blow

Nawrocki’s path to victory was anything but predictable. The 42-year-old former president of Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance had never held elected office before emerging as PiS’s chosen candidate. Yet his populist message resonated with frustrated voters.

Economic grievances provided fertile ground for nationalist appeals. Despite Poland’s relatively low unemployment, youth unemployment of over 10 per cent is an understandable source of anxiety for younger voters. Increasingly, they’re reacting by rejecting mainstream political offerings.

This helped cause the fragmented results of the 18 May first round. Trzaskowski won only 31.36 per cent of the vote and Nawrocki took 29.54 per cent. The combined vote share of right-wing candidates – Nawrocki and far-right politicians Grzegorz Braun and Sławomir Mentzen – exceeded polling expectations. Braun and Mentzen took over 21 per cent between them, thanks to the support of many young voters.

The 1 June runoff saw Nawrocki win 50.89 per cent to Trzaskowski’s 49.11 per cent, a margin of under two percentage points. Nawrocki took 64 per cent of the rural vote while Trzaskowski commanded 67 per cent in urban centres – an established geographic divide that reflects an enduring ideological division between a conservative, nationalist Poland and its liberal, cosmopolitan counterpart.

Election interference

Disinformation is helping fuel polarisation. The election campaign unfolded against a backdrop of foreign interference concerns that echoed troubling developments across the region – particularly in Romania, where the Supreme Court cancelled the 2024 presidential election due to evidence of Russian interference.

Just days before the first round, Poland’s Research and Academic Computer Network discovered evidence of potentially foreign-funded Facebook ads targeting all major candidates. According to an investigation by fact-checking organisation Demagog, TikTok was flooded with disinformation, particularly but not exclusively against Trzaskowski. The platform’s algorithm displayed far-right content twice as often as centrist or left-wing content to new users, with pro-Nawrocki videos appearing four times more frequently than pro-Trzaskowski content. Over 1,200 fake accounts systematically attacked Trzaskowski, while another 1,200 promoted Nawrocki.

The influence operation extended beyond individual character assassination to sowing distrust in the democratic process and sharing broader far-right narratives. Fake accounts systematically promoted anti-Ukrainian sentiment and anti-immigration conspiracy theories.

Donald Trump also gave Nawrocki an unprecedented level of support: he received him at the White House just before the election and sent his Homeland Security Secretary to campaign for him in Poland as she attended the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC). This year, CPAC, a US conservative platform, held two international events, in Hungary and Poland. The Polish one, timed to coincide with the runoff, offered a clear indication of how the nationalist far right has become internationalised.

Institutional paralysis

The viability of Tusk’s ideologically diverse coalition and his own political future have been called into question by the result. With critics in the Civic Coalition blaming the election defeat on the government’s communication failures and Tusk’s personal unpopularity, the confidence vote became a key test.

But even though Tusk has survived the confidence vote, it will be a tall order to implement the reforms needed to restore the democratic institutions that came under strain during the PiS administration. In eight years in power, PiS dismantled judicial independence, made public media its propaganda mouthpiece and undermined women’s rights by introducing one of Europe’s harshest anti-abortion laws. The new government’s attempts to reckon with this legacy had already been hampered by outgoing President Andrzej Duda, who used his veto power to block key reforms. Nawrocki will continue that, leaving Tusk unable to realise his promises to Polish voters and the EU.

The European Commission had counted on Tusk completing promised judicial reforms as it unlocked billions in pandemic recovery funds frozen over rule-of-law concerns during PiS rule. With progress now unlikely, the Commission faces the difficult decision of whether to maintain its funding even if the government’s unable to deliver promised changes.

Beyond the EU, Nawrocki’s foreign policy positions threaten to complicate Poland’s previously staunch backing of Ukraine. Although supportive of continued aid, Nawrocki has pledged to block any prospects of Ukraine joining NATO and prioritise Polish interests over refugee support.

High stakes

The razor-thin margin of victory in the presidential election, combined with record turnout of 72.8 per cent, tells a complex story of a divided society. While high participation suggests robust civic engagement, the deep polarisation reflected in the results reveals faultlines that extend far beyond conventional political disagreements.

The outcome offers further evidence that, when economic grievances aren’t addressed, institutional trust is allowed to erode and information environments are left vulnerable to manipulation, opportunistic politicians will exploit social divisions and anti-establishment anger.

For Poland, the coming years will test whether democratic institutions can withstand the pressures of sustained political deadlock. Poland faces potential institutional paralysis that could further erode public trust in democratic governance. Poland’s institutions will need to try to demonstrate their continuing effectiveness, and civil society and independent media will need to maintain their credibility, to help protect and nurture democratic values.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

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